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Preface
This doctoral dissertation arose out of my research conducted at the Center for Company 
Law, Tilburg University, the Netherlands and during my research semester at the Law 
School of the University of Connecticut (USA). I started my research in April 2004 in the 
midst of the enfolding ‘new’ EU securities disclosure system as implemented after the 
Financial Services Action Plan and just a few years after some famous corporate scandals 
such as Enron, Parmalat and Ahold.
As this research developed the US and EU regulatory choices to the ‘Enronitis’ after the 
burst of the dotcom bubble appeared to differ substantially. US congress responded by 
enhancing, primarily by adopting the Sarbanes Oxley Act, their prevailing federal securi-
ties law disclosure and transparency system for issuers under the Securities Act 1933 and 
Securities Exchange Act 1934. In contrast, the EU responses were not developed by amend-
ing the new EU securities regulation, but rather by changing existing EU corporate law 
directives, ‘new’ recommendations and adopting national corporate law and (differing) ‘self 
regulatory’ corporate governance codes (principles and best practises) partly in the realm 
of corporate law, such as on Non-Executive Directors (NED) and corporate actions, partly 
within the scope of securities law (a.o. disclosure items).
These different responses in combination with the observations of Hansmann & Kraakman 
(‘The End of History for Corporate Law’, Yale Law School No. 235, January 2001) in one of the 
first articles I read on global convergence of public corporations towards a shareholder pri-
macy model directed me to focus this thesis on a comparative legal research on the regula-
tion of issuers. The broadness and complexity of the subject evidently induced a limitation 
of its scope. Although its subject is really ‘global’, I refrained from a global analysis and lim-
ited myself to a ‘trans-Atlantic’ comparative summary inventory of prevailing securities and 
relevant corporate law and aimed to elucidate the basic architecture as well as its major 
changes (and direction) of and regulatory responses to the Enronitis and financial crisis. 
Evidently a multitude of subjects will require further study. Most important is an extension 
of this research to the BRIC- and other emerging markets.
The research itself appeared to be a daunting task as a consequence of a torrent of new 
rules of issuer’s regulation and investor protection also in reaction to the two recent major 
fire alarms: the ‘Enronitis’(2003) and the financial crisis (2007). Therefore I am most grate-
ful to my supervisor Professor Theo Raaijmakers. His support was indispensable in accom-
plishing this dissertation. Our joint research not only proved to be a lot of real academic fun, 
but also very inspiring. Chapter 2 and 4 build on this joint research as reflected in: M.J.G.C. 
Raaijmakers and P.A.van der Schee, ‘Disclosure and Accounting for Issuers in between 
“Federal” EU Securities Law (and Mandatory Application of IFRS) and National Corporate 
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6 Preface
Law Accounting Concepts’1 and M.J.G.C. Raaijmakers and P.A. van der Schee, Bescherming 
van beleggers in beurs-NV’s: het enquêterecht als actie- en de business judgement rule 
als afweermiddel2, in: H.J. Bruisten, M.J.G.C. Raaijmakers, A.F. Verdam, NGB-bundel 2010. 
I am most grateful to Ger van der Sangen, Associate Professor at Tilburg law School, for our 
many discussions and his continuous support, input and scrutinizing my manuscript in one 
of the last stages. Also the comments of Erik Koster proved to be very valuable.
I am extremely grateful to Deterink Advocaten en Notarissen and especially to Hugo Nieu-
wenhuizen for his support and providing me the opportunity to finish this dissertation. I also 
wish to thank the Business law Department of Tilburg University and the Tilburg Graduate 
Law School for providing the opportunity to write this doctoral thesis. The Center for Com-
pany Law did provide a most inspiring environment to conduct my research. I wish to thank 
the University of Connecticut School of Law for providing office space and for offering full 
access to the Universities’ facilities during my research semester in the autumn of 2006.
I wish to thank prof. Philip Blumberg and prof. Patricia McCoy for their inspiring lectures, 
their interest in my research subject and who always took the time for discussion.
I am most grateful to a large group of people who gave advice and all kinds of support. I par-
ticularly want to thank Anja Huijben, Danique van Abeelen, Baukje Nuijten, Adbiba Bouichi, 
Marlise Zeldenrust, Henk te Niet, who passed away far to young, Marijn van Dalen, Frans 
Overkleeft, Janneke Leenders and all others I certainly forget to mention.
I also want to thank my closest friends Rob Slurink, Guus van Galen, Paul Roks, Erik Koster 
and Thijs Möller for their support over the last years. And of course Ellen Wijnings. Without 
her support I could not have finished this book. And last but not least I want to thank my 
parents for their continuous support.
1 In: P.H.J. Essers, T. Raaijmakers, R. Russo, P. van der Schee, L. van der Tas, & P. van der Zanden 
(eds.), The Influence of IAS/IFRS on the CCCTB, Tax Accounting, Disclosure and Corporate Law Accounting 
Concepts, Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International 2008, p. 87-143
2 In: H.J. Bruisten, M.J.G.C. Raaijmakers, A.F. Verdam, NGB-bundel 2010.
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 Chapter 116
1 Prologue/preface
When I started my research for this thesis one of the first things I read was the famous arti-
cle by Hansmann and Kraakman, ‘The End of History for Corporate Law’ (2003). Their most 
exciting analysis of and view on the development of the public corporation as issuer unveiled 
emerging global characteristics and common regulatory designs of all major financial mar-
kets in which a common corporate ideology of shareholder primacy would also emerge, 
resulting in the ‘end of history’ of corporate law. Such a common corporate ideology of 
shareholder primacy would likely press all major jurisdictions towards similar rules of cor-
porate and securities law and practice. Their perspective seems to be based on several 
assumptions. First, a factual globalization of financial investments by market participants 
and disappearing borders of the various markets in which they make their investments; 
secondly, a global convergence of standards for market regulation and investor protection; 
thirdly, a shared and equally global common ideology on the power of investors (‘owners’) in 
public corporations vis-à-vis the board (as their ‘agents’).3 The first two were, as far as the 
European Union (EU) is concerned, supported by the then emerging EU securities regula-
tion, the third was less obvious. They observed a shift from employee and state towards 
shareholders, but paid less attention to the traditional role of corporate law in the EU as a 
means of investor protection in ‘public’ companies. Their perspective therefore seems, at 
least implicitly, to reflect the clear distinction that can be perceived in US law between fed-
eral securities law (focussed on market regulation, protection of investors and public over-
sight) and state corporate law (instrumental to the needs of organizing an entrepreneur’s 
business and firmly based on board supremacy and discretion as managers of the firm and 
its business). This assumption seems to be misunderstood in the EU, where shareholder 
primacy focuses, in the view of Hansmann and Kraakman, especially to the ends by which 
the firm should be run, not necessarily to shareholders being in charge of the corporation 
as ‘owners’/‘agents’. This, as will be demonstrated, often seems to be misperceived.
It raised my desire to learn how that United States (US) evolutionary perspective would fit 
into the European developments following the US perspective upon inception of the EU’s 
Financial Services Action Plan (1999) (FSAP) to integrate the EU financial markets by a com-
mon (‘federal’) market regulation, investor protection and the overall introduction of public 
oversight in the Member States (MS). The FSAP indeed created a common or even ‘federal’ 
European framework that, like US securities law, is directed at regulating financial markets 
and the protection of investors in those markets. This supported the observation of conver-
gence between the US and EU systems; also the wave of emerging corporate governance 
codes seemed to underscore that analysis, since these were fuelled by corporate scandals 
of listed companies and growing power of investors and, hence, similarly resulted in princi-
ples and ‘best practices’ to discipline management and protect investors.
3 Hansmann and Kraakman, ‘The End of History for Corporate Law’, Yale Law School No. 235, January 
2001, a principal reason, as they state, for convergence is a widespread normative consensus that 
corporate managers should act exclusively in the economic interests of shareholders, including non-
controlling shareholders, Harvard Law School, John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Busi-
ness, Discussion Paper No. 280. 
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However the vague notion of ‘corporate governance’ and the somewhat ambiguous nature 
of ‘non-binding’ and ‘self-regulatory’ codes, seemed to conceal the lack of a clear US-style 
distinction between the regulatory ends and means of securities regulation and corporate 
law respectively. It seemed to bypass the border zones with the traditional regulatory role 
of corporate law in (MS of) the EU to protect investors (shareholders) by means of corporate 
law (often based on ‘institutional’ ideologies and the so-called ‘stakeholder’ model4). Con-
vergence of securities regulation seemed to go along, at least in the Netherlands, with a 
certain degree of divergence of the corporate law regime for issuers. After my research in 
the US, I was puzzled to find the principle of board supremacy and discretion of US (Dela-
ware) issuers still being firmly vested in corporate law and effectively untouched by US 
securities law, while these same principles for EU issuers came under attack and in some 
MS were even eroded. How can this phenomenon in the evolutionary process be explained? 
That question became one of the main drivers for this study.
Almost a decade passed since the publication of the article by Hansmann and Kraakman 
and history developed partly in the direction they had sketched, but in another way it did not. 
Global economic developments are changing, as are geopolitics. ‘Enronitis’ and the recent 
‘financial crisis’ changed the scene as well. It raised many questions, but also raised dif-
ferent rather than ‘common’ regulatory responses in the US and EU and therefore also my 
interest in the subject of my thesis: coherence and non-coherence in between securities 
and corporate law protecting investors/shareholders in a listed public corporation. Limiting 
myself to a transatlantic comparison, I would like to illustrate this briefly.
In the prevailing dichotomy between US securities and corporate law, the US Congress 
responded to ‘Enronitis’ after the burst of the dotcom bubble, primarily by enhancing their 
prevailing federal securities law disclosure and transparency system for issuers in the pri-
mary and secondary market under their Securities Act 1933 (SA’33) and Securities Exchange 
Act 1934 (SEA’34). The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (‘SOx’), subsequent US Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) regulation and New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and National Associa-
tion of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (NASDAQ) listing rules, enhanced within 
that system the requirements for the quality of market disclosure and the sanctions for non-
observance. SOx had only a limited effect on issuers’ ‘internal affairs’: they became obliged 
to have an audit committee of the board with the power to appoint and compensate as well 
with the assignment of oversight on the issuer’s external auditor and their Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO) and Chief Financial Officer (CFO) are required to have statutory certification. 
Some commentators, for example Roberta Romano,5 observed this to be federal intrusion 
into state corporate law and contrary to the US Constitution’s ‘commerce clause’ that war-
rants corporate law to remain in the state’s realm. Nevertheless, SOx did not change issu-
ers’ basic governance and ‘internal affairs’. Delaware, the home state of most issuers, kept 
to its permissive corporate law principles (default rules), including board supremacy and 
discretion. Thus investor protection is still mainly provided by federal securities disclo-
4 Wolfgang Schön, ‘Corporate disclosure in a Competitive Environment, – The ECJ’s Axel Springer Case 
and the quest for a European Framework for Mandatory Disclosure’, Working Paper No 55 ECGI, 2006.
5 Roberta Romano, ‘The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the making of Quack Corporate Governance’, NYU, Law 
and Econ Research Paper 04-032, 25 September 2004.
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sure to market and investors under federal public oversight by the federal SEC and private 
enforcement (based primarily on the federal securities fraud action). John Coffee Jr. and 
Dirk Zetzsche, for example, describe this as an outsider system of governance, the share-
holders as investor and monitors.6
The EU regime for issuers misses the sharp dichotomy between the recent EU federal 
securities law and Member States’ corporate law (embedded in their traditional civil and 
commercial law but influenced by a series of EU directives). The execution of the FSAP 
did effectively create a ‘federal’ EU securities law by adopting a series of directives and 
regulations on prospectuses (IPO), admission to listing/trading, continuous disclosure and 
transparency, market abuse, International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and mar-
ket rules on takeovers.7 Its design converges in substance with US securities law, albeit 
that it has been ‘translated’ and implemented into national law, that public oversight is not 
exercised by one federal EU agency but by national public agencies (with a certain degree 
of coordination by Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR, now ESMA) and 
that private enforcement also is left to the MS. Nevertheless, this integrated ‘federal’ EU 
securities law creates a separate ‘European’ regulatory layer for EU issuers comparable to 
the federal securities law in the US. A remarkable and complicating difference with the US 
remains, however, the overlap with the corporate law of Member States. Corporate law for 
‘public corporations’ (a corporate form, like the UK Public Limited Company (PLC), the Ger-
man “Aktiengesellschaft” (AG), the French “Société Anonyme” (SA) and Dutch “Naamloze 
Vennootschap” (NV), that allows for tradable shares) traditionally aims at protecting inves-
tors (as shareholders), but that is not its exclusive aim. Corporate law in several Member 
States is also designed to protect the interests of other ‘stakeholders’, such as creditors 
and other interested parties, inter alia by means of capital protection, limitations to pay out 
dividends and – in contrast to the US – by own rules on accounting and disclosure. These 
systems differ and there is no federal EU corporate law. However a certain degree of har-
monization, aiming for protection of ‘members’ and third parties (arts. 44 and 48 Roman 
Treaty) under principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, has been achieved by EU direc-
tives, e.g. on accounting and disclosure by the 4th and 7th Directives (not exclusively for issu-
ers, but applicable for all ‘public’ and ‘private’ corporations).
This overlap between EU securities and national corporate law has various consequences. 
First, it seems to constrain the evolution of a full-fledged EU securities law, including public 
oversight and common enforcement mechanism and secondly the consequent further inte-
gration of the EU financial markets. Thirdly, it consequently constrains the development of 
global and/or transatlantic convergence of market rules and investor protection (e.g. United 
States Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (US GAAP) and IFRS). Fourthly, it may fuel 
regulatory competition and arbitrage, which of course is not necessarily unfavourable. 
Fifthly, it tends to further obscure regulatory and judicial responses to new developments 
6 Dirk A. Zetzsche, ‘Explicit and Implicit system of Corporate Control, a Convergence Theory of Share-
holders Rights’, CBC-RPS No. 0001, 23 September 2004; John C. Coffee Jr., ‘The Future as History: 
The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and its Implications’, Columbia Law 
School Center for Law and Economic Studies Working Paper, 144, 199.
7 The Takeover Directive (2004/25/EC of 21.04.2004) however entails a minimum harmonization with the 
possibility for the MS to opt out (arts. 9 and 11).
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(e.g. Enronitis and shareholders’ activism) between securities and corporate law solutions 
both at the EU and at the national level. This is clearly illustrated by the emergence of a 
variety of corporate governance codes as a response to both ‘Enronitis’ and the increas-
ing activism and power of investors. By that time the EU and its MS were in the process of 
finalizing and/or implementing the new EU securities regulation. In contrast to the US SOx, 
the responses were not developed by amending the new EU securities law, but rather by 
changes to existing EU corporate law directives and ‘new’ recommendations, national cor-
porate law and (differing) ‘self-regulatory’ corporate governance codes (principles and best 
practices), partly in the realm of corporate law, such as on Non-Executive Directors (NED) 
and corporate actions, partly within the scope of securities law (e.g. disclosure items). 
These codes differ in nature. In the UK, the code is part of the London Stock Exchange 
(LSE) listing rules, in other countries it is ‘annexed’ as a reporting requirement (comply or 
explain) to, and thereby an intrusion of, corporate law. They cover a wide variety of manda-
tory disclosure items (4th, 7th and art. 10 (substantive disclosure requirements) 13th Dir.) in 
the management report on, inter alia, board committees, conflicts of interest, drafting and 
preparing the accounts, audit committees, audit report, internal controls, in control state-
ments, risk factors, strategy discussion and corporate governance of the issuer. These dif-
ferent approaches illustrate the regulatory options and choices that can be and are made. 
They seem to be caused by different starting conditions of markets and, regulatory tradi-
tions and of themselves to cause persistence of overlap and frictions within the existing 
system of ‘EU’ and national corporate law and their different dynamics. That evidently may 
affect not only the ultimate goal of EU market integration, but also, looking from the per-
spective of individual issuers, their selected governance, following from their incorporation 
in one of the member states and listing on one of the exchanges (UK partly, linked to listing 
on LSE), and its exposure to shareholder activism in EU member states and the US.
In hindsight, the first half of the last decade seems to have provided an opportunity for a 
more distinctive securities law in the EU. Enronitis accelerated the execution of the FSAP 
and the creation of a new EU cohesive securities regulation. The EU had the option to 
respond by proper amendments to extend this new body of law for EU issuers, e.g. to further 
requirements on the quality of the reporting process on disclosure documents by issuers 
(e.g. audit committees, certifications and sanctions), as US Congress did in SOx. The Euro-
pean Commission, however, was still strongly focussing on its aim to create a level playing 
field within the EU market for corporate control in its draft takeover directive. Also this 
draft reflects the overlap of corporate and securities law: like the US Williams Act (1968) it 
provides for market-oriented disclosure and ‘traffic’ rules for public offers but unlike (spe-
cifically) Delaware (allowing the target board in principle ‘just to say no’ in case of a hostile 
takeover attempt) the draft directive aimed to severely limit the use of protective devices 
(break through and board neutrality rules). The High Level Group of Company Law Experts 
2002-report was published in the middle of a number of regulatory activities: federalization 
of securities law and the search for proper answers to further liberalize the EU market for 
corporate control as well as to discipline management by other means, including corporate 
law and ‘mixed’ codes. The report also reflected the diffusion and does not focus prima-
rily on amending the new EU securities regulation (pending and being drafted). Although it 
strongly advocated disclosure as a regulatory tool, its main focus was to eliminate barriers 
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to takeovers to achieve an EU level playing field in the market for corporate control and a 
series of recommendations on corporate law issues that were not related to issuers and 
the financial markets. It did not, however, recommend a European corporate governance 
code. In its response to the Report, the May 2003 Action Plan to modernize and improve EU 
corporate law and governance, the European Commission similarly did not focus on amend-
ing and/or extending its pending and proposed securities regulation for issuers, but rather 
continued to follow its traditional corporate law-oriented route. It explicitly preserved the 
acquis communautaire,8 did not fully endorse the High Level Group’s (HLG) claim of superior-
ity of disclosure over substantive regulation, refrained from an EU Corporate Governance 
Code, published recommendations on non executive directors and executive remuneration, 
amended the 4th and 7th Directives to require issuers to make a ‘comply or explain’ disclosure 
on applicable corporate governance codes, strengthened by amendment of the 8th Directive 
the external auditor’s position not only for issuers but for all corporations ‘of public interest’ 
and initiated a directive to enhance shareholders’ rights. These amendments seem to be 
partly inspired by the LLSV study by Shleifer and Vishny.9
These EU regulatory responses seem to illustrate that the EU did not strengthen its new 
securities regulation under way, but rather returned – at least in part – to its earlier prac-
tice of protecting investors by corporate rather than securities law, although the draft 5th 
Directive,10 attempting to harmonize the complete internal affairs of all ‘public corporations’ 
(note: not issuers), by mandatory division of powers between management, supervisors 
(non executive directors) and the GMS, was withdrawn in 200411, because of disagreement 
on labour participation, and the final Statute on European Company (SE) refers the internal 
8 As the EU states: “the Community acquis is the body of common rights and obligations which bind all 
the Member States together within the European Union. It is constantly evolving and comprises: a) the 
content, principles and political objectives of the Treaties; b) the legislation adopted in application of 
the treaties and the case law of the Court of Justice; c) the declarations and resolutions adopted by the 
Union; d) measures relating to the common foreign and security policy; e) measures relating to justice 
and home affairs; f) international agreements concluded by the Community and those concluded by 
the Member States between themselves in the field of the Union’s activities.” Thus the Community 
acquis comprises not only Community law in the strict sense, but also all acts adopted under the 
second and third pillars of the European Union and the common objectives laid down in the Treaties. 
The Union has committed itself to maintaining the Community acquis in its entirety and developing 
it further. Applicant countries have to accept the Community acquis before they can join the Union. 
Derogations from the acquis are granted only in exceptional circumstances and are limited in scope. 
To integrate into the European Union, applicant countries will have to transpose the acquis into their 
national legislation and implement it from the moment of their accession. See for more information 
<http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/community_acquis_en.htm>.
9 R. La Porta, F. Lopez de Silanes, A. Shleifer and R.W. Vishny, Law and Finance, NBER Working Paper, 
w566, 1999. 
10 COM (72) 887 final, 18 July 1972, JO C 131/49; EC Bull Supp 10/72. First draft 1972. Last official draft: 
COM (91) 372 final, 20 November 1991; (1991) OJ C321/9. In 1996, the Commission asked Ernst & Young 
to consider the relevance of the Draft Fifth Directive in the study it had commissioned on corporate 
governance. The Commission decided to draw back the proposal on 9 January 2004, OJ C 5/20 (2004), 
Vanessa Edwards, EC Company Law, New York: Oxford University Press 1999, p. 389. Two highly con-
troversial proposals were the mandatory creation of a two-tier board structure (Art. 2 Fifth Directive) 
consisting of a managing organ and a supervisory organ and mandatory provisions for employees’ 
representation on the supervisory board for companies with a workforce greater than 500, art. 4(2)
(3). See Vanessa Edwards, EC Company Law, New York: Oxford University Press 1999, p. 388.
11 Cf. the famous debate on the ‘race to the bottom’ initiated by Professor Winter in 1964. 
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affairs to the jurisdiction in which an SE is created. The recent directive (2006) on strength-
ening corporate law rights of shareholders as ‘members’ is not inspired by US law, not 
market-oriented and not focussed on improving investor protection, but rather on strength-
ening the position of shareholders in the corporation by amending corporate rather than EU 
securities regulation. It again seems to reflect the ‘institutional’ stakeholder concept of EU 
corporate law directives and that of various MS to divide powers in the internal affairs of the 
‘public’-type corporation, irrespective of its submission to the financial market and securi-
ties regulation as an issuer. This confusion, caused by a lack of clear regulatory notions 
and descriptions, also confuses responses to new developments. Different economic mar-
ket structures, market liquidity,12 shareholder base,13 regulation, traditions and interest 
groups,14 may help to explain the different starting conditions in the US, EU and its Member 
States. (This is not the aim of this study.)
But it cannot explain why EU securities regulation still seems to lack the nature of a mar-
ket-oriented standalone character under public oversight and with its own enforcement 
mechanisms without direct interference with and relation to an issuer’s ‘internal affairs’ 
according to the selected corporate law of Member States; this US dichotomy is lacking. 
My hypothesis is that such dichotomy is needed to enable proper analysis and guidance 
both at EU and Member State level implementing, absorbing and enforcing (new) rules for 
investor protection and by that to contribute to a consistent regulatory system needed in 
its further development: globalization of markets and reaction to new circumstances and 
developments: e.g., entrance of ‘new’ players like State Wealth Funds and hedge funds, new 
financial instruments and techniques like stock lending and empty voting, mergers of stock 
exchanges, creation of new market platforms (Multilateral Trading Facilities’ MTF), other 
techniques to acquire control of issuers next to a takeover or proxy fights, development in 
12 The US securities markets were already very liquid (cf. John Armour and David A. Skeel, ‘Who Writes 
the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and Why? The Peculiar Divergences of US and UK Takeover Regula-
tion’, ECGI Law Working Paper No. 73, 2006) the beginning of the 20th century and investments by the 
public far more dispersed as illustrated in the famous Berle & Means analysis (1932): corporations 
characterized by a separation of ownership from control. The securities markets were already se-
verely regulated by the New Deal federal securities acts of ’33 and ’34, leading to extensive disclosure 
obligations for listed and traded corporations and underpinned by strong public oversight, regulatory 
and enforcement powers of the SEC and private enforcement based primarily on the § 10b and Rule 
10-b SEA ’34 federal securities fraud action. Notably no cooperation between shareholders was al-
lowed, this contributed to the dispersion of shareholders. Also technology, economics and politics 
played their role. The UK with its market system, dispersed shareholders and traditionally strong 
protection of investors also in takeover situation, takes a different position.
13 See among others John C. Coffee, ‘The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in 
Corporate Governance and its Implications’, Columbia Law School Center for Law and Economic Studies 
Working Paper No. 144, February 1999, also Mark J. Roe, Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political 
Roots of American Corporate Finance, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press 1994, But also 
Shleifer, Vihsny, LLSV.
14 There exists a vast amount of literature in the question of why investor protection differs between the 
US and Europe, see also D. Donald, ‘Approaching Comparative Company Law’, Institute for Law and 
Finance (ILF) Working paper series no. 77, 12 February 2008, for critique on the so-called Origin Theo-
rist, Lopez, Shleifer etc. and their theory that the pre-supposed weak form of investor protection in 
continental Europe correlates to civil law origin of most of the European countries compared to strong 
investor protection in the UK and US correlating to their common law origin.
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law suits that support shareholder and again, last but not least, the internal organization 
and governance model of issuers.
This brings me back to Hansmann and Kraakman’s ‘The End of Corporate History’ and the 
market-oriented model of issuers, heavily inspired through law and economics principle-
agency theory, that they described from a US perspective, but with the claim of having glo-
bal value in a globalizing world. The idea fascinated me right from the start of my research. 
I started by making a comparative analysis of the basic elements and characteristics of the 
US and EU standalone body of securities law, its federal character and the system of public 
and private enforcement. Full disclosure to inform the market and investors in the issuer’s 
securities is a key element in both systems and their substantive rules are quite similar. 
The federal US system for the US market as a whole, however, really stands alone since 
it remains addressed to the issuer as such, does not interfere with the freedom to elect 
and design his corporate form and governance, and is ‘complete’ in substance as well as in 
enforcement: it includes traffic rules for takeover bids and federal rules for proxy solicita-
tion, but also provides for its own federal public oversight (SEC), rule-making and enforce-
ment as well as for federal actions for private enforcement. This clear dichotomy between 
federal securities and state corporate law from a regulatory perspective allows for continu-
ous focus on market-related issues in its development. At the same time it allows issuers 
that want to raise finance in the market and thereby accept exposing themselves to the 
federal securities law to select the jurisdiction of incorporation and design their internal 
affairs and governance to organize their business without any interference from ‘federal’ 
corporate law, notwithstanding the influence of the Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA) 
on state corporate law and the dominance of Delaware law in the regulatory competition 
within the US.
This very brief summary may be too simple, but still allows it to be contrasted with the EU 
(also as an analytical tool). The dominance of the new ‘federal’ EU securities law is less 
strong and the dichotomy of corporate law both at EU and even more on state level is less 
sharp, even confused. At EU level it constrains public enforcement since there is no fed-
eral public agency and private enforcement since EU law does not provide for such federal 
action. Implementation by member states requires this dichotomy too and similarly may be 
confused by the lack of a sharp distinctive dichotomy not only in so far as the EU law itself 
conceals the overlap between its securities law and acquis communautaire in corporate law, 
but also of the traditional overlap in the various member countries with corporate, com-
mercial and civil law ‘solutions’ for problems that securities law may or should address 
from its aims to regulate financial markets and to protect investors. Investors often remain 
seen as ‘shareholders’ or ‘members’ in the first place and hence their protection is, at least, 
sought in corporate law. In the turmoil of subsequent crises in the last decade has a seri-
ous regulatory competition and/or arbitrage by issuers has so far not seemed to emerge. 
Economic and financial considerations (such as market liquidity and professionality) will 
remain the primary drivers for selection of the ‘regulated market’ within the EU in which 
the issuer wants to raise finance by issuing securities. But the impact for the issuer of thus 
being exposed to the securities law regime on the governance and internal affairs of their 
selected jurisdiction and the basic position of the board and its supremacy and discretion 
vis-à-vis its investors, may differ substantially in comparison to the US but also within the 
EU. A few examples may illustrate this case.
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Closer analysis of disclosure rules as a cornerstone of securities law shows that the stan-
dalone mandatory disclosure of the annual accounts, including the management report, 
under the Transparency Directive, in various Member States remains closely connected 
with corporate law ‘accounting’ (and indirectly with possible liability) by the board to the 
General Meeting of Shareholders (GMS) as a body corporate within the issuer’s internal 
organization. In the Netherlands the GMS shall even adopt the accounts which overlap with 
the Netherlands Authority Financial Markets (AFM)’s public oversight and power to require 
restatements. The management report, which for issuers is part of their disclosure docu-
ment, shall contain statements on compliance with corporate governance codes, but these 
also aim to enhance the position of shareholders in meeting. What are the basic regulatory 
aims, borderlines and conceptual overlaps of and between corporate and securities law? 
What are the differences with Delaware, the UK and Germany? Do codes result in quasi 
by-laws or enforceable securities regulation?15 Does mandatory disclosure on compliance 
with ‘principles & best practices’ of corporate governance codes thus intrude the issuers’ 
internal affairs? Are ‘shareholder orientation’ and ‘shareholder democracy’ proper means 
to drive the regulatory agenda? And does the rather vague concept of shareholders as 
‘owners’ of the corporation and ‘principals’ (agency theory), also in view of the differences 
between jurisdictions16 (including block and dispersed sharebase!), provide clear guidance 
for regulatory reform? Does the mere concept of ‘corporate governance’ provide a clear 
notion in a global or even transatlantic perspective? How to prevent ‘misguided’ accumula-
tion of traditional corporate law responses caused by not properly taking into account the 
basic market-oriented approach that results from the new EU ‘federal’ securities regula-
tion be prevented. What are the consequences for private enforcement and exposure to the 
recent wave of shareholder’s activism? Will the target board’s supremacy and discretion be 
upheld in an attempt to acquire full or effective control on the borderlines between corpo-
rate and securities law?
All these questions are closely interrelated and therefore easy answers are not available. 
They seem, however, to be indispensable in order to understand the system and its dynam-
ics and as an analytical framework to enable assessment of existing and future regulation. 
How and to what extent does this study address these questions?
2 The structure and aims of this study
The main purpose of this study is to contribute to the analytical framework for regulators 
and issuers to understand the scope, consistency and standalone character of the new EU 
securities regulation in comparison to the US system as well as the impact of ‘going/being 
15 See chapter 4 where it will be demonstrated that the Netherlands Enterprise Chamber under the 
investigation procedure (arts. 2:344-359 NCC) has extensively explained these corporate governance 
rules and under the umbrella of art. 2:8 NCC (reasonableness and fairness) these rules became a sort 
of customary law.
16 See for example: John C. Coffee Jr., ‘The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in 
Corporate Governance and its Implications’, Columbia Law School Center for Law and Economic Studies 
Working Paper No. 144, February 1999.
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public’ on the internal affairs and governance of issuers under their selected jurisdiction 
(securities regulation, listing rules, corporate law, corporate governance codes, their char-
ter and bylaws). Issuers are defined as public corporations whose shares are traded on 
regulated markets, as defined by European law, see art. 4 (1) No. 14 of Directive 2004/39/
EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on markets in financial 
instruments (MIFID). Going public will expose the issuer to a new and extra layer of securi-
ties disclosure and listing rules besides ‘internal affairs’ rules of corporate law and, as a 
consequence of going public, also corporate governance. This study aims to contribute to a 
comparative understanding of the subsequent interaction of securities and corporate law.
Testing the following hypothesis will contribute to this aim. My hypothesis is that a (US) 
dichotomy between aims, nature and scope of securities and corporate law is needed to 
enable proper analysis and guidance both at EU and Member State level implementing, 
absorbing and enforcing (new) rules for investor protection and by that to contribute to a 
consistent regulatory system needed in its further development and reaction to new cir-
cumstances: globalization of markets, entrance of new players like State Wealth Funds and 
hedge funds, new financial instruments and techniques like stock lending and empty voting, 
mergers of stock exchanges, creation of new market platforms (MTF), other techniques 
to acquire control of issuers alongside a takeover or proxy fight, development in suits that 
support shareholder and again, last but not least, the organization and governance model 
of issuers.
The implementation of the new EU securities rules is almost completed and the EU sources 
of law and their regulatory aims and principles therefore will tend to disappear behind the 
law of Member States. These aims and principles should be withheld to guide future EU 
and national developments in the financial markets, corporate practice, public oversight 
and enforcement and to continuously alert regulators to possible risks of diffusion with 
(national) corporate law and corporate governance codes to guide further evolution of ‘fed-
eral’ EU securities law to underscore the integration of a common EU financial market.17 
This requires identification and analysis of overlapping rules and guidance for coherent, 
unambiguous securities and corporate rules regulating the listed public corporation. It also 
requires, on the other hand, similar analysis of company law insofar as issuers are involved. 
So far clear regulatory distinctions do not seem to have guided securities and corporate law 
(internal affairs) objectives. These, as illustrated, ‘mixed’ regulatory responses to corpo-
rate scandals and simultaneous introduction of the EU securities regulation, as well as gov-
ernance codes, may result in different degrees of exposure to shareholders’ activism, also 
in judicial review of board conduct effecting its power to determine strategy and policies 
and especially in case of a takeover or pressure to change strategy. The board’s position in 
several EU jurisdictions seems to be less clear in the perspective of our ability to assess the 
regulatory aims: enhancing market integrity and proper monitoring mechanisms, against 
the impact on the effective direction and management of issuers, which boils down to the 
principle of board supremacy. This affects the choices to be made by public companies on 
‘external’ statutory rules or codes of best practice that should or could find their way into 
17 As will be demonstrated in chapter 2 the implementation of the EU securities disclosure system re-
sults in a similar US securities disclosure system aiming for investor protection by disclosure.
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the company’s articles of associations (or bylaws) and the impact thereof on their enforce-
ment.
Public corporations remain major engines of our economy and the community at large. A 
coherent system of corporate and securities law will contribute to market confidence that 
is indispensable in order to finance their activities through the issue of securities.18 The 
EU and Member States are increasingly intertwined with international and global financial 
markets. A highly professional and trustworthy integrated EU capital market is key to its 
future. The fact that many European companies are listed in the EU as well as in the US 
underpins the relevance of this study.19 These firms have to comply with overlapping and 
often contradictory rules and regulations. A proper understanding of commonalities and 
differences thereof is highly relevant. The same is true for their advisors and the securities 
industry in general (merchant bankers, lawyers, accountants etc.). The operation of these 
public companies also depends on the transparency of that legal framework in which they 
operate and have to comply with. Continuous discussions between the US and the EU on 
exemptions and/or extensions to avoid inefficient overlaps of otherwise cumulatively appli-
cable rules remain important. Comparison of the basic structure of US and EU securities 
and corporate law, especially with regard to its regulatory aims, means and enforcement, 
is needed.
2.1	 Disclosure	and	accounting
Disclosure of information by issuers to the market is the hardcore of US securities law. It is 
the basic regulatory response to the moral hazards of promoters and issuers as perceived 
in the public corporation.20 The new EU securities law essentially adopts that same starting 
point, but, as stated above, still seems to interfere with corporate law concepts of account-
ing by the board to its GMS. My hypothesis for chapter 2 is that, exploring and comparing in 
more detail the first layer of investor protection as provided for by US and EU securities law, 
US securities law essentially provides a standalone character of initial and continuous dis-
closure and in comparison the EU (with mutual difference between the examined Member 
States) a somewhat mixed character of EU regulation that remains linked to some extent 
to corporate law and that in the EU and examined Member States, especially in the Nether-
lands, this overlap and frictions of the securities disclosure systems as implemented in the 
Member States with the existing national system of corporate law is the result. This chapter 
therefore explores from the perspective of the US and EU financial market regulation and 
securities law, the requirements for issuers and the question of whether and to what extent 
(the regulatory aims of) such regulation affect the internal affairs and governance of issuers 
upon going and being public. Chapter 2 will explore that central disclosure philosophy in the 
new EU securities regulation in comparison to the US. It aims at a comparative analysis of 
18 Bernard S. Black, ‘The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets’, UCLA Law 
Review, Vol. 48, pp. 781-856, 2001.
19 Approximately 40 Netherlands companies are listed at one of the American exchanges. 
20 John C. Coffee Jr., The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Gover-
nance and its implications, Columbia Law School Center for Law and Economics Studies working Pa-
per, no. 144, 1999: stating that state law compared to securities law is indifferent as to the regulation 
of the public corporation. Cf also Paul Mahoney.
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the major elements of the US and EU disclosure and accounting systems with the resulting 
regulation of some Member States (UK, Germany, the Netherlands). Post-FSA EU securities 
regulation and starting conditions are seemingly of major influence on the results of this 
comparison. Similarly regulatory overlap and frictions in the borderline between securities 
and corporate law in the several systems will be explored.
Par. 2.1 will first summarize the new EU securities regulation as it emerged from the Finan-
cial Services Action Plan (1999) and, accelerated by the post-Enron momentum, was quickly 
adopted as a coherent securities law covering initial and continuous disclosure of issuers 
under public oversight: Prospectus Directive and regulations (2003), Directive on Admis-
sion to Official Stock Exchange Listing (2003), Transparency Directive (2004), Market Abuse 
Directive(s) (2003) and the IAS Regulations (2002) introducing IFRS as accounting stand-
ards for issuer’s consolidated accounts, also by amendments for issuers of the 4th and 7th 
Directives (2006) and the revised 8th Directive on statutory auditors (2006). Disclosure rules 
cover insider trading, major holdings, intermediate price sensitive information and peri-
odical reports, but the core remains the issuer’s annual financial report (annual accounts, 
management report and a certification of its responsible persons that these provide a true 
and fair view). To allow their comparability and standardization, the issuer’s consolidated 
accounts shall be drafted in accordance with IFRS. Like the US Report to Shareholders 
(10K-20F) this annual financial report effectively serves as a standalone market- and inves-
tor-oriented disclosure document.
Par. 2.2 will elaborate on the concepts of securities law disclosure and corporate law 
accounting. For the US, the federal securities regulation Securities Act 1933 (SA’33) and 
Securities Exchange Act 1934 (SEA’34), SEC’s Rules and listing rules will be examined, in 
corporate law the Revised MBCA that was of major influence in the convergence of states’ 
company laws and Delaware state corporate law and case law of the Delaware Chancery 
and Supreme Court as representative of the most elaborated corporate law will be ana-
lyzed. Par. 2.3 will first summarize the stakeholders-oriented EU system of the 1st, 4th and 
7th Directives and par. 2.4 will summarize and compare the key elements of the US market-
oriented disclosure system. Par. 2.5 will analyze the regulation of annual accounts of issu-
ers as disclosure document and accounting to shareholders.
In their annual report, EU issuers shall state whether they comply with the applicable 
national corporate governance code. These codes seem to interfere with EU securities 
regulation, covering a wide range of best practices for issuers on reporting items in issu-
ers’ annual reports on, inter alia, board committees and conflicts of interest, but also on 
issues directly linked to drafting and preparing the accounts (role of audit committees, 
audit report, internal controls, in control statements, risk factors, strategy discussion, etc.) 
The US did not witness such a proliferation of ‘self-regulatory’ corporate governance best 
practices and disclosure items. US Congress merely enhanced the prevailing US securities 
regulation and its disclosure rules (SOx/SEC-Rules, listing rules).
Thus the EU securities disclosure regulation results in a ‘federal’ standalone set of rules 
under national public oversight. However, unlike in the US, these European securities law 
rules also build on and remain connected with the parallel and still prevailing corporate law 
accounting and disclosure rules of the 1st, 4th and 7th company law Directives that apply to all 
(close and publicly held) companies. These provide mandatory stakeholder-oriented rules 
for single and consolidated accounts with own accounting, audit and ‘disclosure’ rules. They 
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apply also to the single accounts of issuers. So, issuers shall apply IFRS in their consolidated 
accounts, but Member States may allow – as many did – these to be applied in the issuer’s 
single (‘legal’) accounts. The latter, however, remain connected to the stakeholder-oriented 
national corporate law with the emphasis on creditor/shareholder protection rather than 
market transparency and investor protection.
Par. 2.6 will subsequently deal with public oversight of annual reports and their enforce-
ment including the application and interpretation of IFRS. Par. 2.7 will discuss means for 
private enforcement. Being left to the Member States, public and private enforcement of 
these combined and entangled new rules reveal remarkable differences. The way in which 
Member States created enforcement mechanisms, including causes of action to allow 
litigation in court, show important differences that may over time affect the evolution of 
common market principles. These differences will be compared in more detail against the 
background of the aims of an integrated EU financial market.
2.2	 Investor	protection	in	corporate	law:	shareholders	rights	and	board	supremacy	in	
the	‘internal	affairs’	of	issuers
This paragraph will explore in more detail the (statutory) division of (collective and indi-
vidual) powers of investors (GMS) and the board/SB and, hence, both the nature of protec-
tion thus provided to investors (as shareholders) and the statutory level and extent of board 
supremacy, taking into account recent developments that have affected the prevailing sys-
tems.
My hypothesis is that convergence of securities regulation seems to go along with a certain 
degree of divergence of the corporate law regime for issuers in the examined systems as 
related to the division of powers between the board (BoM/SB) and the GMS and (groups of) 
individual shareholders. Especially if focussed on the supremacy of the board, GMS’s rights 
as such and shareholder’s procedural rights seemingly led to a stronger position in the 
organizational design of the issuer in the Netherlands than in the other examined systems. 
As will be demonstrated in chapter 4, the Netherlands right of inquiry (arts. 2:344-359) 
led to erosion of the supremacy and discretion of the Netherlands Board (BoM/SB) in a 
listed public corporation. This seems however to be concealed by the international header 
of corporate governance and resulting principles and ‘best practices’ to discipline manage-
ment and protect investors. They also conceal the lack of clear US-style distinction between 
the regulatory ends and means of securities regulation and corporate law respectively. It 
seems to bypass the traditional regulatory role of corporate law in (Member States of) the 
EU to protect investors (shareholders) by means of corporate law (often based on ‘institu-
tional’ and the so-called ‘stakeholder’ model). This hypothesis will be tested in chapter 3.
Thus although the securities law did converge, the question remains as to how the ‘federal’ 
EU securities law with its main goal of investor protection interacts with internal affairs of 
EU issuers in general and, more specifically, their (degree of) ‘board supremacy’21 in dis-
charging its assignment of directing the issuers entrepreneurial policies and activities and 
managing the firm’s organization and operations. And: whether this new system can play a 
21 This principle was firmly vested in e.g. German (1937 Führer-prinzip) and Netherlands law (Forum-
bank).
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guiding role for new regulation to focus on investor protection by means of disclosure and 
transparency in EU securities regulation, rather than by means of corporate law. From the 
perspective of issuers, that analysis may reveal that securities regulation is converging, but 
still differs insofar as it remains linked to corporate law and that different regimes for the 
issuer’s internal affairs may influence their choice of jurisdiction and financial market to 
issue and have traded their securities.22
The comparison outlined above may, first, contribute to a better understanding of the broad 
regulatory process as such in the field of protecting both investors in financial markets and 
firms that ‘go public’ by issuing shares in those markets. More particularly: a proper demar-
cation (or as the case may be: overlap) between the ends and means of both securities and 
corporate law to allow more precise regulatory impact assessment (including ‘self-regu-
lation’ by corporate governance codes and delegated regulation). Evidently (public/private) 
enforcement is a key element (this will be the topic of chapter 4).
Secondly, it thus may improve conceptualization of the basics of securities law and its pub-
lic and private enforcement and to elaborate (common) principles of market integrity and 
issuer’s integrity in the market.
Thirdly, it may allow a better understanding of initial regulation and subsequent assess-
ment of the impact thereof on the corporate statute of issuers upon going and being ‘public’.
Fourthly, for investors it may facilitate assessment of differences and commonalities of 
markets and issuers in those markets, more specifically their ‘shareholders powers’.
Fifthly, for issuers it may allow a better (comparative) assessment of the impact of securi-
ties and corporate law (including codes) upon going and being public on the dissemination 
of powers between investors and the board, and (the degree of) ‘board supremacy’23 in its 
internal organization, corporate causes of actions for investors to enforce their rights (as 
will be elaborated in chapter 4). Such assessment may allow a well-considered choice of 
both the issuer’s seat and the market in which securities will be issued. Evidently the result 
of that analysis may reveal that securities regulation may no longer show great differences 
but that different regimes for the issuer’s internal affairs may influence, inter alia their 
choice of jurisdiction.24
These comparisons will reveal remarkable differences between the US and EU. Investor 
protection in the US remains vested in securities law, primarily by market disclosure. SOx 
did not change that and rather enhanced the quality requirements of financial disclosure,25 
guided by the necessity to maintain and enhance integrity in the securities markets and 
fairness to investors.26 In corporate law, board supremacy remains the primary standard, 
22 Luca Enriques & Tobias H. Troeger, ‘Issuer choice in Europe’, ECGI-Law Working Paper No. 90/2007, July 
2008; Roberta Romano, ‘The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the making of Quack Corporate Governance’, 
NYU, Law and Econ Research Paper 04-032, September 25, 2004. 
23 This principle was i.e. firmly vested in e.g. German (1937 Führer-prinzip) and Netherlands law 
( Forum-bank),
24 Luca Enriques & Tobias H. Troeger, ‘Issuer choice in Europe’, ECGI-Law Working Paper No. 90/2007, July 
2008; Roberta Romano, ‘The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the making of Quack Corporate Governance’, 
NYU, Law and Econ Research Paper 04-032, September 25, 2004.
25 Raaijmakers 2006, p. 320.
26 ABA-study on listing standards and corporate governance, p. 64, A US study on listing standards and 
corporate governance states in 2002 that corporate governance codes of different kinds have prolife-
rated throughout the world. Many of them are comprehensive. However, the best practice guidelines 
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upheld by the US judiciary, in the internal organization (‘internal affairs’) of US issuers. It 
has not changed fundamentally, has survived recent shareholder activism and also allows 
the board to defend the target in a control transaction. It illustrates that markets matter, 
as does law.
In the EU, regulatory action is seen to be fragmented over corporate and securities law 
by different regulatory instruments: amendments to prevailing EU corporate law direc-
tives and recommendations, and at the level of Member States: amendments to corporate 
law (including strengthening shareholder rights), ‘self-regulatory’ corporate governance 
entailing a mix of corporate and securities law with different nature and status.27 Thus the 
post-FSA securities rules were exposed in the Member States to ‘path-dependant’ differ-
ences of their national systems of checks and balances between investors and the firm tra-
ditionally (continental EU insider system) largely governed in corporate rather than in their 
securities law, which is emerging slowly and at a different speed.
The US-EU comparison reveals – too briefly – that US Congress stuck to the basic structure 
of the ’33 and ’34 Acts and enhancement thereof by the SOx, while the EU still were in the 
process of executing the FSA agenda introducing a ‘federal’ EU securities regulation. It 
suggests that EU issuers have been more exposed to shareholder’s activism, especially in 
takeover fights and pressure on the firm’s strategy.
Par. 3.1 will further analyze the claim of Kraakman and Hansmann concerning the domi-
nance of the corporate ideology of shareholder primacy leading towards major jurisdictions 
adopting similar rules of corporate law and practice and further elaborate the context of the 
aforementioned hypothesis.
Par. 3.2 will elaborate the theoretical concepts underlying the corporate form and corpo-
rate governance (agency theory), also in view of changing market structures and market 
for corporate control. This allows a better understanding of commonalities and differences 
between the US and EU and some of its Member States, particularly the impact of regula-
tory responses to corporate scandals and shareholder activism and its effect on issuers’ 
governance and board supremacy.
Par. 3.3 will compare the statutory division of powers in listed public corporations. The basic 
GMS powers and (groups of) investors with respect to the issuer’s governance and corpo-
rate structure (division of powers between board and GMS/shareholders) will be examined, 
including recent changes. A detailed analysis is given in the annexes.
contemplated by their proposal should be limited to the corporate governance areas that are neces-
sary for and directly relevant to maintenance of integrity in the securities markets and fairness to in-
vestors. In light of recent widely published corporate failures, the issue of defining the most effective 
approach to improving corporate governance as it affects markets is squarely presented at this time. 
It is not necessary or even desirable to redesign the current system to achieve ongoing improvement 
in the process. Improvement should be built on the strengths of the existing system. Any significant 
change in the system creates the potential of new risks to the capital markets, issuers and investors, 
and should only be established after careful and focussed study. Any systemic change should take into 
account the role of state corporate law in governance, corporate governance codes and practices and 
the appropriate areas of concern to and interest of the exchanges.
27 See for example the UK through combined code applicable through the listing rules and the Dutch 
Corporate Governance Code (DCGC) applicable through corporate governance statement (‘comply or 
explain’) in the Management Report (now also mandatory cause of amendment § 46b 4th Directive).
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Par. 3.4.will provide a short overview and comparison of group and individual rights of 
shareholders, mainly focussed on shareholder rights pre-meeting, with the other jurisdic-
tions related to the division of powers between the board and the shareholders: the primacy 
of the board. The level of influence of the shareholders in the company (board supremacy) 
is, alongside the substantive rights of the shareholders, partly determined by these proce-
dural rules related to convocation of a meeting and setting the agenda for the meeting. Par. 
3.5 will draw some preliminary conclusions and par. 3.6 will analyze the bundling of voting 
power and explore if, how and on at what level (corporate or securities law) legal regimes 
have developed and are facilitating mechanism and rules on proxy voting that may influence 
the division of power within the corporation. In par. 3.6 proxy solicitation and voting will be 
analyzed. Par. 3.7 will summarize chapter 3.
2.3	 Board	supremacy	and	discretion	in	the	context	of	investor’s	actions:	the	
Netherlands	right	of	inquiry	as	unique	action	for	activist	shareholders
The HLG in 2002, in its report for modernizing company law in the EU, advised providing 
shareholders with the right to apply to a court or appropriate administrative body to order 
a special investigation. A European framework rule should be adopted to this end (Recom-
mendation III.8). The HLG places its proposal for an investigation procedure in the context 
of strengthening (minority) shareholders’ rights and their monitoring role as ‘principal’. 
The HLG seemingly did not take into account the already evolving EU securities disclosure 
system under which issuers are required to provide investors with information on an annual 
and interim basis and does not make a distinction between listed public and closed compa-
nies and states. The EC in its Action Plan 2003 for the Medium Term proposed enhancing the 
responsibilities of board members by a special investigation right, wrongful trading rule, 
and director’s disqualification. However, the EC did not clarify its proposal. In chapter 4 it 
will be demonstrated that the HLG’s proposal of 2002 to introduce an investigation proce-
dure, in which the Netherlands have already gained experience over 40 years, at EU level 
does seem a good idea. This investigation by its nature is at odds with the securities disclo-
sure system and with corporate law for (listed) public corporations. The analysis of chapter 
4 also leads to the conclusion that Netherlands Right of Inquiry should be re-examined.
As analyzed in chapter 2, investor protection in the US as well as in the EU is primarily based 
on securities law disclosure, public oversight and enforcement both in the primary market 
(IPO) by prospectus liability and in the secondary market by securities fraud. The second 
layer of investor protection is found in US, UK and German derivative suits, albeit under the 
protection of the BJR and hence focussing on its limits, i.e. breaches of fiduciary duties.28 US 
(Delaware) and German law firmly vest the principles of board supremacy and discretion. 
These are upheld in court when business decisions of the board are challenged in claims 
for damages and rescinding business decision. The BJR protects the board by procedural 
28 a)  Protection of shareholders, as especially provided for by EU continental systems, is also found in 
the possibility to annul decisions of the bodies corporate within the issuer’s organization. It can be 
considered as the bolt on GMS decision making and in that sense as protection against abuse by the 
majority. Also decisions of organs other than the board can be rescinded, e.g. 2:15 NCC. However 
in the Netherlands, it is very rarely used as such in the case of issuers since the same or similar 
results can be reached in an investigation procedure.
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requirements but also, more importantly, by the basic assumption of supremacy and dis-
cretion of the board. This may be set aside if the claimant – in a derivative suit – can prove a 
breach of fiduciary duties of the board vis-à-vis the corporation.
A comparative analysis on this issue reveals a remarkable difference of Netherlands law, 
both regarding the basic rule on directors’ liability, but more fundamentally with respect 
to the impact on the board’s discretion of the case law under its investigation procedure. 
Board members may be held liable through an art. 2:9 NCC procedure, but not derivatively. 
As stated above no BJR-rule will protect the board (members), although the standard used 
in that particular (but for issuers extremely unusual) procedure would presumably not dif-
fer substantially from the US, Germany and the UK since the judicial standard is rather 
high. The judicial assessment, however, does not start – as the BJR does – with a ‘free zone’ 
starting from its basic assumption of discretionary business judgment. Thus it lacks the 
certainty of the BJR-approach.
The more remarkable difference, however, is created by Netherlands’ investigation proce-
dure, which is unique and does not exist in the US, at EU level or in the UK and Germany. 
The procedure is enacted in NCC Book 2, chapter 8 (arts. 2:344-2:359). The competent court 
is the Enterprise Chamber of the Amsterdam Court of Appeal.29 It provides shareholders30 
with two successive rights in respect of a corporation (including issuers as well as private 
limited companies). First, shareholders (owning 10% of the shares or shares representing 
an nominal value of EUR 225,000) are entitled to petition for an investigation to be ordered 
in case there are well-founded reasons to doubt proper (‘juist’) administration (‘beleid’) of 
the corporation, and – if the court so finds – appoint one or more investigators to investigate 
the administration and course of affairs of the corporation (during a certain period). Sec-
ondly, based upon the report of the investigator(s) they may request the court to establish 
that this constitutes mismanagement (‘wanbeleid’), and order specific injunctions, includ-
ing dismissal and appointment of new directors.31 Otherwise the court may grant injunc-
tive relief (art. 2:349a NCC) during the whole procedure if the court finds that the state of 
affairs so require. Over the last decade, as will be set out below, this procedure and the 
possibility for (immediate) injunctive relief has turned the investigation procedure into a 
strong weapon for investors and activist shareholders to challenge the board’s supremacy 
29 Cornelis de Groot, Corporate Governance as a Limited Legal Concept, Kluwer Law International: Neth-
erlands 2009, p. 34, technically, the Chamber of Business is a division of the Court of appeals at Am-
sterdam (one of the five Courts of Appeal in the Netherlands). Although part of the Court of Appeal at 
Amsterdam, the Chamber of Business acts as the court of first instance under the provisions on the 
right of inquiry. The aforementioned book gives an extensive overview of this investigation procedure 
in the Netherlands. For some other English articles on this investigation procedure see: M. Josephus 
Jitta et al., The Companies and Business Court from a Comparative Law Perspective (Deventer: Kluwer, 
2004); J.B. Jacobs, ‘The Role of Specialized Courts Resolving Corporate Governance Disputes in the 
United states and in the EU: An American Judge’s Perspective’, Ondernemingsrecht (2007), 80-85; M.J. 
Kroeze, ‘The Companies and Business Court as a Specialized Court’, Ondernemingsrecht (2007), 86-
91; L. Timmerman, ‘Company Law and the Dutch Supreme Court’, Ondernemingsrecht (2007), 91-95.
See also the article of Erik P.M. Vermeulen & Dirk A. Zetzsche , ‘The Use and Abuse of Investor Suits’, 
TILEC Discussion Paper, DP 2010-001, January 2010, for interesting comparative research into German 
rescission suit and the Netherlands investigation procedure.
30 And holders of depository rights.
31 Cornelis de Groot, Corporate Governance as a Limited Legal Concept, Kluwer Law International: Nether-
lands 2009, p. 34, see this book for an extensive overview of this procedure.
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and discretion and thus ‘provoke’ a judicial review of its strategy, policies and actions. This 
procedure effectively evolved towards a quasi-derivative suit, at least to the extent that pre-
liminary judgment may be acquired as to ‘misconduct’ of the board which can be used in a 
subsequent liability suit. Anyhow, this evidently provides claimants ‘leverage’ in subsequent 
settlement negotiations. In a comparative perspective, the most remarkable element of the 
investigation procedure is that it allows an almost unlimited judicial review board action, in 
sharp contrast to the BJR-approach.
Meanwhile, this procedure almost completely absolved the ‘classical’ action to annul 
(former) decisions/resolutions of the GMS (supervisory) board.
My next hypothesis is that board supremacy and discretion of the board of Netherlands 
issuers has been remarkably eroded over the last decade (being re-established only very 
recently by the Supreme Court), due to the fact that this investigation procedure has not 
been the subject of a fundamental review in the total change of the regulatory landscape for 
issuers and remained a corporate law procedure not taking into account the fundamental 
change in securities law.32 This investigation procedure and its declared, but seemingly out-
dated, purposes will be tested and contrasted to the separate ‘layers’ of investor’s protec-
tion offered by the completely revised EU and Netherlands securities regulation, again in 
comparison with the US, EU, UK and Germany. Again I may advise the reader to compare the 
tables provided in the annexes.
Chapter 5. will make some closing and synthesizing observations on issuers as addresse 
of (self-) regulation, public oversight, judicial review and private enforcement in between 
securities and corporate law.
3 Methodology
This research entails a basic understanding of commonalities and differences in the field 
of corporate and securities law. It will be conducted by a comparative functional33 analysis 
of the major elements of the US and EU securities and corporate/accounting law systems 
and the resulting regulation of some Member States (UK, Germany and the Netherlands).
32 Of course the Supreme Court in ABN-AMRO and AMSI reconfirmed the supremacy and discretion of 
the Netherlands board (BoM/SB), nonetheless the procedural structure of the investigation proce-
dure almost automatically leads to substantial board review. 
33 The comparison will be functional: ‘The basic methodogical principle of all comparative law is that of 
functionality. From this basic principle stem all the other rules which determine the choice of laws 
to compare, the scope of the undertaking, the creation of a system of comparative law, and so on. 
Incomparable cannot usefully be compared, and in law the only things which are comparable are 
those which fulfil the same function.’ K. Zweigert & H. Kotz, translated by Tony Weir, An introduction 
to Comparative Law (third edition), Oxford: Clarendon Press 1998. See also Reinier R. Kraakman, Paul 
Davies, Henry Hansmann, Gerard Hertig, Klaus J. Hopt, Hideki Kanda & Edward B. Rock, The Anatomy 
of Corporate Law, A Comparative and Functional Approach, New York: Oxford University Press 2004. Cf. 
also K.J. Hopt, H. Kanda, M.J. Roe, E. Wymeersch, & S. Prigge, Comparative Corporate Governance: The 
State of the Art and Emerging Research, New York, Oxford University Press 1998. See also The Evolution 
of Legal Business Forms in Europe and the United States, Venture Capital, Joint Venture and Partner-
ship Structures, Tilburg University 2003, for US-EU comparative research.
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It focuses on a basic understanding of systems and rules and does not purport to cover the 
voluminous research on corporate governance in economics, sociology, and most recently, 
other disciplines such as behavioural sciences and psychology.34 Before conducting any 
research in the mentioned areas, a basic understanding of these several systems and rules 
is necessary.35 This research will not go into and will not provide an answer to which govern-
ance system is more efficient or whether systems will converge.
The research will be limited to securities disclosure and accounting (rules on drawing 
up, laying before and adoption of the annual accounts/report) obligations for listed public 
corporations (issuers) and internal corporate/governance rules on the division of powers 
between board and GMS and (groups of) shareholders. 36 The comparison in chapter 3 will 
entail an examination of the basic GMS-powers and (groups of) investors with respect to the 
issuer’s governance and corporate structure (division of powers between board and GMS/
shareholders), including recent changes. For a more detailed overview of this comparison 
and analysis I refer to the annexes. In the main text the board supremacy and some core 
rights of shareholder’s meeting and (groups of) shareholders will in particular be analysed. 
Therefore literature research including doctrine/academic research, statutory corporate 
and securities law, corporate governance codes (however not in extenso) and case law will 
be executed.
Issuers are defined as public corporations whose shares are traded on regulated markets, 
as defined by European law: art. 4 (1) No. 14 of MIFID. The corporate form of the issuer is in 
theory not restricted to one type of legal form, however under the examined jurisdictions 
the Netherlands NV, the German AktG, the UK Plc and the US Corporation (Inc.), in general 
will take the legal form of the issuer.
34 Hopt, p. 1163.
35 Ever since the beginning of European company law harmonization, Member State academia and prac-
titioners have followed this process closely and have sometimes helped to prepare it. In the early 
stages, the European Commission even commissioned comparative law studies for its work. Although 
later the practice disappeared, probably due to financial restraints and more orientation to Member 
State pressure from ministries, politicians and lobbyists, Hopt, p.1174.
36 Second Conflicts of Law § 302, Comment (1971), internal affairs (linked with the seat of incorporation 
or in some countries the real seat, but also securities rules, i.e. listing rules in board composition) 
can be described as referring to ‘the relations inter se of the corporation, its shareholder, directors, 
officers or agents … involving primarily a corporation’s relationship to its shareholders (and) including 
steps taken in course of the original incorporation, the election or appointment of directors and of-
ficers, the adoption of by-laws, the issuance of corporate shares, pre-emptive rights, the holding of 
directors’ and shareholders’ meetings, methods of voting including any requirement for cumulative 
voting, shareholders’rights to examine corporate records, charter and by-law amendments, mergers, 
consolidations and reorganisations and the reclassification of shares.’ Restatement (Second Conflicts 
of Law § 302, Comment (1971).
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Disclosure and accounting37
Descriptive analysis and comparison of 
the US and EU regulation (of) issuers 
and markets, disclosure versus 
accounting
37 This chapter builds on joint research as reflected in: M.J.G.C. Raaijmakers and P.A.van der Schee, 
‘Disclosure and Accounting for Issuers in between “Federal” EU Securities Law (and Mandatory Ap-
plication of IFRS) and National Corporate Law Accounting Concepts’, in: P.H.J. Essers, T. Raaijmakers, 
R. Russo, P. van der Schee, L. van der Tas, & P. van der Zanden (eds.), The Influence of IAS/IFRS on the 
CCCTB, Tax Accounting, Disclosure and Corporate Law Accounting Concepts, Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer 
Law International 2008, p. 87-143.
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The Introduction explored the dual regulatory perspective and dichotomy between securi-
ties and corporate law to protect investors in financial instruments, particularly shares, 
by proper disclosure rules and shareholders’ rights and powers respectively. This chapter 
explores and compares in more detail the first layer of investor protection as provided for 
by US and EU securities law and its relation to corporate law, focussing on the standalone 
(or mixed) character of initial and continuous disclosure and any impact on the governance 
of issuers upon going and while being public. This chapter therefore explores from the per-
spective of the US and EU financial market regulation and securities law the requirements 
for issuers and the question of whether and to what extent (the regulatory aims of) such 
regulation affect the internal affairs and governance of issuers upon going and being public. 
The comparison between the US and (Member States of) the EU will reveal the standalone 
character of federal US securities regulation and a somewhat mixed character of EU regu-
lation that remains linked to some extent to corporate law. Chapter 3 will take the reverse 
perspective, looking from the issuer to the market.
‘Disclosure’ directed at market transparency and investor protection is the cornerstone of 
US securities law. The new EU securities law essentially chooses the same approach. By 
a series of directives and regulations, it focuses equally on initial and continuous disclo-
sure rules for issuers. It is equally directed at market transparency and investor protection 
under public oversight by national authorities. To that extent the ‘federal’ EU securities law 
is implemented and ‘translated’ into the national law of the Member States. It replaced the 
former self-regulatory rules of stock exchanges and financial markets with strict manda-
tory securities law. Also, these EU disclosure requirements aim at market transparency 
and cover insider trading, major holdings, intermediate price sensitive information and 
periodical reports. Apart from the prospectus requirements in an IPO, the core of the new 
EU continuous disclosure rules is the issuer’s annual financial report consisting of its annual 
accounts, management report (MR) and certification by its responsible persons that these 
provide a true and fair view. To allow comparability and standardization of disclosure docu-
ments, the issuer’s consolidated accounts shall be drafted in accordance with IFRS. Like 
the US Report to Shareholders (10K-20F), this annual financial report effectively serves as 
a standalone market- and investor-oriented disclosure document. For the EU, an impor-
tant new element is that these disclosure documents are made subject to public oversight, 
albeit, unlike in the US, by national rather than ‘federal’ EU agencies.
Furthermore, also unlike in the US, these European securities law rules build on and 
remain connected with the parallel and still prevailing corporate law accounting and dis-
closure rules of the 1st, 4th and 7th company law Directives that apply to all (close and pub-
licly held) companies. These provide mandatory stakeholder-oriented rules for single and 
consolidated accounts with their own accounting, mandatory audit and ‘disclosure’ rules; 
mandatory deposit of these accounts is required with the commercial register. They apply 
also to the single accounts of issuers. Issuers shall apply IFRS in their consolidated accounts, 
but Member States may allow – as many did – these also to be applied in the issuer’s sin-
gle (‘legal’) accounts. The latter, however, remain connected to the stakeholder-oriented 
national corporate law with emphasis on creditor/shareholder protection rather than mar-
ket transparency and investor protection. Being left to the MS, public and private enforce-
ment of these combined and entangled new rules reveal remarkable differences.
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1 Emerging EU securities regulation: introductory notes
EU securities regulation developed slowly and separately from EU company law, but the 
growth and integration of European financial markets, the concentration of investments in 
securities with institutional investors, pension funds and other major players, shareholder 
activism, the gradual shift towards shareholder orientation of issuers, as well as the strong 
call for regulation in the aftermath of the series of corporate scandals, accelerated the 
process in the last decade (see also chapter 3, Introduction).38 By now, the process of imple-
mentation by MS of the new EU securities regulation is completed. The result is a ‘federal’ 
standalone set of rules under national public oversight and private enforcement, however 
still connected with corporate law disclosure rules of the 4th and 7th Directives.
1.1	 Financial	Services	Action	Plan	and	resulting	EU	securities	regulation
The achievement of integrated deep and liquid capital markets to facilitate the free move-
ment of capital has been on the European agenda since the 1960s.39 The first legislative 
measure relating to issuers was the Directive on admission to official listing,40 followed 
by Directives in 1980s including the Investment Services Directive41and the Public Offers 
of Securities Directive.42 However, during the 1990s, deficiencies in the existing regulatory 
regime were considered an impediment to a single capital market, with the passport provi-
sion for securities offerings as one of the more obvious failings.43
The FSAP, a major effort by the European Commission to equip the Community better to 
meet the challenges of monetary union and to capitalize on the potential benefits of a single 
market in financial services,44 was realized. The FSAP set out a detailed action plan for the 
38 H. Merkt, ‘Disclosing Disclosure: Europe’s Winding Road to Competitive Standards of Publication of 
Company-Related Information’, in: Klaus J. Hopt, Jaap Winter and Eddy Wymeersch (eds.), Reforming 
Company and Takeover Law in Europe, New York: Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 115.
39 Eilís Ferran, Building an EU Securities Market, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2004, p. 3. This 
is also the ultimate aim of European Securities Regulation: Dynamic securities markets are vital to 
Europe’s economic future, see ‘Quantification of the Macro-Economic Impact of Integration of EU Fi-
nancial Markets’, Financial Report to the European Commission – Directorate-General for the Inter-
nal Market by London Economics (in association with PricewaterhouseCoopers and Oxford Economic 
Forecasting), 12 November 2002.
40 Council Directive 79/279/EEC of 5 March 1979 coordinating the conditions for the admission of securi-
ties to official stock exchange listing, OJ 1979 No. L66/21.
41 Council Directive 93/22/EEC of 10 May 1993 on investment services in the securities field, OJ 1993 No. 
L141/27.
42 Council Directive 89/298/EEC of 17 April 1989 coordinating the requirement for the drawing-up, scru-
tiny and distribution of the prospectus to be published when transferable securities are offered to 
the public, OJ 1989 No. L124/8. Eilís Ferran, Building an EU Securities Market, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 2004 p. 4, these Directives made use of the passport concept. The essence of the 
passport concept is that issuers, investment firms and market structure providers authorized in one 
Member State can gain access to other Member States without the need for further, local regulatory 
approvals. The passport concept was conceived as being crucial to the development of a properly inte-
grated pan-European financial market in which issuers, investment firms and investors could operate 
freely and seamlessly, unimpeded by national boundaries. 
43 Eilís Ferran, Building an EU Securities Market, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2004, p. 4.
44 Financial Services: Implementing the Framework for financial markets – Action Plan, Communication 
of the Commission, COM (1999) 232, 11.05.99.
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adoption of legislative measures to support a single, integrated financial market in which a 
strong securities market was envisaged as a major component.45
The FSAP was the start of a broad renovation of the European securities regulation; the 
Lamfalussy procedure (new law-making process) (2001) was developed and the creation 
of the CESR as part of that. The CESR (now ESMA), by coordinating a range of functions, 
including participating in the law-making process, aims to underpin the development of 
pan-European consistency in supervisory practices and policies.46
Following the FSAP, and accelerated by the post-Enron momentum, the EU soon introduced 
a completely revised, coherent securities law covering initial and continuous disclosure 
of issuers upon and after going public under public oversight: Prospectus Directive and 
regulations (2003), Directive on Admission to Official Stock Exchange Listing (2003), Trans-
parency Directive (2004), Market Abuse Directive(s) (2003) and the IAS Regulations (2002) 
introducing IFRS as accounting standards for issuer’s consolidated accounts, amendments 
for issuers of the 4th and 7th Directive (2006) and the revised 8th Directives on statutory audi-
tors (2006).
The emerging EU securities law initial and continuous disclosure regime largely follows that 
of the US Securities Act and of the Securities and Exchange Act respectively, resulting in a 
US-like European securities law disclosure system for issuers that can be extracted from 
these directives.
The IAS Regulations (2002)47 introduced IFRS48 as the accounting standards to be applied in 
the consolidated accounts of issuers (whose securities are admitted to trading on a regu-
lated market of any Member State)49 ‘with a view to harmonizing the financial information 
presented by companies in order to ensure a high degree of transparency and compara-
bility of financial statements and hence an efficient functioning of the Community capital 
market and of the Internal Market’.50 The use of IFRS should warrant the use of uniform 
international standards by issuers. The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) is 
45 Eilís Ferran, Building an EU Securities Market, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2004, p. 1.
46 Eilís Ferran, Building an EU Securities Market, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2004, p. 7.
47 Regulation (EC) 1606/2002 on the application of international accounting standards, OJ L 243/1 of 
11.9.2002 and 1725/2003 adopting certain international accounting standards, OJ L 111/3 of 17.4.2004. 
For an extensive review of the creation of IFRS by the IASB, the adoption of IFRS by the EC and proce-
dures for revision and extension of IFRS we refer to L. van der Tas & P. van der Zanden, ‘The Interna-
tional Financial Reporting Standards’, in: P.H.J. Essers, T. Raaijmakers, R. Russo, P. van der Schee, L. 
van der Tas, & P. van der Zanden (eds.), The Influence of IAS/IFRS on the CCCTB, Tax Accounting, Disclo-
sure and Corporate Law Accounting Concepts, Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International 2008. For 
an analysis of the meaning and impact of IFRS for tax accounting we refer to P. Essers& R. Russo, ‘The 
Precious Relationship between IAS/IFRS, national tax accounting systems and the CCCTB’, in: P.H.J. 
Essers, T. Raaijmakers, R. Russo, P. van der Schee, L. van der Tas, & P. van der Zanden (Eds.), The 
Influence of IAS/IFRS on the CCCTB, Tax Accounting, Disclosure and Corporate Law Accounting Concepts, 
Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International 2008.
48 Art. 4 IAS Regulation (EC) 1606/2002, OJ L 243/1.
49 Art. 4 IAS Regulation (EC) 1606/2002, OJ L 243/1.
50 Art. 1 IAS Regulation (EC) 1606/2002, OJ L 243/1.
Book Vanderschee.indb   38 18-3-2011   15:39:39
Disclosure and accounting 39
responsible for the development of IFRS,51 but to become binding for EU issuers these have 
to be adopted by the European Commission.52
Furthermore, the IAS Regulations allowed EU Member States to permit or require listed 
and non-listed entities to use approved IAS/IFRS in their statutory/single annual accounts 
and non-listed companies to use IAS/IFRS in their consolidated accounts. The IAS Reg-
ulations also empower the European Commission to endorse such standards to become 
binding for EU issuers. The standards of the International Accounting Standards Commit-
tee (IASC) to be used in the EU should be in line with the principles used in the EU direc-
tives on annual accounts and are to be subjected to an endorsement procedure in which the 
European institutions give the standards its democratic legitimacy, see art. 6(2) of the IAS 
Regulations. Notably in 2007, IFRS is required or accepted in more than 100 countries. The 
IASB is discussing convergence projects with major economies like China, India and Japan, 
designed to ultimately lead to one global accounting standard: IFRS.
In 2007, the unthinkable happened when the SEC decided to accept IFRS for foreign reg-
istrants (non-US companies listed in the US) and to start a discussion on the application 
of IFRS by US companies.53 It is now no longer a question of whether US companies will 
at some day be allowed or required to apply IFRS rather than US GAAP, but when.54 In its 
disclosed time schedule, the SEC aimed for the possibility for US issuers to apply IFRS in 
201455, however the SEC recently extended this deadline, the earliest that US companies 
may be able to use IFRS is now 2015.56 This implies that the consolidated accounts would 
only be a disclosure document for the capital markets and would be governed by the rules 
of the regulators of these markets. It would be necessary to make an opt-out for the obliga-
51 L. van der Tas& P. van der Zanden, ‘The International Financial Reporting Standards’, in: P.H.J. Essers, 
T. Raaijmakers, R. Russo, P. van der Schee, L. van der Tas, & P. van der Zanden (Eds.), The Influence of 
IAS/IFRS on the CCCTB, Tax Accounting, Disclosure and Corporate Law Accounting Concepts, Alphen aan 
den Rijn: Kluwer Law International 2008, p. 1. International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) is 
the official name. However, this set of standards used to be called International Accounting Standards 
(IAS). There is no difference between the two; the predecessor to the IASB, the International Account-
ing Standards Committee (IASC) referred to this body of literature as IAS. The name was changed 
in 2001, when the IASB succeeded the IASC. The 2002 European Union Regulation adopting IFRS for 
application in the EU, referred to it as IAS as it was too late to change the reference, which makes it 
slightly confusing.
52 L. van der Tas and P. van der Zanden, 2009, p. 8, A standard can only be endorsed by the Europe-
an Commission (EC) after consultation of the Accounting Regulatory Committee (ARC), consisting 
of representatives of the EU Member States. The criteria for such endorsement are whether (i) the 
standards do not conflict with the principle set out in art. 2 (3) of Directive 78/660/EEC and in Article 
16(3) of Directive 83/349/EEC and (ii) are conducive to the European public good and (iii) meet the crite-
ria of understandability, relevance, reliability and comparability required of the financial information 
needed for making economic decisions and assessing the stewardship of management.’
53 Securities and Exchange Commission, Acceptance From Foreign Private Issuers of Financial State-
ments Prepared in Accordance With International Financial Reporting Standards Without Reconcilia-
tion to U.S. GAAP, RIN 3235–AJ90, Federal Register, Vol. 73, No. 3, Friday, January 4, 2008.
54 For an overview of the history and development of IFRS see the IASB website at <http://www.iasb.
org/About+Us/About+the+Foundation/History.htm> and Stephen A. Zef, and Kees Camfferman, Finan-
cial Reporting and Global Capital Markets: A History of the International Accounting Standards Committee, 
 Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
55 SEC, 17 CFR §§ 210, 229, 230, 240, 244 and 249, [Release, 33-8982; 34-58960; File No. S7-27-08], RIN, 
3235-AJ93, ‘Roadmap for the potential use of financial statements prepared in accordance with inter-
national financial reporting standards by US issuers’.
56 http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/14478612/c_14479673.
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tions of the 7th EU Directive for companies that prepare consolidated accounts for capital 
market purposes.57
The introduction of IFRS fits into the globalization of financial markets and the attempts the 
internationalization of accounting standards for financial transparency under public over-
sight.
The regime for annual financial accounts however, also remains, entangled – as a sepa-
rate layer – with the corporate law and ‘institutional’ disclosure system of the 1st, 4th and 7th 
Directives and consequently remains intertwined with internal affairs and governance of 
issuers (corporate law and best practices).
1.2		 Simultaneous	national	use	of	disclosure	as	regulatory	tool
Other developments caused disclosure to play an increasing role as a regulatory tool 
towards a standalone market-oriented EU disclosure system for issuers. The execution of 
the FSAP’99 in the Lamfalussy-procedure coincided with a series of corporate scandals 
and, hence, a public outcry for regulatory responses. Unlike in the US where SOx enhanced 
but did not fundamentally change existing securities regulation, these developments in 
the EU extended and accelerated the emergence of ‘self-regulatory’ corporate govern-
ance codes (e.g. UK, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and France).58 These codes did 
not build on (or even take into account) the emerging securities regulation of the FSAP’99, 
but covered a wide range of best practices for issuers resulting in reporting items in issu-
ers’ annual reports on, for example, board committees and conflicts of interest, but also 
on issues directly linked to drafting and preparing the accounts (role of audit committees, 
audit report, internal controls, in control statements, risk factors, strategy discussion, 
etc.). Statutory ‘comply or explain’ rules were enacted to require issuers to discuss in their 
annual report compliance with their national corporate governance code. Thus their scope 
reveales an overlap of corporate and securities law issues.
The EU High Level Group of Company Law Experts presented their 2002 report (HLG report) 
59 and strongly advocated disclosure as a regulatory tool over merit (substantive) regulation.60 
It should however be noted that they did not focus on the structure and substance of the new 
securities law disclosure rules as envisaged in the FSAP’99, but rather on the corporate law 
rules or internal affairs of issuers and other business forms.61
57 As long as an opt-out is not available, listed companies would have to adhere to the 7th EU Directive and 
have to prepare consolidated accounts based on the EU-Directives as well as consolidated accounts 
based on IFRS.
58 See Weil, Gotshal & Manges 2002; Alain Pietrancosta, ‘Enforcement of Corporate Governance Code’, as 
Anton Philips Professor 2008-2009, Tilburg University: Oration: 2008-2009.
59 Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on A Modern Regulatory Framework for 
Company Law in Europe, European Commission, Brussels, 4 November 2002.
60 High Level Report, p. 33 and H. Merkt, ‘Disclosing Disclosure: Europe’s Winding Road to Competitive 
Standards of Publication of Company-Related Information’, in: Klaus J. Hopt, Jaap Winter and Eddy 
Wymeersch (eds.), Reforming Company and Takeover Law in Europe, New York: Oxford University Press, 
2004, p. 116.
61 HLG report 2002, p. 27, according to the Group’s mandate, these key priorities are: the creation and 
functioning of companies and groups of companies, cooperatives and mutual enterprises, including 
Corporate Governance; shareholders’ rights, including cross-border voting and virtual general mee-
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The European Commission responded with its 2003 Action plan to modernize and improve 
EU corporate law and governance.62 The EC underlined its intention to preserve the acquis 
communautaire,63 did not endorse the HLG’s claim of superiority of disclosure over sub-
stantive regulation and revealed its agenda for action.64 It refrained from an EU Corporate 
Governance Code, but did publish recommendations on non-executive directors and on 
executive remuneration and initiated a directive to enhance shareholders’ rights.65 Remark-
ably, the European Commission did not elaborate on the standalone character of the new 
EU securities regulation that was in the process of being finalized and implemented at that 
point in time.
1.3		 Post-Enron	(FSA)	regulatory	responses
The US market and investor-oriented system did not witness such a proliferation of ‘self 
regulatory’ corporate governance best practices and disclosure items. US Congress rather 
limited itself to simply enhancing the prevailing US securities regulation and its disclosure 
rules. The SOx, subsequent SEC regulation and NYSE and NASDAQ listing rules consti-
tuted the regulatory responses66 to the burst of the dotcom bubble and ‘Enronitis’. They 
do address some corporate governance issues,67 albeit that their focus clearly remains on 
market transparency and disclosure.
The Senate Report accompanying SOx stated its purpose: “The purpose of the bill is to 
address the systemic and structural weakness affecting our capital markets which were 
revealed by repeated failures of audit effectiveness and corporate financial and broker-
dealer responsibility in recent months and years … The bill also requires steps to enhance 
the direct responsibility of senior corporate management for financial reporting and for the 
quality of financial disclosures made by public companies.”68
Public oversight on qualification, quality and ethical standards of registered auditors was 
introduced (Title I, SOx), auditor independence improved (Title II, SOx), audit and certifica-
tings; corporate restructuring and mobility (for instance, the transfer of the corporate seat); the pos-
sible need for new legal forms (for instance, a European Private Company, which would be of parti-
cular relevance for SMEs) the possible simplification of corporate rules in light of the SLIM report on 
the Second Company Law Directive of 13 December 1976 on the formation and capital maintenance of 
public limited liability companies.
62 Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European Union – A plan to 
move forward, COM 2003.
63 Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European Union – A plan to 
move forward, COM 2003, p. 6.
64 H. Merkt, ‘Disclosing Disclosure: Europe’s Winding Road to Competitive Standards of Publication of 
Company-Related Information’, in: Klaus J. Hopt, Jaap Winter and Eddy Wymeersch (eds.), Reforming 
Company and Takeover Law in Europe, New York: Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 133.
65 Commission recommendation of 15 February 2005 on the role of non-executive or supervisory direc-
tors of listed companies and on the committees of the supervisory board, 2005/162/EC and Directive 
2007/36/EC on the exercise of certain rights of shareholders in listed companies. 
66 J.A. McCahery & J. Armour, After Enron: Improving Corporate Law and Modernising Securities Regulation 
in Europe and the US, Oxford: Hart Publications 2006; John Kenneth Galbraith, The Great Crash, 1929; 
Stuart Banner, Anglo-American Securities Regulation, Cultural and Political Roots, 1690-1860, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 1998. 
67 Par. 204, 301, 303 SOx; Par. 303A.06 and 303A.07 NYSE Listed Company Manual.
68 Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002, Senate Comm. On Banking, 
Hous. & Urban Affairs, S. Rep. No. 107-205, 107th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (2002).
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tion procedures in connection to disclosure documents sharpened (Titles III/IV) and con-
flicts of interest analysis subjected to more scrutiny (Title V).69 Auditors’ independence from 
management was amplified as an independent ‘public watch-dog’,70 to enhance their role 
as independent gate-keeping experts.71 In the EU this role was amplified by the revised 8th 
Directive.72 On both sides of the Atlantic, the statutory audit is regarded as a fundamental 
prerequisite for the proper functioning of the securities and capital markets.73
In this context the certification by the CEO and CFO to be inserted into the public disclosure 
document and the implied warranties on preceding internal controls to be exercised by 
these officers has to be mentioned. The statement required by art. 4 sub 2 (c) Transparency 
Directive now requires issuers to make a similar statement.74
1.4		 Additional	reporting	items	for	issuers	(corporate	governance)
In comparison to the US SOx, which was embedded in the prevailing US securities regula-
tion, the changes in the EU were different. Not building on prevailing and forthcoming EU 
securities law, the responses of the EU and – simultaneously – of its Member States were 
fragmented over corporate and securities law rules by different regulatory instruments, 
primarily by amending prevailing EU corporate law directives and issuing new recommenda-
tions and – at the national level of Member States – by amending corporate law (see Neth-
erlands strengthening shareholder rights), but also introducing ‘self-regulatory’ codes of 
best practice, part of which did focus on the role and organization of boards, the role of 
executive and non-executive directors, the role of the GMS and, hence, the division of cor-
porate power between these bodies corporate.
Both the 4th and 7th Directives (applicable to all ‘companies’) were amended (2006) to insert 
new items to be discussed in the MR-related party transactions, but also on collective board 
responsibility for the financial report and – but this for issuers only – the requirement to 
69 § 501 SOx-Act. Moreover: § 1107, retaliation against informants, § 1102, tampering, § 1001 Corporate 
Tax Return, etc.
70 Werner F. Ebke, ‘Corporate Governance and Auditor Independence: The Battle of the Private Versus 
the Public Interest’, in: G. Ferrarini, K. J. Hopt, J. Winter and E. Wymeersch (eds.), Reforming Company 
and Takeover Law in Europe, New York: Oxford University Press 2004, p. 182.
71 Art. 22 revised 8th Directive (2006).
72 Introducing e.g. public oversight – comparable to the US PCOAB – on approval and withdrawal of 
auditors and firms, educational standards and qualifications, registration, professional ethics and 
secrecy, auditing standards and reporting, quality assurance, investigations and proper sanctions on 
non-observance of the standards, the introduction of public oversight and international cooperation. 
Consequently the audit committee plays a crucial role in the process of drafting, accounting and audit-
ing the accounts and the report.
73 Werner F. Ebke, ‘Corporate Governance and Auditor Independence: The Battle of the Private Versus 
the Public Interest’, in: G. Ferrarini, K. J. Hopt, J. Winter and E. Wymeersch (eds.), Reforming Company 
and Takeover Law in Europe, New York: Oxford University Press 2004, p. 514. 
74 Art. 4 sub 2 (c) TD, the annual report shall comprise: (c) statements made by the persons responsible 
within the issuer, whose names and functions shall be clearly indicated, to the effect that, to the best 
of their knowledge, the financial statements prepared in accordance with the applicable set of accoun-
ting standards give a true and fair view of the assets, liabilities, financial position and profit or loss of 
the issuer and the undertakings included in the consolidation taken as a whole and that management 
report includes a fair review of the development and performance of the business and the position of 
the issuer and the undertakings included in the consolidation taken as a whole, together with a des-
cription of the principal risk and uncertainties that they face. 
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report on compliance with the issuer’s national corporate governance code as well as dis-
closure of a separate corporate governance statement (remarkably introduced in art.10 
of the Takeover Directive).75 The EU recommendations for non-executive directors require 
 several board committees, including an audit committee and set criteria for members’ 
independence.76 The amended 8th Directive (on auditors) now requires issuers to have an 
internal audit committee.77
Though different from the US, disclosure thus was indeed used as a regulatory tool allowing 
investors and the market to monitor the compliance with best practices: most of the items 
mentioned have to be reported upon in the MR. Unlike the uniform IFRS for consolidated 
accounts, the MR does not have to adhere to strict uniform rules. IASB proposals on the MR 
have not yet resulted in definitive standards. It is one of the elements revealing a potential 
centripetal force on uniformity that the IAS Regulations evidently aim to achieve in reporting 
and disclosure by European issuers.
Thus, in the 4th and 7th Directives the report remains distinct from the annual accounts 
drawn up according to IFRS. The directives provide for minimum items to be discussed but 
remain open for national additions and interpretations. This differs from the US Report to 
Shareholders on Form 10-K or 20-F (the content of which follows Regulation S-K) insofar 
its Management Discussion & Analysis (MD&A) merely forms part of that annual report as 
a whole. IFRS does not (yet) contain specific provisions on the MR. The statutory content 
of issuers’ reports therefore may differ since different, national requirements (corporate 
governance codes included) have to be observed in their drafting (RL 4/7 minimum harmo-
nization). Moreover, items related to non-executive directors or supervisory boards in some 
jurisdictions have to be covered separately, at least in the Netherlands, under Best Practice 
(III.1.2 DCCG).78
1.5		 Enforcement
The proof of the pudding remains in the eating. Public enforcement mechanisms and pro-
cedures show some remarkable differences in the EU. An illustrative example of entan-
glement of corporate law procedures on accounting and securities law enforcement of a 
misleading disclosure document is the statutory suspension of the power of the AFM to 
request a court order to restate annual accounts until the general meeting of shareholders 
have adopted the accounts.79
75 Directive 2006/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 amending Council 
Directives 78/660/EEC on the annual accounts of certain types of companies, 83/349/EEC on consoli-
dated accounts, 86/635/EEC on the annual accounts and consolidated accounts of banks and other 
financial institutions and 91/674/EEC on the annual accounts and consolidated accounts of insurance 
undertakings, OJ L 224, 16/08/2006, art. 46a Dir 4 and arts. 50b/50c 4th Dir. and 36a/36b Dir7.
76 Commission recommendation of 15 February 2005, ‘On the role of non-executive or supervisory direc-
tors of listed companies and on the committees of the supervisory board’, 2005/152/EC.
77 Art. 43 8th Dir.
78 Best Practise III.1.2 DCGC, ‘The annual statements of the company shall include a report of the su-
pervisory board. In this report the supervisory board describes its activities in the financial year and 
which includes the specific statements and information required by the provisions of this code.’
79 Arts. 2: 447 and 449 NCC, after the GMS has adopted the annual accounts the AFM and interested par-
ties have the authority to file a request with the Netherlands Business Court (Amsterdam) within six 
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Similarly accounting and disclosure by their nature are closely connected to directors’ 
accountability, liability, discharge and/or indemnification. Accounting is related to the con-
cept of fiduciary duties as ‘agent’ or ‘trustee’ to report, account and disclose on the execu-
tion of their assignment. The flip side of that coin is that acceptance of the agent’s report will 
discharge him for the period covered by his report, not – evidently – for facts and figures that 
were concealed by him. This pattern is typical in traditional corporate ‘accounting’, originat-
ing from partnership rules. Upon implementation of the 4th and 7th (stakeholder-oriented) 
Directives, Member States designed the enforcement thereof partly in the internal govern-
ance of companies, sometimes also with specific actions for creditors.80 These issues and 
the related best practices as defined in governance codes therefore remain – at least par-
tially – embedded in the traditional corporate law substantive and procedural regulations.
Securities law disclosure, however, focuses on the document(s) disclosed by the issuer. Pub-
lic enforcement therefore focuses on correcting (not IFRS-proof) information that is in the 
market. Private enforcement (if and insofar as this term is extended beyond the use of col-
lective and individual ‘member’s rights’ in the issuer’s internal organization) will focus on 
retention of damages suffered by investors caused by misleading statements (securities 
fraud). The way in which Member States have created enforcement mechanisms, including 
causes of action to allow litigation in court, show important differences that may over time 
affect the evolution of common market principles. In the following, I will compare some of 
these differences in more detail against the background of the aims of an integrated EU 
financial market.
2 The regulatory concepts and function of disclosure and ‘accounting’81
This very brief introductory summary reveals a remarkable difference in the basic and 
regulatory function of disclosure and accounting in securities and corporate law and high-
months to restate the annual accounts and the annual report. Cf also art. 2:452 NCC which authorizes 
the AFM to file a request, 6 months after filing of the annual accounts with the AFM, with the BC to 
 order an issuer to give a further explanation concerning the application of IAS. Remarkably, art. 2: 454 
NCC and 455 gives the AFM the power to file a request with the BC to order an issuer, which is incorpo-
rated in another state, to make an public announcement that their annual financial reports/accounts 
are not in compliance with requirements under AFS and IAS. This right can be exercised six months 
after the disclosure of the annual accounts according to art. 5:25c, sub 1 AFS. This procedure is more 
in accordance with the restatement procedure under US securities law. 
80 Art. 2: 138 NCC, which gives creditors the right in bankruptcy situations to file a claim against direc-
tors in case of severe breach of their fiduciary duties. 
81 Periodically extracting, sorting and summarizing the recorded transactions to produce a set of finan-
cial records, also termed financial accounting. The term frequently refers to the report of all items of 
property, income and expenses prepared by a personal representative, trustee or guardian and given 
to heirs, beneficiaries or the probate court. As regaerds the business form (and working of the busi-
ness form in practice) and vision of the corporation (stakeholder/institutional vision v. Shareholder, 
etc.) the nature of accounting works is different. Art. 2 4th Directive, ‘The annual accounts shall com-
prise the balance sheet, the profit and loss account and the notes on the accounts and Art. 46 sub 1 
(a), The annual report shall include at least a fair review of the development and performance of the 
company’s business and of its position, together with a description of the principal risks and uncer-
tainties that it faces.’ 
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lights their different mutual relationship. At first sight, the basic concept of US securities 
regulation seems to be a standalone market-oriented disclosure concept. That concept 
also seems to govern the new EU securities law, but – unlike the US – it still seems to be 
entangled with corporate law accounting. Understanding commonalities and differences 
requires further analysis of these basic notions.
Black’s Law Dictionary defines disclosure as: “The act or process of making known some-
thing that was previously unknown; a revelation of facts.”82 In a broader sense, a disclosure 
regime entails all legally recognized information claims a system of corporate governance 
or a financial system furnishes financial contracting parties with. This may include private 
information channels.83 This description refers to the resulting process or acts rather than 
to the underlying obligation for disclosure. In contrast, the term ‘accounting’ is described 
as: “periodically extracting, sorting, and summarizing the recorded transactions to produce 
a set of financial records, also termed financial accounting”. The term reflects the fiduciary 
nature of the obligation ‘to account’ for the acts since it frequently refers to the report of 
all items of property, income and expenses prepared by a personal representative, trustee 
or guardian and given to heirs, beneficiaries or the probate court.84 Let me first turn to the 
function of disclosure.
2.1	 Disclosure
The focus and regulatory function of securities law (market) disclosure rules for issuers 
of securities is to inform the market, notably investors in the market for these securities. 
These rules are prompted by going and being public. Mandatory disclosure rules for issuers 
provide standards for such market information.85
82 Black’s Law Dictionary, Thomson West, St. Paul, 2004.
83 C. Leuz and J. Wustemann, ‘The role of accounting in the German financial system’, in: J. Krahnen and 
R. H. Schmidt (eds.), The German Financial System, New York: Oxford University Press 2003. Or any 
legal obligation that requires an issuer’s management to provide, on a regular basis, information that 
it otherwise might not be inclined to provide, Merritt B. Fox, ‘Challenges to Corporate Governance: 
Required Disclosure and Corporate Governance’, 62 Law & Contemp. Prob. 113, 1999, p. 2.
84 Black’s Law Dictionary.
85 Investor protection attempts inter alia to mitigate problems of asymmetric and inadequate informa-
tion. Most jurisdictions rely on mandatory disclosure to protect public investors; Roberta Romano, 
Foundations of Corporate Law, New York: Oxford University Press 1993, p. 301: “insofar as managers 
are required to disclose information on the use made of the corporate funds and on the business deci-
sions taken by them in the course of their governance, investors are enabled to monitor the agents’ 
behavior. In many cases it is hard to distinguish these different forms of efficiency-enhancing infor-
mation given by the management to the investors; the capital market function in general (issuer v. 
investor) and the principal-agent problem in particular (management v. shareholder) for example, 
when shareholders use corporate information to decide on measures taken against the management 
(derivative suits etc.) and on the prospect of their investment as such, e.g., in the context of a takeover 
offer which results from bad management and an ensuing fall of the company’s stock price.” 
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2.1.1  Price function disclosure
Its principal objectives are twofold: first, to ensure that the prices of publicly traded securi-
ties are reasonably well-informed (accuracy function: prices reflect all relevant informa-
tion), allowing market participants to determine prices for securities that accurately reflect 
all available information. Disclosure thus contributes to informational efficiency by enabling 
traders to gather information, and thereby reflect new information in prices, at a reduced 
cost compared to a world without disclosure.86
2.1.2 Agency function disclosure
Secondly, disclosure contributes to protection of investors by effective corporate govern-
ance institutions (monitoring) afterwards (agency function).87 Both objectives cause regula-
tors to constrain opportunistic behaviour by managers or controlling shareholders (thus 
addressing the agency problem),88 by reducing the monitoring costs of promoters’ and man-
86 John C. Coffee Jr., ‘Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System’, 70 Va L 
Rev 717 (1984); Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, ‘Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection 
of Investors’, 70 Va L Rev 669 (1984); and Gregg A. Jarrell, ‘The Economic Effects of Federal Regulation 
of the Market for New Security Issues’, 24 J L & Econ 613 (1981) and Marcel Kahan, ‘Securities Laws and 
the Social Costs of “in accurate” Stock Prices’, 41 Duke L J 977, 979 (1992); Jeffrey N. Gordon and Lewis 
A. Kornhauser, ‘Efficient Markets, Costly Information, and Securities Research’, 60 NYU L Rev 761, 802 
(1985); Ronald J. Gilson and Reinier Kraakman, ‘The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency’, 70 Va L Rev 
549, 601 (1984). Eilís Ferran, Building an EU Securities Market, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
2004, p. 130, approaches advocating slimmed-down, agency problem-orientated mandatory disclo-
sure regimes are normative suggestions rather than an accurate description of current regulatory 
practice around the world. See also, idem, p. 47 and Eugene Fama, ‘Efficient Capital Markets: A review 
of theory and empirical work’, 25 J. Fin. 383 (1970) and Ronald J. Gilson and Reinier H. Kraakman, ‘The 
Mechanisms of Market Efficiency’, 70 Va L Rev 549, 601, 1984, p. 3 and the recent article by Gilson and 
Kraakman, ‘The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency Twenty Years Later: The Hindsight Bias’, in: John 
Armour and Joseph A. McCahery (eds), After Enron, Improving Corporate Law and Modernising Securities 
Regulation in Europe and the US, Oxford: Hart Publications 2006, p. 29. And it serves efficiency to gather 
information and form a judgment on the value of the securities based on such information about the 
performance of the issuer and all data relevant to the market and thus to be reflected in the stock 
price to ensure that issuers will provide the market and its participants with proper, adequate, reliable 
and timely information on their performance and registered securities. Eilis Ferran, Building an EU 
Securities Market, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2004, p. 127, behavioural finance scholar-
ship identifies over-optimism and over-confidence as cognitive biases that may contribute towards 
irrationality in securities markets: see, e.g. L.A. Cunningham, ‘Behavioral Finance and Investor Gov-
ernance’, 59 Washington & Lee Law Review , 767, 2002 and R. Prentice, ‘Whither Securities Regulation? 
Some Behavioural Observations Regarding Proposals for its Future’, 51 Duke Law Journal 1397, 2001. 
Investor irrationality tends to attract particular attention but, as various commentators have noted, 
regulatory agencies and other rule-makers are also vulnerable to over-confidence and other biases 
that could distort their decisions: S.M. Bainbridge, ‘Mandatory Disclosure: A Behavioural Analysis’, 68 
University of Cincinnati Law Review 1023, 2000 and S.J. Choi and A.C. Pritchard, ‘Behavioural Econom-
ics and the SEC’, 56 Standford Law Review, 2003. See also G. Raaijmakers, The Effectiveness of Rules in 
Company and Securities Law, Den Haag: Boom Juridische Uitgevers 2006.
87 See also Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, The economic structure of corporate law, Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1991, Roberta Romano, Foundations of Corporate Law, New York: 
Oxford University Press 1993, p. 301 and P. Mahoney, ‘Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to agency 
Problems’ 62 University of Chicago Law Review 1047, 1995, p. 2.
88 Reinier R. Kraakman, Paul Davies, Henry Hansmann, Gerard Hertig, Klaus J. Hopt, Hideki Kanda & 
Edward B. Rock, The Anatomy of Corporate Law, A Comparative and Functional Approach, New York: Ox-
ford University Press 2004, p. 194. Nb. there is also a corporate governance function in better pricing 
accuracy, i.e. market for corporate control and managers are assumed to be incentivised or deterred 
by the knowledge that performance failures will be likely to affect adversely the value of their share-
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agers’ use of corporate assets for self-interested purposes and monitoring for the benefit 
of shareholders, creditors and other interested parties.89 Regulation of corporate financial 
disclosure (also in proxy statements) thus aims at enhancing investors’ ability to monitor 
management90 and their investment decisions. Securities disclosure thus supports and 
supplements the mechanisms of monitoring, litigation and voting.91
Three functions of mandatory disclosure therefore may be distinguished: enforcement, 
educative and regulatory/legislative.92 Disclosure rules that target agency problems may 
not contribute to the accuracy of near-term share prices directly; e.g. rules requiring dis-
closure of self-dealing transactions between the company and its directors may be critical 
to controlling manager-shareholder agency problems, even if these transactions are trivial 
in comparison in comparison to the value of the company’s assets or market capitalization.93
based remuneration and their chances of further reputationally-enhanced personal career progres-
sion, as well as their ability to raise new corporate finance on favourable terms.
89 Reinier R. Kraakman, Paul Davies, Henry Hansmann, Gerard Hertig, Klaus J. Hopt, Hideki Kanda & 
Edward B. Rock, The Anatomy of Corporate Law, A Comparative and Functional Approach, New York: Ox-
ford University Press 2004 and P.Mahoney, ‘Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to agency Problems’, 
62 University of Chicago Law Review 1047, 1995. From a regulatory point of view this perspective of the 
agency problem would lead to a more backward looking approach: how the firms’ money and assets 
are being used over the reporting period, allowing to spot breaches of management towards share-
holders; historical cost accounting then would be appropriate.
90 Alongside other such mechanisms as alignment, bonding, exposure to the market for corporate con-
trol and gate keeping. Its effectiveness is however questionable.
91 Roberta Romano, Foundations of Corporate Law, New York: Oxford University Press 1993, p. 301.
92 Reinier R. Kraakman, Paul Davies, Henry Hansmann, Gerard Hertig, Klaus J. Hopt, Hideki Kanda & 
Edward B. Rock, The Anatomy of Corporate Law, A Comparative and Functional Approach, New York: Ox-
ford University Press 2004, p. 195 and see Reinier Kraakman, ‘Disclosure and Corporate Governance: 
an overview Essay’, in: Klaus J. Hopt, Jaap Winter and Eddy Wymeersch (eds.), Reforming Company and 
Takeover Law in Europe, New York: Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 97.
93 Disclosure of self-dealing transactions are an example of the enforcement function. US securities law 
requires officers, directors and their immediate family members to disclose a material interest in all 
related party transactions involving amounts greater than USD 60,000 (SEC Regulation S-K, Item 404 
(a)). The second governance function of disclosure is educating public shareholders to make or ratify 
fundamental corporate decisions. For example, in proxy contests, shareholders require information 
about the proposed policies and affiliations of competing board candidates. Also a legal requirement 
that shareholders must approve mergers, or that they must vote on self-dealing contracts between 
the company and its directors, would be meaningless without disclosure of the proposed terms of 
these transactions, Reinier Kraakman, ‘Disclosure and Corporate Governance: an overview Essay’, in: 
Klaus J. Hopt, Jaap Winter and Eddy Wymeersch (eds.), Reforming Company and Takeover Law in Europe, 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 97. Similarly, shareholders who are asked to approve a 
merger transaction or respond to a tender offer need information that neither management nor the 
outside bidder will necessarily supply in the absence of a legal requirement to do so, Reinier Kraak-
man, ‘Disclosure and Corporate Governance: an overview Essay’, in: Klaus J. Hopt, Jaap Winter and 
Eddy Wymeersch (eds.), Reforming Company and Takeover Law in Europe, New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2004, p. 98: “From the passage of the securities Exchange Act of 1934 onward, US regulators 
have justified mandatory disclosure as a means of encouraging the participation of public sharehold-
ers in corporate governance. The hope that disclosure might facilitate ‘corporate democracy’ remains 
an important current in US securities law to this day, although the historical evidence suggests that 
SEC disclosure requirements often discouraged shareholder participation in governance in the past.”; 
e.g., J. Pound, ‘Proxy Voting and the SEC’, 29 J Financial Economics 241, 1991.
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2.1.3 Regulatory use disclosure
With respect to the legislative/regulatory and the third function of disclosure Professor 
Kraakman wrote: “Regulators have long appreciated that power over disclosure can be lev-
eraged into power to legislate ‘soft’ substantive norms of the behaviour for public compa-
nies. Corporations are required to report under penalty of law, whether they follow certain 
norms of good governance and corporate citizenship, or explain why they do not. Depending 
on the circumstances, these supra-legal norms may be prescribed outright (e.g., disclosure 
that the directors on the issuer’s nominating committee are independent, or explain why 
they are not), or be left to other authorities, or even the company itself, to determine. But no 
matter how they are set, these norms will be enforced, so the strategy assumes, largely by 
the reputational cost to companies and managers of confessing unusually lax standards or 
governance procedures”.94
My analysis will reveal that this regulatory function of disclosure in the EU is used more 
broadly and intensively in the corporate law and governance-oriented MR. Most illustra-
tive is art. 46a 4th Directive requiring issuers to report on the ‘comply or explain’-rule on 
the observance of best practices in the national corporate governance code. These rules 
remain embedded in the internal affairs of the company. I will show a tension between 
this additional regulatory aim of disclosure and the stricter and narrower securities law 
requirements of the EU Transparency Directive and the disclosure of the stakeholder-ori-
ented corporate annual accounts of the 4th Directive.
As will be set out in par. 5.2, the regulatory function of disclosure for the report of EU-issu-
ers shows an ‘open-ended’ sideway, since the content and comparability of MRs depends 
on national choices made upon implementation, (the development of) different codes (best 
practices) of ‘self-regulatory’ committees/bodies, the way these are supported by listing 
rules and their ‘enforcement’.
2.1.4 Corporate disclosure
The term disclosure can also be used to characterize the mandatory requirements of the 4th 
and 7th Directives for all companies to publish (to be made available to the general public via 
the commercial register) their accounts by depositing these with the commercial register or 
company registrar. This concept enlarges the circle of interested parties from shareholders 
(although those in privately held firms can easily provide for their own accounting rules) to 
94 Reinier Kraakman, ‘Disclosure and Corporate Governance: an overview Essay’, in: Klaus J. Hopt, Jaap 
Winter and Eddy Wymeersch (eds.), Reforming Company and Takeover Law in Europe, New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2004, p. 98; see his example on the use of this regulatory strategy in the US when 
the SEC adopted Rule 13e-3 to regulate going-private transactions; Rule 13e-3 requires controlling 
shareholders who wish to cash-out minority shareholders to disclose whether their proposed trans-
actions are fair to minority shareholders, and, in the course of this discussion, report on a variety of 
procedural features, such as independent representation for minority shareholders, approval by a 
majority of the minority vote, approval by unaffiliated directors, that the SEC was clearly holding out 
as indicia of fairness. See Rule 13e-3 and SEC Schedule M-A, Item 1014 (fairness of Going-Private 
Transaction). 
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third parties, primarily creditors. For purposes of tax accounting, tax law itself sets its own 
accounting and inspection rules.95
Evidently, the different meaning and use of disclosure concepts will be reflected in the 
mechanisms available for their enforcement, e.g. non-disclosure or late/delayed disclosure 
of 4th Directive accounts exposes the director of a Netherlands company in bankruptcy to 
personal liability for the deficit (arts. 2:138/248 NCC).
2.2	 Accounting
Next, I contrast securities (market-oriented) disclosure with ‘internal’ accounting96 of the 
(management) board to the Annual General Meeting (AGM) (shareholders as members of 
the organization) and/or the supervisory board and disclosure to the community at large (via 
deposition of the annual accounts with the commercial register or similar agency). Internal 
accounting to the AGM is sometimes reflected, such as in the Netherlands, in mandatory 
rules that require the management and superviory boards to present the ‘draft’ accounts to 
the AGM (as body corporate) to vote on the proposal to adopt these accounts and separately 
to vote on the proposal to discharge the board.97 Thus, the adoption of the annual accounts 
by the AGM remain framed in the traditional accounting rules, i.e. management to account 
for the financials and its own performance in the past fiscal year vis-à-vis its shareholders 
(members) in meeting.98
However, EU company law 4th and 7th Directives reflect a stakeholder-oriented accounting 
and disclosure system for the public at large as also appears from the Preamble of these 
Directives.99 The resulting system thus focuses on disclosure of the accounts and reports 
as well as the auditor’s report drafted in accordance with this EU accounting standards to 
95 P. Essers & R. Russo, ‘The Precious Relationship between IAS/IFRS, national tax accounting systems 
and the CCCTB’, in: P.H.J. Essers, T. Raaijmakers, R. Russo, P. van der Schee, L. van der Tas & P. van 
der Zanden (eds.), The Influence of IAS/IFRS on the CCCTB, Tax Accounting, Disclosure and Corporate Law 
Accounting Concepts, Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International 2008, pp. 29-81.
96 Black Law Dictionary: “periodically extracting, sorting, and summarizing the recorded transactions to 
produce a set of financial records, also termed financial accounting. The term frequently refers to the 
report of all items of property, income, and expenses prepared by a personal representative, trustee, 
or guardian and given to heirs, beneficiaries, or the probate court.” 
97 The traditional way of accounting by management to participants (shareholders) on the fulfilment of 
their assignment during the accounting period essentially is a specimen of the more general duty to 
account in all fiduciary relationships (agents, trustees, partners in partnership). 
98 Cf Ella Gepken-Jager, VOC 1602-2002:400 years of company law, Deventer: Kluwer Legal Publishers 
2005. The Dutch approach originates from the Dutch United East Indian Company (1602) created by 
charter of parliament granting a trade monopoly for ‘the East’. The accounting scheme became the 
standard form for public companies as enacted in the Napoleontic Commercial Code. Dutch corpo-
rate law until 1970 had just one mandatory provision on the annual accounts of public firms and audit 
which did not prevent the emergence of a broad set of accounting standards. In Germany, the Ger-
man Aktiengesetz (1874, 1892, revised in 1937 and 1965) framed the corporate law charter of the 
Aktiengesellschaft as a ‘Publikumsgesellschaft’ with board supremacy and a supervisory board to 
which management should account and with own specific accounting rules. The aim was a stand-
alone corporate charter for ‘public’ companies, i.e. companies with dispersed anonymous ownership. 
Government consent was dropped and replaced by ‘materielle Normativbestimmungen’ (public over-
sight on creation being replaced by mandatory substantive rules and norms).
99 Preamble 4th Directive (78/660/EEC), whereas the coordination of national provisions concerning the 
presentation and content of annual accounts and annual reports, the valuation methods, used therein 
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serve both the public at large (stakeholders) as well as its shareholders of all companies 
(privately and publicly held).
The different regulatory routes of the US and the EU and its Member States may be illus-
trated by a brief summary of the principles of and the regulatory policies under the “Roman 
Treaty” and the role of the judiciary (European Court of Justice). These starting conditions of 
the EU and US disclosure systems are discussed in following chapters. I focus on disclosure 
and accounting for issuers.100
3 EU corporate accounting and disclosure rules (1st, 4th, 7th and 11th 
Directives)
In 1958, each of the EU’s founding fathers (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg 
and the Netherlands101) had its own corporate law and (largely) self-regulatory securities 
regulation drafted by stock exchanges.102 State oversight (and ‘concession’) on the creation 
of (‘public’) corporations over time had largely been replaced by mandatory substantive 
rules developing towards an ‘institutional’ stakeholder-oriented concept of corporations, 
also on disclosure and accounting. Hence, corporate law was not only directed at protecting 
shareholders, but also creditors and other ‘stakeholders’.
To achieve one common market, the “Roman Treaty”103 established amongst others the 
freedom of establishment (arts. 42-49) and of capital (arts. 67-73). (Cross-border) corpo-
rate mobility was hardly existent104 and regulatory competition105 was restricted by the aims 
and policies to harmonize corporate law (art.44(g)) and adopt regulations for ‘federal’ Euro-
pean business forms.106 The power to harmonize corporate law reflects a broad, ‘institu-
tional’ concept and ‘stakeholder’-approach of companies/entities/legal persons (art. 48-2). 
and their publication in respect of certain companies with limited liability is of special importance for 
the protection of members and third parties.
100 Cf. also Friedrich Kubler, ‘The Rules of Capital Under Pressure of the Securities Markets’, in: Klaus 
Hopt and Eddy Wymeersch (Eds.), Capital Markets and Company law, New York: Oxford University Press, 
2003, p. 95, he discusses some of the prevailing theories explaining the rules on capital as an element 
of a specific “culture” or as the product of ‘path dependence’. This suggests a different approach by 
arguing that the emergence as well as the elimination of rules on capital can be traced to changes in 
financial markets. 
101 Extended in 1973 extended with the UK, Ireland and Denmark, and with Greece (1981) Portugal and 
Spain (1986), Austria, Finland and Sweden (1995), Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania. Malta, 
Poland, Slovenia, Czech Republic (2004), Bulgaria and Romania. 
102 Belgium has since 1935 provided for an act on securities regulation that resembles the US SA’33 and 
SEA’34
103 1 January 1958, amended by inter alia, Treaties of Maastricht (1993), Amsterdam (1997) and Nice 
(2001).
104 Daily Mail. See Case 81/87 The Queen v Treasury and Commissioners of Inland Revenue, ex parte Daily Mail 
and General Trust [1988] ECR 5483; cf. Joseph A McCahery and Erik P.M. Vermeulen, ‘Understanding 
Corporate Mobility in the EU’, Working paper for the 5th European Company Law and Corporate Gov-
ernance Conference in Berlin, June 2007
105 France feared the Netherlands would become the ‘European Delaware’. Harmonization should pre-
vent this.
106 See e.g. the EEIG, SE, SCE, and the recent plans for an EPC.
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Art.44(g) focuses on protecting the interests not only of members (and investors) but also 
of third parties. Though restricted by the subsidiarity principle107 and unlike in the US, the 
EC’s initial aim (arts. 44 (2) (g) and 48 (2) “Roman Treaty”) was undoubtedly to harmonize 
all major company law issues as perceived over time focussing on ‘public’ companies but 
over time on all types of limited liability companies. The EU’s corporate law harmonization 
program, including accounting and disclosure rules, was strongly influenced by the then 
recent German AktG (1965) as a standalone statute for formal ‘public’ management man-
aged corporations. This was reflected in the 1970 draft SE Statute: the corporate charter 
itself should protect the interests of shareholders, creditors, employees and others, also 
– in Title VI – by extensive provisions on drafting, adoption and audit of (single and con-
solidated) annual accounts.108 This draft SE Statute de facto seem to have served as the EU 
agenda for harmonization of corporate law (not securities law). Remarkably, but consistent 
with art.44(g), no substantial distinction was made between public (listed/traded) and pri-
vately held corporations, both types reflected a stakeholder orientation, also on corporate 
accounting, disclosure and audit.
3.1	 EU	corporate	accounting	rules
The 1st Directive is the core of the EU-style corporate disclosure system. To enhance trade 
within the Common Market – it facilitates access to basic data of ‘companies’ as market 
participants and their branches (11th Directive109) by requiring disclosure (through filing with 
the commercial register or similar agency) of their corporate data: instrument of constitu-
tion (incorporation) and amendments, (powers of) managers, subscribed and authorized 
capital and (!) the annual accounts as required by the 4th and 7th Directives (audited single 
and consolidated accounts). The initial exemption of private companies was dropped later.110 
In the US no such general rule prevails.111
107 According to art. 5 of the Roman Treaty, the EU shall not take any measures which are not covered by 
explicit or implicit powers conferred upon them under the EC Treaty. Cf art. 44 (2) (g) (formerly art. 54 
(3) (g) EEC) provides that the Council, the Commission and the European Parliament shall ‘coordinate 
to the necessary extent the safeguards which, for the protection of the interests of members and oth-
ers, are required by Member States of companies or firms within the meaning of the second paragraph 
of Article 48 with a view to making such safeguards equivalent throughout the Community’.
108 Remarkably, annual accounts were to be adopted by management and supervisory board and only in 
case of disagreement between these bodies by the GMS (arts. 211-219).
109 11th Directive, 89/666/EEC, concerning disclosure requirements in respect of branches opened in a 
Member State by certain types of company governed, by the law of another State, OJ L 395/36, 30 
December 1989.
110 Vanessa Edwards, EC Company Law, New York: Oxford University Press 1999 , p. 122, the final version 
of the Directive applied to public and private limited-liability companies as covered by the 1st Directive. 
Limited liability became the criterion because such companies’ activities frequently extend cross-
border and offer no safeguards to third parties beyond their net assets (2nd recital preamble).
111 Nonpublic firms in the US have no legal obligation to draft annual accounts, to have these audited, 
to submit these with an auditor’s opinion to their shareholders or partners for adoption or approval 
and subsequently to disclose these to the public through filing with a public commercial register. 
Disclosure is not a ‘condition’ for the grant of limited liability. The corporate charter may provide for 
inspection rights and accounting to shareholders like in partnerships or other non-corporate firms. 
See Reinier R. Kraakman, Paul Davies, Henry Hansmann, Gerard Hertig, Klaus J. Hopt, Hideki Kanda 
& Edward B. Rock, The Anatomy of Corporate Law, A Comparative and Functional Approach, New York: 
Oxford University Press 2004, p. 8 and 79; Judith Freedman, ‘Limited Liability: Large Company Theory 
and Small Firms!’ Modern Law Review, Vol. 63, No.3, May 2000
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Hence all ‘public’ (including issuers and close112) ‘companies’ shall disclose their annual 
accounts (art. 2, 1st Dir.) and account to their shareholders by means of single and con-
solidated accounts (art. 2, 4th Dir and art.1, 7th Dir.). (Partial) exemptions and mitigations are 
available for (very) small firms.113 The directives also apply to issuers.
The 4th and 7th Directives distinguish the annual accounts (balance sheet, P&L and notes 
thereto: art. 2, 4th Dir.) from the annual report (art.46). The accounts shall be drawn up in 
accordance with the accounting standards provided by the Directive (art. 2, 4th Dir. and art. 
16, 7th Dir.). Detailed explanatory notes to the accounts shall be provided in accordance with 
art. 4 (3) (as amended in 2006): valuation methods, list of subsidiaries, shares and share 
capital, off-balance commitments, number of employees, tax liabilities, compensation 
schemes, etc. These notes shall also explain risks of off-balance transactions and related 
party transactions.114
Management shall also draft an annual report (art. 46, 4th Dir. and 36, 7th Dir.), including at 
least a fair view of the development of the company’s business and of its position, principal 
risks and uncertainties it faces, a balanced and comprehensive analysis of the develop-
ment and performance of the business: financial and non-financial key performance indica-
tors, environment and employee matters, post balance sheet events, future development, 
research and development, branches, details on financial instruments being used. Art. 46a 
(inserted in 2006; cf. art. 10 Takeover Directive) requires issuers only to include a corporate 
governance statement in their report. The regulatory use of the annual financial report will 
be further elaborated in par. 5 below, which shows how reporting requirements for issuers 
based on EU securities law remain intertwined with those of the corporate law directives 
and, hence, national corporate law.
3.2	 EU	corporate	disclosure
All these corporations shall ‘publish’ their duly approved annual accounts and the annual 
(management) report together with the auditors’ opinion as laid down in national law accord-
ing to the 1st Directive (arts. 47-50a 4th Dir. and 38 Dir7). This duty to ‘publish’ is discharged 
by filing these documents with the commercial register (or similar agency such as a compa-
nies registrar): ‘duly approved’ means that according to corporate law the document must 
be ‘final’ and definitive, i.e. adopted by the competent body corporate within the internal 
organization of the issuer.115 The disclosure rules of the EU 4th and 7th company law Directives 
are corporate not securities law. As will be set out below-securities law disclosure requires 
112 German GmbH, French SàRL, Netherlands BV, Italian SaRL, UK private companies limited by shares 
or by guarantee. 
113 Member States may permit SMEs to draft abridged balance sheets and notes (art. 11 and 44). Art. 47 
(2) extends the scope: Member States may relieve them from publishing audited accounts.
114 §§ 401, 402 and 403 SOx. RL 9; Action Plan; annual statements.
115 Art. 47 (1) 4th Dir. and art. 38 (1) 7th Dir., the annual accounts, duly approved, and the annual report, 
together with the opinion submitted by the person responsible for auditing the accounts, shall be 
published as laid down by the laws of each Member State in accordance with art. 3 of Directive 68/151/
EEC. See also art. 2: 394 sub 1 NCC, the corporation is required to make public the annual accounts 
8 days after it has been adopted. Art. 2:394 sub 2 provides for a sanction when the annual accounts 
are not yet adopted by GMS in the prescribed term (13 months as a maximum) that the board will make 
public the annul accounts according to the procedure described in art. 2:394 sub 1 NCC, see J.J.M. 
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prompt disclosure of the annual financial report upon being finalized even if corporate law 
assigns adoption of the accounts to the annual meeting of shareholders. Upon adoption by 
the AGM – as in the Netherlands provided by corporate law – the document shall again be 
‘published’ by filing with the commercial register, i.e. many weeks after its earlier securities 
law disclosure according to the AFS.116
The German AktG illustrates the notion of why corporate law transparency was linked to 
the statutory (formal) business form of the AG rather than to this being listed/traded: pub-
lication of the accounts and its link to capital protection rules intended to serve not only 
to protect shareholders, but also to enable creditors and other third parties to assess the 
financial position of their (potential) debtor.117
3.3	 EU	institutional	corporate	disclosure	design
The resulting EU corporate law system (applicable to both private and ‘public’ type com-
panies and irrespective whether these are ‘issuers’) thus focusses on disclosure of the 
accounts (including the reports) drafted in accordance with the common EU standards and 
audited by an independent auditor accordingly serve the public at large rather than account-
ing to shareholders only.118 Disclosure in this context means: depositing the accounts with 
the commercial register (or similar agency). Still, the accounts remain framed in the tradi-
tional basic pattern that management ‘accounts’ for discharging their duties vis-à-vis the 
corporation by presenting its report (financials and narrative report) to its shareholders 
(and/or its supervisors).
Maeijer, Asser 2-III Vertegenwoordiging en Rechtspersoon, De Naamloze en de Besloten Vennootschap, 
Deventer: Tjeenk Willink 2000
116 Art. 5:25c AFS and art. 5:25i sub 2 and art. 5:53 sub 1 AFS.
117 These provisions constrain a flexible pay-out policy (dividends, distributions) since they can imply a 
formal change of the articles of incorporation to decrease the company’s capital. The amended 2nd 
Directive now allows more flexibility: Directive 2006/68/EC of 6 September 2006 amending Council Di-
rective 77/91/EEC. Specific reporting and disclosure rules are applicable in case of changes of capital 
and other incidental corporate reorganizations: (cross-border) legal mergers and splits (3rd, 6th and 
10th Directive): 3rd Directive, concerning mergers of public limited liability companies, OJ L 295/36, 
6th Directive concerning the division of public limited liability companies, L 378/47.and 10th Directive 
2005/56/EC on cross-border mergers of limited liability companies.
118 Marco Becht, ‘European Disclosure for the New Millennium’, in: Klaus Hopt & Eddy Wymeersch, Capi-
tal Markets and Company Law, New York: Oxford University Press 2003, p. 87-91, strongly pleads for 
a shift towards electronic filing; cf. Jaap Winter, report 2002, par. 3.1., European Commission, Action 
Plan (may 2003), par. 3.1.2. Until now, the EU has no such electronic register like the US ‘EDGAR’ 
electronic filing system. See however consultation and report of EC on reviewing the execution of 
the Transparency Directive in the several MS; the review of the operation of Directive 2004/109/EC: 
emerging issues Accompanying document to the Report from the Commission to the Council, the 
European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Re-
gions Operation of Directive 2004/109/EC on the harmonisation of transparency requirements in re-
lation to information about issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market 
COM(2010)243, p. 17, so far no positive results are reached with the storage of regulated information 
in the MS; access to historical information on listed companies on a pan-European scale has not been 
simplified: interested parties need to go through 27 different national databases. Compared with the 
US, where a single electronic database exists <http://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml>, the EU situation is 
not positive. Therefore the EC will launch a feasibility study on the development of a pan-European 
storage system for regulated information. 
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This whole ‘internal’ process remains applicable for issuers as well, at least in principle. It 
finally results in the disclosed annual financial part and its constituent parts (single, consol-
idated accounts, MR and the board-statement on the fairness of these documents, external 
auditor’s opinion) to follow and remain embedded in the internal governance of the issuer 
as set out by mandatory corporate law and its articles of association. For issuers these 
duties are extended by ‘applicable’ best practices as set out by national corporate govern-
ance codes that – in turn – remain entangled with and extend both ‘governance’ and ‘dis-
closure’ rules without clearly distinguishing between them. The nature of these disclosure 
and ‘accounting’ rules, certainly if viewed separately, may look to be ‘technical’, but in the 
governance charter of the reporting entity (also issuers) they reflect the basic principles 
and regulatory choices that over time have been made by the EU and national regulators for, 
inter alia, the division of powers between management and shareholders, the role,  powers 
and core (entrepreneurial) assignment of directors vis-à-vis NED (SB), common and distinct 
accountability, responsibility and ultimate liability of directors and non-executive directors 
(one or two tier), gate keeping by external auditors and – finally – public oversight by gov-
ernmental agencies. In corporate law and practice such rules are reflected in technical 
and procedural rules on the series of steps to be taken before the final dissemination of 
the annual financial report: internal control and preparations, final drafting, submission to 
and discussion with audit committee and auditor, subsequent submission to and ‘approval’ 
by full board and supervisory board or non-executive directors, establishment of final and 
formal ‘approval’ and signing to also assume responsibility for the completeness and fair-
ness of the financials and the overall view given in the MR, submitting (laying down) the 
document for the shareholders and/or the AGM, simultaneous disclosure to market and 
the public at large, discussion of the document in the AGM and in some jurisdictions even 
‘adoption’ of the accounts (as part of the report), updating auditors opinions and subsequent 
‘final’ corporate law disclosure of the document by filing with the commercial register (or 
similar agency). From the market-oriented perspective of securities law it may be clear 
that prompt disclosure of the annual accounts has to follow their completion by the Board 
and the submission of the final opinion of the external auditor: this is price-sensitive insider 
information par excellence. The notion is to prevent information asymmetry and abuse of 
inside information.
All these steps and elements are part of the corporate law design of the corporation and dif-
fer from Member State to Member State. The draft 5th Directive envisaged harmonizing the 
basic corporate law rules thereof, including the final adoption of the accounts by the AGM119 
119 The draft 5th Directive intended to harmonize such rules by ordering that the accounts together with 
the management report and audit opinion should be submitted to the AGM for adoption/approval, 
which resolution directly and indirectly would discharge the board for its reported performance. This 
draft directive dealt with the very core of corporate governance of ‘large’ formal public companies (not 
issuers): board structure, codetermination, division of powers between management, non executive 
directors and GMS and other governance issues. The subsequent debate essentially was on the choice 
between shareholder and employee orientation, in the sense used by Reinier R. Kraakman, Paul Dav-
ies, Henry Hansmann, Gerard Hertig, Klaus J. Hopt, Hideki Kanda & Edward B. Rock, The Anatomy 
of Corporate Law, A Comparative and Functional Approach, New York: Oxford University Press 2004. 
Inspired by the German Aktiengesetz (1965) the 1972 draft essentially aimed at harmonizing the basics 
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and appointment of and assignment to the external auditor. Not surprisingly no agreement 
could be reached since the core of the dispute related to the regulatory choice between a 
(more institutional) shareholder- or employee-oriented corporate governance system. The 
draft was finally withdrawn by the European Commission in 2004.
I conclude that the 4th and 7th Directives (accounting standards, audit and disclosure) are 
directed at all companies.120 They apply to the (single) accounts of issuers that have to 
adhere thereto and follow the internal and external rules, also on formal approval, which 
will cause tensions with securities law rules (prompt disclosure upon ‘completion’) in juris-
dictions where the annual accounts are adopted by the AGM or the SB (to accept and approve 
the board’s ‘accounting’). Before I can further discuss these tensions in that area I now turn 
to the basic characteristics of securities law rules on disclosure for issuers.
4 Investor protection and market regulation in the perspective of 
securities law: the US and EU model
Therefore we now turn to the perspective of financial markets and securities regulation that 
emerged over the last decade and accompanied a shift of public attention and regulatory 
actions to integrate the EU financial markets, to enhance market integrity and protect inves-
tors in securities by mandatory rules. It resulted in a market-oriented disclosure system 
under public oversight, replacing largely self-regulation and oversight by stock exchanges.
A brief comparative analysis of the US and EU securities disclosure system illustrates that 
the US system is completely market-oriented and that periodic (continuous) disclosure 
is integrated with transactional disclosure. The US annual financial report functions as a 
standalone securities law disclosure document. It will be shown that the EU securities dis-
closure system largely resembles the US system, although the disclosure of the EU annual 
financial report (art. 4 Transparency Directive) appears to remain connected to EU corpo-
rate law concepts.
of corporate governance by mandatory ‘internal’ governance rules: the division of powers between 
management, supervisors (non executive directors) and the GMS. COM (72) 887 final, 18 July 1972, 
JO C 131/49; EC Bull Supp 10/72. First draft 1972. Last official draft: COM (91) 372 final, 20 November 
1991; (1991) OJ C321/9. In 1996, the Commission asked Ernst & Young to consider the relevance of the 
draft 5th Directive in the study it had commissioned on corporate governance. The Commission decid-
ed to draw back the proposal on 9 January 2004, OJ C 5/20 (2004), Vanessa Edwards, EC Company Law, 
New York: Oxford University Press 1999, p. 389. Two highly controversial proposals were the manda-
tory creation of a two-tier board structure (art. 2 5th Directive) consisting of a managing organ and a 
supervisory organ and mandatory provisions for employees’ representation on the supervisory board 
for companies with a workforce greater than 500, art. 4(2) (3). See Vanessa Edwards, EC Company Law, 
New York: Oxford University Press 1999, p. 388.
120 See also Wolfgang Schön, ‘Corporate disclosure in a Competitive Environment, – The ECJ’s Axel 
Springer Case and the quest for a European Framework for Mandatory Disclosure’, Working Paper No 
55 ECGI, 2006 and Axel Springer Case C-435/02 and C-103/03 (Axel Springer G v. Zeitungsverlag Nieder-
rhein GmbH & Co Kg and Axel Springer AG v. Hans Jürgen Wuste), where the ECJ acknowledges the broad 
disclosure philosophy of the 1st, 4 and 7th EU corporate law Directives.
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4.1	 The	US	securities	law	disclosure	system
The regulatory response of US Congress to the crash of 1929 as embedded in the New Deal 
policies of President Roosevelt and influenced by the UK Gladstonian revisions of the late 
19th century clearly focussed and built on the concept of market transparency and full initial 
and continuous disclosure of issuers in the primary and secondary market. This resulted 
in an integrated121 disclosure system that remains122 the core of the federal US securities 
regulation (and listing requirements123) since its inception in the SA’33124 and the SEA’34125. 
Disclosure philosophy has been described as the most characteristic of US securities 
law.126 Overtime, the SEC’s regulatory policies on accuracy enhancement shifted focus from 
accountability of management to their shareholders towards disclosure by the firm. Disclo-
sure requirements shifted from backward-looking ‘accounting’ to forward-looking disclo-
sure on the business: forward-looking statements, current market valuation and segment 
reporting.127
4.1.1 Transactional disclosure
Securities law disclosure is prompted by going public (IPO) and hence limited to ‘ issuers’ 
irrespective of the (domestic or foreign) legal form of their business organization. An IPO 
requires a registration statement to be filed with the SEC, the substance of which is a cir-
cular (‘prospectus’) for the securities that the issuer (and/or underwriters) is offering to the 
121 Historically (previously) required disclosures under the two Acts had been developed independently 
of each other, Louis Loss and Joel Seligman, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation, New York: Aspen 
Publishers 2004, p. 151. Through a series of changes in 1982, the SA’33 and SEA’34 disclosure sys-
tems have been largely integrated and made consistent and non-redundant; see Milton H. Cohen, 
‘The integrated Disclosure System – Unfinished Business’, 40 Bus. Law. 987, 1984-1985, p. 1. Milton H. 
Cohen pleaded in its influential law article, ‘Truth in Securities Revisited’, (Milton H. Cohen, ‘Truth in 
Securities Revisited’, 79 Harvard Law. Review, 1965-1966. Vol 79: 1340) that a new coordinated disclo-
sure system should be created having as its basis the continuous disclosure system of the 1934 Act 
and treating ‘1933 Act’ disclosure needs on this foundation. A coordinated disclosure shifted from 
the SA’33 sporadic, ad hoc disclosure to the 1934 Act’s continuous disclosure system. Continuous 
disclosure under SEA’34 was improved to enable self-registration allowing issuers having all relevant 
information on public file to issue new securities with a quick short form registration for new securi-
ties. Cf EU Prospectus Directive art. 9.
122 Although some scholars question the mandatory character of disclosure, e.g. Roberta Romano, ‘Em-
powering Investors: a Market Approach to Securities Regulation’, 107 Yale L.J. 2359, 1998; see the re-
action of Merritt B. Fox, ‘Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why issuer choice is not Investor 
Empowerment’, University of Michigan Law School Working Paper 99-008, 1999.
123 See § 201.00 NYSE Listed Company Manual and i.e. Rules <http://www.complinet.com/nasdaq/dis-
play/display.html?rbid=1705&element_id=1010 \t “_blank” 4310 (c) (16)> and <http://www.complinet.
com/nasdaq/display/display.html?rbid=1705&element_id=1011” \t “_blank” 4320(e) (14)> of the NAS-
DAQ Rules.
124 Primary focus: initial distribution of securities upon being registered with the SEC by the issuer.
125 Addressed to post-distribution trading: continuous disclosure, periodic reports by issuers and insid-
ers (directors, officers, and 10 percent holders) and solicitation of proxies. Eilís Ferran, Building an EU 
Securities Market, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2004, p. 127.
126 Eilís Ferran, Building an EU Securities Market, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2004, p. 127 
and J. R. Macey, ‘A Pox on Both Your Houses: Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and the Debate Concerning the 
Relative Efficacy of Mandatory Versus Enabling Rules’81’, Washington University Law Quarterly 328, 
330, 2003 and S.M.Bianbridge, ‘Mandatory Disclosure: A Behavioural Analysis’, 68 University of Cincin-
nati Law Review 1023, 2000.
127 Thus facilitating self-registration; cf P. Mahoney, ‘Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to agency Prob-
lems’, 62 University of Chicago Law Review 1047, 1995.
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market. This should enable the public to take a well-informed and considered investment 
decision. By its very nature of a selling document, it is not an ‘accounting’ document but 
rather a description of the securities that are offered for sale and, of course, of the issuer 
(e.g. its past performance, outlook and governance). It provides a detailed description of 
the securities offered for sale to the public in accordance with the mandatory initial disclo-
sure of a registration statement128 by the promoter in an IPO as regulated in the SA’33 and 
Regulation S-K, i.e. detailed historical (past performance) and actual financial and non-
financial data of the issuer, internal organization, rights and powers of investors attached 
to the securities and historical financial data. The SA’33 strongly focuses on preventing 
fraudulent behaviour by promoters.129 See e.g. § 11130 and § 12 SA’33131 on registration and 
prospectus liability.
4.1.2  Periodic (continuous) disclosure
The requirements of the SEA’34 for continuous disclosure essentially extend such initial to 
continuous disclosure in order to keep investors and the market periodically and currently 
updated to allow investment decisions to be based on current prices that reflect and absorb 
such actual information. It also allows investors to monitor the performance of the firm and 
its incumbent management and, if they feel necessary, to use their shareholder rights and 
proxy mechanism with respect to election and dismissal of management.
Using its regulatory powers132 the SEC focuses by means of rules, regulations and releases 
on enhancing the accuracy of initial and continuous disclosure by issuers.133 Issuers are 
held to continuous disclosure requirements as long as the issuers’ securities are traded, 
also if they are not registered or listed.134 These issuers become subject to the periodic 
128 All securities tradable in the US shall be registered with the SEC with a registration statement to be 
filed with and approved by the SEC (§ 5 SA’33 and Rule 400 ff). par. 6 and 8 SA method and proce-
dure of registration, §§  7 and 10 SA and Schedule A, contents registration document and prospectus 
and Form S-1 is the form to be used by commercial and industrial companies. Forms S-2 and S-3 
for corporations under the integrated disclosure system. Forward-looking information, § 27 A (a), 
applicability, forward-looking statements made by inter alia, the issuer that is subject to reporting 
requirements SEA’34, § 27 (A) (b), exclusions, § 27 (A) (c), safe harbour itself, par. 27(A) (i), definitions 
forward looking statement. Regulation S-K, Item 10 (b), Commission encourages the use of manage-
ment’s projections of future economic performance, that have reasonable basis and presented in ap-
propriate format. See 175 Acts Rules for definition forward-looking statement (3b-6, SEA Rules). Cf 
the prospectus requirement in EU law. See par. 5.1. below.
129 Cf UK (P. Mahoney, ‘Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to agency Problems’, 62 University of Chicago 
Law Review 1047, 1995).
130 § 11 civil liability on the issuer, directors, certain officers, the underwriters, accountants, engineers 
and other experts, when the registered statement contains material misstatements or omits to state 
material facts.
131 § 12, Civil liabilities in connection with prospectuses and communications, § 12 (a) (1), any person who 
offers or sells a security in violation of section 5, § 12 (a) (2), imposes civil liability upon any person who 
offers or sells any security by means of material misstatements or omissions to state material facts. 
132 § 19 SA’33. The regulatory power of the SEC is limited to federal securities law and does not extend to 
corporate state law that, under the interpretation of the US Constitution remains the realm of indivi-
dual states.
133 By means of regulation for the offering circular, annual accounts, interim reports, insider trading, 
proxy solicitation and prevention of abusive practices of the issuer and market participants.
134 Issuers that a) have a class of securities listed on a national securities exchange, § 12 (b) SEA’34, b) 
have assets in excess of $ 10 million and c) have a class of equity securities held by a least 500  persons. 
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reporting requirements of § 13 (a). Regulation 13A outlines the required filings by the Com-
mission under § 13 (a). These filings are on Form 10-K for annual reports (20-F for foreign 
issuers),135 10-Q for quarterly reports136 and 8-K for reports on incidental materially impor-
tant events.137
The continuous disclosure under SEA’34 is underscored by the proxy rules under § 14 (a), 
the solicitation of proxies with respect to registered securities must comply with the Com-
mission’s rules,138 tender offer rules, the Williams Act provisions §§ 13 (d)139, (e) and 14 (d)-(f) 
regulate tender offers and require certain beneficial ownership reports and § 16 SEA’34 
which imposes certain controls over insider trading practices.140
The SOx influenced the reporting requirements under the SEA’34 in a number of ways,141 
including quick disclosure on materially adverse changes in the issuer’s financial condi-
tion.142
4.1.3 Financial reporting, internal control and audit
The duty to file with the SEC (and thus: disclose) periodical and other reports (yearly, quar-
terly, material intermediate information143) are addressed to issuers, i.e. public corporations 
(not to its board or officers). The disclosure system does not serve nor is it aimed at ‘inter-
nal’ corporate law accounting to the AGM (shareholders as members of the organization) or 
the SB and disclosure to the community at large, but at market transparency and investor 
protection.
§ 12 (g) (4), registration of any class of security is terminated 90 days after the registrant files a certi-
fication that the number of holders of record of that class of security is reduced below 300.
135 Annual report to be filed within 60 days after year end: Rule 13a-1; Form 10-K, Gen. Instruction A.
136 Rule 13a-13, Form 10-Q every issuer has to file a quarterly report.
137 Rule 13a-11, Form 8-K, current report on Form 8-K within 5 or 15 days after occurrence-specified 
events. NYSE Listed Company Manual par. 202.05, listed firms shall release promptly any news or 
information that might reasonably be expected to materially affect the market for its securities.
138 Rule 14a-3(a), no solicitation subject to the Rules unless each person is concurrently furnished with 
a publicly filed proxy statement containing info specified in Schedule 14A, or with a proxy statement 
included in a registration statement filed under the SA ’33.
139 § 13 (d) (1), any person ‘directly or indirectly’ acquiring more than 5% of stock in a publicly held cor-
poration must file statement on SEC Schedule 13D disclosing that acquisition. Schedule 13D, 1) exact 
number of shares purchased by group or person doing the filing, 2) source and amount of funds used 
to make the purchase, including details about who lent the money to the buyer, if part of the purchase 
price was borrowed, 3) purchaser’s purpose in buying shares, including any plans he may have to seek 
control, to cause a merger to take place, to sell a large part of the company’s assets, etc., 4) any plans 
the filer has to take the company private. Item 4, requiring disclosure of the purpose of the trans-
action.
140 § 16 (a) (1), ‘Every person who is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than 10 percent 
of any class of any equity security which is registered pursuant to section 12, or who is a director or 
an officer of the issuer of such security shall file the statements required by this subsection with the 
Commission.’
141 Inter alia, certification CEO and CFO (§ 302, cf SEA rules 13a-14 and 15d-14); ban on director loans; §§ 
404, 406 and 407 on managements assessment of internal controls, codes of ethics for financial offic-
ers, and disclosure of financial experts on audit committees.
142 Each reporting company shall disclose to the public on a rapid and current basis such additional infor-
mation concerning material changes in the financial conditions or operation of the issuer. The Com-
mission’s response to its mandate under § 13(l) has been to increase the items required to be reported 
on form 8-K and to shorten the time within which that form must be filed.
143 The latter should follow form 8-K for domestic and 6-K for foreign issuers.
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As a matter of securities law they shall ‘make and keep books, records, and accounts, 
which, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions 
of the assets of the issuer’.144 The SEA’34 further requires the issuer to devise and maintain 
a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that 
transactions are recorded as necessary to permit the preparation of high quality accurate 
financial statements in the disclosure document(s).145
The SOx of 2002 mainly focussed on enhancing the accuracy of disclosure in the annual 
report to shareholders. SOx requires the CEO and CFO personally to certify the accuracy of 
the disclosure of periodic reports (§§ 404 and 906 SOx). It also requires issuer to have an 
audit committee, assigned to appoint, compensate and oversee (the work of) the issuer’s 
external auditor who also reports to the audit committee.146 For my comparative analysis 
it is interesting to note that some of these provisions have been criticized by US scholars 
and practitioners to create an intrusion of state corporate law147 148. The NYSE and NAS-
DAQ’s listing rules (approved by the SEC) provide for some corporate governance issues 
(audit committees, board composition), but these remain primarily focussed on improving 
the quality of disclosure. Unlike the EU, the US did not witness a proliferation of ‘self-regu-
latory’ corporate governance codes or recommendations at the borderline between securi-
ties law and the issuers’ internal affairs. As will be demonstrated in chapter 4, this different 
approach to corporate governance can have a profound influence on the supremacy and 
discretion of the board in a listed public corporation.
4.1.4  Annual report (Form 10-K and 20-F)
The core rules of continuous disclosure focus on the annual accounts. Issuers have to 
file with the SEC (i.e. ‘disclose’) their audited annual report normally within 60 days after 
year end.149 These reports shall follow the rules as set for the use of Form 10K (20-F for 
foreign issuers150) and Regulation S-K. The financial statements (balance sheet, profit & 
loss account) shall follow Regulation S-X,151 which adheres to the US GAAP of the Federal 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and reflect all material correcting adjustments that 
have been identified by a registered public accounting firm in accordance with US GAAP and 
144 § 13b (2)(A) SEA’34.
145 § 13(b)(2)(B).
146 Via listing rules to be approved by the SEC § 19 (b) (1) SEA’34; § 301 SOx.
147 See, e.g., Roberta Romano, ‘The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the making of Quack Corporate Governance’, 
NYU, Law and Econ Research Paper 04-032, 25 September 2004 and Roberta S. Karmel, ‘Realizing the 
Dream of William O. Douglas – The Securities and Exchange Commission Takes Charge of Corporate 
Governance.’, Brooklyn Law School, Public Law Research Paper No. 7, 2005.
148 W.B. Chandler and L.E. Strine Jr., ‘The New Federalism of the American Corporate Governance Sys-
tem: Preliminary Reflections of Two Residents of One Small State’, 152 University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review 953, 2003.
149 § 13(a)(2) ’34 Act and secs. A and D Form 10-K.
150 Foreign issuers are exempted in several ways and allowed to follow home country practice. See Rule 
12g-3-2 exempting foreign issuers if they or their home country government annually furnishes the 
Commission with information required by home country rules distributed to its shareholders.
151 Item, 3-02 (a), Regulation S-X, filing for the registrant and its subsidiaries of audited consolidated 
balance sheets at the end of each of the two most recent fiscal years, as well as audited statements of 
income and cash flows for each of the three fiscal years preceding the date of the most recent audited 
balance sheet.
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SEC-rules.152 The Form further requires disclosure – set out in more detail in Regulation 
S-K – of a variety of other issues, including business, properties, legal proceedings, market 
risks, disagreements on accounting and financial disclosure, compensation of directors and 
officers, certain relationships and related transactions.153
A key part of the Form is the MD&A, which shall discuss, inter alia, liquidity, capital 
resources, results of operations, (forms and impact of) off-balance sheet arrangements, 
business controls and procedures, audit committee, executive compensation, adoption of 
code of ethics and use of proceeds.154 Forward-looking statements under certain condi-
tions (e.g. proper identification and meaningful accompanying cautionary statements) are 
covered by ‘safe harbour rules’.155 After Enron, § 401 of SOx amended § 13 of SEA’34 on 
disclosure of material off-balance sheet transactions.156
4.2	 The	new	EU	securities	law	disclosure	rules	for	EU	issuers
In contrast to the US system, the EU disclosure system for issuers is not a complete stan-
dalone securities law system. It does, however, build an extra regulatory layer for issu-
ers on top of the broader ‘institutional’ accounting and disclosure system of the 4th and 7th 
Directives that tends to disentangle these from corporate law and internal affairs of the 
issuer regarding the division of powers and mandatory corporate actions, e.g. adoption by 
the AGM, payment of distributions, shareholder litigation and ‘publication’. Thus the new 
EU securities law, the disclosure system for issuers, can be singled out as distinct from 
these corporate law disclosure and accounting rules on which they build. Their market/
investor-oriented disclosure and – hence – enforcement mechanisms clearly shift to mar-
ket transparency and investor protection and compliance with the global accounting stand-
ards (IFRS) for consolidated (and issuer’s single) accounts.157
152 § 13 (b)(2)(B)(ii) and § 13 (i) and § 401(a)(i) SOx. See Rule 13a-14 Certification of Disclosure in Annual 
and Quarterly Reports. Rule 13a-15 Controls and Procedure.
153 Item 303 Regulation S-K, requires management of all registrants to discuss and analyze financial 
condition and results of operation for full fiscal years. Item 304, disagreements with Accountants on 
Accounting and Financial Disclosure and Item 402, requires all compensation to be disclosed for 1) 
a registrant’s CEO, 2) the four other most highly compensated executive officers whose total annual 
salary and bonus exceeded USD 100,000 and 3) directors.
154 Cf P.N. Ploeger and M.F. van Wissen, ‘Jaarverslag, OFR, MD&A of MC?’, Tijdschrift voor Jaarrekenin-
gerecht, 2007, p. 133-140. Regulation S-K, Item 10 (b), Comm. encourages the use of management’s 
projections of future economic developments, See also Item 303 Regulation S-K, see Rule 175 SA and 
3b-6, SEA Rules for definition and liability forward looking statements. See § 21E SEA’34 and par. 27 A 
(a), applicability forward looking statements, par. 27 (A) (b), exclusions, § 27 (A) (c), safe harbour itself, 
par. 27(A), definitions forward looking statement.
155 § 21E SEA’34, § 21 E (a) (2) for safe harbour rule, § 303-7 Regulation S-K; cf Regulation FD (fair disclo-
sure) for contacts with investors.
156 In January 2004, the Commission adopted amendments to the MD&A to require disclosure of off-
balance sheet arrangements. The adoption Release added Item 303 (c) to Regulation S-B, Items 303 
(a) (4) and (c) to Regulation S-K, Item 5.E to form 20-F, and General Instruction B(11)to Form 40-F.
157 Eilís Ferran, Building an EU Securities Market, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2004, p. 130. 
The EU issuer disclosure regime conforms to the international norm because it is largely designed 
with a view to improving the accuracy of securities prices in the interest of investor protection and 
market efficiency. H. Merkt, ‘Disclosing Disclosure: Europe’s Winding Road to Competitive Standards 
of Publication of Company-Related Information’, in: Klaus J. Hopt, Jaap Winter and Eddy Wymeersch 
(eds.), Reforming Company and Takeover Law in Europe, New York: Oxford University Press, 2004 and 
Eilís Ferran, Building an EU Securities Market, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2004.
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EU securities regulation emerged as a complete and almost ‘federal’ EU securities law (uni-
form regulations and high level harmonization directives). Former directives, and recom-
mendations on admission to listing (1979/80),158 prospectus (1989),159 half year reports (1982), 
transparency (1988) and insider trading (1989), were completely revised and extended into 
a new body of EU securities law consisting of a series of high level harmonization direc-
tives and (uniform) regulations were adopted as will be summarized below.160 Recently the 
EC published a report and a consultation document on the harmonization of transparency 
requirements after the implementation of the Transparency Directives.161 They introduced 
mandatory rules on these subjects largely replacing former (self-regulatory) rules of stock 
exchanges and markets. Public oversight was introduced to be exercised by national super-
visory authorities. As in the US, full focus is on initial disclosure upon issue of new securities 
by means of a prospectus giving full disclosure to be approved by the national supervisory 
authority and on subsequent continuous disclosure. The prospectus and Transparency 
Directive establish the regime for initial disclosure when securities are offered to the pub-
lic or admitted to trading on a securities market, and for periodic financial disclosures by 
listed issuers.162 The Market Abuse Directive deals with timely disclosure of price sensitive 
information by issuers, as well insider dealing and market manipulation more generally.163 
Public oversight was introduced, but not at EU level; the Prospectus, Transparency and 
Market Abuse Directives assign national securities regulators with supervisory and inves-
tigatory powers, they also oblige these regulators to cooperate with each other and to share 
information.164 The CESR was founded and aims for facilitating the development of common 
supervisory standards, practices and philosophical approaches.165 This Committee is now 
named the European Securities Market Authority (ESMA).166 Private enforcement gets less 
158 Council Directive 79/279/EEC of 5 March 1979 coordinating the conditions for the admission of securi-
ties to official stock exchange listing, OJ 1979 L66/21 (‘Admission Directive’), Council Directive 80/390/
EEC of 17 March 1980, OJ 1980 No. L100/1 (Listing Particulars Directive’), Regulation of ongoing dis-
closures by issuers of officially listed shares: Council Directive 82/121/EEC of 15 February 1982, OJ 
1982 L48/26 (Interim Reports Directive).
159 Council Directive 89/298/EEC of 27 April 1989, OJ 1989 L124/8 (‘Public Offers Directive’).
160 The framework for issuer disclosure within the EU is provided by the Prospectus Directive, the Trans-
parency Directive and the Market Abuse Directive. These Directives are supplemented by implement-
ing measures (in EU language, ‘Level 2’ legislation) that contain more detailed, technical rules to 
amplify the basic concepts provided for in the primary (or ‘Level 1’) legislation.
161 EC’s Report on the operation of Directive 2004/109/EC on the harmonisation of transparency requi-
rements in relation to information about issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regu-
lated market, SEC (2010) 611; see also Consultation on Modernisation of the Directive 2004/109/EC 
(transparency requirements for listed companies).
162 Eilís Ferran, Building an EU Securities Market, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2004, p. 134.
163 Eilís Ferran, Building an EU Securities Market, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2004, p. 134.
164 Eilís Ferran, Building an EU Securities Market, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2004, p. 209. 
165 See Eilís Ferran, ‘The Regulatory Process for Securities Law-Making in the EU’, in: John Armour and 
Joseph A. McCahery (eds), After Enron, Improving Corporate Law and Modernising Securities Regulation 
in Europe and the US, Oxford: Hart Publications 2006, CESR was formally established by the Commis-
sion in June 2001 and comprises representatives form national regulators of Member States. It is 
responsible for advising the EC on the detailed implementing rules needed to give effect to framework 
securities laws; given the regulatory expertise of its members, it seems reasonable to assume that is 
plays a significant behind-the-scenes role in setting the pace for regulatory decision-making.
166 Interim Report on the Activities of the Committee of European Securities Regulators to the European 
Commission and sent to: the European Parliament (CESR/03-174b, 2003), available through <http://
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focus than public enforcement, however it is explicitly assigned to the Member States. See 
below par. 7.
4.2.1 Initial disclosure
Initial disclosure upon an offering of securities is the subject of the Prospectus Directive 
(2003)167 and detailed Commission Regulations thereto.168 Aiming to ensure investor protec-
tion and market efficiency by maximum harmonization,169 it introduces de facto ‘federal’ 
prospectus requirements, public oversight and promoters’ liabilities.170 An offer shall, 
unless an exemption is available, be unlawful without prior publication of a prospective 
that has been filed with and approved by the competent national authority and made public 
(arts. 3, 4, 13-15 Prospectus Directive). The prospectus shall contain all information on the 
issuer and the securities being offered or admitted to trading on a regulated market that is 
necessary to enable investors to make an informed decision (art. 5 Prospectus Directive). 
The minimum information and inclusion of the final price is set out in arts. 7-8 Prospectus 
Directive. Responsibilities and liabilities are addressed in art. 5(2)(d) and art. 6: persons 
responsible should declare that the information contained in the document is, to the best 
of their knowledge, in accordance with the facts and that the prospectus makes no omis-
sion likely to affect its import. Issuers shall disclose and file with the competent authority 
‘a document’ that contains or refers to all information that they have published over the 
preceding 12 months (art. 10).171 See also art. 11 which allows for incorporation by reference 
and art. 12 that allows for self-registration (art. 12). No prospectus shall be published until 
it has been approved by the competent authority of the home Member State; the Nether-
lands AFM, the German “Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsausicht” (BaFin) and the 
UK FSA. Public enforcement has been left to the Member States; each Member State shall 
designate a central competent administrative authority responsible for carrying out the 
obligations provided for in this Directive (art. 21). Private enforcement is left to the Member 
States, art. 6 (1) Prospectus Directive requires Member States to ensure that responsibility 
for the information given in a prospectus attaches at least to the issuer or its administra-
www.cesr-eu.org> (accessed May 2004).
167 Directive 2003/71/EC.
168 Commission Regulation 809/2004 implementing the prospectus directive, OJ L 149 of 30.4.2004. The 
use of a Regulation as legal instrument is important because it leaves no room for interpretation 
difference upon implementation in the Member States. Eilís Ferran, Building an EU Securities Market, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2004, p. 140: the detailed disclosure requirements have been 
based on the IOSCO international disclosure standards for share issues and also build upon the dis-
closure requirements that applied under previous Directives.
169 Prospectus Directive, Pre-amble, rec. 10.
170 See for literature on the reasons for maximum harmonization amongst others N. Moloney, ‘Confi-
dence and Competence: The Conundrum of EC Capital Markets Law’, Journal of Corporate Law 1, 2004; 
J.D. Cox, ‘Regulatory Duopoly in US Securities Markets’, 99 Columbia Law Review 1999; J.C. Coffee, 
‘Racing Towards the Top? The impact of Cross-Listings and Stock Market Competition on International 
Corporate Governance’, 102 Columbia Law Review 1757, 1827-8, 2002 and S.J. Choi, ‘Assessing Regula-
tory Responses to Securities Market Globalization’, 2 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 613, 632-5, 2001. Eilís 
Ferran, Building an EU Securities Market, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2004, p. 142 and 143 
also refers to this literature.
171 See also art. 11 which allows for incorporation by reference and art. 12 that allows for self-registrati-
on (art. 12).
Book Vanderschee.indb   62 18-3-2011   15:39:40
Disclosure and accounting 63
tive, management or supervisory bodies. The Directive also demands that Member States 
underscore the disclosure obligations with civil liability under private law (art. 6 (2)).
4.2.2  Continuous disclosure (annual financial report)
The requirements for continuous disclosure are for listed issuers also vested in the Stock 
Exchange Admission Directive172 and include the obligation to make available to the public, 
as soon as possible, its most recent annual single and consolidated accounts and its last 
annual report (art. 67), half-year reports and audit declarations (arts. 70-77).
The Transparency Directive (2004)173 establishes, like the SEA’34 for the US, the EU sys-
tem for periodic and ongoing disclosure of financial statements for issuers whose securi-
ties are already admitted to trading on a regulated market in the EU. The Transparency 
Directive does not adopt the same maximal approach as the Prospectus Directive, but pro-
vides that the home Member State may impose requirements that are more stringent than 
the directive; but the host Member State may not (art. 3, Transparency Directive). Issu-
ers shall disclose their annual financial report (art. 4 Transparency DIrective), half year 
and other interim statements (arts. 5 and 6 Transparency Directive). Disclosure documents 
shall simultaneously be filed with the national competent authority (art. 19 Transparency 
Directive) as designated (art. 24 Transparency Directive). National authorities shall have all 
powers necessary for the performance of their function, including requests for information 
and documents from issuers, for additional disclosure by issuers, suspension/prohibition 
of trading, monitoring compliance, public announcement of failure to comply, examination 
of disclosure documents and carring out on-site inspections to verify compliance174 (art 24 
Transparency Directive). Private enforcement and liabilities are left to the Member States 
(art. 7 Transparency Directive), not excluding rules on internal affairs and corporate actions 
to be taken.
Ongoing disclosure rules are further required by the Market Abuse Directive (2003),175 par-
ticularly art. 6, requiring issuers to inform the public as soon as possible of inside informa-
tion which directly concerns the issuer. Inside information is qualified as to be such that ‘if 
172 Arts. 67, 68, 69 and 70 Stock Exchange Admission Directive. Directive 2001/34/EC, OJ L 184 of 6.7.2001, 
amended by Directive 2003/6/EC and Directive 2003/71/EC, OJ L 354/64 of 31.12.2003. Though the 
national authorities will have to approve the listing rules, exchanges are free to compete within the 
limits as set by EU law in adopting their listing standards.
173 Directive 2004/109/EC on the harmonization of transparency requirements with regard to information 
about issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market, OJ L of 31.12.2004. The 
Transparency Directive echoes the policy aspirations of the Prospectus Directive with regard to the 
building of sustained investor confidence and enhanced market efficiency, Transparency Directive, 
rec. 1.
174 Disclosure by auditors at the request of the authority shall not be a breach of his contract with the is-
suer (Art. 24-6).
175 Directive 2003/6/EC on insider dealing and market manipulation (market abuse), OJ L 96/16 of 
12.4.2003, art. 6. It vested public oversight on admission, suspension and delisting of securities as 
well as the power to enforce prevailing listing requirements with the competent national authorities 
(arts. 10-19). It requires the listing particulars for issuers to contain the information necessary to 
enable investors and their investment advisers to make an informed assessment of the assets and 
liabilities, financial position, profits and losses, prospects of the issuer and the rights attaching to the 
listed securities (art. 21).
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it were made public, would be likely to have a significant effect on the prices’ of – in short – 
securities and derivatives,176 however under certain circumstances the issuer may delay the 
public disclosure of inside information.177 Also the Takeover Directive demands for disclo-
sure obligations; art. 6 (1) Takeover Directive requires that a decision to make a bid is made 
public without delay and that an offeror is required to draw up and make public in good time 
an offer document containing the information necessary to enable the holders of the offeree 
company’s securities to reach a properly informed decision on the bid. Also, art. 8 Takeover 
Directive requires that Member States shall ensure that a bid is made public in such a way 
as to ensure market transparency and integrity for the securities of the offeree company, 
of the offeror or any other company affected by the bid, in particular in order to prevent the 
publication or dissemination of false or misleading information.178
4.2.3 The annual financial report
The key rules of the Transparency Directive concern the ‘annual financial report’ (art. 4 
Transparency Directive). An issuer shall ‘make public’ such annual financial report179 at the 
latest four months after year end. The four-month period limits the period for disclosure, 
but does not itself require prompt disclosure (as for interim statements).180 There is how-
ever no doubt that it should be disclosed promptly upon its finalization as ‘price sensitive 
176 Art. 1 sub 1 MAD, ‘Inside information’ shall mean information of a precise nature which has not been 
made public, relating, directly or indirectly, to one or more issuers of financial instruments or to one 
or more financial instruments and which, if it were made public, would be likely to have a significant 
effect on the price of those financial instruments or on the price of related derivative financial instru-
ments.
177 Art. 6 sub 2 MAD, an issuer may under his own responsibility delay the public the public disclosure of 
inside information, such as not to prejudice his legitimate interests provided that such omission would 
not likely to mislead the public and provided that that such omission would not be likely to mislead the 
public and provided that the issuer is able to ensure the confidentiality of that information. Member 
States may require that an issuer shall without delay inform the competent authority of the decision to 
delay the public disclosure of inside information.
178 See Marco Ventorusso, ‘The 13th Directive and the contrasts between European and US Takeover Reg-
ulation: different (regulatory) means, not so different (political and economic) ends’, Bocconi Legal 
Studies Research Paper no. 06-07, October 2005. Comparing US and EU takeover rules Ventorusso con-
cludes that in concept these systems do not differ greatly, especially regarding traffic rules regulating 
the public bid. Cf also M.J.G.C. Raaijmakers m.m.v. P.A. van der Schee, ‘Regulering en handhaving 
van overnamebiedingen in perspectief’, in: M.P. Nieuwe Weme, G. van Sollinge, R.P. ten Have and L.J. 
Hijmans van den Bergh (eds.), Handboek Openbaar Bod, Serie Onderneming en Recht, part 46, Deventer: 
Kluwer 2008. p. 1125-1174.
179 Regulation (EC) 1606/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 July 2002 on the appli-
cation of international accounting standards has already paved the way for a convergence of financial 
reporting standards throughout the Community for issuers whose securities are admitted to trading 
on a regulated market and who are required to prepare consolidated accounts. Thus, a specific regime 
for security issuers beyond the general system for all companies, as laid down in the Company Law 
Directives, is already established. This Directive builds on this approach with regard to annual and in-
terim financial reporting, including the principle of providing a true and fair view of an issuer’s assets, 
liabilities, financial position and profit or loss. Transparency Directive, recital 9.
180 Art. 5 TD: issuer shall make public a half-year financial report as soon as possible after the end of that 
period and (art. 6) an update.
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information’.181 For Example, under Netherlands law, art. 5:25i (2) AFS requires that insider 
information as defined182 in art. 5:53 (1) AFS will be disclosed promptly.
The ‘annual financial report’ contains a) the audited financial statements, b) the MR and 
c) statements by the persons responsible that to the best of their knowledge the report 
‘includes a fair review of the development and performance of the business and the position 
of the issuer and the undertakings included in the consolidation taken as a whole, together 
with a description of the principal risks and uncertainties they face’ (art. 4 sub 1 Transpar-
ency Directive). The consolidated accounts shall follow IFRS and the single accounts of the 
parent shall be included in the financial report (art. 4 sub 3 Transparency Directive). Art. 4 
Transparency Directive requires issuers to prepare their consolidated accounts (showing 
the issuer and its group together as one economic unity) in conformity with the IFRS.183 To 
prevent the complexities of using and explaining different standards for the issuer’s single 
and consolidated accounts,184 art. 5 IAS Regulations allows (but does not require) Member 
States to permit issuers to prepare their single accounts in conformity with IFRS.185 The 
audit report shall be disclosed and the MR shall follow art. 46/36 of the 4th and 7th Directives 
(art, 4 sub 4 and sub 5 Transparency Directive).
The IAS Regulations (2002)186 introduce IFRS187 as the accounting standards to be followed 
by issuers188 ‘with a view to harmonizing the financial information presented by companies 
referred to in art. 4 in order to ensure a high degree of transparency and comparability of 
financial statements and hence an efficient functioning of the Community capital  market and 
181 Art. 67 SE Admission Directive; cf art. 21 TD and art. 6 MAD. Cf par. 430 UK CA., par. 37v, Jahres-
finanzbericht, WpHG and par. 37w, Halbjahresfinanzbericht: unverzüglich’; art. 5:25 c, d and m (sub 
1) Netherlands Act on Financial Oversight, Parliamentary documents (Tweede Kamer), 2006–2007, 
31 093, No. 2.
182 See art. 5:53 AFS.
183 Adopted in accordance with the procedure laid down in art. 6(2) of the IAS Regulation (EC to adopt as 
EU rules the standards – IFRS – as developed by the IASC. L. van der Tas& P. van der Zanden, ‘The 
International Financial Reporting Standards’, in: P.H.J. Essers, T. Raaijmakers, R. Russo, P. van der 
Schee, L. van der Tas, & P. van der Zanden (Eds.), The Influence of IAS/IFRS on the CCCTB, Tax Account-
ing, Disclosure and Corporate Law Accounting Concepts, Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International 
2008.
184 Cf art. 4(3) TD.
185 Cf arts. 395 and 397 UK CA (2006); par. 37 y (1) WpHG; art. 2:362 (8) NCC (optional for non-issuers, but 
only if both and single accounts follow IFRS).
186 Regulation (EC) 1606/2002 on the application of international accounting standards, OJ L 243/1 of 
11.9.2002 and 1725/2003 adopting certain international accounting standards, OJ L 111/3 of 17.4.2004.
187 For an extensive review of the creation of IFRS by the IASB, the adoption of IFRS by the EC and pro-
cedures for revision and extension of IFRS see L. van der Tas & P. van der Zanden, ‘The International 
Financial Reporting Standards’, in: P.H.J. Essers, T. Raaijmakers, R. Russo, P. van der Schee, L. van 
der Tas & P. van der Zanden (eds.), The Influence of IAS/IFRS on the CCCTB, Tax Accounting, Disclosure 
and Corporate Law Accounting Concepts, Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International 2008, p. 1-26. 
For an analysis of the meaning and impact of IFRS for tax accounting see, P. Essers & R. Russo, ‘The 
Precious Relationship between IAS/IFRS, national tax accounting systems and the CCCTB’, in: P.H.J. 
Essers, T. Raaijmakers, R. Russo, P. van der Schee, L. van der Tas, & P. van der Zanden (eds.), The 
Influence of IAS/IFRS on the CCCTB, Tax Accounting, Disclosure and Corporate Law Accounting Concepts, 
Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International 2008, p. 29-81.
188 Art. 4 IAS Regulation (EC) 1606/2002, OJ L 243/1.
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of the Internal Market’.189 It reflects the globalization of capital and stock markets and trend 
towards global standards for financial transparency (also ‘best practices’) in international 
finance. It is important to note that IFRS to a certain extent may influence tax accounting and 
thus may contributes to EU uniform standards for tax accounting.190 IFRS should warrant 
the use of uniform international standards by issuers which further directs discretionary 
judgments of the issuer’s board and auditor and also – indirectly – of public supervisors and 
the judiciary in litigation. This also illustrates the shift from classical ‘accounting’ of boards 
for their management and oversight of the business to share- (and other) stakeholders 
towards uniform ‘market disclosure’ by issuers. The ‘annual financial report’ of EU issuers 
thus tends towards a US-style standalone securities law disclosure document. Neverthe-
less, it remains connected to corporate law accounting. In the US, neither the Revised Model 
Business Corporation Act, nor, for example, the predominant Delaware General Corporate 
Law require annual reports to be submitted for approval to (the annual meeting of) share-
holders.191
The foregoing description and analysis allows us to turn to the conceptual and practical 
problems that arise if we try to match the new EU securities law disclosure rules with cor-
porate law powers, responsibilities and procedures.
5.  Issuers’ ‘annual financial report’ as market-oriented disclosure 
confronted with ‘corporate accounting’ rules
The US concept of the annual report (Form 10-K or 20-F) as a uniform market-oriented and 
standalone disclosure document is effectively followed in EU securities law by the introduc-
tion (in the Transparency Directive) of the ‘annual financial report’ that shall be disclosed to 
the market promptly upon its finalization, irrespective of any other corporate law procedure 
(e.g. adoption by the AGM) and/or disclosure (with commercial register or similar agency). 
It contains all essentials: audited single and consolidated accounts, MR and a ‘certification’ 
by responsible persons within the issuer’s internal organization. As in the US, where annual 
reports shall be filed with the SEC and disclosed to the market (not published in a commer-
cial register not submitted for approval or adoption by the AGM and therefore also not con-
nected to explicit or implicit discharge),192 the document shall be made public and filed with 
189 L. van der Tas & P. van der Zanden, ‘The International Financial Reporting Standards’, in: P.H.J. Ess-
ers, T. Raaijmakers, R. Russo, P. van der Schee, L. van der Tas & P. van der Zanden (eds.), The Influence 
of IAS/IFRS on the CCCTB, Tax Accounting, Disclosure and Corporate Law Accounting Concepts, Alphen aan 
den Rijn: Kluwer Law International 2008, p. 1-26.
190 P. Essers & R. Russo, ‘The Precious Relationship between IAS/IFRS, national tax accounting systems 
and the CCCTB’, in: P.H.J. Essers, T. Raaijmakers, R. Russo, P. van der Schee, L. van der Tas & P. van 
der Zanden (eds.), The Influence of IAS/IFRS on the CCCTB, Tax Accounting, Disclosure and Corporate Law 
Accounting Concepts, Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International 2008, p. 29-81.
191 Only rules on investigating corporate books and records in case of a proper purpose and disclosure of 
conflicts of interest are provided for, § 220 DGCL.
192 US: cf § 16.20 RMBCA: ‘furnish’ accounts to shareholders; summary statements as to audits; Werner 
F. Ebke, ‘Corporate Governance and Auditor Independence: The Battle of the Private Versus the Public 
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the national supervisory authority. In the US, the document is not a ‘corporate governance 
tool’ for shareholders or the AGM in the sense that they have corporate rights and powers 
in the corporate process from preparing to final approval and disclosure. That evidently 
does not take away the educative and regulatory (monitoring) functions of the Report for 
investors nor the means for public and private enforcement with respect to the report as a 
disclosure document. SOx did not change the system, but strengthened internal oversight, 
monitoring and compliance procedures as well as auditor’s independence with the ultimate 
objective of enhancing the accuracy of the disclosure document.
The EU system differs in at least three major aspects. First, Member States have not (yet) 
all embodied the sharp distinction between the securities law objectives as reflected in 
the concept of the ‘annual financial report’ of the Transparency Directive and the remain-
ing corporate law procedures and concepts of the 4th and 7th Directives as reflected in their 
national law. Secondly, the concept of the MR, although a crucial part of the annual financial 
report, misses a uniform (IFRS) format such as the US MD&A and fits does not completely fit 
in with the distinction between executive and non-executive members of the board (or SB); 
the US annual report to shareholders is signed by CEO and CFO, but, for example, a Nether-
lands report has to be signed by all members of the management board and the supervisory 
board, although the MR is essentially a report of management.193 Thirdly, this report specifi-
cally reflects the increasing use of disclosure as a regulatory tool by national regulators 
and therefore its content is exposed to emerging differences between Member States which 
seems not to be the case in the US where the SEC prescribes the rules for the MD&A.
The first element brings me to the problem of how the prevailing disclosure concept of the 
annual financial report and its constituent parts (single, consolidated accounts, MR and the 
board statement/persons responsible for the fairness of these documents, audit opinion) 
matches with the whole preceding ‘internal’ process of mandatory corporate law, articles 
of association and ‘applicable’ national corporate governance codes that reflect the regula-
tory choices by the EU and national regulators.194
Interest’, in: G. Ferrarini, K. J. Hopt, J. Winter and E. Wymeersch (eds.), Reforming Company and Takeo-
ver Law in Europe, New York: Oxford University Press 2004, p. 191.
193 Art. 50b, 4th Dir., MS shall ensure that the members of the administrative, management and supervi-
sory bodies of the company have collectively the duty to ensure that the annual accounts, the annual 
report and, when provided separately, the corporate governance statement to be provided pursuant to 
art. 46a are drawn and published in accordance with the requirements of this Directive…; art. 50c, 4th 
Dir., MS shall ensure that their laws, regulations and administrative provisions on liability apply to the 
members of the administrative, management and supervisory bodies referred to in art. 50b, at least 
towards the company, for breach of the duty referred to in art. 50b. Cf. also III.1.2 DCGC for separate 
annual report of the supervisory board; cf. art. 2: 101 sub 2 NCC.
194 For, inter alia, the division of powers between management and shareholders, the role, powers 
and core (entrepreneurial) assignment of directors vis-à-vis non-executive directors (supervisory 
boards), common and distinct accountability, responsibility and ultimate liability of directors and non-
executive directors (one or two tier), gate-keeping by auditors and – finally – governmental agencies. 
In corporate law and practice such rules are reflected in technical and procedural rules on the series 
of steps to be taken before the final dissemination of the annual financial report: internal control and 
preparations, final drafting, submission to and discussion with audit committee and auditor, subse-
quent submission to and ‘approval’ by full board and supervisory board or non-executive directors, 
establishment of final and formal ‘approval’ and signing to also assume responsibility for the comple-
teness and fairness of the financials and the overall view given in the management report, submitting 
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The second and third elements will reveal the influence of reporting on the internal govern-
ance of boards and the exposure to diverging regulatory choices made by national regula-
tors regarding reporting items (and their impact on the issuer’s governance), and by that on 
board supremacy and internal governance in general, leading in some respects to greater 
exposure to shareholder activism.
5.1		 Drafting,	approval,	adoption,	audit	and	disclosure	of	annual	accounts
To clarify the intertwining concepts of corporate and securities law we now turn to some 
corporate law procedures with respect to drafting, approval, adoption, audit and disclosure 
of annual accounts.195
Accounting to shareholders and approval/adoption of the accounts by the AGM was for a 
long time the usual pattern in European corporate law, also in public companies (issuers). It 
was related to discharge of the board for such accounting and conditional to payment of divi-
dends, since profits have to be established by adoption of the accounts to allow and enable 
the issuer to pay dividends. In some Member States it still is (German AktG and Netherlands 
Civil Code (NCC)) in others, like the UK, which resembles the US system, it is not (secs. 414 
and 437 UK CA). Art. 48 draft 5th Directive196 and earlier drafts of the SE Statute required 
submission of the annual accounts to the AGM. However neither the 4th and 7th Directives nor 
the IAS Regulations require any such AGM-approval or adoption. Although the 2006-amend-
ments to these directives (arts. 50b/50c 4th Dir. and 36a/36b Dir7) focus on the board’s role 
and tasks by proclaiming collective duties of the administrative, management and supervisory 
body to ensure that the accounts and report are drawn up and published in accordance with 
the directives and for issuers with IFRS, both the use of ‘drafting’ and ‘publishing’ and the 
addition that these bodies ‘shall act within the competence assigned to them by national 
law’ clarify that the directives do not seem to preclude adoption/approval of ‘draft’ accounts 
by another body corporate (e.g. the AGM). Such a procedure if applied to issuers seems to be 
at odds with the rules and objectives of the disclosure system of the Transparency Directive.
These annual accounts shall be audited before they are laid down for (adoption by) the GMS, 
the audit report identifies the financial reporting framework that has been applied in their 
preparation;197 for EU issuers IFRS shall apply, giving the auditors a pretty straightforward 
guideline in auditing these annual accounts.198 In recent years, it has become clear that 
(laying down) the document for the shareholders and/or the annual general meeting, simultaneous 
disclosure to market and the public at large, discussion of the document in the AGM and in some 
jurisdictions even ‘adoption’ of the accounts (as part of the report), updating auditors opinions and 
subsequent ‘final’ corporate law disclosure of the document by filing with the commercial register (or 
similar agency).
195 L. van der Tas & P. van der Zanden, ‘The International Financial Reporting Standards’, in: P.H.J. Ess-
ers, T. Raaijmakers, R. Russo, P. van der Schee, L. van der Tas & P. van der Zanden (eds.), The Influence 
of IAS/IFRS on the CCCTB, Tax Accounting, Disclosure and Corporate Law Accounting Concepts, Alphen aan 
den Rijn: Kluwer Law International 2008, p. 1-26.
196 It allowed MS to provide that adoption would be attributed to another organ (supervisory board) to 
accommodate prevailing national regimes as e.g. German and the Netherlands provisions for large 
corporations with supervisory boards composed with influence of employee representatives. See art. 
2:163 NCC (old) and §§ 172 and 173 AktG.
197 See arts. 51 and 52 4th Dir. and art. 37 7th Dir. 
198 Of course interpretation differences under IFRS framework will exist, however as a common frame-
work as such it provides less room for deviance than in previous times when national accounting 
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the accounting and audit are part of the laws about market regulation and that the further 
development of rules concerning these subjects are very closely connected to the efforts to 
create an internal financial market for the EU.199
Between drafting, auditing and publication200 stand the corporate actions of approval/cer-
tification, explicit or implicit discharge as well as the securities corporate act of (prompt) 
disclosure. How – if at all – are these related? Management shall prepare the document 
and approve the draft that will be submitted for discussion with the audit committee that 
in turn will advise the board or the SB whether or not to approve. Management and, as the 
case may be, non-executives (or SB), by their approval, resume collective responsibility 
for the accounts, including the ‘certification’ as required in the report; according to Neth-
erlands law all members in evidence thereof shall sign the accounts (art. 2:102 NCC). The 
Transparency Directive requires statements to be made by the persons responsible within 
the issuer, whose names and functions shall be clearly indicated, to the effect that ‘to the 
best of their knowledge’ the statements prepared in conformity with IFRS ‘give a true and 
fair view’ of the assets, liabilities, financial position and profit or loss of the issuer, and the 
undertakings included in the consolidation taken as a whole and the MR includes a fair view 
of the development and performance of the business and the position of the issuer, and the 
undertakings included in the consolidation taken as a whole, together with a description of 
the principal risks and uncertainties that they face. ‘Persons responsible within the issuer’ 
do not refer only – as in par. 302 SOx – to the CEO and CFO explicitly, but necessarily to the 
full board (or management and supervisory board), because of the fact that members of the 
administrative, management and supervisory bodies of the company have the collective 
duty to ensure that the annual accounts are drawn up and published in accordance with the 
4th and 7th Directives.201
systems were applied. See also 8th Directive which joins the idea of one common financial reporting 
framework and the executing there of also in auditing, see Pre-amble 3, “The lack of a harmonized 
approach to statutory auditing in the Community was the reason why the Commission proposed, in its 
1998 Communication on the statutory audit in the European Union: the way forward, the creation of 
a Committee on auditing which could develop further action in close cooperation with the accounting 
profession and MS.” See also Preamble 16, “In order to increase comparability between companies 
applying the same accounting standards, and to enhance public confidence in the audit function, the 
commission may adopt a common audit report for the audit of annual accounts or consolidated ac-
counts prepared on the basis of approved international accounting standards, unless an appropriate 
standard for such a report has been adopted at Community level.”
199 Peter Nobel, ‘Audit Within the Framework of Corporate Governance’, in: Klaus J. Hopt and Eddy 
Wymeersch (eds.), Capital Markets and Company Law, New York: Oxford University Press 2003, p. 199-
220.
200 Only accounts that are duly approved shall be published (as laid down in national law according to the 
1st Directive) together with the annual report and the auditors’ opinion.
201 art. 50b 4th Dir., MS shall ensure that the members of the administrative, management and supervi-
sory bodies of the company have collectively the duty to ensure that the annual accounts, the annual 
report and, when provided separately, the corporate governance statement to be provided pursuant to 
art. 46a are drawn and published in accordance with the requirements of this Directive…; art. 50c 4th 
Dir., MS shall ensure that their laws, regulations and administrative provisions on liability apply to the 
members of the administrative, management and supervisory bodies referred to in art. 50b, at least 
towards the company, for breach of the duty referred to in art. 50b. Cf. also Best practise III.1.2 DCGC 
for separate annual report of the supervisory board. See also art. 36a, 7th Directive. 
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Moreover, such responsibility, as following from the 4th and 7th Directives, does not refer 
explicitly to the accounts as disclosure documents but rather to the corporate accounts: arts. 
50b and 50c 4th Directive.202 This contrasts with art. 4 sub 2 (c) Transparency Directive which 
underscores the unity of the annual financial report and function as a market disclosure 
document as a whole by requiring that the annual financial report comprises statements 
by the persons responsible within the issuer that the disclosed information (financial state-
ments and MR) give a true and fair view of the assets, liabilities, financial position and profit 
or loss of the issuer, and that the MR includes a fair view of the development and perform-
ance of the business and the position of the issuer.
As soon as the annual financial report is thus approved and finalized and the auditors’ opin-
ion has been received, the document is effectively ‘approved’ and shall therefore be dis-
closed promptly to the market (and not be postponed in any way by a later duty to deposit 
the accounts with the commercial register). It follows that issuers cannot defer this prompt 
disclosure on the ground that the document (still) has to be ‘laid before’ or be submitted (as 
‘draft’) to the AGM (to be held several weeks later) for discussion and/or approval/adoption. 
This document is beyond any doubt to be considered as containing price sensitive informa-
tion, also in the meaning of the Market Abuse Directive. The corporate law rule that the 
‘final’ accounts shall be deposited with the commercial register therefore cannot defer the 
securities law requirement of prompt disclosure of the annual report (by publication and 
filing with the public agency). Let us now have a closer look and test these statements.
5.1.1 Adoption of the accounts
In the UK, the accounts of a PLC are adopted – as in the US – by the board and signed 
by a director of the company.203 These will be ‘laid before’ but not formally adopted by the 
AGM.204 The German AktG requires the management of an AG to submit the accounts and 
report to the SB to be ‘prüfed’ (reviewed);205 the SB shall make a report to the AGM (extended 
with governance items). The AktG allows adoption by either the management or supervisory 
board but the adoption of the accounts that are already ‘approved’ accounts may be left to 
the AGM.206 According to the German Cromme Code (sec. 2.2.1 GCGC), the board submits 
the annual accounts to the GMS.207 Netherlands law sticks to the traditional ‘accounting’-
202 Secs. 425 (4), 418, 450 (4) and 451 and 451 UK CA 2006. Art. 50b and c 4th Dir., Duty and liability for 
drawing up and publishing the annual accounts and the annual report, Directive 2006/46/EC, 2:138/139 
NCC.
203 Sec.414, UK CA (2006), A company’s annual accounts must be approved by the board of directors and 
signed on behalf of the board by a director of the company.
204 Sec.437, UK CA (2006).
205 §§ 170 and 171 AktG.
206 See §§ 172 and 173 AktG, The AGM resolves anyhow on profit distribution (§ 174 AktG and the schedule 
of par. 172 AktG)); cf art. 50 4th Dir. and sec. 2.2.1 Deutscher Corporate Governance Codex (Cromme); 
cf art. 2:105 (1) and art. 2:362 lid 2 (NCC). Note that under Netherlands law distribution of dividends out 
of profit is held hostage upon adoption by the AGM of the accounts which show that such distribution is 
permissible (art. 2:105-3 NCC).
207 Sec. 2.2.1 GCGC, The Management Board submits to the General Meeting the Annual Financial State-
ments and the Consolidated Financial Statements. The General Meeting resolves on the appropriation 
of net income and the discharge of the acts of the Management Board and of the Supervisory Board. It 
elects the shareholders’ representatives to the Supervisory Board and, as a rule, the auditors.
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tradition by requiring that all members of both management and SB shall sign the accounts 
and submit these – also issuers (!) – to the AGM for adoption (art. 2:101 (2) (3) NCC208), not 
the MR which evidently will not be adopted by the AGM. Publication by depositing the annual 
financial report with the commercial register (1st Directive) shall take place after adoption.209
This (corporate law) ‘draft’ status, however, does not, in my opinion, defer the securities law 
disclosure duty to promptly disclose the document (including the reports) after its approval 
(by the boards) in accordance with the market perspective for issuers under the combined 
EU (directives) to promptly disclose (‘as soon as possible’) their ‘annual financial report’, 
including the MR, upon its completion, i.e. final approval of the (supervisory) board and audit 
opinion210 (art. 4 Transparency Directive; art. 67 Stock Exchange Admission Directive and 
art. 6 Market Abuse Directive) and to file it simultaneously with the national authority (art.19 
Transparency Directive).211 Hence, a resolution on adoption or (final) approval by the AGM 
shall – having regard to notice and announcements to be made – only be resolved several 
weeks later. Under Netherlands law such adoption fixes the profit and hence the condi-
tion of payment of any dividends out of that profit. Issuers shall nonetheless promptly dis-
close their annual financial report upon completion, announce their year results in a press 
release and at a press conference, usually followed by ‘road shows’, even though these are 
technically still ‘drafts’. The market absorbs this ‘draft’ information and usually the later 
AGM in this respect passes by as a non-event. If, in the AGM-discussion,212 new price sensi-
tive information is given, prompt disclosure is required (art. 6 Market Abuse Directive). See 
also art. 5:25i lid 2 AFS.
A different point is that the corporate law ‘publication’ of the annual financial report with the 
commercial register (or similar agency) shall take place after AGM adoption.
These observations evidently have consequences for the public oversight on compliance 
with these rules and annual financial reports as such. See par. 5.1.4. below.
5.1.2  Changes of ‘draft’ accounts by the AGM?
Some authoritative Netherlands scholars have argued that the AGM, apart from having 
the power to decide on allocation and distribution of net profits, may change the accounts, 
for example to increase distributable profits or reserves.213 Also § 173 (3) German AktG 
208 Until 2004, the AGM in a ‘structure’-company did not adopt, but only approved the accounts. The super-
visory board did adopt the accounts.
209 See art. 2:101 sub 1 NCC, this can take 13 months in total.
210 The AGM may only adopt the accounts if the auditor’s statement is available (art. 2:393 (6) NCC).
211 Cf. arts 5:24 (4) and 5:25c and 5:25d and 5:25o AFS; Lower House, 2006–2007, 31 093, nr. 2. (for 
implementing the Transparency Directive); compare sec. 430 (4) UK CA (2006) providing that the 
annual accounts and reports ‘must be available as soon as reasonably practicable’ (on the issuers’ 
website) and § 37v WpHG. Note that the competent authority will be the commercial register and the 
securities  supervisor, as the Netherlands AFM.
212 When discussing these documents the BoM and SB will provide all necessary information, unless a 
‘zwaarwichtig’ (weighty) interest of the company prohibit them from doing so (art. 2:107 (2) NCC). As 
required by art. 2:107(2) NCC, unless a material interest of the company prohibit them.
213 J.J.M. Maeijer, Asser 2-III Vertegenwoordiging en Rechtspersoon, De Naamloze en de Besloten Vennoot-
schap, Deventer: Tjeenk Willink 2000, No. 47.
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seems to imply that the AGM – if empowered to adopt (§§ 172/173 (1) AktG) – may change 
the accounts. This, however, seems inconceivable and inconsistent if it implied that Board-
members – as well as the external auditor that examined the Report – could be forced to 
accept such changes and assume liability for such changes in ‘their’ accounts which had 
been certified by them with their statement and which were prepared with all the required 
scrutiny, certainly if in their opinion the suggested changes would contravene mandatory 
standards or the required true and fair view of equity and results, or if that the use of their 
discretionary power to account under the prevailing standards would be contested under 
the ‘institutional’ umbrella by other ‘interested parties’.214 This might occur if payment of 
dividends were contested, for example by activist investors who want to raise the pay out by 
changing reserves or cost items. It seems inconsistent and inconceivable to hold the board 
responsible for a report that it no longer supports.
Key is that their ‘certification’ as required by art. 4 of the Transparency, covers the whole 
financial accounts as disclosure document, as is the case for the prospectus. This would 
become invalid and hence the annual financial report incomplete. The same applies to the 
external auditor’s opinion that effectively no longer refers to the report that was audited. 
Similarly the public agency assigned with oversight may reject the changed report and may 
require a restatement. Thus the AGM’s power to adopt and change the accounts is at odds 
with these rules.215 § 173 (3) AktG provides that the changes to the accounts will only take 
effect after that a new auditor’s statement is delivered to the amended accounts, without 
reference to the position of management and the supervisory board.
It shows that adoption by the AGM seems to be clearly at odds with securities law princi-
ples and objectives that do not allow changes ‘at will’ but are rather concerned with proper 
restatement of information in case of reasonable doubt on the correctness of the informa-
tion provided.
5.1.3 Material events after disclosure of the annual financial report
Events that materially affect the report of the issuer after the (securities law) disclosure 
of that annual financial report will as such not itself make the disclosure document incor-
rect, since the document reflects the situation at the moment of its disclosure. Such ‘post 
balance sheet’ events shall be disclosed in subsequent interim reports or – if needed – a 
separate statement: arts. 5-6 Transparency Directive and art. 6 Market Abuse Directive. 
This is the procedure in the US and the UK, where the AGM is not involved in the adoption 
of the accounts. Such submission for adoption to the AGM of (conceptually) ‘draft’ accounts 
reveals a remarkable difference. If the disclosed annual financial report on the day that 
the AGM is scheduled to adopt that ‘draft’, would no longer provide a true and fair view 
of the issuer’s situation, management will furnish additional information to the AGM to be 
taken into account when resolving on the adoption. Remarkably art. 2:362 (6) NCC requires 
management – as a matter of corporate law – if the accounts after their adoption prove to 
seriously deprive the document from giving the required insight, to inform its shareholders 
214 See art. 2:447 NCC implementing the Act Supervision Financial Reporting.
215 Cf arts. 2:101(3),105 (3) and 393 (1), (2),(5) and sub 6 NCC.
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promptly and file a statement with the commercial register (which deviates from the disclo-
sure rules in the AFS) together with an auditor’s opinion. Obviously, for issuers the test is 
whether any further information or restatement requires subsequent disclosure as ‘price 
sensitive information’ by means of an incidental press release,216 also to be filed with the 
AFM (public agency) according to securities law requirements.
5.1.4 Securities law disclosure and corporate law publication
The annual financial report shall, under the 1st Directive ‘publication’ regime, also be pub-
lished through filing with the ‘registrar’ (arts. 47-50a 4th Dir.) after adoption by the AGM. 
One copy thereof, signed by the BoM and SB, shall to be filed (again) with the commer-
cial register.217 From a securities law perspective this does not add to the disclosure of the 
annual financial report that already took place after board-approval, although – at least in 
the Netherlands – the subsequent AGM-resolution to adopt the annual financial report is 
conditional to payment of dividends (art. 2: 105 sub 3 NCC) and has to be deposited with the 
Commercial Register. In practice an updated auditor’s opinion will be required as per that 
later date which increases the audit costs for the issuer. Again, this separate duty does not 
impede the securities law disclosure duties. It also illustrates how, with respect to the way 
of ‘disclosure’, the securities law disclosure (publication and filing with the public agency 
assigned with oversight) and corporate law deposition of the accounts with the commercial 
register (or similar agency) differs.
5.2	 The	management	report	(US	and	EU)	as	part	of	the	disclosure	document
As already observed in par. 4, the US securities disclosure system mainly focuses on dis-
closure to the market and investors to enable them to assess the value of the company 
and the shares. It also allows monitoring. The US MD&A report underscores this monitor-
ing function for the market and investor community, as do rules on insider transactions, 
directors’ loans or listing requirements on the independency of audit committees. Evidently, 
information on the issuer’s performance also serves investors (and their advisors) to decide 
whether and how to vote on i.e. board elections or on a merger proposal.
In the EU disclosure system, the management report also reflects the link with traditional 
internal corporate accounting and disclosure to the public at large. The revised 4th Directive 
(art. 46a) now requires listed218 companies (issuers) to include in their annual report a cor-
porate governance statement and to explain if and why they depart from provisions of the 
applicable national code (‘comply or explain’-rule), the rules of which (in different ways and 
degrees) are related to the internal affairs of the issuer. This theme will be further elabo-
rated in chapter 3. For now, we focus on the role of the MR in the annual financial report 
as required by the Transparency Directive and – again – the link with traditional corporate 
accounting.
216 Art. 6 Market Abuse Directive.
217 §§ 441 and 447 UK CA 2006.
218 A company whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market within the meaning of art. 
4(1), point 14 of Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 
on markets in financial instruments.
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As set out below, the EU MR (4th Directive) as part of the annual financial report (Trans-
parency Directive) appears not to serve completely as a standalone disclosure document 
to the market and investors. The report also serves as a catch-all for evolving reporting 
items on ‘self-regulatory’ corporate governance codes, corporate law rules, environmental 
and other non-financial items. Thus, the regulatory use of disclosure in the US and the EU 
reflects these different aims and means. (This has its consequences on the internal organi-
zation of the issuer in general, on the board supremacy and therefore different exposure to 
shareholder activism, as will be demonstrated in chapter 4.) As mentioned before, against 
the background of the emerging EU securities regulation, a series of corporate governance 
codes were introduced in the Member States with a different nature and scope and also 
enforcement mechanisms which also has been reflected in the exposure to shareholder 
activism, see the investigation procedure for the Enterprise Chamber. The UK Combined 
Code is part of the LSE listing rules: delisting by the LSE is the ultimate sanction for non-
adherence to the ‘comply or explain’ principle. In the Netherlands, observance of the Cor-
porate Governance Code is primarily to be assessed by the AGM, but in an investigation 
procedure before the Enterprise Chamber of the Amsterdam Court of Appeal, principles 
and best practices tend to be regarded as customary law under the general umbrella of 
intra-corporate bona fide fiduciary duties and authority versus accountability (art. 2:8 NCC). 
I will further explore this issue in the next chapter.
With respect to the MR three observations have to be explored. First, the MR is distinguished 
from the accounts in the 4th and 7th Directives, which affects the corporate procedures dis-
cussed above (MR by its nature is not adopted by another body corporate). On the other 
hand, it forms a constituent part of the ‘annual financial report’ as the integrated disclosure 
document under art. 4 Transparency Directive. Secondly, the concept of the MR, although 
a crucial part of the annual financial report (disclosure document), lacks a uniform (IFRS) 
format like the US MD&A. It does not take into account reporting items from non-executive 
directors (or supervisory board). Thirdly, the 4th Directive only enumerates a minimum list 
of items to be addressed in the MR but does not provide for a uniform MR-format (like the 
US MD&A). This exposes this part of the ‘annual financial report’ to differences that Member 
States may create by using disclosure as a regulatory tool. The second and third elements 
will reveal the influence of reporting on the internal governance of boards and the exposure 
to diverging regulatory choices made by national regulators regarding reporting items (and 
their impact on the issuers’ governance).
5.2.1  MR: format
The MR again reveals the different approach of the US annual report to shareholders (Form 
10-K or 20-F) that contains a fixed statutory format for the MD&A (Item 303 Regulation 
S-K) as a narrative and backward-looking analysis of the development of the (segments of) 
business closely connected to the financial statements. Forward-looking statements are 
nowadays allowed under protection of specific ‘safe harbour rules’.219 Items to be discussed 
219 Regulation S-K, Item 10 (b), Comm. encourages the use of management’s projections of future eco-
nomic developments. See also item 303 Regulation S-K, see Rule 175 SA and 3b-6, SEA Rules for 
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include: liquidity, capital resources, results of operations and (forms and impact of) off-
balance sheet arrangements.220 The 4th Directive distinguishes the MR from the accounts, 
i.e. the balance sheet, profit & loss account, consolidated accounts and explanatory notes 
(arts. 46 4th Dir. and art. 367th Dir.). Art. 4(5) Transparency Directive in turn, however, uses 
the unitary concept of ‘annual financial report’ to refer to the ‘disclosure document’ that 
shall comprise: the audited financial statements, the MR and directors’ ‘certifications’ 
(which underlines the unity of the document).221 The items to be addressed in the MR are 
listed in arts. 46/46a 4th Dir.: the financial situation of the company (issuer), risk analysis and 
management, societal issues like labour and employment, (compliance with) environmental 
and ethical standards (business principles) and forward-looking statements (without safe 
harbour rules). The 2006 amendments added a mandatory corporate governance statement 
(arts. 46a 4th Dir. and 10 Dir13222) and the ‘comply or explain’ principle with respect to issu-
ers, effectively influencing the internal affairs and governance of issuers by requiring statu-
tory223 disclosure on compliance with voluntary (‘self-regulatory’)224 non-binding corporate 
governance codes, a single report of the issuer and the 7th Directive consolidated accounts 
of its group of companies. Note that ‘issuers’ become a specific class of ‘companies’ within 
the 4th Directive and that the EU consciously refrained from amending the Transparency 
Directive to reflect these specific requirements for issuers. This may be explained by the fact 
that IFRS, constituting the main body of disclosure items and rules for issuers, focusses on 
the (consolidated) financial statements only and does not (yet) address the content of the 
definition and liability forward looking statements. See par. 21E SEA’34 and par. 27 A (a), applicability, 
forward looking statements, § 27 (A) (b), exclusions, § 27 (A) (c), safe harbour itself, § 27 (A), definiti-
ons forward looking statement.
220 Cf P.N. Ploeger and M.F. van Wissen, ‘Jaarverslag, OFR, MD&A of MC?’, Tijdschrift voor Jaarrekenin-
genrecht, 2007, p. 133-140. After Enron, par. 401 of SOx amended par. 13 of ’34 Act to provide for disclo-
sure of material off-balance sheet transactions. Item 303 (c) to Regulation S-B, Items 303 (a) (4) and 
(c) to Regulation S-K, Item 5.E to form 20-F, and General Instruction B(11) to Form 40-F.
221 Cf art. 2(4) TD and art. 5:24 AFS; ‘document’.
222 First, art. 46a (2006 amendments) requires issuers only to include a corporate governance statement 
in their report. That statement shall supply information on a) the corporate governance code the com-
pany is subject to (as in the US via NYSE and NASDAQ rules and in the UK the Combined Code under 
the LSE listing rules) or may have voluntarily decided to apply (like the Cromme and Tabaksblat codes 
in Germany and the Netherlands respectively) and all relevant information about the corporate gov-
ernance practices applied beyond the requirements under their national law. Secondly, art. 46a (4) 
includes into the 4th Directive, again only applicable for issuers, the corporate governance statements 
as required by art. 10 of the Takeover Directive (2004/25/EC), including restrictions on transfer of 
shares, significant shareholdings, special control rights, restrictions on voting rights, agreements 
between shareholders resulting in restriction of transfer or voting rights, rules for appointment/dis-
missal board members, change of control contracts, golden parachutes, as well as – finally – unless 
otherwise available a) rules on the operation and key powers of shareholders’ meetings and individual 
shareholders’ rights, b) composition and operation of the administrative, management and super-
visory bodies and their committees. Cf § 315 (4) (German) HGB. art. 2:392 (5) NCC; The ‘corporate 
governance statement’ may be separated from the MR.
223 Cf. § 1269, corporate governance rules, in part 6 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (ch.8), 
insert par. 89O Corporate Governance Rules. UK CA (2006); § 161 AktG and art. 2:391(5) NCC.
224 Note that the UK Combined Code is part of the London Stock Exchange Listing Rules. The UK Com-
bined Code is coupled to the LSE listing rules, but reporting is also compulsory according to sec. 1269 
UK CA (2006). German and Netherlands corporate law in general terms require issuers to disclose ac-
cording to the comply or explain rule their observance of the Code (§ 161 AktG and art. 2:391(5) NCC). 
The corporate governance statement (art. 46a 4th Dir. and 10 Dir13) may come separately.
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MR. The IASB published a draft discussion paper on the Management Commentary (2005)225 
proposing such common standards but it is expectedly to take a long time before these will 
be adopted by the IASB (and subsequently by the EU). Evidently, such an IFRS model would 
by its very nature focus on disclosure of the accounts rather than on the substance of cor-
porate internal affairs. Note that the introduction of such an IFRS format for the MR in the 
present structure would require an amendment of the 4th Dir. either to explicitly refer to that 
format or to carve out applicability of arts. 46 ff for issuers.
5.2.2  Reporting items for non-executive directors and responsibility for the report
The MR concept further illustrates the friction between the annual financial report (disclo-
sure document) and the corporate law distinction between accounts and MR as discussed 
in par. 5.1.1 above. The MR by its nature is not subject to approval by the AGM, although it is 
a) indispensable for assessing the accounts and b) explicitly an integral part of the annual 
financial report (disclosure document).
Furthermore, the nature of the MR changes to a broader report since separate disclosure 
requirements for NEDs, supervisory boards, audit and other board committees are emerg-
ing.226 The strict division between management and supervision in German law is reflected 
in a separate report of the SB on its review of the accounts (and report) to the AGM, including 
governance disclosure (§ 171-2/3 AktG). The German Corporate Governance Code (GCGC) 
does not deviate substantially from general corporate law. The Netherlands law is less 
clear. SBs did not report separately and usually ‘advised’ the AGM to adopt the audited 
accounts, adding information on changes in their own composition. In corporate practice 
they now ‘report’ separately on compliance with a number of best practices of the Corpo-
rate Governance Code directly addressed to (members of) SBs (for example, independence, 
meetings, assessments and on its review of and involvement in (also through the audit com-
mittee) the drafting and audit of the accounts, see Best Practise III.1.2 DCGC).227 That report 
is – at least formally – not part of the MR, although over time it seems likely that they will 
report in one document, a separate SB-report seems at odds with the unitary concept of the 
225 The Discussion Paper (al. A3) defines the MC as “information that accompanies financial statements 
as part of an entity’s financial reporting. It explains the main trends and factors underlying the devel-
opment, performance and position of the entity’s business during the period covered by the financial 
statements. It also explains the main trends and factors that are likely to affect the entity’s future 
developments, performance and position”.
226 Compulsory under art. 41 Dir8 and regulated by national codes and the 2005 EC Recommendations.
227 For, inter alia, the division of powers between management and shareholders, the role, powers 
and core (entrepreneurial) assignment of directors vis-à-vis non-executive directors (supervisory 
boards), common and distinct accountability, responsibility and ultimate liability of directors and non-
executive directors (one or two tier), gate-keeping by auditors and – finally – governmental agencies. 
In corporate law and practice such rules are reflected in technical and procedural rules on the series 
of steps to be taken before the final dissemination of the annual financial report: internal control and 
preparations, final drafting, submission to and discussion with audit committee and auditor, subse-
quent submission to and ‘approval’ by full board and supervisory board or non executive directors, 
establishment of final and formal ‘approval’ and signing to also assume responsibility for the comple-
teness and fairness of the financials and the overall view given in the management report, submitting 
(laying down) the document for the shareholders and/or the AGM, simultaneous disclosure to market 
and the public at large, discussion of the document in the AGM and in some jurisdictions even ‘adopti-
on’ of the accounts (as part of the report), updating auditors opinions and subsequent ‘final’ corporate 
law disclosure of the document by filing with the commercial register (or similar agency).
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annual financial report as disclosed by the issuer. There is also a certain tendency that the 
one- and two-tier boards228 are converging,229 besides the traditional position of the SB as 
‘gate keepers’ on behalf of investors and other constituencies, they also seem to function as 
NEDs in a unitary board,230 consequently making the MB and SB more jointly accountable 
for strategy and soon. In the Netherlands, the DCGC illustrates the foregoing by making the 
SB and management more jointly accountable for strategy, finance and major transactions: 
these best practices codes and principles generate a self-fulfilling power in preparing the 
annual financial report but also on the role of the SB, NEDs and audit committee as internal 
supervisors.231
In Germany and the Netherlands, the SB reviews the annual financial report as prepared by 
management. The SB’s review is prepared by the audit committee; the full SB will resolve.232 
Disputes between management, the audit committee and the auditor will by then be resolved 
so that (in the Netherlands) both BoM and SB-members can sign the financial statements 
(art. 2:101 (2) NCC) and the auditor give a clean opinion.233 They thus effectively already 
assume responsibility for the annual financial report as a whole.234 The ‘certification’ of art. 
4 Trancparency Directive, however, clearly concerns the annual financial report as a whole. 
This – again – firmly underscores the unitary concept of the report.
Comparing this to art. 50b ff 4th Dir. and art. 36a ff Dir7 reveals that these articles only 
require the accounts to be signed by all members of the board (one-tier board structure) 
or the board of management and supervisory board (for a two-tier board structure). Art 4 
Transparency Directive, however, apparently allows ‘certain persons’ to be designated.
228 Not legally regulated in the Netherlands, but possible through articles of association, see Unilever 
NV. See also Best Practise III.8 DCGC, one-tier management. See Netherlands proposal on the act 
introducing possibilty for the choice of one-tier strcture,Wetsvoorstel (Kamerstukken 31 763) tot Wij-
ziging van boek 2 van het Burgerlijk Wetboek in verband met de aanpassing van regels over bestuur 
en toezicht in de naamloze en besloten vennootschappen.
229 Paul Davies, ‘Board Structure in the UK and Germany: Convergence or Continuing Divergence?’, Inter-
national and comparative corporate law journal 4, no. 435, 2001
230 Sven Dumoulin, ‘De positie van niet-uitvoerend bestuurder in het monistisch bestuursmodel’, 
Ondernemingsrecht 2005-8, p. 268, in structure and organization, there are several management and 
supervisory bodies. This relevates the dichotomy between the one-tier and the two-tier model in the 
sense that no uniform one-tier or a two-tier model exists. Directors and commissioners, depending 
on the company in which they operate, are not always in the same positions and do not have always 
similar taks to perform.L
231 See e.g. Best Practise III.1.8 DCGC; Raaijmakers, Ondernemingsrecht, 2006. 
232 As discussed below in some more detail, each of the BoM and SB members will be severally liable 
for any misleading statements causing damage to shareholders and others (art. 2:139 CC). If the SB 
agrees on the accounts they will co-sign these documents.
233 Compare § 171 German AktG and § 315 HGB.
234 Although a distinction should be made between financial accounting (subject to statutory audit) and 
the narrative non-financial part of the MR providing an overall view on the activities of the issuer and 
forward looking statements secs. 414 ff UK CA (2006) explicitly provide that the report is ‘approved’ by 
the board and signed by one of the directors. § 172/173 AktG allows adoption of the Jahresabschluss 
by the management and supervisory board (or AGM). Compare the certification of CEO/CFO of § 302 
SOx. Best Practise II.1.4 DCGC requires management to make an ‘in control statement’ in its report 
which is not part of the accounts.
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5.3	 Governance	influx
Coming back to par 5.2.1 (MR-content), the somewhat hybrid and open-ended character of 
the report reveals its capability to be used as ‘catch-all’ for disclosure issues/topics based 
on the regulatory function for company law issues as promoted by the HLG: “Requiring dis-
closure of information can be a powerful regulatory tool in company law”.235 Thus, issues 
‘regulated’ by ‘soft law’ show up where EU harmonization (cf the 5th Directive and the EC 
recommendations) or national legislation (including board composition) did not result in 
agreement on legislation. The EC refrained from harmonizing substantive governance rules 
and drafting its own European corporate governance code, but nevertheless inserted cer-
tain elements into directives236 and came forward with its recommendations on NEDs and 
executive compensation.237 Disclosure on these items thus serves the regulatory, educative 
and monitoring functions of disclosure as discussed above. While the US MD&A is merely 
part of the disclosure document of the issuer as prescribed by the SEC, the EU MR thus may 
be subject to an influx of diverging national rules and soft law. The regulatory function of 
disclosure for the report of EU issuers thus seems to show an ‘open-ended’ sideway, since 
the content and comparability of MRs depends on national choices made upon implementa-
tion, (the development of) different codes (best practices) of ‘self-regulatory’ committees/
bodies and the way these are supported by listing rules and their ‘enforcement’.
6 Public oversight on annual financial accounts and reports
The new EU securities law introduced public oversight. The US did so already in the ’33 
and ’34 Acts to underscore the disclosure system with such oversight and enforcement by 
the SEC.238 The EU securities markets and market participants, (demutualized) exchanges, 
 issuers, auditors and other market professionals (e.g. analysts) were thus subjected to 
235 HLG Nov 2002, ch. p. 33, pt. 3 and the EC, Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Gov-
ernance in the European Union – A plan to move forward, COM 2003.
236 E.g., comply or explain rule – art. 46a 4th Dir.; audit committees – art. 37 (appointment statutory audi-
tor) and 41 (audit committee) Dir8; collective responsibility – art. 50b/36a 4th Dir./Dir7).
237 The Commission’s 2004 Recommendation on the role of non-executive or supervisory directors and 
on supervisory board committees (IP/04/1182) aims at improving shareholders’ control over executive 
management by reinforcing the presence of independent directors on boards and board committees. 
The Commission has now published a report on how Member States apply the recommended stand-
ards, which finds that a majority of Member states comply to a large extent with the recommendations, 
but some weaknesses remain. <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/directors-remun/
index_en.htm> Remuneration is one of the main areas of potential conflicts of interest for execu-
tive directors. Excessive remuneration has also emerged as a prominent feature in many corporate 
fraud scandals. The Commission’s 2004 Recommendation on directors’ remuneration (IP/04/1183) 
provides for high standards of disclosure on this issue and recommends greater involvement of share-
holders in the decisions relating to remuneration. The Commission has now issued a report on how 
Member States apply the recommended standards, which finds widespread disclosure of remuner-
ation, but some reluctance to involve shareholders fully in the decision over remuneration policy. 
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/directors-remun/index_en.htm>. 
238 Review every three years, audit requirements, i.e. oversight by independent public auditors, market 
regulation for other market professionals (including auditors, analysts and securities lawyers), penal 
sanctions, possible disqualification of directors and officers and experts that signed the disclosure 
documents. (§ 9 ’33 Act and § 301 SOx). 
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public oversight239 to enhance market integrity and transparency and protect investors. It 
replaced self-regulation by exchanges,240 the securities industry and professionals, though 
mixtures like the UK City Panel still exist. Many rules were ‘criminalized’ by making non-
compliance offences or misdemeanours, thus allowing public enforcement by penal law. 
Administrative means for the authorities were introduced or extended (fines, orders, sus-
pension of treading, delisting). Public enforcement does, however, not replace ‘gate keeping’ 
by independent auditors on the issuer’s annual financial report nor private enforcement. As 
already mentioned, the auditor’s independence from management was enlarged to become 
an independent ‘public watch-dog’,241 to enhance their role as independent gate-keeping 
experts.242 In the EU, this role was enlarged by the revised 8th Directive.243 On both sides of 
the Atlantic, the statutory audit is regarded as a fundamental prerequisite for the proper 
functioning of the securities and capital markets.244 No less important are market mecha-
nisms such as investor pressure, which often appears effective in view of the reputational 
damage that issuers may suffer if they do not respond in a timely and proper manner.245 
These disciplinary forms of oversight and market forces to enhance trust and reliability in 
the operation of financial markets should be assessed in their mutual relationship and as 
a whole.246
6.1	 Public	oversight/enforcement	in	the	US
The SEC exercises oversight on firms’ mandatory disclosure and may sanction non-observ-
ance by issuers. § 12 (J) SEA’34 authorizes the Commission to suspend registration for 
not more than 12 months, or to revoke registration on a finding that the issuer has failed 
to comply with any provision of this Act or the administrative remedy in § 15 (c)(4) SEA’34, 
which authorizes the Commission, if it finds that any person subject to §§ 12, 13, 14, or 15 (d) 
239 I do not discuss here the specific rules for and oversight on the banking and insurance industry. 
240 Cf Thomas M.J. Möllers, ‘Effizienz als Maβstab des Kapitalmarktrechts’, Archiv für die civilistische 
Praxis, 2008, p. 1-36.
241 Werner F. Ebke, ‘Corporate Governance and Auditor Independence: The Battle of the Private Versus 
the Public Interest’, in: G. Ferrarini, K. J. Hopt, J. Winter and E. Wymeersch (eds.), Reforming Company 
and Takeover Law in Europe, New York: Oxford University Press 2004, p. 182.
242 Art. 22 revised 8th Directive (2006).
243 Introducing, inter alia, public oversight – comparable to the US PCOAB – on approval and withdrawal 
of auditors and firms, educational standards and qualifications, registration, professional ethics and 
secrecy, auditing standards and reporting, quality assurance, investigations and proper sanctions on 
non observance of the standards, the introduction of public oversight and international cooperation. 
Consequently the audit committee plays a crucial role in the process of drafting, accounting and audit-
ing the accounts and the report.
244 Werner F. Ebke, ‘Corporate Governance and Auditor Independence: The Battle of the Private Versus 
the Public Interest’, in: G. Ferrarini, K. J. Hopt, J. Winter and E. Wymeersch (eds.), Reforming Company 
and Takeover Law in Europe, New York: Oxford University Press 2004, p. 514.
245 Cf. Bill W. Bratton and Michael L. Wachter, ‘The Case against Shareholder Empowerment’, University 
of Pennsylvania Law Review, vol. 158: 653, 2010, these mechanisms also play a role in the responsive-
ness of issuers’ corporate governance systems to the demands of activist shareholders.
246 Thomas M.J. Möllers, ‘Effizienz als Maβstab des Kapitalmarktrechts’, Archiv für die civilistische Praxis, 
2008, p. 15.
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has failed to comply with any such provision in any material respect, to publish its findings 
and order compliance.247
With respect to disclosure documents that do not meet the statutory requirements, § 21C 
SEA’34 invests the SEC with the power to institute cease-and-desist proceedings against an 
alleged wrongdoer. The respondent to such action will be informed before the SEC release 
is made public. The respondent may agree to and undertake all such measures and actions 
as are necessary to properly adjust a wrongful disclosure and to agree that this will be 
disclosed in the SEC Release. Effectively this results in informing the market and (finally) 
correcting financial statements that were previously disclosed. This procedure completely 
aligns with the disclosure system of the SEA’34.
The SEC used to review the annual statements of issuers every seven years. That period 
was reduced to three years by SOx.248 Similarly, criminal sanctions on white-collar crimes 
(including disqualification) were made more severe.249
6.2	 Public	oversight	and	enforcement	in	the	EU
A brief summary illustrates the present scope of EU public oversight. The national author-
ity shall approve prospectuses (art. 13 Prospectus Directive), approve admission to listing 
(art.11-15 SE Admission Directive),250 approve listing rules of stock exchanges (art. 35 Stock 
Exchange Admission Directive) and exercise broad oversight on market abuses by issuers 
and market professionals and participants (arts. 7 and 11-15 Market Abuse Directive). It 
shall be informed of a takeover bid, approve the offering circular (arts. 4 and 6 Transparency 
Directive) and monitor the rules during takeover bids. It also monitors the monitors: enti-
tlement to audit public interest entities and continuous oversight of auditor’s professional 
and ethical standards was assigned to the national authority by the amended 8th Directive.
Public oversight was extended to continuous disclosure of issuers by art. 24 Transparancy 
Directive,251 which assigns oversight on compliance with the rules of the directive to a cen-
247 The SEA permits the Commission, in its discretion, to make such investigations as it deems neces-
sary in order to determine whether any person has violated, is violating, or is about to violate that Act 
(exchange) or any rule issued under the Act, Louis Loss and Joel Seligman, Fundamentals of Securities 
Regulation, New York: Aspen Publishers 2004, 1480; James D. Cox, Robert W. Hillman and Donald 
Langevoort, Securities Regulation, Cases and Materials, 5th edition, New York: Aspen Publishers 2006, 
p. 810, § 21 (a) (1) SEA’34. An order for a formal investigation under one or more of the statutory provi-
sions is generally preceded by an informal investigation. See also McLucas, Hamill, Shea & Dubow, 
‘An Overview of Various Procedural Considerations Associated with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission’s Investigative Process’, 45 Bus. Law. 625, 1990, 628. See also § 20 (d) SEA’34 and § 21 (d) 
SEA;34 for civil monetary penalty, violations for one of the Sec. Acts. See also § 20 (e) SEA’34; Sec. Ex. 
Act par. 21 (d) (2). Authorize the courts to bar or suspend a person who has violated § 17 (a) (1) SA’33 or 
§ 10 (b) SEA’34 from acting as an officer or director of any issuer that has a class of securities regis-
tered under the 1934 Act or that is required to report under § 15 (d).
248 § 408 (c) SOx.
249 Titles IX on White-Collar Crime Penalty Enhancements; Title XI: Corporate Fraud and Accountability.
250 That, in case of non-compliance, may make public that fact (art. 17) or decide to suspend or disconti-
nue listing (art. 18) in which case the issuer may oppose such order by court action (art. 19).
251 With reference to art. 21 of the Prospectus Directive (2003/71/EC).
Book Vanderschee.indb   80 18-3-2011   15:39:41
Disclosure and accounting 81
tral national authority with the power of delegation.252 All ‘regulated information’ disclosed 
by issuers shall be filed simultaneously with the authority (art. 19 Transparancy Directive). 
This national oversight covers compliance by issuers with the global, but – through adoption 
by the EC – also ‘Europeanized’, IFRS.
Information shall be disclosed ‘in a manner ensuring fast access on a non-discriminatory 
basis’: art. 21 (1) Transparency Directive. Art. 24 (4) Transparency Directive requires proper 
powers for the authorities on information and investigation, order to disclose, suspension 
or prohibition of trading securities, monitoring timely information to ensure effective and 
equal access to the public, disclosure of findings of non-observance (‘naming and sham-
ing’), examination that the required information complies with the relevant reporting 
framework and taking appropriate measures in case of discovered infringements, inspec-
tions and examinations and further: appropriate administrative, civil and/or penal penalties 
(arts. 28-29). To avoid and prevent divergent interpretations, a permanent European Securi-
ties Committee has been established to assist the EC. EU-US cooperation will enable this to 
become more important.253 Cooperation on oversight between national authorities or those 
of third countries, important in cases of multiple listings or trading, is the subject of art. 23 
Transparancy Directive. The directive does not specifically provide for or exempt authorities 
from civil liability (see art. 13(6) Prospectus Directive), nor does it regulate jurisdictional 
conflicts between concurring corporate or court actions by investors to enforce their rights.
It may be clear that all these (new/extended) tasks require adequate and high quality staff-
ing of the authorities and continuous monitoring of the regulatory and enforcement mecha-
nisms in the Member States. The costs for these authorities are covered by fees to be paid 
by the addressees of the oversight.254
An important difference with the US remains that the EU, although aiming at integration of 
the European financial markets has not yet created a European SEC, although CESR (see 
chapter 5 ESMA) has been assigned a coordinating role. Since public oversight extends to 
compliance by issuers with IFRS, the dispersion of oversight throughout national authori-
ties does not guarantee uniform interpretation and application thereof even though the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) has final jurisdiction in these matters (art. 13 EUTR).
The tension between corporate law accounting and a disentangled market-oriented (con-
tinuous) disclosure system remains, also in audit and public oversight.
6.2.1 Restatements
Upon final board approval, the annual financial report contains highly price sensitive infor-
mation and shall therefore, together with the audit opinion, has to be disclosed ‘in a man-
ner ensuring fast access on a non-discriminatory basis’. Such disclosure and professional 
assessments thereof assure quick absorption by the market (participants). The author-
ity shall oversee such quick market access, equal treatment and prevention of insider 
252 FSA (UK), AFM (Netherlands), Bundesanstalt BaFin (Germany).
253 Cf FD 9 April, 2006: Zalm (IASB) expects that by 2013 US firms will be allowed to apply IFRS.
254 Thomas M.J. Möllers, ‘Effizienz als Maβstab des Kapitalmarktrechts’, Archiv für die civilistische Praxis, 
2008, p. 15.
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 trading.255 If the annual financial report and audit opinion were disclosed in a timely and 
proper manner but allegedly contain (materially) misleading, incorrect or incomplete state-
ments, public oversight aims at ensuring that the market will be provided as soon as pos-
sible with additional information to correct or supplement (restate) the initial ‘misleading’ 
information. Alleged misstatements can have different origins: such as a) misapplication 
of IFRS (e.g. incorrect off-balance accounting, non-consolidation, improper impairments, 
incorrect valuation of resources, assets and derivatives, incorrect explanatory notes to the 
accounts), b) misleading figures, or c) incomplete or misleading statements in the MR (e.g. 
forward-looking statements, environmental risks, labour risks, corporate governance).
Contesting the disclosure document will already per se affect the issuer’s reputation, its 
officers and other persons involved in the preparation, audit and/or assessment after dis-
closure by analysts, rating agencies and others. Private investors may use such allega-
tions as leverage which in court proceedings may be contested and characterized as being 
‘frivolous’ and result in attributing the costs to the plaintiff. Any announcement or rumour 
of action by the authority will have the same effect. UK CA (2006) explicitly indemnifies the 
FSA. The Netherlands Wtfv (Act on Financial Reporting), however, reduced this risk by post-
poning actions of the authority until adoption of the accounts by the AGM and subsequent 
judicial review (art. 2:449 sub 1 NCC). After the GMS (art. 2: 447 and 449 NCC) has adopted 
the annual accounts, the AFM and interested parties have the authority to file a request 
with the Netherlands Enterprise Chamber to restate the annual accounts the annual report 
within six months. Cf. also art. 2:452 NCC, which authorizes the AFM to file a request, six 
months after filing the annual accounts with the AFM, with the Enterprise Chamber to order 
an issuer to give a further explanation concerning the application of IAS. Remarkably, 2: 
454 and 455 NCC give the AFM the power to file a request with the Enterprise Chamber to 
order an issuer, which is incorporated in another state, to make a public announcement that 
their annual financial reports/accounts are not in compliance with the requirements of AFS 
and IAS. This right can be exercised six months after the disclosure of the annual accounts 
according to art. 5:25c, sub 1 AFS. This procedure is more in accordance with the restate-
ment procedure under US securities law.
The way that the role and responsibility of authorities to require ‘correction’ of defective 
annual financial reports have been implemented in various EU MS show remarkable differ-
ences and so does comparison with the SEC’s powers (par. 6.1. above). Evidently, disputes on 
the correctness of disclosure documents may also affect the assessment of the statutory 
audit that was exercised.256
6.2.2 Restatement of the annual accounts/report
If reasonable doubts exist as to whether the annual financial report complies with the statu-
tory requirements, (the board of) the issuer shall inform the market whether the effect is 
material and shall prepare additional information or adjust the accounts and/or report(s) 
255 Cf. e.g., secs. 441-453 UK CA (2006).
256 I will not discuss the tension between public oversight on issuers and auditors separately.
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that are already disclosed and have this additional or adjusting information audited before 
disclosure. This voluntary procedure is explicitly foreseen in sec. 454 UK CA (2006).
Absent such voluntarily revision in the UK, the Secretary of State, finding that the published 
financial report does not comply with reporting standards, may give notice to the issuer and 
request an explanation or preparing of revisions within one month. If a satisfactory explana-
tion has not been given by then or revisions not been prepared, he may apply to court (sec. 
455 UK CA 2006) for a declaration on the alleged non-compliance and an order requiring the 
directors to prepare revisions. In giving such an order, the court may also give directions 
on the auditing, the nature of the revision and order directors responsible for the defective 
reports to pay reasonable expenses (sec. 456 UK CA 2006). Certain qualified third parties 
may be authorized by the Secretary of State to execute such proceedings (sec. 457 UK CA 
2006).
The Netherlands procedure is enacted in Title 16 (arts. 2:447 ff) Book 2 (legal persons) 
Civil Code, i.e. as part of general corporate law, in the Act on Supervision Financial Report-
ing (ASFR) and Decree on Supervision Financial Reporting (DSFR). It takes into account 
the statutory submission for adoption of the annual financial report (of accounts) to the 
AGM. Before that time, the AFM may request explanations after initial disclosure. If there is 
serious doubt, the AFM questions may – after due internal process – compel management 
(SB and audit committee) to provide additional information or restatements. If the issuer 
refuses or does not respond in a timely and satisfactory way the AFM may recommend the 
issuer disclose a statement to explain the deficiencies in the annual financial report and the 
consequences thereof for the report and future disclosure, art. 3 ASFR. This recommenda-
tion has to be treated as price sensitive information, art. 2 DSFR. If the issuer still refuses, 
the AFM may request a judicial order of the Enterprise Chamber of the Amsterdam Court of 
Appeals to ‘correct’ the accounts (art. 2:447 NCC).257 (This procedure does not cover interim 
statements.) This court action, however, can be brought only after adoption of the accounts 
by the AGM of the issuer, which usually is held several weeks after disclosure of the annual 
financial report. If the AGM (being informed of the dispute) does not adopt the accounts, the 
AFM can bring such a court action. Note also that any ‘interested person’ can bring a similar 
court action, also without AFM authorization (unlike in the UK) and even to dissent from a 
request or ‘order’ of the AFM.
In Germany, public oversight on annual financial reports and intermediate information is 
invested in the Bundesanstalt (BaFin) (§ 37n Wertpapierhandelsgesetz (WpHG)).258 It inves-
tigates on the basis of concrete indications or at random. Such procedure will be blocked if a 
corporate law action for annulment of the annual financial report has been brought (by share-
holders) or a Sonderprüfer has been appointed (par. 37o-2 (WpHG)). A Prüfstelle (§ 342a-e 
Handelsgesetzbuch (HGB))259may inform the Sonderprüfer that the issuer refuses to follow 
257 Cf P.M. van der Zanden in his annotation of Enterprise Chamber in the case Spijker, LJN BC1057.
258 Cf Thomas M.J. Möllers, ‘Effizienz als Maβstab des Kapitalmarktrechts’, Archiv für die civilistische 
Praxis, 2008, p. 1-36.
259 According to § 342b HGB the Prüfstelle can investigate whether the annual financial report complies 
with the rules on the ground of concrete indications, at the request of the Bundesanstalt or at random. 
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its recommendations. In that case, the BaFin can establish – without judicial interference – 
the extend of the shortcomings and order the issuer to announce and disclose these (unless 
this contrary to the public interest or the interest of the company): § 37q WpHG. This proce-
dure also applies to interim statements. Apparently, the specific ‘restatement procedures’ 
as described do not bar the authority from using any other means available.
Both German and Netherlands law show that an action by the public agency (AFM/BaFin) 
in exercising its oversight from a market perspective and protecting investors is to some 
extent dependent on or barred by corporate actions (private enforcement); the UK agency is 
apparently more independent (like the US SEC).
6.2.3 Restatement and liability
A correction of the accounts evidently replaces/restates the preceding information. It may 
initiate securities fraud actions by investors that claim to have been damaged by the initial 
misleading information or even any kind of derivative suit against (members of) the board or 
officers. Such actions will be dealt with in more detail in chapter 3.
6.3	 Correction	of	the	management	report/corporate	governance	statement
The procedures described do not distinguish between the constituent parts of the annual 
financial report and therefore are in principle also applicable with respect to defective 
reports. Since the soft law elements thereof, as discussed above, are non-binding, over-
sight – as with the audit – will be limited to the question of whether – as prescribed – the 
report discloses which code the issuer has followed and whether the issuer has satisfacto-
rily adhered to the ‘comply or explain’ rule and thus also properly explained the non-com-
pliance with such soft law rules. Hence, a distinction has to be made between the simple 
reporting rule as such (‘comply or explain’) and the principles and best practices’ which are 
addressed and defined in such codes. A court or agency order to ‘correct’ such statements 
clearly can only address the former, since addressing the latter would be virtually incom-
patible with the non-binding nature of these rules. Some observations can be made with 
regard to the link between securities law disclosure of the report (as constituent part of the 
annual financial report of the Transparency Directive) and intra corporate law reporting.
First, in those jurisdictions where the AGM has been invested with the power to adopt the 
accounts, the management report strict sensu is not adopted. Secondly, insofar as any action 
to restate is dependent on such adoption or an action for annulment, it is unclear whether 
and to what extent this bars the powers of the public agency. Thirdly, this reveals the close 
connection and vague boundary with governance (internal affairs), also with respect to the 
governance statement as by now required separately by art. 46a 4th Dir. (and art. 10 Takeo-
ver Directive).
Again, no major problem arises if the test is limited to whether such statements appropri-
ately reflect the ‘comply or explain’ rule, although even this test implies a possible review 
of the internal affairs on ‘compliance’. Somewhat more difficult is the test a) whether and to 
Such procedure will be blocked if an action for annulment has been brought to annul the accounts or 
a Sonderprüfer has been appointed. The Prüfstelle informs the company of its findings and allows a pe-
riod in which the issuer declares whether he agrees. He reports to the Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht: 
§ 342b (2) HGB.
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what extent a reported adherence to a corporate governance code constitutes (an enforce-
able) quasi amendment of the articles of association (and/or bylaws or internal regula-
tions) and b) whether and to what extent principles and best practices constitute per se 
customary law that can be enforced. As will be discussed in more detail in chapter 4, these 
questions have been litigated in substance in the Netherlands in investigation procedures 
brought before the Enterprise Chamber of the Amsterdam Court of Appeal. This procedure 
serves, albeit in a very general and open ended way, to achieve ‘openness in the corpora-
tions’ affairs’ and may therefore overlap with the specific procedures as described above. 
Moreover, the Attorney General of the Amsterdam Court of Appeals may also initiate an 
investigation into the affairs of an issuer ‘in the general interest’. It is unclear if such power 
is barred by an action brought by the AFM or any ‘interested person’ and an action to annul 
the AGM resolution in which the financial accounts were adopted.
These questions illustrate how securities law disclosure raises further questions as to the 
demarcation with (and possible extension of) investor protection under corporate law. In 
chapter 4 this tension will be further elaborated.
6.4	 Federal	oversight	in	the	EU:	need	for	a	European	SEC?
The foregoing leads to the question of whether a European SEC is needed to warrant uniform 
standard setting and interpretation of IFRS and for disclosure of issuer’s annual financial 
reports. I tend to concur with scholars who have argued that the absence of a centralized 
enforcement authority and in that sense a separation of standard setting and enforcement 
will lead to a loss of regulatory quality. A European SEC260 seems to be necessary261 for 
achieving such an objective in the perspective of capital market integration.262 A European 
SEC could contribute to fostering, developping and administering flexible regulations for the 
European equity market.263 It could play an important role in exercising oversight of private 
sector accounting bodies and participate in the ongoing drafting process of the IASC (IASB), 
as well as with the US SEC on the convergence of US GAAP and EU IFRS.264 A European SEC 
260 The idea of en ESEC is not new: Hopt argued in 1976 that such an institution should be considered, see 
K.J. Hopt, ‘The necessity of Co-ordinating or Approximating Economic Legislation, or of Supplement-
ing or Replacing it by Community Law-A Report’, 13 Common Market Law Review 245, 1976 and G. Her-
tig and R. Lee, ‘Four predictions about the future of EU securities regulation’, Journal of Corporate Law 
Studies 2003, p. 372.
261 See G. Hertig and R. Lee, ‘Four predictions about the future of EU securities regulation’, Journal of 
Corporate Law Studies 2003, p. 375. There are good reasons to believe that Member States will not be 
able to guarantee effective corporate disclosure by EU issuers. In view of the historical comparative 
opacity of most Member States’ accounting standards, it is hard to believe that Member States will be 
able to guarantee the appropriate transparency of financial statements.
262 Donald C. Langevoort, ‘Structuring Securities Regulation in the European Union: Lessons from the US 
Experience’, ECGI. Law Working Paper Series, 41/2005, p. 25. I agree with Donald Langevoort that prob-
ably practical politics probably stand in the way of the sense of vision expressed by the Treaty of Rome. 
Langevoort ends his article by saying: “Whether one admires the SEC or not, we should admit that its 
replication in Europe would not be particularly easy. For better or worse, a European SEC would be a 
markedly different creature.”
263 Roberta S. Karmel, ‘The Case for a European Securities Commission’, 38 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 9 1999-
2000.
264 Roberta S. Karmel, ‘The Case for a European Securities Commission’, 38 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 9 1999-
2000, p. 34.
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could also play a role in monitoring of the harmonized annual and periodic disclosures265 
and advise the EC on amendments if market development were to require modernizing such 
rules. A similar role could be played in clearance and settlement systems and procedures 
to further an efficient pan-European securities market.266
Adequate means for private enforcement should prevent that public enforcement from 
becoming too bureaucratic and costly.267 Whether a ESEC is political feasible is another ques-
tion. Further research is necessary. However, the EC recently reported on the implementa-
tion of the Transparency Directive in the MS and proposed the establishment of ESMA.268 
On 24 November 2010, ESMA was introduced by Regulation (EU) 1095/2010.269 CESR will 
take over, as appropriate, all existing and ongoing tasks from the CESR (Regulation, art. 8 
Regulation).270
7 Private enforcement of securities law rules by investors and other 
interested parties
From public enforcement as described in the preceding paragraph, we now turn to private 
enforcement of the new EU securities regulation, also of disclosure of the annual financial 
report as the key disclosure document. The securities law directives and regulations leave 
265 Roberta S. Karmel, ‘The Case for a European Securities Commission’, 38 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 9 1999-
2000, p. 35 and G. Hertig and R. Lee, ‘Four predictions about the future of EU securities regulation’, 
Journal of Corporate Law Studies 2003, p. 375.
266 Roberta S. Karmel, ‘The Case for a European Securities Commission’, 38 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 9 1999-
2000p. 32.
267 Roberta S. Karmel, ‘The Case for a European Securities Commission’, 38 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 9 
1999-2000 and G. Hertig and R. Lee, ‘Four predictions about the future of EU securities regulation’, 
Journal of Corporate Law Studies 2003, p. 376. ESEC intervention should foster private enforcement 
procedures. Very generally, ESEC intervention will make financial statements, periodic disclosure 
and ongoing information less opaque, thus making it more difficult to issue misleading statements, 
or to hide managerial mistakes and blatant discrepancies between compensation and performance. 
Given increased competitive pressures, which aggravate the consequences of mistakes, and reduced 
investor tolerance towards managers who fail to deliver, this is likely both to increase investors’ will-
ingness to sue, and as well as courts’ sympathy for their complaints.
268 See consultation and report of EC on reviewing the execution of the Transparency Directive in the 
several Member States. The review of the operation of Directive 2004/109/EC: emerging issues Ac-
companying document to the Report from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, 
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions Operation of Direc-
tive 2004/109/EC on the harmonisation of transparency requirements in relation to information about 
issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market COM(2010) and the proposal 
for the establishment of a ESMA, EC COM (2009) 505 final, Proposal for a Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council establishing a European Securities and Markets Authority.
269 Regulation (EU) No. 1095/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24-11-2010, esta-
blishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Securities Markets Authority) amending Deci-
sion No. 7136/2009/EC and repealing Commission 2009/77/EC.
270 Regulation, art. 76, The Authority shall be considered the legal successor of CESR. By the date of 
establishment of the Authority, all assets and liabilities and all pending operations of CESR shall be 
automatically transferred to the Authority. The CESR shall establish a statement showing its closing 
asset and liability situation as of the date of that transfer. That statement shall be audited and appro-
ved by CESR and by the Commission.
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and assign such private enforcement271 to the Member States to fit in with their national 
legal systems and traditions.
As stated before, in the US the ’33 and ’34 Acts underscored the disclosure system with 
private causes of action directly related thereto and focussed on their enforcement: a strict 
liability for securities fraud.272 Hence, private enforcement is not shaped through any cor-
porate action of shareholders, but through the threat of strict liability of the firm itself and 
officers for disseminating misleading information to the market. Its use focussed on insider 
trading cases.273 Securities fraud actions are clearly distinguished from (derivative) actions 
on ‘directors’ liability’. The concept of discharge is unknown in US law, but such (derivative) 
actions can be rebutted by the business judgment rule. Corporate state law only plays a 
role insofar as fiduciary duties are concerned, not in case of an allegation of disclosure of 
misleading information to the market.274 SOx did not substantially change these means for 
private enforcement.275 It rather aimed at enhancing the drafting and disclosure process and 
oversight on auditors and market professionals in the securities industry.276 It increased 
sanctions for non-compliance with internal procedures (certification CEO/CFO; role of the 
audit committee and position of the auditor,277 sharpened sanctions, such as, disqualifica-
tion of directors, and increased sentencing guidelines for punishment278). Non-compliance 
with new governance rules (such as audit committees, independent directors279) may lead to 
suspension or delisting.280 The main private actions therefore available to investors remain 
those of the ’33 and ’34 Acts. Conceptually, prospectus liability of promoters is extended to 
continuous disclosure under the SEA’34.281
271 Art. 6 (1) PD requires Member States to ensure that responsibility for the information given in a pros-
pectus attaches at least to the issuer or its administrative, management or supervisory bodies. The 
directive also demands Member States to underscore the disclosure obligations with civil liability 
under private law (art. 6 (2)), see also art. 7 TD.
272 § 10b SEA ’34, Rule 10b-5, it shall be unlawful for any person using interstate facilities a) to employ 
any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit 
to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circum-
stances under which they were made, not misleading, or, c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of 
business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the 
purchase or sale of any security.
273 Larry D. Soderquist and Theresa A. Gabaldon, Securities Law, New York: Foundation Press 2007, p. 149. 
Other usage of Rule 10b-5: when a person mismanages a corporation in ways that are connected with 
the purchase or sale of securities, when a securities firm or another person manipulates the market 
for a security traded in the over-the-counter market, and, when a securities firm or securities profes-
sional engages in certain other forms of conduct connected with the purchase or sale of securities.
274 See Business Roundtable.
275 Not part of state company law but of federal action on securities fraud.
276 Cf the proposals made by, inter alia, Lucian Arye Bebchuk, ‘The Case for Increasing Shareholder 
Power’, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 118. No. 3, p. 933-914, January 2005.
277 §§ 302, 404 - 408 SOx.
278 SOx, Title VIII.
279 Cf. § 301 SOx and § 10A (m) SEA ’34
280 12 (j) SEA’34, and § 801-809 SEA’34.
281 § 11 SA’33, civil liability on the issuer, directors, certain officers, underwriters, accountants, engi-
neers, and other experts, when registration statement contains material misstatements or omits to 
state material facts. § 12 SA’33, Civil liabilities in connection with prospectuses and communications, 
par. 12 (a) (1), any person who offers or sells a security in violation of section 5, § 12 (a) (2), imposes 
civil liability upon any person who offers or sells any security by means of material misstatements or 
omissions to state material facts. § 10-b SEA’34 and Rule 10b-5.
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Looking to the EU a similar distinction between liabilities for initial and continuous dis-
closure can be perceived. The investor/market-oriented rule art 6. Prospectus Directive 
requires Member States to ensure that their laws, regulations and administrative proce-
dures on civil liability will apply to persons responsible for the information given in a pro-
spectus. Similarly, art. 7 Transparency Directive requires Member States to ensure that 
responsibility for the information to be drawn up and made public in accordance with arti-
cles 4, 5, 6 and 16 lies at least with the issuer or [emphasis added] its administrative, man-
agement or supervisory bodies and liability apply to the issuers, the bodies referred to in 
this article or the persons responsible within the issuers’.
Apart from these securities law provisions, the amended 4th and 7th Directives now spe-
cifically require Member States to ‘ensure that their laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions on liability apply to the members of [these] administrative, management and 
supervisory bodies282 (..) at least towards the company’.283 This wording does not exclude 
issuers and seems to imply, in the concept and structure of these directives, the corporate 
law rules on drafting and submission of the accounts to the SB and/or the AGM and the 
subsequent corporate law disclosure. The directives seem to allow two ways of implemen-
tation: a) extension of 4th Dir./7 liabilities284 (being also available to third parties) to issuers 
themselves and b) a separate securities law based integration of liabilities (directed to com-
pensation of damages to investors) to cover both liability for prospectus and subsequent 
periodical information. In the latter option, liabilities can – in principle – be disconnected 
from corporate actions (e.g. adoption of the accounts) and any action to annul, amend or 
reconsider business judgments, actions and resolutions by bodies corporate and related 
assessment of business judgment rules. Taken together, these different rules do not create 
a homogenous and integrated disclosure and enforcement system in EU securities law (also 
having regard to the new public oversight).
The foregoing analysis reveals that the classic accounting approach already seeks to invert 
shareholders (AGM and individually or groups) with powers in the corporate decision-mak-
ing process with respect to the laying down, discussion and even adoption or approval of 
the annual accounts (not financial statements). The flipside of this is the principle that those 
providing accounts duly and properly will in principle be discharged from the execution of 
282 Note that issuers (as public interest entity) are required by art. 39 of the amended 8th Directive to have 
an audit committee.
283 See art. 50b Dir 4, Member States shall ensure that the members of the administrative, management 
and supervisory bodies of the company have collectively the duty to ensure that the annual accounts, 
the annual report and, when provided separately, the corporate governance statement to be provided 
pursuant to art. 46a are drawn up and published in accordance with the requirements of this Directive 
and, where applicable, in accordance with the international accounting standards adopted in accor-
dance with Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002. Such bodies shall act within the competences assigned 
to them by national law. Arts. 50c 4th Dir. and 36b Dir7, Member States shall ensure that their laws, 
regulations and administrative provisions on liability apply to the members of the administrative, ma-
nagement and supervisory bodies referred to in art. 50b, at least towards the company, for breach of 
the duty referred to in art. 50b.
284 Such ‘4th Directive liabilities’ then – upon implementation in national law – are not limited to nor would 
they be exclusively guided by a market-oriented approach to protect investors, but – in different de-
grees – intertwined with classical corporate law actions and sanctions.
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their tasks and assignment during the reporting period. In some EU Member States, this 
‘accounting’ approach, as explained, still interferes with the new securities law disclosure 
approach. Specific actions for damages caused by misleading information are embedded in 
principles of tort law. Specific prospectus liability for promoters was addressed at an early 
stage, but enforcement of continuous disclosure rules is evolving.
The other perspective of securities law market disclosure and investor protection evidently 
seeks to address the enforcement mechanisms on misleading or fraudulent information 
and improper or untimely disclosure as such, with a clear division between initial disclosure 
(upon issuing new securities in the market: prospectus liability) and continuous disclosure 
(as long as the issuer’s shares are listed/traded).
7.1	 Prospectus	liability
History shows that abusive offerings of securities were the first to be addressed a.o. with 
civil liabilities of promoters and others directly involved in and accountable for the prospec-
tus and issue of securities, whilst rules for ongoing disclosure and enforcement developed 
differently.
The Prospectus Directive and accompanying regulations require a prospectus285 to contain 
explicit declarations of the (management and board of the) promoter and other persons 
(underwriter, experts).286 These persons shall be clearly identified in the prospectus and 
shall declare ‘that to the best of their knowledge, the information contained in the prospec-
tus is in accordance with the facts and that the prospectus makes no omission likely to affect 
its impact’.287 The Member States shall ensure that their rules on civil liability apply to these 
persons.288 Enforcement by means of civil liability is thus left to the Member States. They 
shall ensure that responsibility for the information disseminated in the prospectus attaches 
‘at least to the issuer or its administrative, management or supervisory board, the offeror 
(also lead manager) and the person asking for admission to listing. Submission to listing/
trading rules underscores this commitment of issuers, be it contractually or otherwise’.289
Specific prospectus and liability rules were already introduced in various Member States at 
an early stage.290 Differences in private enforcement will occur and these may cause friction 
with EU (‘federal’) basic concepts and the framework of the integrated European finan-
cial market, and may explain the differences between the EU and the US as well as those 
amongst Member States. MIFID did not solve these issues neither did the current revised 
Prospectus Directive.
285 Directive 2003/71/EC, art. 13 (to be approved by the competent authority).
286 Issuers shall disclose and file with the competent authority ‘a document’ that contains or refers to all 
information that they have published over the preceding 12 months (art. 10) Self-registration is pos-
sible (art. 12), Directive 2003/71/EC, art. 13.
287 Art. 6 (1) Dir. 2003/71/EC.
288 Art. 6 (2) Dir. 2003/71/EC.
289 Special study on market structure, listing standards and corporate governance, American Bar As-
sociation, The Business Lawyer, August 2002.
290 In 1928 in the Netherlands. The Gladstonian reforms in the second half of the 19th century introduced 
disclosure rules to cope with the moral hazard of promoters and prevention of abuses in an IPO. These 
rules sometimes were extended to other disclosures: e.g. arts 2:139 and 6:194-196 NCC.
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7.2	 Liability	for	misleading	information/continuous	disclosure
As stated earlier, apart from the availability of ‘securities fraud’ actions for misleading ini-
tial and continuous disclosure, the 4th and 7th Directives require Member States to provide 
for liability of board and officers vis-à-vis the company itself. This evidently is again linked to 
corporate law and therefore also in this respect national regulations do differ.
For the UK, sec. 463 (2) CA (2006) provides that a director of a company is liable to compen-
sate the company for any loss suffered by it as a result of any (knowingly) untrue or mislead-
ing statement in a report or an omission from a report required to be included. This only 
applies to ‘reports’; no person shall be subject to any liability other than the company result-
ing from reliance, by that person or another, on information in such a report.
German securities law provides in § 37b/37c WpHG for a cause of action to recover dam-
ages caused by non-compliance of duties to disclose insider information and disclosure of 
untrue insider information. The Kapitalanleger-Musterverfahrensgesetz (KapMuG) allows 
for collective action of securities law claims for damages caused by false, misleading or 
omitted disclosure duties, in annual financial reports and interim statements (§ 1/2 Kap-
MuG). I memorize that the annual financial report of an AG (also issuer) will be null and 
void if drafted such that if its content violates rules that have been given exclusively or 
predominantly to protect the creditors of the company (§ 256 AktG). This fact can be estab-
lished by the court at the request of investors that were shareholders at the time that the 
report was adopted, but also by the management board and individual members thereof 
(§ 256-7 and 245 AktG).291 Cf the general rules for directors’ liability for improper execution 
of an assignment: par. 93(2) and the German variant of the business judgment rule in par. 
93(1) AktG. This action can – if agreed by a majority of the GMS – be brought as a derivative 
action (§ 147 and 148 AktG). Art. 2:139 NCC for the Netherlands provides that all directors 
(note: not the issuer) will be jointly and severally liable vis-à-vis third parties (creditors and 
shareholders), if the annual accounts or intermediate statements disclosed by the company 
have given a misleading picture of the situation of the company, for the damages thereby 
suffered, unless a director proves that he is not to blame. Art. 2:138 NCC provide that direc-
tors will be held liable for the company’s deficit in bankruptcy if the annual financial report 
was not published (in a timely manner). The general rules applicable in case of ‘securities 
fraud’ are given in arts. 6:194-196 NCC under the umbrella of misleading ‘advertisements’ 
for prospectus liability; especially art. 6:193a NCC and further; misleading information 
under continuous disclosure obligations will be addressed/redressed in the Netherlands 
on the basis of a general tort law action for damages.292 If in an investigation procedure 
‘mismanagement’ has been established on the ground of improper or misleading disclosure 
of materials, this fact may be a cause for a subsequent action on liability of directors.293 The 
291 § 256 (7) AktG, BaFin also has the authority to rescind the already adopted annual financial report in 
case of a listed public corporation.
292 Art. 6:162 NCC, in case of intent of gross negligence, board members can be liable for misleading 
statements: Netherlands Supreme Court 25 November 1927, NJ 1928, 364 (Kretschmar/Mendes de 
Leon). See also the dissertation by S.N. de Valk, Aansprakelijkheid van Leidinggevenden, Uitgave van 
wege het Instituut voor ondernemingsrecht, Kluwer: Deventer 20009, p. 129.
293 The facts uncovered by the investigation procedure leading to the judgment of mismanagement of the 
legal entity and possible keeping the directors responsible, can be used in general tort action (art. 
6:162 NCC).
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Act Collective Settlement of Mass Damages inserted in arts. 7:907-910 NCC and 1013-1018 
Netherlands Code on Legal Procedure allows a settlement between a tort feasor and a legal 
entity representative for the collectivity (class) of claimants (injured persons) to be declared 
binding for the whole class. The legal entity can use art. 3:305a NCC to file a claim for the 
class which can result in the aforementioned settlement. This procedure may also be used 
by investors claiming damages in cases of ‘securities fraud’. In the Netherlands the Dexia 
and Shell294 case was one of the first in which the Netherlands Court declared a settlement 
binding for a whole class.295
The general liability for ‘improper management’ rests on art. 2:9 NCC, which does not pro-




I have argued that the key element of the new EU securities regulation is the disclosure of 
the annual financial report as a whole, including the ‘certification’ statement by directors. I 
further argued that corporate procedures and actions to submit accounts for adoption to the 
AGM is at odds with this EU principle and that the focus of private enforcement is developing 
towards European forms of securities fraud actions.
Germany and the Netherlands are familiar with the concept of discharge as a general rebut-
tal in litigation for personal liability of directors.296 Here, however, my starting observations 
of this paragraph are illustrated since this concept is embedded in classic corporate law 
and decision-making in the setting of ‘accounting’. Both jurisdictions envisage, in different 
ways, the power of the AGM to resolve to discharge management and supervisors from the 
execution of their assignment in the reporting period. This links such a resolution to the dis-
cussion and approval/adoption of the annual financial report.297 This is, as discussed above, 
not the case in the US. Under UK law, the report is only laid before the AGM, allowing discus-
sion but not requiring adoption or approval. Netherlands law explicitly requires adoption of 
the accounts (only) by the AGM and German law gives the option that the (complete) ‘Jahres-
294 The Amstedam Court of Appeal declared in 2009 a settlement concerning the oil reserve scandal 
between Shell corporation and a foundation binding, Amsterdam Court of Appeal 29 May 2009, LJN 
BI5744 (Shell).
295 See for some Netherlands literature on this ‘new’ Netherlands device, I.N. Tzankova, ‘Enkele over-
peinzingen naar aanleiding van de Dexia-beschikking’, Ondernemingsrecht 2007, 88, in which she pro-
vides some convincing arguments why under the Netherlands regulation e.g. US fear for ‘sweetheart 
settlements’ as prevailing under their system is ungrounded: e.g. the involvement of sufficient pow-
erful and experienced ‘lead plaintiffs’. Cf also A.F.J.A. Leijten, ‘De betekenis van de Wet Collectieve 
Afwikkeling Massaschade voor corporate litigation’, Ondernemingsrecht 2005, 176.
296 Discharge is acceptance by the assignor (or his representative) of the accounting by the assignee(s), 
i.e. in a corporation: discharge of management (board) by the corporation (represented by another 
body corporate: AGM, SB or NEDs) and thereby releasing them in principle from liability, albeit with 
certain limitations as set out below. This resembles the position of a trustee vis-à-vis the beneficia-
ries.
297 I memorize a) that adoption by the AGM (as in the Netherlands and – optionally – in Germany) is not 
an EU requirement , b) that also adoption by the SB (Germany) or the board (UK) is not foreclosed and 
c) that the same holds for any corporate resolution and the (degree of) defence offered thereby to 
discharge (members) of the (supervisory) board.
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abschluss’ be approved by the Vorstand/SB or the AGM. In the latter jurisdictions therefore 
the question is whether and to what extent adoption or approval discharges management 
(and SB) from ‘accounting’ to the resolving corporate body and its consequent legal effect.
In the Netherlands, adoption of the accounts by the AGM was long regarded as ‘acceptance’ 
of the ‘accounting’ by the directors (as ‘agents’) and thereby also as discharge of board 
members from the performance of the tasks attributed to them by statute and articles of 
association. Such discharge was usually in the articles of association assumed to have been 
given by such an AGM resolution, but standing case law prohibited the use thereof as a 
defence in a law suit against directors for misleading or incomplete statements.
In 2004, art. 2:101 (3) NCC explicitly disconnected adoption (by the AGM) of the accounts from 
such discharge. Hence, discharge requires separate AGM resolutions and the Corporate 
Governance Code makes a further split between management and supervisory board.298 So, 
the accounts may be adopted (the report is not) and at the same time discharge of manag-
ers and/or SB members withheld. This may signal a desire for policy changes. If so deprived 
from discharge, no alternative statutory business judgment rule protects management and 
SB in a later suit for liability which also may follow an investigation procedure, in which 
case, mismanagement of the company may be established on non-compliance with best 
practices of the Corporate Governance Code. These threats and the reputational damage 
involved may increase risk-aversion conduct. This will be elaborated on in chapter 4.
Comparison with German law shows that according to § 120 AktG, the AGM each year 
resolves on the discharge (Entlastung) of managers and supervisory board members which 
resolution “billigt der Verwaltung der Gesellschaft”, but does not result in a waiver for a 
claim for compensation (“enthält kein Verzicht auf Ersatzansprüche”). Such claims can be 
litigated under the general provision on directors’ liability (§§ 93 and 116 AktG), also as a 
derivative suit (§§ 148-149 AktG). The German legislator apparently did observe the discon-
nection of the concept of discharge from the new securities law and did indeed introduce a 
new business judgment rule in § 93 AktG. “Eine Pflichtverletzung liegt nicht vor, wenn das Vor-
standsmitglied bei einer internehmerischen Entscheidung vernünftigerweise annehmen dürfte, 
auf der Grundlage angemessener Information zum Wohle der Gesellschaft zu handelen.”
The Netherlands does not have a similar business judgment rule299 to shield claims, irre-
spective their (in)-effectiveness in an action for securities fraud. Nor are there statutory 
298 Best Practice IV.1.6 DCGC.
299 § 8.31 (a)(2) MBCA, directors are not liable to the corporation or its shareholders for any decision, 
unless, challenged conduct consisted or was the result of: i) action not in good faith; or (ii) a decision 
(a) which the director not reasonable believe to be in the best interest of the corporation, or (b), as 
to which director was not informed to an extent the director reasonably believed appropriate in the 
circumstances; or (iii) a lack of objectivity due to the director’s self-interest. (iv), a sustained failure 
of the director to devote attention to ongoing oversight of the business and affairs of the corporation 
(v), receipt of financial benefit to which the director was not entitled or any other breach of director’s 
duty of loyalty. See also § 102 (b) (7) DGCL. Cf § 93(1) AktG: ‘Die Vorstandsmitglieder haben bei ihrer 
Geschäftsführing die Sorgfalt eines ordentlichten und gewissenhaften Geschäftsleiters anzuwenden. 
Eine Pflichtverletzung liegt nicht vor, wenn das Vorstandsmitglied bei einer unternehmerischen Ent-
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I already questioned the consistency thereof taking into account the different status of 
the management report that is – at least in a technical legal sense – not ‘adopted’. Such 
adoption requires proper corporate action, here: a proper discussion301 of this item on the 
AGM agenda and a proper AGM resolution. This seems inconceivable and inconsistent302 if 
it implied that board members could be forced to accept such changes and assume liability 
for such changes in ‘their’ accounts.
The classical enforcement tool is a court action to annul the corporate resolution to adopt 
the accounts (as recorded in the minutes) on general corporate law grounds. The grounds 
may vary from abuse of majority power (for example, resulting in retaining profits and 
decreased pay out) to incorrect application of accounting standards. Note that for the Neth-
erlands, adoption of the accounts is a condition of legitimate payment of dividends from 
profit (or distributable reserves) as evidenced in the accounts.303 See for actions for annul-
ment Germany: §§ 256 and 257 jo 243 AktG and for the Netherlands: arts. 2:15 and 447 ff 
NCC. The latter procedure shall be directed to ‘correction’ rather than annulment of already 
adopted accounts and be limited to the grounds that – in short – IFRS has not been properly 
applied.304 The UK CA (2006) does not envisage an action to annul (the resolution to adopt) 
the financial report, but rather a revision (‘restatement’): sec. 454 ff CA (2006), primarily by 
public enforcement (to allow quick availability of such restatements to the market to allow 
proper pricing). This is also the purpose of the new German and Netherlands rules on public 
enforcement, which especially in the Netherlands, is connected to adoption of the annual 
accounts.
In the UK and the Netherlands, private actions for such ‘restatement’ can also be initiated by 
investors and any interested party.305 In the UK, the plaintiff needs approval by the Secretary 
scheidung vernüftigerweise annehmen dürfte, auf der Grundlage angemessener Information zum 
Wohle der Gesellschaft zu handeln.’
300 Gower and Davies, Principles of Modern Company Law, Sweet & Maxwell, London: 2008
301 Cf. § 243(4) Aktg; no audit-certification; role of auditor in GMS; Tabaksblat and Wta (Act on supervision 
on auditors).
302 The Netherlands Social Economic Council advised that the authority to adopt the annual accounts 
would be transferred in ‘structuurvennootschappen’ to the general meeting of shareholders in stead 
of the supervisory board. The Social Economic Council considered that it would not match with our 
system if the GMS had the right to change the accounts. The GMS only has the choice between adopting 
or not adopting the annual accounts.
303 See art. 2:105 sub 1 and 3 NCC and Best Practise IV.1.4 DCGC, the policy concerning dividends has to 
be put on the agenda for AGM. See Germany Best Practice, § 119 and 174 AktG. This requirement does 
not exist in the US.
304 As opposed to the way the competent authority can require and enforce a restatement (and then may 
include questions of interpretation of IFRS and, in case of multiple listings, also of US GAAP). 
305 Addressees of disclosure: consumers or professionals, see H. Merkt, ‘Disclosing Disclosure:  Europe’s 
Winding Road to Competitive Standards of Publication of Company-Related Information’, in: Klaus J. 
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of State (secs 456/457 UK CA 2006). In the Netherlands, there is no such limitation (arts. 
2:447/448 NCC).
It is expected that the focus will shift towards assessment of the correctness of the annual 
financial report within the decreasing limits of managerial discretion in the application of 
IFRS. The connection to corporate law procedure of adoption and finalization of the financial 
annual report/accounts and enforcement and means for restatements shows the tension 
involved in enforcing market-oriented substantive rules. The request for a restatement has 
to be filed in the Netherlands two months after the adoption of the annual accounts.306 By 
then the issuer will supposedly have made a disclosure required by the Transparency, Mar-
ket Abuse and Stock Admission Directives. Although adoption of the annual accounts/report 
includes implicit or explicit discharge of the directors, the question remains as to whether, 
and if so how, ex post liability of the issuer and its directors and officers for misleading 
annual and intermediate reports has to be addressed.
8 Summary disclosure and accounting
The new EU securities law created by a series of directives and regulations focuses on 
initial and continuous disclosure rules for issuers equally directed at market transparency 
and investor protection under public oversight by national authorities. The new EU securi-
ties disclosure system resembles the US disclosure system, which since its inception in 
1933/1934 is characterized by strict initial and continuous disclosure rules for issuers. 
Directed at market transparency and investor protection, these rules have a standalone 
character distinct from corporate law (and tax accounting). Their function is to protect 
investors, not the interests of creditors and other stakeholders of issuers. The SEC is 
assigned public oversight, additional rule making powers and public enforcement. Private 
enforcement is facilitated by securities fraud actions. The SOx (2003) sharpened the rules 
but did not change the system.
EU law is implemented into the national law of the Member States. It replaced the former 
self-regulatory listing rules set by stock exchanges and financial markets with strict man-
datory securities regulation. The core of the new EU continuous disclosure rules is the 
issuer’s annual financial report consisting of its annual accounts, MR and a certification of 
its responsible persons, who provide a true and fair view. To allow comparability and stand-
ardization of disclosure documents, the issuer’s consolidated accounts shall be drafted in 
accordance with IFRS. Like the US report to shareholders (10K-20F), this annual financial 
report effectively serves as a standalone market- and investor-oriented disclosure docu-
ment.
Hopt, Jaap Winter and Eddy Wymeersch (eds.), Reforming Company and Takeover Law in Europe, New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 138.
306 Art. 2:449 lid 1 NCC.The UK restatement procedure seems to have a broader scope including any sum-
mary financial statement.
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However, these securities law rules and the annual financial report also build on and remain 
connected with the parallel corporate law accounting and disclosure rules of the 1st, 4th and 
7th company law Directives that apply to all (close and publicly held) companies. These pro-
vide mandatory stakeholder-oriented rules for single and consolidated accounts with own 
accounting, audit and ‘disclosure’ rules.
I observe that not all Member States have (yet) embodied the sharp distinction between 
the securities law objectives as reflected in the concept of the ‘annual financial report’ of 
the Transparency directive and the remaining corporate law procedures and concepts of 
the 4th and 7th Directives as reflected in their national law. The corporate procedures and 
actions to submit annual accounts for adoption to the AGM (as in the Netherlands, as the 
default rule in Germany, but not in the UK) is at odds with the standalone securities law 
disclosure character of the annual financial report (art. 4 Transparency DIrective). The con-
nection with corporate law procedure of adoption and finalization of the financial annual 
report/accounts and enforcement and means for restatements shows the tension involved 
in enforcing market-oriented substantive rules. The request for a restatement has to be 
filed in the Netherlands two months after the adoption of the annual accounts. By then, the 
issuer will probably have made a disclosure required by the Transparency, Market Abuse 
and Stock Admission Directives. Although adoption of the annual accounts/report includes 
implicit or explicit discharge of the directors, the question remains as to whether and if so 
how ex post liability of the issuer and its directors and officers for misleading annual and 
intermediate reports has to be addressed.
The concept of the MR, although a crucial part of the annual financial report, misses a uni-
form (IFRS) format such as the US MD&A and does not match completely with the distinction 
between executive and non-executive members of the board (or SB). Specifically, this report 
reflects the increasing use of disclosure as a regulatory tool by national regulators and 
therefore its content is exposed to emerging differences between Member States, which 
seems not to be the case in the US where the SEC prescribes the rules for the MD&A.
Being left to the Member States, public and private enforcement of these combined and 
entangled new rules reveales remarkable differences. The way that the role and respon-
sibility of authorities to require ‘correction’ of defective annual financial reports have been 
implemented shows remarkable differences and so does comparison with the SEC’s pow-
ers. Evidently, disputes on the correctness of disclosure documents may also affect the 
assessment of the statutory audit that was exercised. An important difference with the US 
remains that the EU, although aiming at integration of the European financial markets has 
not yet created a European SEC, although CESR has been assigned a coordinating role (now 
ESMA). Since public oversight extends to compliance by issuers with IFRS, the dispersion of 
oversight among national authorities does not guarantee uniform interpretation and appli-
cation thereof, even though the ECJ has final jurisdiction in these matters.
Private enforcement of the new EU securities regulation, also of disclosure of the annual 
financial report as the key disclosure document, is left to the Member States to fit into 
their national legal systems and traditions. My analysis reveals that the classic accounting 
approach already seeks to invest shareholders (the AGM, and individually or in groups) with 
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powers in the corporate decision-making process with respect to the laying down, discus-
sion and even adoption or approval. The flipside of this is the principle that those providing 
accounts duly and properly will be discharged from the execution of their tasks and assign-
ment during the reporting period. This approach, as observed, still characterizes the law 
in some EU jurisdictions. Specific actions for damages caused by misleading  information 
are embedded in principles of tort law. Specific prospectus liability for promoters was 
addressed at an early stage, but enforcement of continuous disclosure rules is evolving.
It is expected that the focus will shift towards assessment of the correctness of the annual 
financial report within the decreasing limits of managerial discretion in the application of 
IFRS.
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law: shareholders rights and board 
supremacy in the 
‘internal affairs’ of issuers
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3.1 The End of Corporate History Revisited: towards a common 
regulatory framework for issuers?
In the Introduction, I briefly referred to the famous article by Hansman and Kraakman on the 
end of corporate history. They claimed the dominance of the corporate ideology of share-
holder primacy leads to major jurisdictions adopting similar rules of corporate law and 
practice. Their claim in a certain sense illustrates a school in corporate governance observ-
ing and forecasting convergence of corporate governance systems all adopting shareholder 
primacy as the best model to generate most value for the corporation and its shareholders, 
keeping directors’ interests aligned to shareholders. Their approach essentially follows the 
analysis of the ‘agency theory’ as developed in law and economics literature: shareholders 
are ‘principals’, ‘residual/ultimate claimants’ and ‘owners’ of the corporation, the corpora-
tion’s board (members) and officers being aligned to the shareholder’s interests. Share-
holder orientation and the hegemony of the shareholders model would eventually replace 
‘employee’ and ‘state orientation’. Then the internet bubble burst and corporate scandals 
erupted. Remarkably, the regulatory responses on both sides of the ocean differed substan-
tially putting the aforementioned claim in a different perspective.307 US securities law was 
amended to enhance financial disclosure by the SOx but the prevailing principle of board 
supremacy and division of powers in the internal affairs of US issuers remained, at least 
conceptually, unchanged. In contrast, the EU did not limit itself – as did SOx in the US – to 
building on the basics of the then emerging EU securities law as discussed in chapter 2, 
although it accelerated the regulatory FSAP process. Both at the level of the EU and of its 
Member States, discussions and, hence, regulation focussed on enhancing corporate gov-
ernance by means of corporate governance codes, amendments of corporate law and new 
case law resulting in a shift of powers in the internal affairs of issuers by rules on oversight 
by non-executive directors, powers of the AGM and of individual shareholders, the role of 
independent auditors, the relationship and ‘dialogue’ between issuers and their investors, 
executive compensation and the mechanics of the market for corporate control. The intro-
duction of the EU securities law neither stopped nor channelled the debate. The increasing 
shareholder activism again illustrated that law matters. The developments also showed 
that relevant law did not converge, but rather took different routes on both sides of the 
Atlantic. If we look from the perspective of issuers, the question can be raised as to whether 
and to what extent their internal affairs do indeed converge, especially if we focus on the 
supremacy and discretion of the board. My hypothesis is that a closer analysis will reveal 
remarkable differences between issuers in the US, EU and its Member States. Although 
there is more than one good reason to extend the research to other areas as well, this will 
be limited to these two markets.
307 John C. Coffee Sr., ‘A Theory of Corporate Scandals: Why the US and Europe Differ’, in: John Armour 
and Joseph McCahery (eds.), After Enron, Improving Corporate Law and Modernising Securities Regula-
tion in Europe and the US, Oxford and Portland: Oregon 2006.
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3.1.1	Unification	of	EU	securities	law	but	different	regulatory	framework	for	issuers
What puzzled me most was that apart from the emerging ‘federal’ EU securities law and 
the growing influence of (institutional and other) investors, the European Commission in its 
2003 response to the 2002 Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts, seemed 
to deviate from its FSAP agenda and did not concentrate on enhancing the emerging EU 
securities law. EU/MS responses seemed rather to return to corporate law responses by 
amending EU directives and recommendations on corporate governance issues (internal 
affairs) and on national level by amending corporate law (see the Netherlands’ strengthen-
ing of shareholder rights). At the same time a series of ‘self-regulatory’ codes of best prac-
tices were (further) elaborated containing both principles and best practices in the realm of 
corporate (e.g. on NEDs, corporate actions, board assignment, board committees) as well 
as in that of securities law (e.g. extension of disclosure items). Issuers were confronted 
both with a new EU body of securities law as analysed in chapter 2 as well as extension of 
shareholders rights that seemed to erode the principle of board supremacy, not the least 
by the draft 13th Directive as well as with a variety of non-binding and mandatory provisions 
regulating their internal affairs.
Therefore, in hindsight, Hansmann and Kraakman seem to have been right in their 2003 
analysis that at that time also EU public corporations (issuers) were moving to (increasing) 
shareholder orientation, but they apparently did not foresee that the simultaneous intro-
duction of a US-like securities law and extension of the powers of shareholders and their 
enforcement could result in a considerable intrusion of the internal affairs of issuers to 
the extent of eroding the principle of board supremacy in managing the issuers’ affairs. In 
the following years such erosion seemed to emerge particularly in the Netherlands where 
in some major law suits (activist) investors successfully challenged large issuers’ board 
supremacy and discretion in the pursuit of the issuers’ strategy and policies. This can be 
explained by some coinciding factors: growing pressure of financial markets and investors 
especially in the direction of enhancing the market for corporate control, early reactions 
of the legislator to renew the rules for takeover bids and extension of shareholders rights, 
the introduction of a bill – in advance of a definitive 13th EU Directive – to limit anti-takeover 
defences, the introduction of (first) a set of recommendations on corporate governance and 
followed (after the outbreak of ‘Enronitis’) by a full Netherlands Code on Corporate Gov-
ernance, together with the then emerging renewal of securities law and introduction of 
public oversight. In these circumstances the very broad powers of the Amsterdam Court 
of Appeals’ Enterprise Chamber in an investigation procedure (including assessment of 
‘(mis)management’) were applied to the principle of board supremacy and discretion. And 
although the Supreme Court in several cases reversed such judgements, the practical 
impact on issuers confronted with requests for changes of strategy and policies (including 
but not limited to break up scenarios) remained (the rights of inquiry as regulated in Title 8 
of Book 2 Netherlands Civil Code will be analysed in chapter 4).
3.1.2	 Common	securities	law	and	substantial	differences	in	governance	of	US	and	EU	
issuers?
That differs sharply from the vested board supremacy and discretion of boards of Delaware 
issuers. It raises the question on how this can be explained, particularly since the EU intro-
duced a comprehensive and in fact ‘federal’ US-style securities law. Thus the EU embraced 
Book Vanderschee.indb   99 18-3-2011   15:39:42
 Chapter 3100
the basic regulatory disclosure architecture of regulating the relationship between issuers 
and the financial market(s) in which their securities are traded/listed as the basis for mar-
ket discipline. This seemingly created a commonality of starting conditions. The analysis in 
chapter 2, however, already revealed that the implementation of this ‘federal’ EU securi-
ties law into the national law of Member States did not result in complete commonality but 
rather shows important differences. In part these differences could be explained by already 
existing and preceding differences between Member States in means and systems of public 
and private enforcement, but we saw already that overlapping concepts of securities and 
corporate law, such as securities law disclosure and corporate law (institutional) ‘account-
ing’ (1st , 4th and 7th Directives) illustrating the European (EU) concept of the corporation as 
institution protecting members (shareholders) and third parties, creditors and employees 
(e.g German AG), also resulted in remarkable differences.
A further strengthening of the EU securities disclosure system seems to have been ham-
pered by the fact that the FSAP agenda at the time was not yet fully executed and imple-
mented, the lack of a proper integration of the 2003 Action Plan into the FSA agenda and 
national responses (codes) that did not build on full implementation of the completely revised 
securities regulation of the then unfinished FSAP agenda, and the more structural element 
that EU securities regulation does not provide for ‘federal’ rules on private enforcement308 
by investors, such as a common action for ‘securities fraud’, since this is left to the Member 
States. Hence, the starting conditions at the outbreak of Enronitis were different in the US 
and the EU. The remaining connection and overlap between substantive and formal securi-
ties and corporate law unveils the basic ‘vulnerability’ to path dependency.309
The EU FSAP was not a regulatory response to the bursting of the dotcom bubble and the 
corporate scandals accompanging these events, nor was it the final result of directives and 
regulations that together constitute ‘EU securities law’. (Only now is the EU consulting on 
amendments following the financial crisis and the wave of shareholders’ activism.)310 Its 
aim was rather to complete a common European financial market by providing a ‘federal’ 
regulatory system of securities law. Evidently such a system will not create commonality of 
factual markets with dispersed or concentrated holdings by itself.
Meanwhile market structures, market for corporate control and shareholder activism 
changed considerably and put pressure on the division of powers between board, GMS and 
(groups of) shareholders and on the classical organisational pattern of the public corpora-
tion. This will be further elaborated on in this chapter: regulatory responses to corporate 
scandals, the influence on board supremacy and different exposure to shareholder activ-
ism. The EU was not neutral in this debate. The European Commission aimed at common 
rules (in the 13th Directive) for the market for corporate control and assigned the High Level 
Group to come up with proposals for creating a level playing field. As shown, inter alia, by 
308 Cf. amongst others Guido A. Ferrarini and Paolo Giudici, Financial Scandals and The Role of Private 
Enforcement: The Parmalat Case, ECGI-Law Working Paper, No. 40/2005.
309 Mark J. Roe, Political Determinants of Corporate Governance: Political Context, Corporate Impact, 
Harvard Law John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business, Discussion Paper No. 451, 2003
310 EC’s Report on the operation of Directive 2004/109/EC on the harmonisation of transparency requi-
rements in relation to information about issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regu-
lated market, SEC (2010) 611; see also Consultation on Modernisation of the Directive 2004/109/EC 
(transparency requirements for listed companies) of May 2010.
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its proposal for a ‘break-through’ rule, this debate between the EU and Member States 
necessarily was directly related to the internal affairs of issuers and the ultimate power 
of investors, including the very notion of board supremacy and discretion to protect the 
interest of the company in the pursuit of the issuers’ strategy, policies and affairs. The final 
Transparency Directive provides securities law rules to be applied in the market process of 
a takeover bid and only optional rules on board neutrality during such process.
Member States did give such national ‘post-Enron’ regulatory responses. So did the EU in 
its 2003 response to the HLG report. These, as stated before, rather turned to corporate law 
answers. Thus the EU/MS regulatory responses seem to build on the classical EU pattern 
to regulate issuers and their governance by corporate law means to protect shareholders 
(and third parties) rather than by market oriented federal disclosure rules, as in the US. The 
EU has no Model Act (like the US MBCA) that, although non-binding, provides a common 
conceptual framework.
All this, however, still does not provide us with a complete explanation of the question before 
us. In this chapter these differences will be analysed against (then) existing governance sys-
tems of corporate and securities regulation and the ends and means by which issuers are 
run. The focus will be on investor protection in corporate law: shareholders rights and board 
supremacy in the ‘internal affairs’ of issuers.
3.1.3	 Different	corporate	governance	codes	and	the	lack	of	common	EU	approach
As stated before, the May 2003 Action Plan seems to mark a shift towards a corporate law 
approach. In hindsight the EC thus added to the confusion, by also involving itself in the cor-
porate governance debate and its policy to strengthen the powers of shareholders. Unlike in 
the US, a wave of new and amended national ‘self-regulatory’ corporate governance codes 
emerged in the EU partly responding to ‘Enronitis’, sometimes to prevent strict rules of 
mandatory law; as in the UK, the Netherlands and Germany they build on the ongoing gov-
ernance debate and pressure for responding to market pressure. They are applicable to 
issuers within their jurisdiction (and usually not dependent on their securities being traded 
in a certain market). Principles and best practices usually have a mixed character since 
both securities law (disclosure) and corporate law items are covered. The latter intrude 
into the internal affairs of issuers by rules on the role and organisation of boards, the role 
of executive and non-executive directors, board committees and membership, conflicts of 
interest, the role of the GMS, the auditor, the division of corporate power between these 
bodies corporate, but also on the relationship (‘dialogue’) with investors. On the other hand, 
they cover issues directly linked to drafting and preparing the accounts: role of audit com-
mittees, audit report, internal controls, in control statements, risk factors, strategy discus-
sion, etc. These differences largely reflect the different mix of corporate and securities 
law protection in the Member States. They did not build on the FSAP process (at that time 
still under way), not on its basic concepts and patterns. They are in principle non-binding, 
but subject – by the amendment 4th Directive, art. 46a311 EU law – to the rule of ‘comply or 
311 See 4th Directive as amended by Council Directive 2006/99/EC of November 2006, OJ L 363/137, art. 
46a, 20.12.2006. A company whose securities are admitted to a regulated market within the meaning 
of the Financial Market Directive shall include a corporate governance statement in its annual report. 
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explain’. Consequently enforcement in a strict sense is in principle not possible. In principle, 
because different means to press for observance may be available. In the UK, the Code 
is part of the LSE Listing Rules. In the Netherlands, ‘observance’ of the Code is a mat-
ter for the AGM but upon judicial review in an investigation procedure before the Chamber 
of Business of the Amsterdam Court of Appeal (and supported by the Supreme Court) its 
content has been upheld as ‘custumory’ law (generally accepted principles), at least where 
the issuer disclosed that it had ‘committed’ itself to observance of the Code (for further 
elaboration, see chapter 4). Therefore they may underscore private actions of investors.312
Thus the (EU’s and MS’s) regulatory responses are fragmented over corporate and securi-
ties law rules by different regulatory instruments, amending prevailing EU corporate law 
directives and issuing new recommendations and – at the national level of Member States 
– by amending corporate law (for example, in the Netherlands strengthening of shareholder 
rights), but also through new or amending of existing ‘self-regulatory’ corporate govern-
ance codes on the boundary of corporate and securities law differing also in nature and sta-
tus. These rules show ‘path-dependant’ differences of their national systems of checks and 
balances between investors and the firm traditionally largely governed in corporate rather 
than in their only slowly (and at a different speed) emerging securities law.
Again in contrast: US Congress stayed with the basic structure of the SA’33 and SEA ’34 
and enhancement thereof by SOx. SOx focuses on enhancement of (the quality of) finan-
cial disclosure to the market and strengthening of sanctions313 to maintain integrity in the 
securities markets and fairness to investors.314 To repeat, SOx did not essentially change 
corporate law. The principle of board supremacy in the US remained the primary standard, 
upheld by the US judiciary in disputes relating to the internal organisation (‘internal affairs’) 
of US issuers, also allowing the board to defend the target in a control transaction. The 
principle survived recent developments and shareholder activism.
It shows that markets matter, as does law. That picture is thus different for the (member 
countries of) the EU.
312 Cf. Eddy Wymeersch, Enforcement of Corporate Governance Code, ECGI-Law Working Paper 46, 2005; 
cf. also Erik Berglöf and Stijn Claemens, Corporate Governance and Enforcement, World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper, 3409, Sept. 2004; cf. also oratio Alain Pietrancosta, ‘Enforcement of Corpo-
rate Governance Code’, as Anton Philips Professor 2008-2009, Tilburg University.
313 Raaijmakers, Ondernemingsrecht, Pitlo/Raaijmakers, Deventer: Kluwer 2006, p. 320.
314 ABA study on listing standards and corporate governance, p. 64, A US study on listing standards and 
corporate governance states in 2002 that: “corporate governance codes of different kinds have pro-
liferated throughout the world. Many of them are comprehensive. However, the best practises gui-
delines contemplated by their proposal should be limited to the corporate governance areas that are 
necessary for and directly relevant to maintenance of integrity in the securities markets and fairness 
to investors. In light of recent widely published corporate failures, the issue of defining the most ef-
fective approach to improving corporate governance as it affects markets is squarely presented at 
this time. It is not necessary or even desirable to redesign the current system to achieve ongoing 
improvement in the process. Improvement should be built on the strengths of the existing system. 
Any significant change in the system creates the potential of new risks to the capital markets, issuers 
and investors, and should only be established after careful and focused study. Any systemic change 
should take into account the role of state corporate law in governance, corporate governance codes 
and practices and the appropriate areas of concern to and interest of the exchanges.”
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3.1.4	 Reasons	for	further	comparative	analysis
These introductory observations indicate that US and EU regulatory choices and responses 
to market and other developments over the last decades resulted in remarkable differ-
ences. Globalisation of financial markets and economies seemed not to accompany a con-
vergence of ‘standalone’ market regulation and investor protection by and enforcement of 
securities law, nor with a common governance model. When a corporation goes public to 
finance itself by issuing shares, it does so ‘as is’, for example with its prevailing govern-
ance under its jurisdiction315 and with its articles of association or bylaws determining its 
internal affairs, fiduciary duties and assignment of the board, judicial review (also business 
judgement) and dissemination of powers between board, AGM and the rights of individual 
(or groups of) investors and causes of action (including derivative suits and class actions). 
Securities regulation and listing requirements will apply and determine its relation with the 
market and its former and new investors. Further comparative analysis may be helpful for 
various purposes.
First, it may contribute to a better understanding of the broad regulatory process as such in 
the field of protecting both investors in financial markets and firms that ‘go public’ by issuing 
shares in those markets. More particularly: a proper demarcation (or as the case may be: 
overlap) between the ends and means of both securities and corporate law to allow more 
precise regulatory impact assessment (including ‘self-regulation’ by corporate governance 
codes and delegated regulation). Evidently (public/private) enforcement is a key element 
(this will be the topic of chapter 4).
Secondly, it thus may improve conceptualisation of the basics of securities law and its public 
and private enforcement and to elaborate (common) principles of market integrity and the 
issuer’s integrity to the market.
Thirdly, it may allow a better understanding of initial regulation and subsequent assess-
ment of the impact thereof on the corporate statute of issuers upon going and being ‘public’.
Fourthly, it may facilitate investors assessing differences and commonalities of markets 
and issuers in those markets, more specifically their ‘shareholders powers’.
Fifthly, it may allow issuers a better (comparative) assessment of the impact of securities 
and corporate law (including codes) upon going and being public on the dissemination of 
powers between investors and the board and (the degree of) ‘board supremacy’316 in its 
internal organisation, corporate causes of actions for investors to enforce their rights (as 
will be elaborated in chapter 4) and, hence, the exposure to shareholder activism and the 
market for corporate control. Such assessment may allow a well considered choice of both 
the issuer’s seat and the market in which securities will be issued. Evidently the result of 
that analysis may reveal that securities regulation may no longer show great differences 
315 See, for example ASMI, which got a listing at Euronext Amsterdam, and went public with an oligarch 
governance structure, however stated and clearly disclosed in the prospectus. Recently this Nether-
lands founded corporation received much criticism from (activist) shareholders concerning its stra-
tegy and governance structure.
316 This principle was firmly vested in German (1937 Führer-prinzip) and Netherlands (Forum-bank), law, 
for example.
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but that different regimes for the issuer’s internal affairs may influence, inter alia, their 
choice of jurisdiction.317
3.1.5	 Roadmap	for	this	chapter
This chapter will analyse the division of powers between board (BoM/SB) and shareholders’ 
meeting and compare major elements of the corporate (securities) law systems in the US 
and the EU and some Member States (UK, the Netherlands and Germany).
First, some theoretical concepts of the corporation and its governance (agency theory) 
will be briefly explored as well as changing market structures and the market for corpo-
rate control to better understand the commonalities and differences between the US and 
EU and some MS systems of investor and shareholder protection, the different regulatory 
responses to Enronitis and recent developments and the exposure to shareholder activ-
ism. Several elements require closer attention. Thereafter, a comparison will be made of 
the statutory division of powers in listed public corporations in the several systems. GMS 
rights are of course important, for example its required approval for an important change 
of identity or character of the corporation entailing a low threshold, as in the Netherlands 
of one third subsequently influences the supremacy of the board (BoM/SB). Alongside the 
collective powers of shareholders ‘in meeting’, the GMS as a body corporate of the issuer, 
shareholders also have statutory individual and groups rights and powers. Individual rights 
clearly encompass voting rights, the right to receive dividends and distributions from a pay 
out by the issuer and the residual rights upon dissolution. As part of these individual rights 
of shareholders’ the possibilitys to make them concrete by using the mechanism of voting, 
for example the possibility to call an extraordinary meeting, to put items on the agenda of 
the meeting, proxy solicitation and voting influence the division of power between the board 
and the shareholders. 318
In particular, if focussed on the supremacy of the board, the Dutch system, in compari-
son to the other examined systems, the substantial rights of the GMS and the procedural 
shareholder’s rights to effectuate these rights seemingly led to a stronger position in the 
organisational design of the issuer (in combination with the unique Dutch right of inquiry, 
as has been elaborated in chapter 4, this seemingly resulted in an erosion of the Dutch 
board). This seems however to be concealed by the international header of corporate gov-
ernance and resulting principles and ‘best practices’ to discipline management and protect 
investors. These also conceal the lack of clear US-style distinction between the regulatory 
ends and means of securities regulation and corporate law respectively. It seems to bypass 
the traditional regulatory role of corporate law in (Member States of) the EU to protect 
investors (shareholders) by means of corporate law (often based on ‘institutional’ and the 
so-called ‘stakeholder’ model). Thus Chapter 3 (pars. 3.3–3.6) explores in more detail the 
(statutory) division of (collective and individual) powers of investors (GMS) and the board/SB 
and, hence, both the nature of protection thus provided to investors (as shareholders) and 
317 See Luca Enriques & Tobias H. Troeger, ‘Issuer choice in Europe’, ECGI-Law Working Paper No. 90/2007, 
July 2008, Roberta Romano, ‘The Sarbanes Oxley Act and the making of Quack Corporate Governance’, 
NYU, Law and Econ Research Paper 04-032, 25 September 2004. 
318 Extension shareholder rights. See EU Directive in shareholder rights concerning: record date, proxy 
voting, electronic voting, no solution for ultimate holder problems.
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the statutory level and extent of board supremacy, taking into account recent developments 
that affected the prevailing systems. Although there is more than one good reason to extend 
the research to other areas as well, this will be limited to these two markets. Par. 3.7 will 
draw some preliminary conclusions.
3.2 Basic concepts of ‘public corporations’ and their regulation
This paragraph summarises concepts underlying today’s theory of the firm, corporate form 
and corporate governance (agency theory) since these theories, specifically those devel-
oped in the school of law and economics (L&E), seem to have largely influenced the public 
debate of the last decades on (regulation of) market structures, firms, governance, control 
transactions, investor protection, codes of best practices, public oversight and enforcement 
mechanisms.
This debate also directly influenced legal theory and concepts and, hence, regulation and 
guided regulatory action in the field of corporate and securities regulation, also in response 
to “Enronitis”. It is important to note that the L&E analysis and concepts over time and cer-
tainly in the EU and several of its Member States have influenced the way in which markets 
and its participants are analysed as well as classical corporate law concepts, for example 
the concept of investors being ‘owners of the corporation’ in contrast to the view that they 
only ‘own’ shares in the issuer. It may explain why and how the EU and several of its Member 
States besides their own institutional approach of protecting members and third parties 
(e.g. 1937/1965 German AktG), have reacted so differently post-FSA to corporate scandals 
when it was developing a new overall securities law (FSAP) and, therefore, was not properly 
prepared to fine-tune its responses as US Congress did by enhancing the system of financial 
reporting to the market (SOx). Concepts and language seem to have been used somewhat 
out of context.
3.2.1	 The	‘Agency	Theory’	and	the	corporate	governance	debate
The public corporation319 with publicly traded shares is the business form that issuers 
mostly often use to go public.320 Berle & Means concluded to the separation of ownership 
from control in such firms.321 That separation and, hence, board supremacy were enacted as 
319 One of the features of the public corporation is that shares are fully tradable. This feature maximises 
the liquidity of shareholdings and the ability of shareholders to diversify their investments. It also 
gives the firm maximal flexibility in raising capital.
320 Another thing is that also publicly held corporations vary a lot. Some firms go public under rules that 
stifle any attempt at control: Ford, for example, issued non-voting stock, leaving the firm in family 
hands for a long time. Some managerial teams attempt to insulate themselves from investors’ control 
in order to carry out programmes that they view as more important than profits. Both the New York 
Times and the Wall Street Journal have established structures that give their managers substantial 
freedom to produce news at the potential expense of profit. The way in which corporations run the 
business, control agency costs, raise money and reward investors will change from business to busi-
ness and from time to time within a firm, see Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, The economic 
structure of corporate law, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991, p. 13.
321 A. Berle and G. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, New York : Harcourt, Brace and 
World 1967. The first edition was published in 1932.
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corporate law principle for ‘public’ corporations (AGs) in the German AktG as early as 1937: 
“Der Vorstand hat unter eigener Verantwortung die Gesellschaft zu leiten”, (§ 76 (1) AktG). 
In the UK, art. 2 of the Model Articles gives substantial authority to the board: “Subject to 
the articles, the directors are responsible for the management of the company’s business, 
for which purpose they may exercise all the powers of the company.” In the Netherlands 
the principle was vested by the Supreme Court in the Doetinchemse IJzergieterij322 (1949) and 
Forum-bank cases323 (1955) and codified in the present arts. 2:129 and 140 NCC; the principle 
had to be reconfirmed by the Supreme Court in some recent cases: ABNAMRO324 and ASMI. 
325 In Delaware General Corporate Law (DGCL), § 141(a) Delaware reads: “The business and 
affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the 
direction of a board of directors”.
In the principal agent theory, shareholders are regarded as owners of the firm (principals), 
whereas the managers (agents) have control. The ‘property’ (‘control’) rights are no longer 
held by the firm’s managers (as if they were ‘managing partners’ in a partnership).326 One 
of the principal aims of corporate (corporate governance) and securities law is the attempt 
to control conflicts of interest among corporate constituencies, including those between 
corporate insiders, such as controlling shareholders and top managers, and outsiders, 
such as minority shareholders or creditors.327 These conflicts constitute – in the language 
of economists – agency problems or principal problems, all deriving from the following 
mechanism, in short: an agency relationship can be described as a contract under which 
one or more persons (the principals) engage another person (the agent) to perform some 
service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision-making authority to the 
agent. The problem lies in motivating the agent to act in the principal’s interest rather than 
simply in the agent’s own interest. The core problem is that because the agent commonly 
has more and better information than the principal about the relevant facts, the principal 
cannot costlessly assure himself that the agent’s performance is precisely what was prom-
ised. As a consequence, the agent has an incentive to act opportunistically, skimping on the 
quality of his performance, or even diverting to himself some of what was promised to the 
principal. This means, in turn, that the value of the agent’s performance to the principal will 
be reduced, either directly or because, to assure the quality of the agent’s performance, the 
principal must engage in costly monitoring of the agent. Besides monitoring costs, bond-
ing and residual costs can be distinct. In some situations, the agent will expend resources 
(bonding costs) to guarantee that he will not take certain actions which would harm the 
principal or to ensure that the principal will be compensated if he does take such action. 
Under this theory there will always be some divergence between the agent’s decisions and 
322 Dutch Supreme Court 01-04-1949, NJ 1949, 465.
323 Dutch Supreme Court 21-01-55, NJ 1959,43, AA 2006, 522, Forumbank Revisited, prof. mr. M.J.G.C. 
Raaijmakers
324 Dutch Supreme Court 13 juli 2007, R07/100HR (Enterprise Chamber 135) (with annotation of M.J. van 
Ginneken)
325 Dutch Supreme Court 9 juli 2010, LJN BM 0976, Enterprise Chamber.
326 A. Berle and G. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, New York: Harcourt, Brace and 
World 1967. The first edition was published in 1932.
327 Cf.L. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen and Allen Ferrell, ‘What Matters in Corporate Governance’, Harvard, John 
M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business, Discussion Paper No. 491, 09, 2004.
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those decisions which would maximize the welfare of the principal.328 Minds differ however 
as to whether corporations/issuers themselves are able to reduce agency costs by being 
responsive to market and shareholders’ demands or whether external change of corporate 
governance systems is needed.329
In sum, the interest of shareholders may be damaged by the ‘moral hazard’ that the board 
and officers are exposed to and therefore various disciplinary mechanisms are elabo-
rated: 1) alignment, which departs from the assumption that interests of executives should 
be aligned with those of shareholders by linking executive compensation more closely 
to company performance; stock-based pay should provide a direct link between pay and 
performance and should play a role in mitigating ‘agency-problems’ between managers 
and shareholders330; 2) bonding, which are devices to assure the fidelity of employees and 
agents where oversight is impractical or too costly, 331 for example if an agent agrees to 
place a portion of his or her salary in escrow to assure faithful performance;332 and 3) moni-
toring, by instalment of independent directors333 and gatekeepers, for example auditors,334 
but also through the market for corporate control. The market for corporate control in that 
sense is an important accountability mechanism (such as director liability cause of breach 
of fiduciary duties). A corporation’s poor performance in its product market is reflected in 
the market price of its stock. Where poor performance is due to management inefficiency, 
the potential for gain exists through purchasing the corporation’s shares at the depressed 
price and then installing efficient management. Two important conditions are necessary for 
this concurrence of results. First, the market price of the corporation’s stock must accu-
328 C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs, and 
Ownership Structure’, in: Roberta Romano, Foundations of Corporate Law, Foundation Press 1993, p. 7. 
See Prof. H. Schenk, ‘Hefbomen van het moderne financieringskapitalisme’, Ondernemingsrecht 2007, 
No. 5, p. 180-185 for critical remarks on the normative value of this theory.
329 Cf. Bill W. Bratton and Michael L. Wachter, the Case against Shareholder Empowerment, University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 2010, vol. 158: 653, these mechanisms also play a role in the responsiveness 
of issuer’s corporate governance systems to demands of activist shareholders.
330 Martin J. Conyon and Kevin J. Murphy, ‘Stock-Based Executive Compensation’, in: Joseph A. McCa-
hery, Piet Moerland, Theo Raaijmakers and Luc Renneboog (eds.), Corporate Governance Regimes, 
Convergence and Diversity, New York: Oxford University Press 2002, p. 625–646. Piet Duffhues, Rezaul 
Kabir, Gerard Mertens, and Peter Roosenboom, ‘Emloyee Stock Option Grants and Firm Performance 
in the Netherlands’, in: Joseph A. McCahery, Piet Moerland, Theo Raaijmakers and Luc Renneboog 
(eds.), Corporate Governance Regimes, Convergence and Diversity, New York: Oxford University Press 
2002, p. 668-678, finding a positive relationship between stock option grants and firm’s operating 
performance. Firms with high returns grant relatively more employee stock options. Furthermore, 
stock option schemes lead to higher operating performance in the subsequent year. Cf. Raaijmakers, 
Ondernemingsrecht, Pitlo/Raaijmakers, Deventer: Kluwer 2006, p. 318.
331 Robert W. Hamilton, The Law of Corporations in a nutshell, West Group 2000, p. 56.
332 William A. Klein and John C. Coffee Jr., Business Organizations and Finance, Legal and Economic Princi-
ples, New York: Foundation Press 2004, p. 177.
333 Cf. James D. Cox, ‘The Oligopolistic Gatekeeper: The US Accounting Profession’, in: John Armour and 
Joseph McCahery (eds.), After Enron, Improving Corporate Law and Modernising Securities Regulation in 
Europe and the US, Oxford: Hart Publications 2006.
334 Raaijmakers, Ondernemingsrecht, Pitlo/Raaijmakers, Deventer: Kluwer 2006, p. 318 and cf. James 
D. Cox, ‘The Oligopolistic Gatekeeper: The US Accounting Profession’, in: John Armour and Joseph 
McCahery (Eds.), After Enron, Improving Corporate Law and Modernising Securities Regulation in Europe 
and the US, Oxford: Hart Publications 2006, p. 295-342. See SA’33, 15 U.S.C.§ 77aa (25) (26); § 13 (a) (2) 
SEA, 15 U.S.C. § 78m (a) (2), made this formerly voluntary practice a requirement for public compa-
nies.
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rately reflect the incumbent management’s inefficiency. Disclosure of financial informa-
tion to the markets plays an important role and underpins the monitoring function of that 
market and the working of the market for corporate control. However, stock prices are not 
always efficient, as we have seen in the Enron bankruptcy and more recent volatile stock 
prices at the start of the financial crisis; the school of behavioural economics uses cognitive 
and social psychology for market behavior.335, 336 Secondly, there must be mechanisms avail-
able for displacing incumbent management.337
The global debate was largely influenced by these concepts. Corporate governance, as 
Shleifer and Vishny describe, deals with the way in which suppliers of finance to corpora-
tions assure themselves of getting a return on their investment338, or as the Higgs Report 
defines very generally but differently as the system by which companies are directed and 
controlled.339 The ‘agency theory’ seems to have inspired and guided new corporate regula-
tion as illustrated by topics such as bonding and alignment of directors, also seemingly in 
relation to regulatory responses to corporate scandals. See for example the Dutch Code 
Tabaksblat 2003 (renewed by the Frijns Commission in 2008 and put into operation as of 
1 January 2009 as the Dutch Corporate Governance Code (DCGC)), which aimed to restore 
the confidence of investors in capital markets/stock markets and governance of listed pub-
lic corporations, not only by strengthening financial disclosure to the market but also by 
amplifying the rights of shareholders as ‘members’ of the corporation and in so doing also 
clarifying relations between board and GMS.340 Thereby the DCGC (2003) aimed at changing 
335 Cf amongst others Donald C. Langevoort, ‘Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock Markets: A Behav-
ioural Approach to Securities Regulation’, in: John Armour and Joseph McCahery (eds.), After Enron, 
Improving Corporate Law and Modernising Securities Regulation in Europe and the US, Oxford: Hart Pub-
lications 2006, p. 65-126 and Bill W. Bratton and Michael L. Wachter, ‘The Case against Shareholder 
Empowerment’, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, vol. 158: 653, 2010. See also A. Shleifer, Inef-
ficient Markets: An Introduction to Behavioural Finance, Oxford: Clarendon Press 2000.
336  Cf M.J.van Ginneken, ‘De Passiviteitsgedachte in het Amerikaanse recht’, in: M.P. Nieuwe Weme, 
G. van Solinge, R.P. ten Have and L.J. Hijmans van den Bergh (eds.), Handboek Openbaar Bod, Serie 
Onderneming en Recht, deel 46, Deventer: Kluwer 2008, p. 1067-1094, makes an interesting remark 
on the contradiction between the ‘neutrality rule’, in essence resulting from the belief in an efficient 
market for corporate control and plurality of interests are in conflict with each other. The neutrality 
would lead to a board focussing on the share price on the short term, just to prevent to become a target 
in the market.
337 Ronald J. Gilson and Bernard S. Black, The law and Finance of Corporate Acquisitions, Westbury, New 
York: The Foundation Press, Inc. 1995, p. 363, Henry Manne, ‘Mergers and the Market for Corporate 
Control’, The Journal of Political Economy,Vol. 73, No. 2, 1965, p. 110-120, which is the seminal work on 
the market for corporate control as a means of corporate accountability; See William J. Carney, ‘The 
legacy of “The market for Corporate Control” and the Origins of the Theory of the Firm.’, 50 Case West-
ern Reserve Law Review, 215, 1999; Fred S. McChesney, Henry G. Manne, ‘Mergers and the Market for 
Corporate control’, 50 Case Western Reserve Law Review 245, 1999.
338 A. Shleifer and R. Vishny, ‘A survey of Corporate Governance’, 52 Journal of Finance 737, 1997, P.W. 
Moerland, Corporate Governance, Theorie en praktijk in internationaal perspectief, Wolters-Noordhoff 
1997. The UK Combined Code on Corporate Governance, Preamble 1: “Good corporate governance 
should contribute to better company performance by helping a board discharge its duties in the best 
interests of shareholders; if it is ignored, the consequence may well be vulnerability or poor perform-
ance. Good governance should facilitate efficient, effective and entrepreneurial management that can 
deliver shareholder value over the longer term.”
339 The Higgs Report: review of the role and effectiveness of non-executive directors.
340 See the DCGC, ‘Verantwoording van het werk van de Commissie, p. 3 and p. 37. See also Raaijmakers 
2006, p. 323.
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the division of powers as well as the supremacy of the board in a listed NV and to strengthen 
the position of investors,341 remarkably its principles/best practices sometimes even go fur-
ther than statutory law. See for example the former Principle IV.2 on ‘Depositary receipts 
for shares’, stating that ‘Depositary receipts for shares shall not be used as an anti-takeo-
ver measure. The management of the trust office shall issue proxies in all circumstances 
and without limitation to the holders of depositary receipts who so request. The holders of 
depository receipts thus authorised can exercise the voting right at their discretion.’
3.2.1.1 Convergence of Corporate Governance
Some scholars have observed that corporate governance systems throughout the world 
are converging (with the shareholder model dominant),342 others that path dependency still 
constrains such convergence. However, in spite of globalisation of economies and financial 
markets, corporate governance systems and ownership structures are still very different343 
showing that an economy’s structures, including the composition of the system of securi-
ties and corporate law at any point in time are likely to depend on those that it had in earlier 
times.344, 345 Evidently, so far the comparative debate focussed primarily on the ‘transatlantic’ 
341 Raaijmakers 2006, p. 324.
342 Hansmann/Kraakman, End of history for corporate law, Yale Law School Working Paper no. 235; NYU 
Working Paper No.013; Harvard Law School Discussion Paper No. 280; Yale SOM Working Paper No. 
ICF-00-09.
343 Companies with dispersed ownership and companies with concentrated ownership co-exist in, all 
major jurisdictions. Nonetheless the corporate universe divides in to two basically alternative sys-
tems of corporate governance:1) A dispersed ownership system, characterised by strong securities 
markets, rigorous disclosure standards, high share turnover, and high market transparency, in which 
the market for corporate control constitutes the ultimate disciplinary mechanism; and 2) a concen-
trated ownership system, characterised by controlling block holders, weaker securities markets, 
high private benefits of control and lower disclosure and market transparency standards, but with a 
possibly role played by large banks and non-controlling block holders, John C. Coffee, jr, ‘A theory of 
corporate scandals: why the US and Europe differ’, Columbia Law School and Economics Working Paper 
No. 274, March 2005. In comparative corporate governance one of the themes is explaining why owner-
ship structures are in Europe, with the UK as common law country with dispersed ownership, much 
more concentrated then in the US. Shleifer & Vhisny in their famous article Law and Finance explain 
this difference by the distinction between the civil and common law tradition with the latter providing a 
better protection for shareholders. And that again induces a more dispersed ownership of sharehold-
ers.
344 Path dependence can be structure driven or rule driven. The former concerns the direct effect of ini-
tial ownership structures on subsequent ownership structures. This theory shows how the corporate 
structures that an economy has at a given point in time are influenced by the corporate structures it 
had earlier. There are two reasons for such structural path dependence, one grounded in efficien-
cy and the other grounded in rent-seeking. The other type of path dependence is rule driven, initial 
ownership structures affect subsequent structures also through affecting the corporate rules under 
which these subsequent structures will be chosen. There are two reasons, one grounded in efficiency 
and the other in interest group politics (political theory), explaining why a country’s legal rules at any 
point in time might be influenced by the ownership patterns that the country had at earlier times, Lu-
cian A. Bebchuk and Mark J. Roe, ‘A theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Governance and Owner-
ship’, Columbia Law School, The Center for Law and Economics Studies, Working Paper no. 131, November 
1999.
345 See Lucian A. Bebchuk and Assaf Hamdani, ‘The Elusive Quest for Global Governance Standards’, Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 157, 2009, pp. 1263-1317, for an interesting article that touch-
es upon the convergence debate; they criticise metrics assessing governance of public companies 
around the world often not paying attention to differences in ownership structures. They argue that 
the quest for global governance standards should be replaced by an effort to develop and implement 
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jurisdictions with less attention the ‘BRIC’ countries (Brazil, Russia, India & China). This 
study also restricts itself to that area. It is, however, clear that subsequent research should 
start to include markets that are gradually shifting from ‘emerging’ status to ‘major’ mar-
kets.
As perceived by going public, a corporation is exposed to the discipline of the market and 
influence of investors, however the IPO not being a control transaction per se, the autonomy 
of the corporation and its board (SB) is not already eroded. However, when a corporation 
is the subject of takeover rumours in the market, market pressure and also the treat of 
liability for board members have a strong influence, particularly when the corporation is at 
play. However global and interwoven the financial markets are, the market and corporation 
in which they invest still preserve their particular territorial and jurisdictional character.
3.2.2	 ‘Governance’	and	its	relationship	with	financial	markets	and	the	market	for	
corporate	control
In continental Europe, most markets are not characterised by dispersed shareholders, but 
the UK market with its dispersed shareholders and very liquid markets is regarded as an 
exception. The Dutch market can be defined as ‘mixed’ system346 and the German market 
has still a block holding regime.347 Evidently the principal/agency problem works out dif-
ferently in different market structures. For example, abuse of a minority shareholder by 
a major shareholder and/or management may evidently occur more easily in corporations 
with a major shareholder.
The takeover market has its own dynamics, but is not uniform. It was the emergence of the 
market for corporate control that pushed the issue of (limiting) board supremacy to the core 
of the debate or even brought about the emergence of the ‘CG’ debate. With dramatically 
changing world economies and financial markets the market for corporate control really 
emerged from a theoretical concept to reality in corporate life. It is part of the L&E as well 
as the more traditional legal corporate governance debate. Disciplining/monitoring direc-
tors is one of the pillars, including: oversight on directors, disclosure (also related party 
transaction, director loans etc.), alignment of board and shareholder interest and market 
for corporate control.348 The crucial question remains: is the board of a target company 
allowed and legitimated to resist a hostile takeover even if a majority of investors would be 
prepared to accept the offer of the bidder? Evidently, this question has to be placed against 
the background of market structures and financing patterns of specific issuers (block-
separate methodologies for assessing governance in companies with and without a controlling share-
holder. They also identify the key features that these separate methodologies should include, and 
discuss how to apply such methodologies in either country-level or firm-level comparisons. Cf. also 
the takeover fight for ABNAMRO.
346 Moerland, Corporate Governance, Theorie en praktijk in internationaal perspectief, Wolters-Noordhoff 
1997.
347 Van der Elst, Christoph, Abe de Jong and Theo Raaijmakers, ‘Een overzicht van juridische en econo-
mische dimensies van de kwetsbaarheid van Nederlandse beursvennootschappen’, Report to the So-
cial and Economic Council of the Netherlands (SER), 2007. Cf. also Christophe van der Elst, Shareholder 
Mobility in Five Euroepan Countries, ECGI-Law Working Paper 104, 2008.
348 M.J.G.C. Raaijmakers m.m.v. P.A. van der Schee, ‘Regulering en handhaving van overnamebiedingen 
in perspectief’, in: M.P. Nieuwe Weme, G. van Sollinge, R.P. ten Have en L.J. Hijmans van den Bergh 
(eds.), Handboek Openbaar Bod, Serie Onderneming en Recht, deel 46, Deventer: Kluwer 2008, p. 3.
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holders, size of free float). The US and EU differ both in market liquidity and degree of dis-
persion of ownership of shares. Consequently their takeover rules differ. The US Williams 
Act in 1968 already focussed on federal securities regulation of the bidding process, leaving 
the corporate law elements to local state law. Despite the influence of the ‘agency theory’ 
the answer under Delaware corporate law is quite clear: apart from exceptions (Revlon) the 
board may indeed resist a hostile takeover; it will be protected by the business judgement 
rule if attacked in a derivative suit initiated by shareholders.349
The situation within the EU is less clear and ranges from board neutrality in the UK (Gen-
eral Principle 3 and Rule 21 UK City Code), to a Delaware-like position (similar function 
of US anti-takeover statutes and German concept of ‘interest of the firm’ WpÜG § 3 (3) in 
Germany, to unclear border lines in the Netherlands (that were clarified only very recently; 
see chapter 4). A level playing field in this respect does not really exist in the EU, despite the 
outspoken policy of the European Commission to achieve such common ground. Its attempt 
to force such result by mandatory corporate law rules in the draft 13th Directive, supported 
by the advice of the HLG, failed. The final Transparency Directive had a mixed character, 
again reflecting the overlap between securities and corporate law. Like the US Williams 
Act it contains market rules (securities law) for takeover bids under public oversight, i.e. 
‘traffic’ rules regulating a public takeover bid by means of rules on proper market disclo-
sure to allow assessment of the bid by the market and investors. The aim to also achieve a 
common market for corporate control by a ‘level playing field’ failed: only optional corpo-
rate law rules were adopted regarding the ‘internal’ relationship between the board and 
the investors and the meeting of shareholders respectively (i.e. breakthrough and board 
neutrality) (arts. 9-12). The structure of financial markets and shareholdings are of course 
not per se changed by the Takeover Directive and differences remain: dispersion versus 
concentration with institutional investors and pension funds, pyramid constructions, family 
holdings, state influence and forms of employee participation.350 Such a level playing field 
was therefore not reached in the EU and still less on a global scale with the US and the BRIC 
countries. Protectionist reactions seems to endanger the global economy in the post-credit 
crunch era.
Ergo: the corporate and securities regulation and enforcement of these rules (self-reg-
ulation, public oversight and judicial intervention) still differ between jurisdictions and 
therefore changes in markets and regulation may and also presumably will have different 
consequences.
349 Cf M.J.van Ginneken, ‘De Passiviteitsgedachte in het Amerikaanse recht’, in: M.P. Nieuwe Weme, 
G. van Solinge, R.P. ten Have and L.J. Hijmans van den Bergh (eds.), Handboek Openbaar Bod, Serie 
Onderneming en Recht, deel 46, Deventer: Kluwer 2008, p. 1067-1094. See also his dissertation M.J. 
van Ginneken, Vijandige overnames, De rol van de vennootschapsleiding in Nederland en de Verenigde 
Staten, Kluwer: 2010.
350 Zie Henry Hansmann en Reinier Kraakman, ‘Towards a Single Model of Corporate law?’ In: Joseph 
A. McCahery et al. (eds.), Corporate Governance Regimes,Convergence and Diversity, New York: Oxford 
University Press 2003, p. 56-82. Their article seems to be inspired by the famous book by Francis 
Fukuyama, The End of History and the last man (1992). His prophecy related to the development of a 
universal model of a liberal democracy on capitalist foundation, needs to be refined in the light of later 
developments in inter alia Russia, China and India. 
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3.2.3	 Ends	of	the	public	corporation	(issuers)
Corporate governance has consistently been debated against the background of the ulti-
mate aims of the (public) corporation/issuer. 351 The overall objective of corporate law is to 
allow entrepreneurship as well as to serve and protect the interests of society as a whole. 
More particularly, the ultimate goal of corporate law is to advance the aggregate welfare of 
a firm’s shareholders, employees, suppliers and customers. Economists would character-
ise this as the pursuit of overall social efficiency.352 This is no different from other business 
forms, such as partnerships and sole proprietors.
The common view in the US is that the corporation focuses (and should focus) primarily on 
maximisation of shareholder return. It is taken to be the best end by which corporate law can 
serve the broader goal of advancing overall social welfare.353 It will also reduce the cost of 
collective decisions, because shareholders’ interests are more homogenous than for other 
groups. However, this claim can be put into perspective by also considering the very differ-
ent constellation of shareholder/investor base of the listed public corporation, where day 
traders, hedge funds, state wealth funds, private equity, institutional investors and mutual 
funds can be distinguished, all having their own interest and investment horizon.354
US corporate law presumes that firms should be managed for shareholders’ and not man-
agers’ interests when those interests conflict. However the shareholder-wealth maximisa-
tion norm seems not be an appropriate means for judicial enforcement except in especially 
provocative situations, as in the famous case of Revlon, in which the court held that only 
under certain conditions does the board have to aim for the highest value for the share-
351 In the market-oriented systems the external labour market and remuneration systems play an impor-
tant role, for network-oriented systems the internal mobility of managers is more characteristic. PvS: 
related to remuneration our system seemingly has moved to the US model
352 See Kanning and Kerkmeester, Economie en recht, Groningen/Houten: Wolters-Noordhoff: 2004, p. 28.
353 See also R. la Porta, F.L. de Silanes, a. Shleifer and R.W. Vishny, Investor Protection and Corporate 
Governance, June 1999. There are a number of persuasive explanations for the perspective of max-
imising shareholder revenues. First, in competitive markets, maximizing share value allocates re-
sources efficiently and thereby maximises social welfare. Second, in competitive markets, it provides 
managers with a clear-cut decision rule that maximizes the utility of the firm’s owners who may have 
disparate preferences for current and future consumption, because it enables shareholders to trade 
against the increased value to achieve whatever consumption pattern they wish without affecting the 
firm’s policy. In this regard, it also reduces the cost of collective decisions, because shareholders’ 
interests are more homogenous than other groups. This however could be contested considering the 
very different constellation of shareholder/investor structure (investors/shareholders: day traders, 
hedge funds, state funds, private equity, institutional investors, mutual funds etc.) Finally, it best 
matches organisational design with incentives. Because equity investments are residual claims with 
no fixed income guarantee or maturity date, they are the only investments in the firm that are not 
periodically renewed: hence, they are more vulnerable than the investments of other stakeholders, 
such as bondholders and employees, which can be and are protected by express contracting. See also 
article of Lynn Stout, ‘Bad and not so bad arguments for shareholder primacy’, who contests such claims. 
Moerland, Corporate Governance, Theorie en praktijk in internationaal perspectief, Wolters-Noordhoff 
1997.p. 63, who joins with the above theoretical explanation for aiming at maximising shareholder 
value, but emphasises that shareholders are not owners of the corporation nor that shareholders 
interests are or should be of a higher order. 
354 Cf. G.T.M.J. Raaijmakers, Nederlandse beursondernemingen te afhankelijk van financiele markt, Vrije 
Universiteit Amsterdam: Oratie: 2009.
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holders.355 Instead, it is enforced indirectly through a complex and varied set of extrajudicial 
accountability mechanisms, of which shareholder voting is but one.356
In continental Europe and in the Netherlands, however, the stakeholder model seems to 
support this goal.357 Directors and managers should consider the interests of all corpo-
rate constituencies in making corporate decisions.358 The UK Companies Act 2006 (here-
after: § 172 UK CA 2006) introduced the concept of ‘enlightened shareholder value’. The 
means for running the issuers’ business can moreover be divided into managerial/director 
or shareholder primacy. Theories at the shareholders primacy end of the spectrum were 
traditionally founded on the notion of shareholders ‘owning’ the corporation. Consequently, 
directors and officers are then deemed to be mere stewards of the shareholders’ inter-
ests.359 Shareholders have a privileged position360 among the corporation’s constituencies, 
due to their ‘contract’ with the firm showing ownership-like features, including the right to 
vote and the reverse fiduciary obligations of directors and officers. Director primacy – on 
the other hand – has a different claim, neither shareholders nor managers, but boards of 
directors control corporations.361 The continental view, on the other hand, tends to build on 
the concept of ‘membership’ of investors as shareholders in the company as an ‘associa-
tion’.
Fundamentally, all of these models are differing views of means and ends of the corporation 
as such and its corporate governance, i.e. the internal governance of issuers. These focus 
on two basic sets of questions: 1) As to the means of corporate governance, who decides? In 
355 Judges have often affirmed the importance of maximising shareholder value. See Dodge v. Ford Mo-
tor Co. (1919). One of the ways of advancing that objective in the US is to impose fiduciary duties, and 
in particular a duty of loyalty, on corporate officers and directors: ‘Managers must prefer investors’ 
interests to their own in the event of conflict. That is the core of the duty of loyalty. 
356 Stephen Bainbridge, ‘Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance’, UCLA, School 
of Law Research Paper Series, 02-06, February 2002.
357 Cf. L. Timmerman, ‘Grondslagen van geldend ondernemingsrecht’, Ondernemingsrecht 2009, 2, he 
sees ‘enlighted shareholder’, as adhered to in the UK, as good alternative and guidline for the board 
instead of shareholder primacy or interest of plurality/interest of the corporation. See also H.J. de 
Kluiver, ‘Vennootschappelijke repliek op Timmerman’s grondslagen’, Ondernemingsrecht 2009, 4, 
see also J.M. Blanco Fernández, ‘Timmerman’s gronslagen, reactie op de oratie’, Ondernemingsrecht 
2009, 5. 
358 Supra note 46. See also Raaijmakers, Ondernemingsrecht 2006 and M.J.G.C. Raaijmakers, Forumbank 
(1955) Revisited, Verschuivende machtsverhoudingen binnen een beurs-NV, Ars-Aequi, 2006(7), 522-529; 
cf. also L. Timmerman, ‘Grondslagen van geldend ondernemingsrecht’, Ondernemingsrecht 2009.
359 Lucian Arye Bebchuk, ‘The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power’, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 118. No. 
3, p. 933-914, January 2005. A more recent variant, which is one of Coase’s many progeny, argues that 
shareholders are merely one of many factors of production bound together in a complex web of ex-
plicit and implicit contracts. Influenced by agency cost economics, proponents of this variant continue 
to treat directors and officers as agents of the shareholders, with fiduciary obligations to maximise 
shareholder wealth.
360 Bebchuk recently put forward a related set of proposals designed to allow “shareholders to initiate 
and vote to adopt changes in the company’s basic corporate governance arrangements.” As Bebchuk 
explains, the housekeeping rules of corporation law effectively preclude shareholders from initiating 
corporate action.
361 Margaret M. Blair and Lynn A. Stout, ‘A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law’, Virginia Law 
 Review, Vol. 85, No. 2, 1999, pp. 248-328. Lynn A. Stout, ‘The Mythical Benefit of Shareholder Control’, 
Regulation Vol. 30, no. 1, 2007, pp. 42-44.
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other words, when push comes to shove, who is ultimately in control? 2) As to the aims of the 
corporation and its governances, whose interests prevail?362 Again: law matters!363
Theory and practice may, however, differ to some extent. US shareholder primacy as the 
ultimate corporate objective does not apparently preclude a simultaneous recognition of 
board supremacy as the best economic and organisational model to create wealth, even in 
contested takeovers and in the face of short-term interests of investors to cash a takeo-
ver premium. 364 Similarly, the concept of serving regulatory reform, aiming at shareholder 
democracy is rather vague. Analysing the ideology of shareholder primacy, the ends and 
means of the corporation have to be distinguished. Having shareholders’ interests as the 
ultimate goal for the listed public corporation, does not necessarily mean that they are or 
should be in control of the corporation. That depends on legal framework, i.e. investor pro-
tection and corporate law framework.
In this respect we should recall the analysis of chapter 2. Notably shareholder orientation 
also seems to underscore regulation following the FSAP and IAS and the underlying moni-
toring function of disclosure.
3.2.4	 Evolution	of	regulatory	responses	to	corporate	scandals
The general nature of these theoretical foundations of the regulation of issuers will remain 
to influence new regulation and practice of prevailing and emerging governance systems and 
objectives/ends and means of the firm. Therefore this will apply to regulatory responses to 
corporate scandals,365 as was the case not only in the post-Enron-era, but also upon earlier 
scandals in history. Since the inception of the public company, legislators in the US and EU, 
and in other parts of the world,366 have reacted on or responded to such corporate scandals 
by various generic or specific means ranging from limiting the use of the public corpora-
tion as such to regulation more focussed specifically on issuing securities, see for example 
362 Stephen Bainbridge, ‘Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance’, UCLA, School 
of Law Research Paper Series, 02-06, February 2002. Cf. also Leo E. Strine, jr., ‘Towards a true Cor-
porate Republic: A Traditionalist Response to Lucian’s Solution for Improving Corporate America’, 
Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper, No. 541, February 2006.
363 Regulatory perspective, investor protection or corporate governance in corporate law.
364 Simon Deakin and Suzanne J. Konzelmann, ‘Corporate Governance after Enron: An Age of Enlight-
ement?’, in: John Armour and Joseph McCahery (Eds.), After Enron, Improving Corporate Law and Mod-
ernising Securities Regulation in Europe and the US, Oxford: Hart Publications 2006, p. 155-158.
365 Corporate scandals, which happened recently on global scale and raised global questions. The corpo-
rate governance and financial reporting problems revealed by the failures at several major US firms 
over late 2001-2, including Enron, Worldcom, Tyco, and Adelphia (but also Ahold and Parmalat) shed 
new light on the convergence debate. First, the scandals emerged just at the moment when many 
thought that the US model was about to claim the prize as the ‘best in show’. Systems that seem 
dominant, the US in the 1990s, Japan in the 1980s, repeatedly prove vulnerable, and this vulnerability 
seems to emerge before other systems converge, John Armour and Joseph McCahery (eds.), After 
Enron, Improving Corporate Law and Modernising Securities Regulation in Europe and the US, Oxford: Hart 
Publications 2006; Bratton, W.W. (2002), Enron and the dark side of shareholder value, 76 Tulane L. 
Rev. 1275; John C. Coffee, jr., Understanding Enron: It’s about the gatekeepers, stupid, Columbia Law 
& Economics Working Paper No. 207; John C. Coffee, jr, Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron Means for 
the Management and Control of the Modern Business Corporation: Some Initial Reactions, 69 U. Chi; 
Gordon and Roe 2004, p. 5. See also John C. Coffee, jr, ‘A theory of corporate scandals: why the US and 
Europe differ’, Columbia Law School and Economics Working Paper No. 274, March 2005.
366 See also OECD corporate governance code.
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the introduction of prospectus liability in the UK (1890) and the Netherlands (1928). One of 
the key questions remains: regulatory responses by means of securities or by corporate 
law? In the very early years of the Dutch United East Indian Company (VOC)367 in 1611, the 
Dutch Parliament forbade short selling (securities law). The UK Bubbles Act of 1720 aban-
doned the use of a public company completely for more than a century (corporate law).368 
The Great Crash of 1929 fuelled the complete change of US securities regulation, resulting 
in the SA’33 and SEA ’34 that also introduced public oversight by and regulatory power of 
the federal SEC leading to investor protection through disclosure (securities law). The clash 
between BCCI (Bank of Credit and Commerce International) and Maxwell was the prelude 
to the Cadbury Report and subsequent corporate governance codes.369 The burst of the dot-
com bubble and the corporate scandals of those times (Enron et al.) urged US Congress to 
respond by changing the prevailing securities law with the SOx.370 The MS reacted with a 
series of ‘self-regulatory’ corporate governance codes of various natures and scopes (pri-
marily focussing on corporate law issues, but also including disclosure items) and the EU 
by amending EU corporate law directives and ‘soft law’ recommendations. Member States 
also introduced a variety of amendments to corporate law371, but remarkably also dropped 
the draft 5th Directive, essentially dealing with the core subjects of the internal organisation 
of ‘large’ corporations (including issuers).
The existing systems and recent amendments of corporate governance (corporate and 
securities law) in a global variety of jurisdictions are thus influenced by choices made by the 
legislators in reaction to market developments, corporate scandals and the recent financial 
crisis. They remain framed in the historical, political and economical background of the 
countries in which they function,372 not least, as evidenced by the US, by the prior existence 
367 Although the shareholders in this company had some core rights in practice they had almost no influ-
ence, H.Den Heijer, De geoctrooieerde compagnie, De VOC en de WIC als voorlopers van de naamloze 
vennootschap, Ars Notaratus, Kluwer, Deventer 2005, 215-216.
368 Paul Frentrop 2002, A history of corporate governance 1602-2002, Prometheus: Amsterdam 2002 
and Stuart Banner, Anglo-American Securities Regulation, Cultural and Political Roots, 16909-1860, 
Cambridge University Press 1998, 75-86 for a more detailed version of the financial crises in England 
of 1720 and the following reaction from the legislator.
369 Hopt 2006, p. 1182, the beginning can be pinpointed precisely to 1992 when the Report of the Com-
mittee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance was published in London, this has become 
known internationally as the Cadbury Report after the name of the chairman of the committee. It 
was the first in whole series (Greenburry, Hampel, Higgs, and Tyson) and is now consolidated in the 
Combined Code which is issued as an appendix to the Listing Rules, and dates in its revised form from 
2003.
370 Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 30 July 2002, Pub L No 107-204, 116 Stat 745.
371 Belgian Corporate Governance Code 9 December 2004, German Corporate Governance Code (The 
Cromme Code) 26 February 2002, Amendment to the German Corporate Governance Code (the Crom-
me Code) 21 May 2003, The Dutch Corporate Governance Code 9 December 2003 and The English 
Combined Code on Corporate Governance 23 July 2003.
372 See the theory of the path dependency, which states that forces such as tradition, history and culture 
were/are very important in shaping law, Lucian A. Bebchuk and Mark J. Roe, ‘A theory of Path Depend-
ence in Corporate Governance and Ownership’, Columbia Law School, The Center for Law and Economics 
Studies, Working Paper no. 131, November 1999 and Teubner (1998). Also in the literature there was 
fierce debate on what had caused these scandals and how to prevent these problems in the future. One 
questioned also if the scandals on both sides of the ocean had different causes and required different 
solutions. See difference between inside and outside system, J.A. McCahery & J. Armour, After Enron: 
Improving Corporate Law and Modernising Securities Regulation in Europe and the US, Oxford: Hart Pub-
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of a well-established system of securities regulation, which until recently did not exist as 
such in the EU.
Despite the new EU securities regulation, and unlike in the US, where federalisation of cor-
porate law did not emerge, EU regulatory responses seem again to concentrate, as in the 
early days of the Union, on elaborating EU ‘corporate law’ rules on governance to protect 
the interests of investors (shareholders).
The 1972 draft 5th Directive (as amended), however, was withdrawn in 2004. It essentially 
aimed at harmonising the basics of corporate governance by mandatory ‘internal’ gov-
ernance rules: the division of powers between management, supervisors (non-executive 
directors) and the GMS, as well as accounting to GMS.373 It overlapped in part with securi-
ties law disclosure. Also the recent EU directive on strengthening rights of shareholders 
as ‘members’ of the issuer’s ‘organisation’ reveals a similar conceptual overlap with and 
departure from the FSA securities regulatory programme (that has apparently not yet been 
completely absorbed).
3.2.5	 (New)	Self-regulatory	corporate	governance	codes374
As stated before, the US response to Enronitis was limited to SOx, namely a series of 
amendments of the prevailing securities regulation primarily focussing on enhancement 
of the quality and reliability of corporate disclosure to the market. In the EU, it accelerated 
and refuelled the corporate governance debate that since its beginning in the US (growing 
role and activities of institutional investors375; exit or voice; liquidity versus control; impact 
on market for corporate control, disciplining management) had also spread to the EU. As 
stated before, it accelerated the execution of the EU FSAP agenda and the finalisation of 
the series of directives and regulations towards the new EU securities regulation. Simul-
taneously, it gave a new momentum to the development of corporate governance codes 
that had emerged in several EU Member States. They responded to different events (cor-
porate failures and scandals) and developments (revival of financial markets and pressure 
lications 2006. See also article by John Armour and David A. Skeel, ‘Who Writes the Rules for Hostile 
Takeovers, and Why? The Peculiar Divergences of US and UK Takeover Regulation’, ECGI Law Working 
Paper No. 73, 2006; and the article by John C. Coffee, Jr, ‘A theory of corporate scandals: why the US 
and Europe differ’, Columbia Law School and Economics Working Paper No. 274, March 2005.
373 COM (72) 887 final, 18 July 1972, JO C 131/49; EC Bull Supp 10/72. First draft 1972. Last official draft: 
COM (91) 372 final, 20 November 1991; (1991) OJ C321/9. In 1996, the Commission asked Ernst & Young 
to consider the relevance of the Draft Fifth Directive in the study it had commissioned on corporate 
governance. The Commission decided to draw back the proposal on 9 January 2004, OJ C 5/20 (2004), 
Vanessa Edwards, EC Company Law, Oxford University Press, New York 1999, p. 389. Two highly con-
troversial proposals were the mandatory creation of a two-tier board structure (Art. 2 5th Directive) 
consisting of a managing organ and a supervisory organ and mandatory provisions for employees’ 
representation on the supervisory board for companies with a workforce greater than 500, Art. 4(2) 
(3). See Vanessa Edwards, EC Company Law, New York: Oxford University Press 1999 , p. 388.
374 Weil, Gotshal & Manges, ‘Comparative Study of Corporate Governance Codes Relevant to the Euro-
pean Union and Its Member States’, Final Report& Annexes I-III, January 2002, p. 28, the simplest and 
most common definition of this sort is that provided by the Cadbury Report (UK), which is frequently 
quoted or paraphrases: “Corporate governance is the system by which business are directed and 
controlled”.
375 See amongst others B. Black, ‘Agent Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice,’ 
UCLA Law Review, Vol. 39, 1992, and J. Coffee, ‘Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as 
Corporate Monitor’, Columbia Law Review, Vol 01, 1991. 
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of investors on issuers to focus on their interest).376 The UK Cadbury Code (1992) was a 
self-regulatory response to the public indignation and concern after the collapse of BCCI 
and Maxwell and focussed on enhancement of board structure, oversight by NEDs, audit 
and other board committees and financial reporting, as did subsequent UK codes, finally 
resulting in the UK Combined Code (Hampel, Greenbury and Higgs Report377), now called 
UK Corporate Governance Code.378 The last-mentioned, however, also coincided with and 
reflected the general corporate governance debate and the growing attention and activities 
of investors and markets to maximise shareholder value.
Whereas these UK codes primarily aimed at ‘self-regulation’ by the financial community 
(‘City’) and focusses on enforcement through the LSE listing requirements, continental 
jurisdictions followed a somewhat different route. In the Netherlands the ‘Forty Recommen-
dations’ of the Peeters Committee (1996) were initiated by the Amsterdam Stock Exchange 
and the Association of Issuers to align governance with the growing percentage of foreign 
investment in Dutch issuers, recommending transparency and accounting to sharehold-
ers. These did not react to corporate scandals but rather aimed at improving governance 
of Dutch issuers. The 2003 DCGC (Code Tabaksblat379) coincided with the fierce national and 
EU debate on limitation of anti-takeover devices as well as with the outbreak of ‘Enronitis’. 
The Peeters Committee, although designed to produce a self-regulatory corporate gov-
ernance code, was effectively pushed for by the Government. The DCGC partly rephrased 
existing corporate law rules, but in fact further combined principles and best practices of 
the UK Combined Code (also including best practices for dialogue and contacts with institu-
tional investors) with US SOx elements (financial disclosure, certification, in control state-
ments and business controls). The Committee further emphasised its recommendations 
on statutory restrictions to the use by a target board of anti-takeover devices (the draft 
13th Directive was by then pending in the European Parliament). The Code also extended 
the rights of GMS/shareholders over and above mandatory corporate law, see e.g. Best 
Practice IV.1.2 DCGCconcerning voting rights on preferred shares and Best Practice IV.1.6 
on the discharge of the BoM and SB separately on the agenda for shareholders to vote upon. 
The ‘comply or explain’-rule was enacted shortly afterwards into corporate law (art. 2:391 
lid 5 NCC). Meanwhile, the DCGC was amended in 2009 introducing amongst otherthings a 
response time for the board of a target in case of a hostile takeover attempt (responding to 
some cases in which hedge funds tried to force the Board to execute break up scenarios). 
376 H.H.Voogsgeerd, Corporate Governance Codes, Markt- of rechtsarrangement?, IOR nr. 55, Kluwer: 
Deventer 2006.
377 Final report of the Committee on Corporate Governance (Gee, 1998), in the final report the Hampel 
Committee endorsed the ‘overwhelming majority’ of the recommendations of the Cadbury Committee 
and of the Greenbury Committee which had reported in the interim on the particular and still contro-
versial subject of directors’ remuneration). Hampel’s main contribution was to propose, as indeed 
happened, that the recommendations of the Cadbury and Greenbury Committees, as refined by Ham-
pel, should be brought together in a Combined code.
378 Gower and Davies, Principles of Modern Company Law, 2008, p. 403.
379 The Committee Tabaksblat was initiated by the Minister of Finance and composed in cooperation with 
VNO-NCW, NCD, VEB, Euronext and, now, Eumedion. The DCGC was published in December 2003 and 
contained principles and best practice rules. Then in late 2004 the Monitoring Committee Corporate 
Governance (Frijns Committee) was created to monitor compliance with the Dutch Corporate Gover-
nance Code.
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The German Cromme Code, in contrast, remained closely linked to the principles of the 
existing AktG.380
As in The Netherlands, the EU in 2002/2003 was involved in a (political) debate on 13th Direc-
tive. In its response to the HLG Report (2002), part of which was dedicated to the elimination 
of takeover barriers, the EU/EC refrained from developing a European code because con-
vergence between the codes of the Member States were already considerable.381 However, 
it did react with recommendations on non-executive directors and remuneration (which 
followed the main lines of these codes).
In spite of the observed convergence, the content of several codes reflect their different 
tradition and background.382 So, while the new EU federal securities law as perceived was 
under way, the EU Member States mainly reacted to the 2000/2001 corporate scandals 
through ‘self-regulatory’ governance codes on the edge of corporate and securities law. 
They varied in nature and status. The UK Code is applicable through the LSE Listing Rules, 
while the ‘comply or explain’ rule in the Netherlands was enacted in corporate law. This 
specific rule was later enacted by the EU into the (corporate law) 4th Directive (§ 46b), but 
not into the Transparancy Directive.
These various EU codes indeed cover a wide range of best practices for issuers resulting 
in reporting and disclosure items in issuer’s annual reports on, inter alia, board commit-
tees, conflicts of interest, but also on issues directly linked to drafting and preparing the 
accounts (role of audit committees, audit report, internal controls, in control statements, 
risk factors, strategy discussion, etc.). Their differences largely reflect the different mix 
of corporate and securities law protection in the Member States. From a US perspective 
this mix might indeed be regarded as an intrusion (or sometimes extension) of securi-
ties law aims (i.e. regulation of process of financial disclosure to the market, protection 
of investors in the code) into the ‘internal affairs’ of issuers. However, they were designed 
and proclaimed separately from the new ‘federal’ securities regulation. Any influence is 
hardly perceivable. These codes are non-binding ‘best practices’, not enforceable rules. 
Issuers, however, were pressed by the market and investors, sometimes supported – as in 
the Netherlands – by judiciary decisions resulting in de facto application of such ‘soft law’. 
This is not completely surprising in view of the ‘legislative’ support of the EC’s recommen-
dations on non-executive directors and executive compensation (‘threatening’ to come up 
380 Compare Theodor Baums, ‘Company Law Reform in Germany’, Journal of Corporate Law Studies April 
2003, p. 143, the government commission adopted the German corporate governance code on Febru-
ary 26, 2002. Amended on May 21, 2003, and more recently on May 26, 2010. By amendment of § 161 
AktG by the Transparency and Disclosure Act, entered into force on 26 July 2002, the Code has a legal 
basis.
381 Weil, Gotshal & Manges, ‘Comparative Study of Corporate Governance Codes Relevant to the Euro-
pean Union and Its Member States’, Final Report& Annexes I-III, January 2002, p. 6 to reiterate there is 
little indication that code variation poses an impediment to the formation of a single European equity 
market. Moreover, the various codes emanating from the Member States appear to support a conver-
gence of governance practices. This, taken together with the need for corporations to retain a degree 
of flexibility in governance so as to be able continuously adjust to changing circumstances, lead us to 
conclude that the European Commission need not expend energy on the development of a code appli-
cable to companies in the European Union. Ideas about best practices as reflected in the codes should 
be allowed to develop over time by the business and investment communities, under the influence of 
market forces. 
382 Raaijmakers, Ondernemingsrecht, Pitlo/Raaijmakers, Deventer: Kluwer 2006, p. 323.
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with a European code upon having assessed the developments) and the standard ‘comply or 
explain’-rule that was made mandatory. Investors were supposed to use their voting power 
(as a means of ‘private enforcement’) to compel the board to apply the best practices of 
such codes. By now issuers have to disclose in their management report (part of the annual 
accounts) their compliance with the national applicable code under the statutory ‘comply or 
explain’-rules (4th and 7th Directives), enhances by a corporate governance statement (§10 
Transparancy Directive).
In summary, it may be clear that these codes are a mix of securities (disclosure) and cor-
porate law (intrusion in different ways and degrees into the internal affairs of issuers). The 
rules deviate in addition to – apart from the ‘comply or explain’-rule – the enforcement (and 
oversight) mechanisms. In the Netherlands, observance of the CGC is primarily a matter 
for discussion in the GMS, but non-observance may be the subject of judicial review in an 
investigation procedure before the Enterprise Chamber of the Amsterdam Court of Appeal 
(at least if the issuer ‘committed’ itself to observance).383 Being linked to LSE Listing Rules, 
non-observance of the UK Code may, at least theoretically, cause delisting.384 These differ-
ences also influence exposure to shareholder activism – as will be elaborated in chapter 
4.385 In the next chapter, the division of powers against the background of former develop-
ments between the board and GMS will be further scrutinised.
3.3 Comparative analysis of the position of investors (shareholders) in 
the corporate law division of their collective and individual powers 
and those of the Board in ‘public’ corporations (issuers)
At least until the outbreak of the still-continuing financial crisis, the general development 
has been that investors have explored opportunities in global markets to increase returns 
on their investments. As explained before in par. 3.2, this development went along with 
institutional investors, pension funds, state wealth funds, private equity firms and not least 
hedge funds to become more active in using the powers and rights attributed to their capac-
ity of shareholders, although in practice different attitudes and policies continue to exist, 
ranging from passivity to aggressive attacks on the issuers’ strategy and policies.386 Some 
383 See e.g. Enterprise Chamber ASMI, LJN: BJ4688
384 Alain Pietrancosta, ‘Enforcement of Corporate Governance Code’, as Anton Philips Professor 2008-
2009, Tilburg University: Oration: 2008-2009
385  In the ABNAMRO-case the Amsterdam Business court de facto put the sale of La Salle on hold in the 
takeover fight for ABN. Interesting is the comparison with the UK, where under the supervision of the 
Takeover Panel tactical litigation is not allowed. 
386  (Activist) shareholders can be distinguished between small private investor, institutional investor as 
pension funds (or unions) or financial institutions both of them having different perspectives. But also 
investors with short investment horizon using volatility and inefficiencies in stock trading yet also 
hedge funds following a strategy of activism to get a maximum return on their invest. Also a com-
petitor that by acquiring percentages finalises a (hostile) takeover, or private equity aiming to take the 
corporation private can be seen as activist shareholders. See G.T.M.J. Raaijmakers, ‘Beleggers, aan-
deelhouders en de AVA’, Ondernemingsrecht 2005, nr. 4. Distinguishing between small private inves-
tors, investor with short investment horizon aimed volatility and inefficiencies, major mid-term and 
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may seek ‘undervalued’ issuers, buy its shares and press the issuer to change its strategy 
to realise short-term returns on investment.387 They may present their case in private ‘one-
on-ones’, but also via public disclosure and pressure. Rules on market abuse will preclude/
limit any trading on inside information or, conversely, force publication, unless agreement 
was reached on confidentiality and ‘stand still’.388 Also further action shall include securi-
ties law disclosure rules, but usually be based upon their corporate law powers and causes 
of action, including those on (contested) takeovers. Famous cases may illustrate this (such 
as in Germany, Deutsche Börse and in the Netherlands, ABNAMRO, Stork and ASMI, in dif-
ferent ways related to acquisition of control). Law appears to matter.
Several codes, setting principles and best practices, were elaborated to address (groups 
of) investors (International Corporate Governance Network (CGN), Organisation for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and several national codes, such as UKCGC 
and DCGC). Since this study remains focussed on comparing statutory investor protection 
by means of securities and corporate law, these codes will not be elaborated on. Nonethe-
less, in comparing the several systems, reference is made to the princples and best prac-
tice of the various codes. A remarkable commonality is their attention on the somewhat 
vague concept of a ‘dialogue’ with (the board of) issuers.
3.3.1	 Regulation	of	‘internal	affairs’	in	the	US	and	the	EU:	remarkable	differences
Chapter 2 revealed the emergence of a US-like structure of EU securities regulation focuss-
ing on full initial and continuous disclosure to allow the financial markets and investors to 
continuously and properly assess the value of the issuer’s shares, alongside forceful public 
oversight (SEC) and a federal securities fraud action. Federal corporate law is nonexist-
ent; the focus of corporate state law is not on protection of investors. The preceding para-
graphs indicate the differences with the EU where, also after the introduction of the new 
US like ‘federal’ EU securities regulation (including public oversight and the assignment 
for a private action for securities fraud), corporate law (and corporate governance codes) 
continues to be used as a regulatory tool to protect shareholders (investors), both collec-
tively as a body corporate (‘in meeting’) and individually (or groups). This seems to rest on 
the basic assumption that – apart from the new public oversight and enforcement – share-
holders are thus provided with tools for ‘broad private enforcement’ (acting ‘in meeting’ 
as well as individually). Thus, the EU still does not fully focus on (enhancement of) its new 
long-term investors, strategic and financial participants, public shareholders. see amongst others: 
G.T.M.J. Raaijmakers, Nederlandse beursondernemitngen te afhankelijk van financiele markt, Vrije Uni-
versiteit Amsterdam: Oration: 2009; cf.Lynn A. Stout, New Thinking on ‘Shareholder Primacy’, UCLA 
School of Law., Law Econ. Research Paper, no. 11-04. 
387 Cf. Bill W. Bratton and Michael L. Wachter, ‘The Case against Shareholder Empowerment’, University 
of Pennsylvania Law Review, vol. 158: 653, 2010, shareholders/investors use that part of the share prize 
that can be considered as speculative. The board is best equipped to judge the share prize and from 
that draw a conclusion for the strategy and policy of the issuer. However this does not mean that the 
board has to follow the prize of the share submissively. John Maynard Keynes has explained this as 
follows: short-term trading leads us to focus on what the stock market is doing rather on what com-
panies are doing. Consequently, even today, potential restrains on share trading remain topical
388 A.F. Verdam, Het toenemende belang van de voorfase voor de aandeelhoudersvergadering: een goed 
begin is het halve werk?, Ondernemingsrecht 2004, 156, p. 412-418; S.E. Eisma, Investor Relations 
(oration) 1998.
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‘ federal’ securities regulation, but continues to build on the classic acquis communautaire 
of prevailing corporate law directives.389 That focus is illustrated by its mandatory ‘comply 
or explain’-disclosure (in the 4th and 7th corporate law Directives). And although the EU thus 
far refrained from using such codes as a regulatory tool, its attitude seems to be somewhat 
ambiguous (cf ‘recommendations’ and its plans for governance of financial institutions that 
may be extended to issuers in genera). It raises the question as to whether (to what extent) 
the execution of the market-oriented FSAP agenda is hampered by the traditional (collective 
and individual) corporate law rights of the issuer’s investors as ‘members’ of the public cor-
poration next to the new body of securities law protective rules. Below we will see that such 
regulatory choices do indeed matter and therefore urge explicit argumentation and discus-
sion. Conversely, harmonisation of corporate law rules to protect investors may influence 
(hamper) regulatory competition and arbitrage, for example by means of different default 
rules to protect minority shareholders (other than ‘federal’ disclosure).390 Making no choice 
may – as will be explained – result in overlaps as well as different enforcement mechanisms 
and hence exposure of shareholder activism since this depends on formal powers of GMS 
and access of individual shareholders to enforcement of corporate resolutions, including 
proxy solicitation and enforcement of judicial review of corporate policies and strategy.
The basic differences between the US and the EU can already prima facie be illustrated by 
comparing shareholders’ rights as attributed by the US MBCA and DGCL (Delaware, the 
majority of US publicly traded companies is incorporated in Delaware391) with the accu-
mulated provisions of EU corporate law directives and national provisions. The MBCA and 
DGCL limit the (collective and individual) powers of ‘shareholders’ (remarkably and in con-
trast to the EU and MS not using GMS as notion of a body corporate) to a few major issues: 
appointment and dismissal of board members, mergers and consolidations,392 sales, leases 
or exchanges of all or substantially all of the corporation’s property and assets393 and leaves 
the use of proxy solicitation to securities law (§ 14 SEA’34).394 EU and MS corporate law 
389 See also the influence of economical concepts as the “agency-theory”, seemingly influencing regula-
tory reforms after corporate scandals as in 2000/2001, par. 3.2 and references to the literature. May 
2003-reaction of EC. 
390 Cf. Luca Enriques, ‘Company Law Harmonization Reconsidered: What Role for the EC’, ECGI Law Work-
ing Paper, No. 53, 2005, the paper concludes that, ideally, the EC should only engage in free-choice 
and contractual freedom enhancing harmonisation, while recognising that EC lawmakers cannot be 
expected to espouse such a programme and expressing the no more realistic hope that they will have 
the courage, in Gérard Hertig’s words, “of doing nothing” instead of pursuing their ambitious harmo-
nization agenda.
391 In 2002, Delaware was the domicile of 59% of Fortune 500 firms and 58% of all publicly traded compa-
nies, Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms’ Decisions whereto incorporate, 46 J.L. & Econ. 383, 
3911 tbl 2 (223). Model Bus. Corp. Act, introduction at xxvii (2002).
392 § 251 (c) DGCL.
393 § 271 (a) DGCL.
394 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Shareholder Activism in the Obama Era, UCLA School of Law, Law-Econ Re-
search Paper No. 09-14, July 2009, p. 11-12, these direct restrictions on shareholder power long have 
been supplemented by a host of other rules that indirectly prevent shareholders from exercising sig-
nificant influence over corporate decision making. Three sets of statutes are especially noteworthy: (1) 
disclosure requirements pertaining to large holders; (2) shareholder voting and communication rules; 
and (3) insider trading and short swing profits rules. These laws affect shareholders in two respects. 
First, they discourage the formation of large stock blocks. Secondly, they discourage communication 
and coordination among shareholders.
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provides for a far more extensive list (e.g. appointment/dismissal of directors, alteration 
of articles of association, changes in capital and share issues, legal merger, de-merger, 
dissolution, and change of substance and character of the firm, buy-back of shares, pass-
ing pre-emptive rights, use of certain anti-takeover devices395 (grant options on preferred 
protective shares).396 Similarly, provisions on boards, indemnification and insurance of its 
members, corporate reorganisations, exit rules (squeeze out, sell out and appraisal rights) 
reveal remarkable differences. All these differences are spelt out in the tables attached in 
the annexes.
This paragraph will explore in more detail the (statutory) division of (collective and indi-
vidual) powers of investors (GMS) and the board/SB and, hence, both the nature of protec-
tion thus provided to investors (as shareholders) and the statutory level and extent of board 
supremacy, taking into account recent developments that affected the prevailing systems.
One may – validly – argue that a ‘black letter’ comparison necessarily will conceal: a) 
market structures and their developments, b) factual dispersion or concentration of hold-
ings, hence, c) different effects of attribution of legal rights to shareholders397 and d) their 
enforcement in court. This argument, however, does not invalidate the observation that at 
end of the day an investor’s action, depending on his total position of enforceable legal rights 
as attributed by the issuer’s jurisdiction and charter, may influence the prevailing govern-
ance model and board supremacy. Also GMS motions and dialogues outside a formal GMS 
should be taken into account.398 Therefore a comparative investigation of his position and 
rights and those of the issuer’s board is indispensible.399
3.3.2	 Comparison	rights	of	General	Meeting	of	Shareholders	as	such:	preliminary	
remarks
This paragraph compares the rights of the GMS as such, i.e. as the body corporate within the 
internal organisation of the issuer. Some preliminary remarks should be made.400
395 These can be grounded on statutory devices and devices inserted in the articles of incorporation and 
the activation thereof. However, they also can have an economical or structural character as other 
markets in and outside the EU often appear. Structural protection for Dutch listed corporations is 
merely non-existent and therefore they mainly have to fall back on ‘judicial’ ways of protection. See 
Van der Elst, Christoph, Abe de Jong and Theo Raaijmakers, ‘Een overzicht van juridische en econo-
mische dimensies van de kwetsbaarheid van Nederlandse beursvennootschappen’, Report to the So-
cial and Economic Council of the Netherlands (SER), 2007, ch.2.
396 The ultimate test for the supremacy of the board is the question of whether the board (BoM/SB) is 
authorised to protection the corporation against a hostile takeover.
397 NB: in the articles of incorporation, different shareholder types can be set up, e.g. ‘one-share one 
vote’principle can be limited.
398 Also procedural rules such as the possibility to call a meeting, or the requirement to deposit your 
share upfront a meeting etc. (mechanical) facilitating the exercise of voting rights in GMS are of influ-
ence on the supremacy of the board, see also the proxy voting system in the US.
399 Mathias M. Siems, Convergence in Shareholder Law, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 
119, the future of shareholder activism, however, does not depend solely on the regulatory complex 
that facilitates the position of the shareholders as such, e.g. voting at a general meeting. Instead, what 
matters is, first, whether the general meeting has important matters to decide freely at all.
400 Mathias M. Siems, Convergence in Shareholder Law, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 
154, that states that for positive law, however, it is not appropriate to assume a direct contractual 
mandate from shareholders, since that would go beyond the competence granted by statute or in the 
articles of association.
Book Vanderschee.indb   122 18-3-2011   15:39:43
Investor protection in corporate law 123
First, the GMS as a body corporate in the internal organisation of a public corporation in the 
EU typically follows the pattern of ‘association’401 and is therefore operating as its ‘meeting 
of members’,402 attributed as such with the power to decide on basic decisions concerning 
the constitution of that ‘association’ (more or less using language of constitutional law403). In 
contrast, the US MBCA and DGCL speak merely of ‘the shareholders’ and put the board at 
the centre of the issuer’s internal affairs. Consequently, all major decisions have to be initi-
ated by the board; shareholders cannot404 initiate such decisions. Their primary means for 
changing the issuer’s ‘constitution’ is to replace the board by a team that will adopt the poli-
cies they want (by means of a (hostile) tender offer or a proxy fight). The central position of 
the board appears also from the fact that, as in the Netherlands, in cases where the articles 
are incomplete or management is unable to act, no residual competences remains for “the 
shareholders”.405 Leo Strine wrote: “The perspective of the corporate law traditionalist is one 
that recognizes that here is great value to the American, i.e. Delaware, approach to corporation 
law. This approach invests corporate managers with a great deal of authority to pursue business 
strategies through diverse means, subject to a few important constraints. These constraints, 
that stockholders approve certain important transactions such as mergers,406 vote for direc-
401 Raaijmakers, Ondernemingsrecht, Pitlo/Raaijmakers, Deventer: Kluwer 2006, p. 376. Cf. also E.J.J. van 
der Heijden and W.C.L. van der Grinten, Handboek voor de Naamloze en de Besloten vennootschap (elfde 
druk), W.E.J. Tjeenk Willink, 1989, p. 365.
402 Mathias M. Siems, Convergence in Shareholder Law, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 
62 the association-membership view is marked by the notion that in any association individuals come 
together in order jointly to pursue an objective that would be precluded to each of them individually. 
Here, the legal relations among shareholders, as well as between shareholder or management and 
the association, play a decisive part. Membership as a special legal relation thus gives the share-
holders rights vis-a vis the company. Moreover, the association, rendered autonomous vis-à-vis it 
members, counts, so that its purpose and functionality may set bounds to the exercise of shareholder 
rights. For the public corporation with shares traded on a regulated market this metaphor of the 
shareholder “as member of an association” seems to contradict and give some frictions when the 
shareholder is seen above all as investor. Viewing the shareholder as member of the association re-
lates to concepts as “shareholder democracy”, in which shareholders are seen as the “parliamentar-
ians” of the company and thus as its highest body. Cf als supra note 14, p. 64 where Siems refers to 
Peter O. Mülbert, Aktiengesellschaft, Unternehmensgruppe und Kapitalmarkt, 2nd edition, Munich: Beck 
1996, pointing out that capital-market-oriented features can be identified in the German Companies 
Act 1965 (GerAktG). He therefore sees the shareholders in a hybrid dual role as association member 
as well as investor, which has also to be taken into account in interpreting the German AktG. However 
it seems that German legislator as in the US has made a conscious choice to protect investor mainly 
through securities law. NB: in the articles of incorporation different shareholder types can be set 
up, by that one can differentiate from e.g. the ‘one-share one vote ‘principle’, a principle applied in 
the examined jurisdiction. Shareholders mostly is given the chance to vote when rights are changed 
attached to their class of shares, see § 10.04 MBCA, § 242 (b) (2) DGCL, art. 25 (3) 2nd Directive 77/91/
EEC, sec. 630 UK CA 2006, § 179 (3) AktG, art. 2: 122 NCC.
403 Such as “shareholders democracy” or oligarchic regulations.
404 Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for limited Shareholder Voting Rights, UCLA Law Review, Vol. 53, pp. 
601-636, 2006, p. 2 indeed, the extent to which corporate law is stacked against what Bebchuk calls 
‘intervention power’ goes beyond just the housekeeping rules; much of both corporate and securities 
law serves to sharply limit shareholder involvement in corporate decisions making. See Sofie Cools, 
‘The Real Difference in Corporate Law between the United States and Continental Europe: Distribu-
tion of Powers’, Delaware Journal of Corporate Law, Vol. 30, No. 3, 2005, p. 44.
405 Cf. § 8.01 (b) MBCA and § 141 (a) DGCL with e.g. art. 2:107 NCC.
406 § 251 DGCL.
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tors annually,407 and have access to books and records;408 that stockholders can hold managers 
accountable for failing to fulfill their fiduciary duties; and that state and federal policies give inde-
pendent directors the clout and duty to police corporate insiders are vital. They provide assur-
ance that managers will not abuse the powers granted to them, thereby instilling confidence in 
investors that capital may be safely entrusted to corporations run by centralized management. 
Importantly, potent federal laws requiring accurate accounting and periodic reporting of material 
financial information and subjecting corporate insiders to criminal and civil liability for fraud sup-
plement state protections for public companies.409 The traditionalist recognizes the need for pro-
tections of this kind and the reality that developments in the business world might give rise to a 
need to strengthen or modify them.”410 And Lucian Bebchuk, taking another perspective wrote: 
“The division between shareholders and board is considered a long-standing, basic feature of 
American corporate law, the preclusion of shareholders from intervening to adopt changes in the 
company’s basic governance arrangements or to make major business decisions. The legal rules 
that tie shareholderś  hands and insulate management from shareholder intervention partly 
account for the power of management and the weakness of shareholders in such companies.”411
Secondly, GMS resolutions have to be taken with quorum and majority requirements,412 in 
407 § 211 DGCL Stockholders may also remove directors between annual meetings, although they may 
only remove the members of a staggered board for cause unless the articles of incorporation provides 
otherwise, § 141 (k) DGCL.
408 § 220 DGCL
409 §§ 13 (a), 13 (i), 32 (a) SEA ‘34; Corporate Criminal Fraud Accountability Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1350 
(2004), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78ff (2001).
410 Leo E. Strine, jr., ‘Towards a true Corporate Republic: A Traditionalist Response to Lucian’s Solu-
tion for Improving Corporate America’, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper, No. 541, February 
2006, p. 7.
411 Lucian Arye Bebchuk, ‘The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power’, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 118. No. 
3, p. 933-914, January 2005. This article reconsiders the basic allocation of power between board and 
shareholders in publicly traded companies with dispersed ownership. US corporate law has long pre-
cluded shareholders from initiating any changes in the company’s basic governance arrangements. 
His analysis and his empirical evidence indicate that shareholder’s existing power to replace directors 
is insufficient to secure the adoption of value-increasing governance arrangements that management 
disfavours. He puts forward an alternative regime that would allow shareholders to initiate and adopt 
rules-of-the-game decisions to change the company’s charter or state of incorporation. Providing 
shareholders with such power could operate over time to improve all corporate governance arrange-
ments. Cf. Bainbridge and Strine, who react fiercely on Bebchuk’s therory and adhere the Board’s 
primacy model. Leo E. Strine, jr., ‘Towards a true Corporate Republic: A Traditionalist Response to 
Lucian’s Solution for Improving Corporate America’, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper, No. 
541, February 2006; cf. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 
University of California, Los Angeles School of Law, Research paper No. 05-25.
412 Reinier R. Kraakman, Paul Davies, Henry Hansmann, Gerard Hertig, Klaus J. Hopt, Hideki Kanda & 
Edward B. Rock, The Anatomy of Corporate Law, A Comparative and Functional Approach, New York: Ox-
ford University Press 2004, p 41, a final dimension of the extent of shareholder influence over cor-
porate appointments concerns the ability of the shareholder majority to surmount its own collective 
action problem. Whenever corporate ownership is splintered among numerous shareholders, the law 
can enhance or diminish shareholder influence by facilitating or deflecting collective action by the 
shareholder majority. Cf Mathias M. Siems, Convergence in Shareholder Law, New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008, p. 169, as with the governing bodies of political organisations or other associa-
tions, for the general meeting the question arises of what majority justifies attributing the decision 
to the whole organisation. The room for manoeuvre here ranges from a requirement for unanimity 
to a relative majority of shares entitled to vote. Mathias M. Siems, Convergence in Shareholder Law, 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 169, for shareholders, quorums or qualified majori-
ties sometimes constitute a compromise between the more cumbersome unanimity principle and the 
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various EU Member States under certain conditions they may typically be annulled, which 
forms a major element in the enforcement of the rights of the GMS.413
Thirdly, the comparison of GMS rights and powers does not – of course – reflect differences 
between shareholders (small, institutional investors, pension funds, hedge funds) nor types 
of shares.414
Fourthly, neither does it reflect the attendance of shareholders to meetings. Attendance 
and absenteeism of shareholders at the GMS is and has been a major topic in the recent 
corporate governance debate. The underlying presumption is that better attendance of 
shareholders at the GMS and thus less absenteeism results in more ‘shareholder democ-
racy’ and therefore better ‘checks and balances’ in the governance organisation within the 
corporation. This idea suits the EU public corporation in which the GMS typically follows the 
pattern of ‘association’ and therefore is operating as its ‘meeting of members’. Also in EU 
corporate governance codes, the idea of better ‘shareholder democracy’ has been trans-
lated into principles and best practices, see for example the Best Practise IV.1 DGCC, which 
states: “Good corporate governance requires the fully-fledged participation of sharehold-
ers in the decision-making in the general meeting. It is in the interest of the company that 
as many shareholders as possible take part in the decision making in the general meeting. 
The company shall, in so far as possible, give shareholders the opportunity to vote by proxy 
and to communicate with all other shareholders, and ‘the general meeting should be able 
to exert such influence on the policy of the management board and the supervisory board 
of the company that it plays a fully-fledged role in the system of checks and balances in 
the company.” As will be elaborated in par. 3.6, in the US the proxy system (solicitation 
and voting) as regulated in the SEA’34 and Rules mainly has a disclosure function protect-
ing investors by enabling them to make an informed vote. The US system is less based on 
rules on convocation and agenda setting. In the case of US public companies, proxies are so 
principle of the simple majority. Several topics are playing a role, first there is the question of how to 
take account of abstentions, secondly, there is sometimes a requirement for a minimum proportion of 
all shareholders with voting rights in order for a resolution to be valid, thirdly, in most legal systems, 
supermajorities are required for particular decisions. Quorum and qualified majorities can be seen 
as instruments underpinning “shareholder democracy”, ensuring that all or at least major decisions 
are supported by a clear majority of shareholders, so that decision-making is enhanced and random 
majorities avoided. In public corporations with dispersed holdings as in the US quorums and qualified 
majorities sometimes are hard to obtain. That is one of the reasons a sophisticated system of proxy 
solicitation and voting has been developed in the US. The protection of investors through sale of their 
shares on the market and appraisal rights in stead of qualified majorities, suits the US investor ori-
ented system better.
413 See e.g. art. 2:15 NCC.
414 Mathias M. Siems, Convergence in Shareholder Law, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008, 
p. 66-67, who makes a classification of several types of shareholders; A typology of shareholders is 
possible from various stand points. From theoretical viewpoints, the models of the shareholder as 
owner, quasi-partner, association member, parliamentarian, investor and bystander can be distin-
guished. Since reality does not exactly reflect these models, further indications have been given of 
various real types of shareholder, where differentiation may for instance be made according to dura-
tion of investment, extent of involvement or the person of the investor. This also includes the possibil-
ity of addressing different types of shareholders through the articles of association. In this part of the 
research I take notice of the existence of these different types of shareholders in real world, however 
I focus on the position of the board, its supremacy and discretion, and how that position is affected by 
investor searching for investment opportunities and using shareholders law to put pressure on the 
board, e.g. to change it strategy.
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intensively used that the notion of personal attendance at general meetings is regarded as 
a myth.415 For a US listed public corporation, the proxy rules put the proxy machinery in the 
hands of the management/board.416 This system matches the investor-oriented US system 
as provided in the Securities Acts and strong board supremacy and discretion under state 
law (US MBCA and DGCL), which still prevails.417
Fifthly, the effectiveness of voting rights (and also of the sale of shares) depends on inves-
tors being adequately informed about the issuer and the identity of fellow shareholders to 
foreclose ‘hidden actions’ by management. Here, again, securities law disclosure is crucial. 
However, information rights vested in corporate law also play a role, for example the right 
to demand information at the GMS, such as art. 2: 117 NCC, a right of the GMS to be informed 
by the board/SB, and § 131 AktG,418 an individual right of a shareholder to be informed.419 
Compare also the US shareholder right of inspection of records and books, § 16.02 MBCA 
and § 220 (c) DGCL.420
3.3.3	 GMS:	appointment,	nomination,	compensation	and	dismissal	of	directors
Appointment and dismissal of members of the board (BoM or SB members) constitute the 
most important powers in the internal affairs of issuers: since the board ‘controls’ the strat-
egy and policies of the firm, ‘control’ over the board is crucial. Control in that sense is typi-
cal for subsidiaries and closely held firms; it is not so in the organisation of issuers with 
dispersed ownership.
A distinction has to be made between selection and nomination of board members (and 
officers), the act of appointment and setting the terms of employment (terms of office, expi-
ration, re-eligibility, compensation, terms of retirement in case of a (hostile) takeover). 
Appointment is typically a right of the GMS, although there are exceptions (German AG and 
a few issuers in the Netherlands under the ‘structuurregime’).
The process of selection and nomination cannot be handled by the collectivity of dispersed 
shareholders. It is a major responsibility of (a special committee from) the NED or the SB 
to select and nominate candidates. However, evidently (large, activist) shareholders may be 
415 Mathias M. Siems, Convergence in Shareholder Law, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008, 
p. 103 and the reference made to Stoud v. Grace, 606 A 2d 75, 86 (Del. Supr. 1992) (‘Realities in modern 
corporate life have all but gutted the myth that shareholders in large publicly held companies person-
ally attend their annual meetings’).
416 Mathias M. Siems, Convergence in Shareholder Law, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008, 
p. 107 See also other literature.
417 See however Mathias M. Siems, Convergence in Shareholder Law, New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2008, p. 107 who argues that the US system from a theoretical viewpoint, this would be justified 
only if the shareholders and investor’ were to be merely spectators, with no active involvement in the 
firm. Siems states that it is better, however, to grant even the ‘shareholder as investor’ certain partici-
patory rights, so as to ensure the value of his shares an the quality of the conduct of business. However 
also in the US system shareholders have certain rights to vote on major issues, e.g. that stockholders 
approve certain important transactions such as mergers, vote for directors annually, and have access 
to books and records.
418 Mathias M. Siems, Convergence in Shareholder Law, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008, 
p.122 it is argued that § 131 AktG additionally is aimed at protecting the shareholder as investor.
419 Mathias M. Siems, Convergence in Shareholder Law, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008, 
p. 119.
420 Cf. § 131 AktG.
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interested in the nomination of new directors, specifically if they want to replace an under-
performing board and change the strategy and policies of the corporation in a break up, 
share buy-back or similar scenario.421 Direct access to the ballot therefore is fiercely debated 
generally as well as in particular cases. On the one hand, the board should be allowed to 
defend the corporate bastion and have the discretion to execute long-term strategy/policy 
without pressure to be thrown out of office with its potential corresponding liability. On the 
other hand, staggered boards with, the possibility to take protective measures are seem-
ingly a part of the explanation for ‘loss’ in shareholder value. However research results are 
mixed. (proxy contest on the cheap!)Without taking a position in the above debate, the first 
question is how easy or difficult it is to replace and appoint board members (BoM/SB) in 
the various systems.422 Similarly, setting the conditions for service as board members and 
officers came under pressure.
United States. In the US, § 8.08 (a) MBCA, the plurality of the shareholders and § 141 (k) 
DGCL,423 the holders of a majority of the votes (then entitled to vote at an election of direc-
tors), may remove any director or the entire board with or without cause (§ 141 (k) DGCL).424 
See the annexes (table comparison shareholder rights) under ‘Removal of Directors’ for 
differences between the MBCA and DGCL, also related to the use of staggered boards and 
cumulative voting.425
421 See e.g the Netherlands cases of Hermes v. ASMI and Centarus versus Stork.
422 Mathias M. Siems, Convergence in Shareholder Law, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008, 
p. 157 A member leaves the board when his term expires or he is dismissed. For the securing of share-
holder interests, both events are of decisive importance. If board members are untouchable because 
of long terms and lack of power of dismissal, the danger exists that the management can without risk 
pursue the interests of other stakeholders or its own, at its discretion. However, this is something dif-
ferent that shareholder with only a certain percentage of the shares already acquire effective control 
without paying a premium.
423 § 141 (k) DGCL Any director or the entire board of directors may be removed, with or without cause, by 
the holders of a majority of the shares then entitled to vote at an election of directors, except as fol-
lows.
424 Allen, Kraakman and Subramanian, Commentaries and Cases on the Law of Business Organizations, 
Aspen Publishers, New York, 2007, p. 180, corporate law facilitates the election of directors by crea-
ting a flexible framework for holding the annual meeting of shareholders. Generally, the state statutes 
fix a minimum and maxi-mum notice period (e.g., 10-60 days § 222 (b) DGCL) and quorum requirement 
for the general meeting (§ 216 DGCL). The statutes also establish a minimum and maximum period for 
the board to fix a so-called ‘record date’. shareholders who are registered as of the record date are 
legal shareholders entitled to vote at the meeting (e.g. DCGL § 211 (c)). Within the range of alternatives 
permitted by statute, a corporation’s actual notice period, quorum requirement, and record date will 
be established by the charter or in a bylaw. 
425 § 8.06 MBCA allowing the practise of ‘classifying’ the board or ‘staggering’ the terms of directors so 
that only one-half or one-third of them are elected at each annual shareholders’ meeting and direc-
tors are elected for two or three-years terms rather than one-year terms. The traditional purpose of 
a staggered board has been to assure the continuity and stability of the corporation’s business stra-
tegies and policies as determined by the board. In recent years the practise has been employed with 
increasing frequency to ensure that a majority of the board of directors remains in place following 
a sudden change in shareholding or a proxy contest. It also reduces the impact of cumulative voting 
since a greater number of votes is required to elect a director if the board is staggered than is required 
if the entire board is elected at each annual meeting. A staggered board of directors also can have the 
effect of making unwanted takeover attempts more difficult, particularly where the articles of incor-
poration provide that the shareholders may remove directors only with cause or by a supermajority 
vote, or both.
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§ 8.03 (c) US MBCA and § 211 (b) DGCL the shareholders by plurality vote (§ 7.28 (a) MBCA) 
must each year elect the directors, however staggered boards (§ 8.06 MBCA), cumulative 
voting426 (§ 214 DGCL) and the proxy machinery, usually controlled by the board, result in 
board members being elected from a list of eligible candidates set by the board.427 Electing 
(nominating) other (‘own’) candidates is therefore considered to be burdensome.
Shareholders may start a proxy fight, but that procedure is rather expensive in view of the 
securities law rules that have to be observed amongst other things. The SEC did propose 
allowing shareholders to come with their own slate of directors back in 2003 (SEC Rule 
14a-11).428 This rule has recently been enacted by the SEC, however it is not yet effective. 
Under this new Exchange Act Rule 14a-11, companies are required to include a shareholder 
nominee or nominees for director in the company proxy materials, if the shareholder meets 
certain conditions, and if the shareholders are not otherwise prohibited — either by appli-
cable state or foreign law or a company’s governing documents — from nominating a can-
didate for election as a director.429
This new rule could be enacted under the new Obama administration. It can be regarded as 
a first battle won for the proponents such as Lucian Bebchuck of shareholder access to the 
ballot. Others, such as Stephen M. Bainbridge and Martin Lipton, on the other side of the 
spectrum, consider this kind of amendment to be an erosion of long-standing US principles 
of board supremacy and discretion, in the long run also producing less shareholder value 
and, as regards the 2007/2008 financial crisis, not a proper analysis or answer. 430
European Union. The EU draft 5th Directive (13-12-1972/C 131/49),431 harmonising the com-
plete internal affairs of all ‘public corporations’ (note: not issuers), by mandatory division 
426 By using cumulative voting (minority) shareholders can pool their votes and elect a candidate opposite 
to the candidate of the corporation, see § 214 DGCL. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporate Law, 2nd Edition, 
Foundation Press, New York 2009, p. 236, cumulative voting, however, is not frequently used in issuers.
427 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, ‘Shareholder Activism in the Obama Era’, UCLA School of Law, Law-Econ 
Research Paper No. 09-14, July 2009, p. 3 referring to Bayless Manning, Book Review, 67 Yale L.J. 1477, 
1485-89 (1958), already describing that in practice, of course, even the election of directors (absent a 
proxy contest) is predetermined by the existing board nominating the next year’s board.
428 See very interesting debate on board elections enfolding during Symposium held by Harvard Univer-
sity, Lucian Bebchuk (editor), ‘Symposium on Corporate Elections’, Harvard, John M. Olin Center for 
Law, Economics, and Business, Discussion Paper no. 448, 11, 2003, the symposium brought together SEC 
officials, CEOs, directors, institutional investors, money managers, shareholder activists, lawyers, 
judges, academics and others to discuss the subject from a wide range of perspectives. See also 
Grechten Morgenson, ‘Who’s Afraid Of Shareholder Democracy?’ The New York Times, October 2, 2005.
429 17 CFR Parts 200, 232, 240 and 249, release Nos. 33-9 136; 34-62762; IC-29384; File No. S7-10-09, RIN 
3235-AK27 Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations.
430 Cf. Bill W. Bratton and Michael L. Wachter, ‘The Case against Shareholder Empowerment’, University 
of Pennsylvania Law Review, vol. 158: 653, 2010. Cf. also Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, ‘Some thought 
for Boards of Directors in 2008’, AEI Legal Center – Briefly, Vol. 11, No. 7, 2008 highlighting some of the 
significant issues that boards of directors of US companies face in 2008, including tremendous pres-
sures to realise short-term stock-market gains at the expense of long-term value. These pressures 
have become acute as hedge funds and other activist shareholders, as well as influential proxy advi-
sory firms, have sought to reshape the landscape in ways that undermine the board-centric model of 
governance. In addition, this memorandum highlights some issues and practical considerations for 
directors to bear in mind in reviewing the roles, duties and procedures of boards and board commit-
tees.
431 COM (72) 887 final, 18 July 1972, JO C 131/49; EC Bull Supp 10/72. First draft 1972. Last official draft: 
COM (91) 372 final, 20 November 1991; (1991) OJ C321/9. In 1996, the Commission asked Ernst & Young 
to consider the relevance of the Draft 5th Directive in the study it had commissioned on corporate 
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of powers between management, supervisors (non-executive directors) and the GMS, was 
withdrawn, because of disagreement on labour participation, in 2004.432 Art. 13 sub 1 states 
that the members of the management organ may be dismissed by the supervisory organ 
and art. 13 sub 2 states that the members of the supervisory organ may be dismissed at any 
time by the organ or persons who appointed them and under the same procedures.433 Art. 
3 states that SB will appoint members of the BoM. Art. 4 sub 1 states that for companies 
which employ five hundred staff or more, the members of the SB, shall (sub 2), be appointed 
by the general meeting, and not less than one third of the members of the SB shall be 
appointed by the workers or their representatives or upon proposal by the workers or their 
representatives.434 This draft was withdrawn in 2004 since it had become obsolete by the 
shift in to the corporate governance debate.
United Kingdom. Sec. 168 UK CA 2006 gives the GMS the ability to remove directors at any 
time by ordinary resolution, also, in contrast to the US,435 when the articles provide for 
a staggered board, replacement is still always possible.436 The UK appointment process 
which is regulated predominantly by the company’s articles of association is opposed to 
the right of removal.437 The UK CA 2006438 requires neither that directors be elected by the 
shareholders in the GMS nor that they submit themselves periodically to re-election by the 
governance. The Commission decided to draw back the proposal on 9 January 2004, OJ C 5/20 (2004), 
Vanessa Edwards, EC Company Law, New York: Oxford University Press 1999, p. 389. Two highly con-
troversial proposals were the mandatory creation of a two-tier board structure (Art. 2 5th Directive) 
consisting of a managing organ and a supervisory organ and mandatory provisions for employees’ 
representation on the supervisory board for companies with a workforce greater than 500, Art. 4(2) 
(3). See Vanessa Edwards, EC Company Law, New York: Oxford University Press 1999 , p. 388.
432 Cf. the famous debate on the ‘race to the bottom’ initiated by professor R.K.Winter: R.K. Winter, ‘State 
Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation’, 6 J. Legal Stud. 251, 1977; Cf. Frank 
H. Easterbrook, The Race for the Bottom in Corporate Governance, Inaugural Ralph K. Winter Lecture, 
Yale Law School (Dec. 5, 2005); See for analysis of competition between federation and the state, e.g. 
Delaware, for enacting corporate law: William W. Bratton and Jospeh A. McCahery, ‘The Equilibrium 
Content of Corporate Federalism’, Georgetown Law and Econ. Research Paper, 606481,2004.
433 Art. 13 sub 2, ‘However, the members of the supervisory organ who were appointed by it under Art. 4(3) 
may be dismissed only where proper grounds for dismissal are found to exist by judgment, of the court 
in proceedings brought in that behalf by the supervisory organ, the general meeting or the workers’ 
representatives.
434 In case the SB members are not appointed by the GMS or workers representatives, (sub 3), the SB 
shall be appointed by that other organ, however the GMS or the representatives of the workers may 
object to the appointment of a proposed candidate on the ground either that he lacks the ability to 
carry out his duties or that if he were appointed there would, having regard to the interest of the com-
pany, the shareholders or the workers, be imbalance in the composition of the supervisory organ. In 
such cases the appointment shall not be made unless the objection is declared unfounded by an inde-
pendent body existing under public law, (sub 4), as regards companies which employ a lesser number 
of workers than that fixed in pursuance of paragraph 1 the members of the SB shall be appointed by 
the GMS.
435 § 141 (k) DGCL provides that when the board is classified directors can be removed only ‘for cause’, 
unless the charter provides otherwise.
436 The articles may provide that directors shall be appointed for three years at a time and that no more 
than one third of the board comes up for election in any one year, in the US these arrangements are 
referred to as ‘staggered boards’.
437 Gower/Davies, Principles of Modern Company Law, Sweet & Maxwell, London 2008, p. 379
438 Gower/Davies, Principles of Modern Company Law, Sweet & Maxwell, London 2008, p. 378 the CA 
main concern is to give publicity to those who are appointed rather than to regulate the appointment 
process.
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share holders.439 The articles of public companies normally provide for retirement of board 
members by rotation on a three-year cycle (see art. 20 Model Articles for Public Compa-
nies, hereafter: MAPC) and for the filling of the vacancies at each annual general meeting.440 
The sec. 160 UK CA 2006 provides that each appointment in a public company shall be voted 
on individually. The company’s articles often provide provisions which make it difficult for 
shareholders to put up candidates against the board’s nominees. As the appointment proc-
ess is predominantly regulated by the company’s articles of association, is would not be a 
breach of any mandatory rule for the articles to provide that none of the directors should 
be required to stand for re-election and that the existing directors, without shareholder 
sanction, should choose any replacements for directors who resigned or were removed. 
Thus, in theory shareholders could be wholly written out of the appointment process. In 
practice such extreme cases are rare, though for reasons that reflect market rather than 
legal constraints as large companies might find it difficult to sell their shares to institu-
tional investors on the basis of such articles.441 Also taking into account, secs. A.4 and A.7 
‘Re-election’ UK CC, all directors should be submitted for re-election at regular intervals, 
and all directors should be subject to election by shareholders at the first GMS after their 
appointment, and to re-election thereafter at intervals of no more than three years. So, the 
crucial decisions for the shareholders in public companies are normally whether to accept 
the board’s nominees for election at the annual general meeting and whether subsequently 
to exercise their removal rights.442
Germany. Directors (BoM) (§ 23 (5) AktG) can only be replaced for urgent cases; such as 
the withdrawal of confidence (unsachlich) in them by the GMS.443 Dismissal of supervisory 
board members is, unless otherwise provided in the articles of association, possible only by 
three-quarters of the votes cast, unless there is overriding justification (§103(1), (3) AktG). 
The board (Vorstand) of an AG is not appointed by the GMS, but by the Supervisory Board 
(SB, ‘Aufsichtsrat’), 444 445 (§ 84 AktG) for terms of five up to years, re-election is allowed (§ 
84 (2) AktG). § 33 ‘Mitbestimmungsgesetz’ requires that a labour director (Arbeitsdirector) 
is appointed to the Vorstand.446 However, sec. 5.1.2 GGCC advises that for first-time appoint-
ments, the maximum possible appointment period of five years should not apply. A re-
appointment prior to one year before the end of the appointment period with a simultaneous 
termination of the current appointment shall only take place under special circumstances.
439 Gower/Davies, Principles of Modern Company Law, Sweet & Maxwell, London 2008, p.379; § 12 UK CA 
2006, initial registration to Reg. of Com; particulars of first directors with foundation of a company.
440 Model public company articles, art. 20 directors appointed by ordinary resolution or by decision of the 
directors and art. 21 retirement of directors through rotation.
441 Gower/Davies, Principles of Modern Company Law, Sweet & Maxwell, London 2008, p. 389.
442 Gower/Davies, Principles of Modern Company Law, Sweet & Maxwell, London 2008, p. 380.
443 Karsten Schmidt, Gesellschaftsrecht, Heymans 2002, p. 808
444 Aktiengesetz, Kommentar, p. 965, Die Beschrankung des Widerrufsrechts unterstutzt die Stellung 
des Vorstands unde dessen aufgabe, das Unternehmen unabhangig und eigenverantwortlich zu lei-
ten. Weder die Satzung noch die Hauptversammlung kann dem Aufsichtsrat die befugnis zum jeder-
zeitigen Widerruf einraumen.
445 Aktiengesetz, Kommentar, p. 946, the allocation of the power to appoint and replace the directors to 
the SB expresses the opinion in 1937 that the SB is better suited to appoint the directors than the GMS 
(Hauptversammlung). See also 108 for decision of the SB.
446 §§ 33 MitbestG, 13 MontanMitbestG, 13 MitbestG.
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Shareholder influence (GMS) is limited, since the SB itself is not completely appointed by 
the GMS, since the SB consists in part of shareholder and of employee representatives. In 
‘large’ corporations, employing more than 2000 employees, the formula is 50/50, but the 
chairman, who has a casting vote, is elected from the shareholders representatives. The 
shareholder representatives to be appointed by the GMS are in practice nominated by the SB 
in office and the management board.447 So, according to § 101 (1) AktG, the GMS elects part 
of the SB, the rest are appointed by representatives of the employees by virtue of §§ 6-24 
Mitbestimmungsgezetz. For an AG employing more than 500 but less than 2000 employees, 
two thirds of the SB members are appointed by the GMS and one third by the employees 
(Betriebsverfassungsgesetz).
The Netherlands: each director (BoM) may, at any time, be suspended and removed by the 
body empowered to appoint him, namely the GMS or SB, (arts. 2:134 (1) NCC and 2:144 and 
147 NCC).448 The articles of incorporation may provide that the resolution to suspend or 
remove a director (BoM/SB) may only be passed by an increased majority (arts. 2:134 (2) 
NCC; and 144 (2)).449 Another route for dismissal of a director is provided by the Netherlands 
Enterprise Chamber (Amsterdam) by way of ‘injunctive relief’ (art. 2:349a NCC) or final ‘pro-
vision’ 356 NCC in case of well-founded reasons to doubt good policy on the part of the 
corporation or, in case of mismanagement of the corporation (for further elaboration on this 
unique procedure, see chapter 4). The GMS appoints (art. 2:132 NCC) directors,450 unless the 
issuer is a ‘structuur-NV’ where the SB appoints the board members according to art. 2:162 
NCC.451 There are very few such issuers (since the regime does not apply if more than half of 
all employees are employed outside the Netherlands, which for practically all issuers is the 
case). If the issuer has a supervisory board (no structuur-NV), its members are appointed 
by the GMS (art. 2:142 NCC).452
The articles of incorporation may limit the power of the GMS to appoint the members of the 
board by binding nominations.453 In that case the board (BoM/SB) may put a binding nomina-
tion of two candidates per vacancy on the agenda: art. 133 (1) (2) NCC. The GMS can waive the 
447 Mathias M. Siems, Convergence in Shareholder Law, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
448 Art. 2:147 (2) The suspension may be set aside by the general meeting at any time, unless the power to 
appoint directors is vested in the supervisory board. 
449 Art. 2:134 (2) NCC If the articles provide that the resolution to suspend or remove may only be passed 
by an increased majority in a general meeting at which a specific part of the capital is represented, 
such increased majority may not exceed two-thirds of the votes cast representing more than one half 
of the capital.
450 Art. 3 5th Dir. (13-12-1972/C 131/49), Art. 3, SB will appoint members of the BoM.
451 Art. 2:134 (1) NCC: Each director may, at any time, be suspended and removed by the body empowered 
to appoint him. Art. 2: 162 NCC: The supervisory board shall appoint the directors of the company; 
this power may not be limited by any binding list of candidates. It shall notify the general meeting of 
shareholders of an intended appointment of a director of the company. It shall not remove a director 
until the general meeting has been consulted on the intended dismissal. Art. 2:158 (11) NCC shall apply 
mutatis mutandis.
452 The articles of incorporation (Art. 2:132(2) NCC) may impose requirements which the directors must 
meet, these however may be waived by a resolution of the general meeting adopted by two-thirds of 
the votes cast representing more than one half of the issued capital. See art. 2:120 (3) NCC the articles 
can provide for lighter criteria.
453 B.P.A. Santen and F. Kloosterman, ‘Bad governance of goede bescherming? –Benoeming van bestuur-
ders en commissarissen in de niet-structuur-beursvennootschap’, TvOB 2007-2, p. 49-56, from their 
research it appears that in the Netherlands the articles of incorporation appear to limit the power of 
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binding character thereof by two-thirds of the votes cast representing more than one half 
of the issued capital. Best practice IV.1.1 DCGC advises a limitation to an absolute majority 
of the casted votes representing one third of the issued shares. Art. 2:120 (3) provides that if 
a quorum is not reached, a new meeting can be called in which the resolution can be made 
independently of the present capital, unless the articles provide otherwise, in which case the 
quorum demand shall still be standing.454
The articles can for example authorise holders of priority shares to propose such binding 
nomination. Such shares are often held by the founders of the company, but over time these 
have often been transferred to the SB. Under pressure of the market, many issuers have 
dropped such provisions. Compare also Professor Van der Elst, who provides empirical 
evidence that in the Netherlands the presence of priority shares has declined over recent 
years.455 Powers and responsibility have shifted to the supervisory board and its selection 
and nomination committee.456 Cf. Best Practice III.5.13 DCGC for selection and nomination 
committee.457
For the very few Dutch issuers that still apply the ‘structuur-regime’, the supervisory board 
shall appoint the directors of the company. This power may not be limited by any binding list 
of candidates. It shall notify the general meeting of shareholders of an intended appoint-
ment of a director of the company. It shall not remove a director until the general meeting 
has been consulted on the intended dismissal (see 2:162 NCC). The GMS for ‘structuur’ NV 
appoints, according to a nomination mechanism (art. 2:158),458 suspends and also removes 
the commissioners. Since 2004 the law provides for a low threshold to collectively remove 
the supervisory board, arts. 2:158 (4) and 2:161a NCC. This strengthening of the position of 
the GMS to appoint the board members, a major/controlling shareholder does not have the decisive 
voice.
454 B.P.A. Santen and F. Kloosterman, ‘Bad governance of goede bescherming? –Benoeming van bestu-
urders en commissarissen in de niet-structuur-beursvennootschap’, TvOB 2007-2, p. 49-56, only a few 
corporation have that provision in their articles.
455 Raaijmakers, Ondernemingsrecht, Pitlo/Raaijmakers, Deventer: Kluwer 2006, p. 394, Van der Elst, 
Christoph, Abe de Jong and Theo Raaijmakers, ‘Een overzicht van juridische en economische dimen-
sies van de kwetsbaarheid van Nederlandse beursvennootschappen’, Report to the Social and Economic 
Council of the Netherlands (SER), 2007.
456 B.P.A. Santen and F. Kloosterman, ‘Bad governance of goede bescherming? –Benoeming van bestu-
urders en commissarissen in de niet-structuur-beursvennootschap’, TvOB 2007-2, p. 52, most of the 
listed Dutch corporations (not ‘structure-regime, 10 out of 50 corporations (AEX and AMX) adhere to 
the ‘structuur-regime’. In 25% the ‘prioriteit’ is authorized.
457 Raaijmakers, Ondernemingsrecht, Pitlo/Raaijmakers, Deventer: Kluwer 2006, p. 394; Selection and ap-
pointment committee; III.5.13 The selection and appointment committee shall in any event focus on: 
a) drawing up selection criteria and appointment procedures for supervisory board members and 
management board members; b) periodically assessing the size and composition of the supervisory 
board and the management board, and making a proposal for a composition profile of the supervi-
sory board; c) periodically assessing the functioning of individual supervisory board members and 
 management board members, and reporting on this to the supervisory board; d) making proposals for 
appointments and reappointments; e) supervising the policy of the management board on the selec-
tion criteria and appointment procedures for senior management.
458 See art. 2; 158 (4), (5), (6), (7), (9) and (10), with absolute (= 100%) majority of the votes representing 1/3 
of the votes the nomination can be breached. So in the election process of SB members also the rights 
of GMS are strengthened.
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the GMS gave (activist) shareholders the possibility, in the case of Stork, to put pressure on 
the board to split up the corporation.459
In normal circumstances, the SB will therefore decisively influence the appointment of its 
own members and of the management board by the GMS. However, in view of Best Practice 
IV.1 DCGC and art. 2:161a NCC in combination with possible judicial review in the framework 
of the investigation procedure, the position of the GMS has been strengthened for contested 
takeovers and attempts to remove allegedly underperforming directors or simply in case of 
a change of strategy. The low numerical and legal thresholds for initiating an investigation 
procedure before the Amsterdam Enterprise Chamber opens the possibility for immediate 
and final injunction (arts. 2:349a and 2:356) to suspend, remove or add SB members in case 
of well-founded reasons to doubt good policy on the part of the corporation or mismanage-
ment of the corporation (for further elaboration on this unique procedure, see chapter 4). In 
some major cases this has indeed been by decrees of the Enterprise Chamber and only in 
part [corrected] by the Netherlands Supreme Court. This means of enforcing shareholder 
activism deviates from the pattern as described for the US, UK and Germany. Both the SER 
and the DCGC Monitoring Committee advised limitting these possible actions and changes. 
The introduction of some form of BJR has in particular been fiercely debated (see further 
chapter 4).
However, these provisions from ‘the law in the books’ do not reveal the corporate practice of 
intermediate dismissal of CEOs and other executives, usually initiated by the non-executive 
directors.
3.3.4	 Board	remuneration	(annex,	under	remuneration	policy)
In recent years, setting of the conditions for service as board members and officers came 
under pressure.
On the one hand, alignment (grant of stock options and bonuses) has been promoted to 
equate with the interests of investors. On the other hand, ‘excessive’ compensation was 
fiercely debated. It resulted in a shift of statutory powers from (committees of) the board to 
the GMS.460
459 Court of Appeal (Enterprise Chamber), 17-01-2001, AA 2007, 346, Stork, note M.J.G.C. Raaijmakers; 
arts. 2:142, 144, 158 (4) 161a NCC.
460 See e.g. art. 2:135 NCC, the GMS will adopt the remuneration policy of the board. Cf. also Wachtell, 
Lipton, Rosen & Katz, ‘Some thought for Boards of Directors in 2008’, AEI Legal Center – Briefly, Vol. 11, 
No. 7, 2008, pointing out that executive compensation continues to be a high-profile corporate issue 
and a major focus of shareholder activism. One aspect of executive compensation reforms that has 
recently gained traction is the advocacy of “say on pay” policies that call for non-binding shareholder 
ratification of executive compensation. Both Verizon and Aflac have announced that they will hold 
a shareholder advisory vote on executive compensation at their 2009 annual meetings. In addition, 
Pfizer and several other large companies have formed a working group with union and pension funds 
to discuss adoption of a “say on pay” policy. The issue has likewise gained traction in political forums. 
Last April, “say on pay” legislation received the approval of the U.S. House of Representatives, and a 
companion bill was promptly introduced in the Senate. Cf. Jeffrey N. Gordon, ‘Say on Pay’: Cautionary 
Notes on the UK Experience and the Case for Shareholder Opt-In’, ECGI – Law Working Paper No. 117, 
2009. Cf. also G. T.M.J. Raaijmakers, De effectiviteit van regels in het ondernemings- en effectenrecht, 
Den Haag: Boom Juridische Uitgevers 2006, p.14, who observes a trend that corporate and securities 
rules are designed with the aim of certain behavioural affects. He also questions whether lawyers 
have the proper instruments to achieve that kind of results. In that sense he also questions whether 
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However in the US, the board still has the authority to fix the compensation for directors, 
§ 8.11 MBCA and § 141 (h) DGCL. Again, the basic (governance) assumption is that when 
directors abuse their authority to set their own compensation, shareholders have the pos-
sibility of challenging the level of compensation through a derivative suit cause of breach 
of the duty of loyalty.461 According to Item 9-22 of Schedule 14A SEA’34, compensation plans 
have to be added to the proxy statement and to be disclosed to the market. NYSE Listed 
Company Manual § 303A.05 requires the board of directors of all listed companies to have a 
compensation committee. This committee must be comprised solely of independent direc-
tors.462
EU. The EC Recommendation on Directors’ Remuneration (hereafter: ‘Recommendation’), 
as stated in the Preamble, considers the form, structure and level of directors’ remu-
neration as matters falling within the competence of companies and their shareholders. 
Disclosure is considered as an important mechanism to inform shareholders about the 
companies’ remuneration’s policy, but also to make the company and its board accountable 
to its shareholders. However, no reference is made to the Transparency Directive and the 
Annual Financial Report. Recommendation sec. II.3.1 states that listed companies should 
disclose a statement of the remuneration policy of the company (the ‘remuneration state-
ment’). It should be part of an independent remuneration report and/or be included in the 
annual accounts and annual report or in the notes to the annual accounts of the company. 
The remuneration statement should also be posted on the listed company’s website. The 
Preamble also considers it important that the GMS should have a say in the remuneration 
of directors. Therefore, sec. II 4.1 states that the remuneration policy and any significant 
change to it should be an item on the agenda of the annual GMS, and sec. II 4.2 provides that 
the remuneration statement should be submitted to the annual GMS for a vote, this vote may 
be either mandatory or advisory, however MS may provide that such a vote will be held only 
if shareholders representing at least a quorum of 25% request it, unless national law dif-
fers, and sec. IV 6.1 on share-based remuneration states that schemes under which direc-
tors are remunerated in shares, share options or any other right to acquire shares or to be 
remunerated on the basis of share price movements should be subject to the prior approval 
of shareholders by way of a resolution at the annual GMS prior to their adoption.
In the UK, the articles 12 and 22 MAPC) provide that the board shall have power to set direc-
tors’ remuneration (also fees) as executives, the director whose remuneration is at issue 
is not usually permitted to vote on the matter.463 No statutory rule requires a shareholder 
vote nor does the CC recommend this as best practice, however after public concern and 
disclosure/transparency is the right tool to tackle perceived problems with director remuneration. 
Disclosure/transparency made directors’ remuneration more comparable, but seemingly resulted in 
upwards in stead of downwards pressure on directors’ remuneration.
461 Cf. Mathias M. Siems, Convergence in Shareholder Law, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008, 
p. 159. 
462 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporate law and Economics (2nd edition), Foundation Press 2009, p. 85, only 
listed companies in which a shareholders or group of shareholders acting together own 50% or more 
of the stock are exempt from this requirement. 
463 Arts. 12 and 22 MAPC.
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debate over levels of directors’ remuneration, the companies legislation was amended464 
and requires that the directors of quoted465 companies produce an annual remuneration 
report (sec. 420 (1) UK CA 2006) and an advisory vote of the shareholders on the report (sec. 
439 UK CA 2006).466 However, shareholder approval is required under the Listing Rules (LSE 
LR art. 9.4 and 9.4.2) for certain share option schemes and other long-term incentive plans 
for directors, in the case of companies admitted to the official list and traded on the main 
market of the LSE. Notably, the payment of performance-related remuneration to execu-
tive directors is now recommended as best practice by the Combined Code (sec. B.1.3 CC)467
Germany: In Germany, the SB decides on remuneration of and loans to directors (§ 87  AktG 
and 89468). The sec. 4.2.2 GCGC recommends that, on the proposal of the committee dealing 
with BoM contracts, the full SB determines the total compensation for the individual direc-
tors and resolves and regularly reviews the MB compensation system. In sec. 4.2.3 GCGC 
the composition, fixed as well as variable components, of the BoM’s remuneration is further 
elaborated. In general it states that the compensation structure must be oriented toward 
sustainable growth of the enterprise. The total compensation for each of the members of 
the management board is to be disclosed by name, divided into fixed and variable compen-
sation components. Disclosure may be dispensed with if the general meeting has passed a 
resolution to this effect by a three-quarters majority (§ 4.2.4). And disclosure shall be made 
in a compensation report which, as part of the Corporate Governance Report, describes 
the compensation system for management board members in a generally understandable 
way (sec. 4.2.5, see also sec. 4.2.3 and sec. 4.2.4 GCCC). The normal remuneration of SB 
members is set in articles of association or by the GMS (§ 113 (1) AktG). Where exception-
ally an additional consultancy contract is concluded with an SB member, its effectiveness, 
including the remuneration components, is dependent on assent by the whole SB (§ 114 (1) 
(2) AktG).469
In the Netherlands the remuneration policy of the company will be adopted by the GMS (art. 
2:135 sub 1 NCC470). The detail to which this remuneration policy will be determined by the 
GMS is not clear.
464 These amendments were made after the 2002 Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations (SI 
2002/1986).
465 Defined as having equity share capital officially listed in the UK or an EEA Member State or admitted 
to dealings on the NYSE or NASDAQ: Companies Act 1985, s. 262(1). Cf. Gower & Davies, 2008, p. 385, 
the purpose of this broad definition is to remove any incentive for British companies to escape the new 
requirements by listing their securities elsewhere than in London.
466 Gower/Davies, Principles of Modern Company Law, Sweet & Maxwell, London 2008, p. 385. See also 
Ellis Ferran, ‘Company Law Reform in the UK: a Progress Report’, ECGI Law Working Paper 27, 2005 
and L. Roach, ‘The Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations 2002 and The Disclosure of Executive 
Remuneration’, 25 Company Lawyer 141, 2004 who discusses the disclosure requirements concerning 
directors’ remuneration.
467 Sec. B.1.3 CC, its Main Principle on Remuneration now includes the statement: “A significant pro-
portion of executive directors’ should be structured so as to link rewards to corporate and individual 
performance”.
468 Christoph H. Seibt, in K. Schmidt/Lutter (eds.), Aktiengesetz Kommentar, 2008, § 87 and § 89, p. 984.
469 Mathias M. Siems, Convergence in Shareholder Law, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 
159-160.
470 Lower House of the Dutch Parliament, 2002-2003, 28 179, no. 31 
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During parliamentary proceedings, the Minister of Justice made the remark that the GMS 
has the authority to establish the boundaries in which an organ of the company appointed 
by the articles can determine the remuneration of the individual director.471 The remunera-
tion of the directors will be adopted by the GMS according to the remuneration policy of the 
company, unless another organ is authorised by the articles (art. 2:135 sub 3 NCC). The 
SB is the most eligible organ, because it will exercise constant supervision of the BoM. In 
case of share-based remuneration, also when another organ determines the remuneration 
of the directors, the GMS has to approve a proposal (art. 2:135 sub 4 NCC). If a company 
has a remuneration committee, Best Practise III.5.9 DCGC states that this committee will 
present a proposal to the SB concerning the remuneration policy. Chapter 11.2 of the DCGC 
provides the principles and detailed best practice on directors’ remuneration. According to 
principle and Best Practice II.10 DCGC, the SB, on proposal of the remuneration commit-
tee, will determine the remuneration of the individual members of the management board 
within the scope of the remuneration policy adopted by the general meeting (art. 2:135 sub 1 
NCC). The remuneration report of the SB will be posted on the website of the company; this 
report shall explain how the chosen remuneration policy contributes to the achievement of 
the long-term objectives of the company and its affiliated enterprise in keeping with the risk 
profile (Best Practise II.2.12 DCGC472). The GMS can adopt the remuneration of the SB mem-
bers (art. 2:145 NCC and Best Practise III.7 DCGC). To safeguard the independent discharge 
of their duties Best Practise III. 7 DCGC  determines that the remuneration of the individual 
SB members will not be dependent on the results of the company and a supervisory board 
member may not be granted any shares and/or rights to shares by way of remuneration 
(Best Practise III.7.1 DCGC)473. (For more detail, see the annexes.)
If we compare the authority to set the remuneration of the board/SB, the US board is most 
supreme in setting the conditions of its own remuneration. The UK board also has much 
leeway in setting its remuneration, only UK CA 2006 requires an advisory shareholder vote 
on the remuneration report and the LSE LR require an advisory shareholder vote in case 
of share-based remuneration. The Netherlands GMS has the most influence on the remu-
neration of the BoM/SB as it adopts the remuneration policy of the corporation. However, 
the Netherlands SB in practice sets the individual remuneration of the board; this equates 
to the German system where the SB determines the remuneration of the BoM; nevertheless 
the German GMS has no power to influence the remuneration of the BoM.
471 Upper House of the Dutch Parliament 2003-2004, 28  179, D, p. 7, see also Lower House of the Dutch 
Parliament 2002-2003, 28 179, no. 51, p 2
472 The remuneration report of the supervisory board shall contain an account of the manner in which 
the remuneration policy has been implemented in the past financial year, as well as an overview of 
the remuneration policy planned by the supervisory board for the next financial year and subsequent 
years. The report shall explain how the chosen remuneration policy contributes to the achievement of 
the long-term objectives of the company and its affiliated enterprise in keeping with the risk profile. 
The report shall be posted on the company’s website.
473 See also Best Practise III.7.2 DCGC. Any shares held by a supervisory board member in the company 
on whose board he sits are long-term investments and Best Practise DGCG III.7.3 The company may 
not grant its supervisory board members any personal loans, guarantees or the like unless in the 
normal course of business and after approval of the supervisory board. No remission of loans may be 
granted.
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3.3.5	 Adoption	annual	accounts	and	distribution	of	dividends	from	profit
As already discussed in chapter 2, securities disclosure is to be distinguished from corpo-
rate law ‘accounting’. US securities law focuses completely on initial and continuous disclo-
sure under public oversight and private enforcement (by means of securities fraud actions). 
EU securities law introduced a similar system (Transparency Directive, Market Abuse and 
IAS Regulation), but retained its links to corporate law ‘accounting’ to ‘members’ (4th/7th 
Directives), however, without EU provisions on corporate action (adoption by GMS in art. 
48(1) of the withdrawn 5th Directive474). This results in some remarkable differences in MS’ 
law on adoption, disclosure and restatement of annual accounts.
US: In the US, no accounting to the GMS as an organ of the firm is required, since the annual 
report serves as a standalone (securities law) disclosure document.
UK: In the UK, the accounts of a PLC are adopted – as in the US – by the board and signed by a 
director of the company.475 These will be ‘laid before’ but not formally adopted by the AGM.476
Germany: §§ 170 and 171 AktG require the management of an AG to submit the accounts and 
report to the SB to be ‘prüfed’ (reviewed); the SB shall make a report to the AGM (extended 
with governance items).477 § 172 AktG allows adoption by both the management and SB but 
the adoption of the accounts that are already ‘approved’ accounts may be left to the AGM 
(§ 173 AktG).478 According to sec. 2.2.1 GCGC, the board submits the annual accounts to the 
GMS.479
Netherlands: Netherlands law sticks to the established ‘accounting’ tradition by requiring 
that all members of both BoM and SB shall sign the accounts and submit these – also  issuers 
– for adoption to the AGM (art. 2:101 (2) (3) NCC480), not the MR which evidently will not be 
adopted by the GMS. Publication through depositing the annual financial report with the 
commercial register (1st Directive!) shall take place after adoption.481
474 5th Directive, Art. 48 (1) 5th Dir. the annual accounts shall be adopted by the general meeting, (2) how-
ever the laws of the Member States may, however provide that annual accounts shall be adopted not 
by the GMS but by the management organ and the supervisory organ, unless those two organs decides 
otherwise or fail to agree. See also 4th/7th Directive and IAS regulation do not provide for an adoption 
of the annual accounts by the GMS. See however arts. 50b/50c 4th Dir. and 36a/36b Dir7 on collective 
duties of the administrative, management or supervisory body for the accounts and report (accordance to 
the dir. and for issuers according to IFRS).
475 Sec. 414 UK CA (2006), A company’s annual accounts must be approved by the board of directors and 
signed on behalf of the board by a director of the company.
476 Sec. 437 UK CA (2006).
477 §§ 170 and 171 AktG, BoM of an AG to submit the accounts and report to the SB to be ‘prüfed’ (revie-
wed); the SB sends report to the AGM (extended with governance items); §§ 172 and 173 AktG, adoption 
by either BoM and SB but the adoption accounts (‘approved’) accounts may be left to the AGM.
478 The AGM resolves anyhow on profit distribution (§ 174 AktG); cf art. 50 4th Dir. and sec. 2.2.1 GCGC 
(Cromme); cf arts. 2:105 (1) and 2:362 lid 2 (NCC). Note that under Dutch law, distribution of dividends 
out of profit is held hostage upon adoption by the AGM of the accounts which show that such distribu-
tion is permissible (art. 2:105-3 NCC).
479 Sec. 2.2.1 GCGC, The Management Board submits to the General Meeting the Annual Financial State-
ments and the Consolidated Financial Statements. The General Meeting resolves on the appropriation 
of net income and the discharge of the acts of the Management Board and of the Supervisory Board. It 
elects the shareholders’ representatives to the Supervisory Board and, as a rule, the auditors.
480 Until 2004 the AGM in a ‘structure’ company did not adopt, but only approved the accounts. The Super-
visory Board did adopt the accounts.
481 See art. 2:101 sub 1 NCC, this can take 13 months in total.
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As mentioned, issuers are not exempt, although the annual financial report has to be dis-
closed promptly after these have been signed by all MB and SB members.482 This anomaly 
not only influences the power to require restatement by the AFM, but also the related but 
disconnected issue of discharge (and liability) of board members.
Note that under Dutch law, payment of dividends (out of the established profit over the fis-
cal year) is conditional upon adoption of the accounts (art. 2:105 1/3 NCC).483 The policy on 
reservation and distribution, especially the maximum, destination and form of reservation, 
distribution and dividends, shall be put on the agenda for discussion according to Best Prac-
tise IV.1.4. DCGC.
In the US (§ 170 DGCL) and the UK (not in act, see art. 69, 69 (2) MAPC recommendation from 
the board and shareholder approval) the board decides on the distribution of dividends. In 
Germany the GMS decides (§§ 119 and 174 AktG).
3.3.6	 Discharge	board	members
As already explained in chapter 2, § 7.4 adoption by the GMS of the accounts is based on 
the idea of ‘accounting’.484 The concept of discharge is embedded in classic corporate law 
and decision-making in the field of ‘accounting’. Thus, traditionally the flipside of proper 
accounting was a discharge of the board and its members for the fulfilment of their tasks 
and assignment over the fiscal year for which they had accounted. Such a discharge served 
as shield against liability vis-à-vis the corporation.485 Germany and the Netherlands are 
familiar with the concept of discharge as a general rebuttal in litigation for the personal 
liability of directors.486 These jurisdictions envisage, in different ways, the power of the AGM 
to resolve to discharge management and supervisors for the execution of their assignment 
in the reporting period.
482 Art. 2:101 (1) NCC With in five months (extension of 6 months by GMS possible) after the end of the fi-
nancial year, annual accounts drawn up by BoM and lays them down for inspection by the shareholders 
at the office of the company; (2) all directors and members SB shall sign the accounts; (3) GMS adopts 
the annual accounts. See ch. 2 for explanation on what grounds prompt disclosure of annual accounts 
to the market is required.
483 Art. 2:105 (1) NCC: Save as otherwise provided by the articles, the profits shall accrue to the sharehol-
ders. 3. Any distribution of profits shall be made after the adoption or approval of the annual accounts 
from which it appears that the same is permitted.
484 Cf. H.Beckman, Hoofdlijnen van het Jaarrekeningrecht, Deventer: Kluwer 2008, p. 3 and p. 7, when a 
seperation exists between management and owners the lack of an administration prevents a proper 
accounting towards its owners; therefore there interests will be harmed. See also the interesting fact 
that US corporate law limits the accounting obligation of closely held corporations to keeping financial 
account, which they are under no duty to disclose publicly, Reinier R. Kraakman, Paul Davies, Henry 
Hansmann, Gerard Hertig, Klaus J. Hopt, Hideki Kanda & Edward B. Rock, The Anatomy of Corporate 
Law, A Comparative and Functional Approach, New York: Oxford University Press 2004, p. 79. 
485 Cf. Raaijmakers, Ondernemingsrecht, Pitlo/Raaijmakers, Deventer: Kluwer 2006, p. 423.Cf. however 
Mathias M. Siems, Convergence in Shareholder Law, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008, 
p. 155, stating that the possibility of a regular discharge is not a waiver of claims. Waiver of claims is 
instead often bound up with special requirements (e.g. §§ 93 (4, s.3) 116 AktG) and in any case cannot 
as a rule be presumed.
486 Discharge is acceptance by the assignor (or his representative) of the accounting by the assignee(s), 
i.e. in a corporation: discharge of management (board) by the corporation (represented by another 
body corporate: AGM, SB or NEDs) and thereby releasing them in principle from liability, albeit with 
certain limitations as set out below. This resembles the position of a trustee vis-à-vis the beneficia-
ries.
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US: Discharge of directors is unknown in the US, since the issuer as such is obliged to dis-
close financial statements and reports, which includes the annual report to sharehold-
ers. These are not ‘accounting’ documents to the GMS and the GMS is not involved in their 
adoption and, hence, neither in any related ‘discharge’. On the other hand, for example the 
 Business Judgement Rule (BJR, see § 8.30 MBCA) serves as a general defence in which 
directors are sued for directors’ liability, also in a derivative suit. The BJR is of course 
not available in a securities fraud action (§ 10b SEA’34 and Rule 10b-5) since that action is 
initiated against the issuer as such. Compare also the possibility of indemnification, Dela-
ware (§ 145 (a), (b), (c) DGCL, see also § 8.50 MBCA) prescribes mandatory indemnification 
rights for directors and officers. The statute authorises corporations to commit to reim-
burse directors for reasonable expenses for losses of any sort arising from any actual or 
threatened judicial proceedings or investigation.
UK: The UK CA 2006 does not provide for discharge of directors. Provisions that purport 
to exempt directors from or indemnify against any liability towards the company in case of 
negligence, default, breach of duty of trust are void (sec. 232 (1),(2) UK CA 2006). However, 
sec. 233 UK CA 2006 allows insurance against any such liability as mentioned above.
Germany: German law teaches that according to § 120 AktG, the AGM each year decides on 
the discharge (Entlastung) of managers and supervisory board members (deciding on the 
destination of profits implies discharge (‘Enlastung’) of BM and SB members (§ 120 AktG)),487 
which decision ‘billigt der Verwaltung der Gesellschaft’, but does not result in a waiver for 
a claim for compensation (‘enthält kein Verzicht auf Ersatzansprüche’). Such claims can be 
litigated under the general provision on directors’ liability (§§ 93 and 116 AktG), also as a 
derivative suit (§§ 147-149 AktG). The German legislator apparently observed the discon-
nection between the concept of discharge and the new securities law and did indeed intro-
duce a new business judgement rule in § 116 AktG: ‘Eine Pflichtverletzung liegt nicht vor, wenn 
das Vorstandsmitglied bei einer internehmerischen Entscheidung vernünftigerweise annehmen 
dürfte, auf der Grundlage angemessener Information zum Wohle der Gesellschaft zu handelen.’
Netherlands: In 2004, art. 2:101 (3) NCC explicitly disconnected adoption (by the AGM) of 
the accounts from such discharge.488 Hence, discharge requires separate GMS resolutions, 
therefore Best Practise DGCG IV.1.6 makes a further split between management and the 
supervisory board. So, the accounts may be adopted (the report is not) and discharge of 
managers and/or SB members withheld. Consequently, its nature seems to change direc-
tion according to a ‘poll’ of present and future strategy and policies, thus extending the 
powers of shareholders in meeting and diminishing the protection of board members. If so 
deprived from discharge, no alternative statutory business judgment rule protects man-
agement and SB in a later suit for liability which may also follow an investigation proce-
dure. In this case mismanagement of the company may be established on non-compliance 
with best practices of the CGC. These threats and the reputational damage involved may 
increase risk-aversive conduct. This departs from the other examined systems; in the US 
system where the director’s right to statutory indemnification and protection of the BJR in 
a derivative suit shields him from liability; the UK where the court has to allow a derivative 
487 Die billigt die Verwaltung der Gesellschaft, aber enthält kein verzicht auf ersatzansprüche.
488 Cf. The Forty Recommendations of the Peters Commission.
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suit; and Germany where a new BJR has been introduced. The function of discharge and the 
unique Dutch procedure with the Amsterdam Court of Business will be discussed further 
in chapter 4.
3.3.7	 Appointment	and	assignment	external	auditor
In the US, SOx strengthened the position of the auditor and the audit committee is now man-
datory. Public oversight on qualification, quality and ethical standards of registered audi-
tors was introduced (Title I, SOx), auditor independence improved (Title II, SOx), audit and 
certification procedures in connection with disclosure documents sharpened (Titles III/IV) 
and analyst conflicts of interest subjected to greater scrutiny (Title V).489 Auditor’s independ-
ence from management was amplified as an independent ‘public watchdog’,490 to enhance 
their role as gate-keeping independent experts.491 In the EU this role was amplified by the 
revised 8th Directive.492 On both sides of the Atlantic, the statutory audit is regarded as a 
fundamental prerequisite for the proper functioning of the securities and capital markets.493
US: in the US, the audit committee of the board is responsible for the appointment, compen-
sation and oversight of the work of the auditor.494
EU: the EU in art. 51 4th Dir. requires that the annual accounts be audited by one or more 
persons approved by MS to carry out statutory audits on the basis of the 8th Directive; how-
ever a mandatory audit committee is not required. The appointment and assignment of the 
auditor is not regulated on EU level. Art. 55 (1) 5th Dir. determined that the auditor shall be 
appointed by the GMS. The 8th Directive (84/253/ECC of 10 April 1984) lays down the condi-
tions for the approval of persons responsible for carrying out the statutory audit and aims at 
high-level harmonisation of statutory audit requirements (see chapter 2 for further analysis 
of the 8th Directive).
UK: Secs. 489 (4) and 491 (1) (b) UK CA 2006, states that the GMS has the power to appoint the 
auditor. There are only exceptional circumstances in which the directors may appoint the 
auditors, for example sec 489 (3) UK CA 2006 to fill a casual vacancy, after a period in which 
the company has not been required to have an audit, or before its first accounts meeting. 
489 § 501 SOx-Act. Moreover: § 1107, retaliation against informants, § 1102, tampering, § 1001 Corporate 
Tax Return, etc.
490 Werner F. Ebke, ‘Corporate Governance and Auditor Independence: The Battle of the Private Versus 
the Public Interest’, in: G. Ferrarini, K. J. Hopt, J. Winter and E. Wymeersch (eds.), Reforming Company 
and Takeover Law in Europe, New York: Oxford University Press 2004, p. 182.
491 Art. 22 revised 8th Directive (2006).
492 Introducing inter alia public oversight – comparable to the US PCOAB – on approval and withdrawal 
of auditors and firms, educational standards and qualifications, registration, professional ethics and 
secrecy, auditing standards and reporting, quality assurance, investigations and proper sanctions on 
non observance of the standards, the introduction of public oversight and international cooperation. 
Consequently the audit committee plays a crucial role in the process of drafting, accounting and audi-
ting the accounts and the report.
493 Werner F. Ebke, ‘Corporate Governance and Auditor Independence: The Battle of the Private Versus 
the Public Interest’, in: G. Ferrarini, K. J. Hopt, J. Winter and E. Wymeersch (eds.), Reforming Company 
and Takeover Law in Europe, New York: Oxford University Press 2004, p. 514.
494 § 301 SOx adds § 10A (m) to the SEA’34 and expressly directs: the audit committee of each issuer, in its 
capacity as a committee of each issuer, in its capacity as a committee of the board of directors, shall 
be directly responsible for the appointment, compensation, and oversight of the work of any registered 
public accounting firm; cf. also NYSE/NASDAQ rules.
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Notably, if a public company fails to appoint an auditor or auditors in accordance with sec. 
489, the Secretary of State may appoint one or more persons to fill the vacancy.495
Germany: in Germany, the GMS appoints the accountant (§ 119 AktG and § 318 HGB, see also 
sec. 7.2 GCGC).
Netherlands: In the Netherlands, the GMS appoints the external auditor, unless other ways 
are provided (art. 2:393 (2) NCC and Best Practise V.2 DCGC). However the SB shall nomi-
nate a candidate for this appointment, while both the audit committee and the BoM advise 
the SB (Best Practise V.2 DCGC).496 According to Best Practise V.2.1 DCGC the external audi-
tor may be questioned by the general meeting in relation to his report on the fairness of 
the financial statements. The external auditor shall attend for this purpose and be entitled 
to address this meeting. This entails a somewhat confusing concept now the BoM and (the 
audit committee of) the SB remain responsible for drawing up, structuring and the content 
of the annual accounts/report. This rule tends to make the external auditor an ‘organ’ of the 
enterprise.497
Thus in the examined EU countries, the GMS in general appoints the external auditor. In 
the US, the audit committee as a committee of the board takes up this responsibility. This 
seems to fit in the US system where the issuer is ultimately responsible for drawing up the 
annual accounts and report and to disclose these documents to the market and investors.
3.3.8	 Fundamental	changes	of	the	issuers’	charter	or	nature
If the company’s fundamentals are to be changed, the GMS must usually give its consent. 
Corporate law reserves a handful of rules for this kind of decision. No jurisdiction, for 
example, authorises the board of directors to unilaterally amend the company’s charter 
in a material way.498 Corporate law limits board authority to make certain important trans-
actions and decisions as altering the articles of incorporation/bylaws or total sale of assets. 
However the examined jurisdictions differ in the thresholds for effectuating certain signifi-
cant corporate actions.499 These differences for allowing fundamental changes, inter alia, 
seemingly reflect the different level of supremacy of the board.500
495 Gower and Davies, 2008, p. 775, however the proposal to appoint the auditors, to reappoint them or 
to appoint others in their place comes normally from the board and the meeting, almost invariably, 
will agree with the board’s proposal. This is an example of a situation where the shareholders’ co-
ordination problems make it difficult, though not impossible, for them to generate a proposal of their 
own. PvdS, This ‘problem’ is of course exacerbated when the board has the initiative to put an item on 
the agenda of the annual meeting.
496 Best Practise V.2 DCGC, The remuneration of the external auditor, and instructions to the external 
auditor to provide non audit services, shall be approved by the supervisory board on the recommen-
dation of the audit committee and after consultation with the management board.
497 Raaijmakers, Ondernemingsrecht, Pitlo/Raaijmakers, Deventer: Kluwer 2006, p. 554.
498 Reinier R. Kraakman, Paul Davies, Henry Hansmann, Gerard Hertig, Klaus J. Hopt, Hideki Kanda & 
Edward B. Rock, The Anatomy of Corporate Law, A Comparative and Functional Approach, New York: Ox-
ford University Press 2004, p. 131.
499 Cf. Reinier R. Kraakman, Paul Davies, Henry Hansmann, Gerard Hertig, Klaus J. Hopt, Hideki Kanda 
& Edward B. Rock, The Anatomy of Corporate Law, A Comparative and Functional Approach, New York: 
Oxford University Press 2004, p. 132, there is, however, an important complication. Because jurisdic-
tions weigh the interests of shareholders, minority shareholders, and stakeholders differently, they 
inevitably diverge to some extent in how they select and regulate ‘significant’ corporate decisions. 
500 Cf. Reinier R. Kraakman, Paul Davies, Henry Hansmann, Gerard Hertig, Klaus J. Hopt, Hideki Kanda 
& Edward B. Rock, The Anatomy of Corporate Law, A Comparative and Functional Approach, New York: 
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3.3.8.1 Substantial change of corporate governance structure: amendments to the articles of 
association/bylaws/corporate governance codes
In comparing the authority of the GMS to alter the charter, a distinction has first to be made 
between the memorandum/articles of incorporation and the articles/bylaws. In the US, the 
articles of incorporation set out the corporation’s essential rules, the basic terms under 
which it will operate.501 The UK memorandum (articles of incorporation) only requires enter-
ing the names of the founders and first shareholders in the document (sec. 8 UK CA 2006). 
The US and UK (secs.18 and 21 UK CA 2006) articles (bylaws502) regulate the internal organi-
sation of the company. In the UK, the principle is that the articles may regulate any subject 
not regulated in any other source of UK company law.503 The UK model articles for public 
companies limited by shares as promulgated by the Secretary of State provide a default sys-
tem; these model articles will apply, unless different or amended articles are chosen.504In 
the UK, substantive matters relating to the central operation of the company are largely left 
to regulation by the articles. Thus, matters of internal organisation, such as the division of 
powers between shareholders and the board, are mainly regulated by these articles. How-
ever, the UK CC also has an influence on the above-mentioned autonomy of the company.505 
In Germany and the Netherlands, such a distinction between the articles of incorporation 
and bylaws is not made, in both systems, and especially in Germany, the internal organi-
sation mainly follows the statutory rules on the division of powers between shareholders 
and the board as inserted into the articles of incorporation. § 23 (5) AktG provides that the 
company charter may deviate from the provisions of the law only where expressly provided 
for in the law, and such express grants are not generously provided.506
Oxford University Press 2004, p. 131, although the efficiencies of the corporate form require central-
izing management power, shareholders need not (and generally do not) delegate all authority to act 
for the corporation to the board of directors. Even a board-centered jurisdiction such as Delware must 
grapple with the problem of optimal delegation, that is, of just how much discretion to delegate to the 
board.
501 Once the articles are filed with the appropriate authority (US Secretary of State’s office, UK Registrar) 
the company comes into existence.
502 The US bylaws are decided upon the first organisational meeting of the board and provide mainly 
the internal roadmap for the corporation. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporate law and Economics (2nd 
edition), Foundation Press 2009, p. 15, the bylaws typically deal with such matters as number and 
qualification of directors, board vacancies, board committees, quorum and notice requirement for 
shareholders and board meetings, any special voting procedures, any limits on the transferability of 
shares, and titles and duties of the corporation’s officers.
503 Gower and Davies, Principles of Modern Company Law, Sweet & Maxwell, London: 2008, p. 62.
504 Former model articles are: Table A of 1985 or earlier of 1948. Now applying model articles are for pu-
blic companies Schedule 3 to the draft Regulations. Gower and Davies, Principles of Modern Company 
Law, Sweet & Maxwell, London: 2008, p. 67, the company’s articles become a public document at the 
moment of formation, either because the relevant model articles, themselves a public document, will 
apply or because the company supplies to the registrar for public registration its own articles which 
amend or even fully replace the statutory model.
505 Gower and Davies, Principles of Modern Company Law, Sweet & Maxwell, London: 2008, p. 62.
506 See D. Donald, ‘Approaching Comparative Company Law’, Institute for Law and Finance (ILF) Working 
paper series no. 77, 12 February 2008, p. 46, the AktG is also quite inflexible, and leaves little room 
for individualized company structures. § 23 (5) AktG provides that the company charter may deviate 
from the provisions of the law only where expressly provided for in the law, and such express grants 
are not generously provided. As Prof. Karsten Schmidt notes, pursuant to German corporate law, 
‘the constitution-like, prescribed structure of the stock corporation may be altered only slightly by 
the articles of incorporation, given that, contrary to limited liability companies and partnerships, the 
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In Germany, the GGCG also mainly sticks to this statutory division of powers as provided 
by the AktG. The DCGC imposes some rules beyond statutory law and, combined with its 
enforcement, has seemingly eroded the supremacy of the Netherlands public corporation 
(listed). Chapter 4 will elaborate on this presumption.
The US system provides a default system of company law in which shareholders, accord-
ing to their own preferences, can adopt the rules as provided by the articles and bylaws.507 
However, the possibility to alter the constitution, after the initial articles of incorporation 
are filed with the Secretary of State’s office and the bylaws are adopted by the incorpora-
tor or the initial director’s at the corporation’s organisational meeting of the corporation,508 
is restricted in two respects, 1) only on initiative of the board can the articles be changed 
(§ 242 (b) (1) DGCL), if the board makes a proposal amendments to the articles must be 
approved by a majority of shares eligible to vote (§ 242 (b) (1) DGCL); § 10.03 (e) MBCA only 
requires a majority vote: an amendment is approved if more shares are voted affirmatively 
than voted negatively,509 2) the bylaws can be amended not only by the shareholders but also 
by the board (§ 10.20 MBCA).510 To forestall cycling amendments and counter-amendments 
§ 10.20 (b) (2) MBCA authorises the board to adopt, amend and repeal bylaws unless “the 
shareholders in amending, repealing, or adopting a bylaw expressly provide that the board 
of directors may not amend, repeal, or reinstate that bylaw”. § 109 (a) DGCL provides that 
only shareholders have the power to amend bylaws, unless the articles of incorporation 
expressly confer that power on the board of directors. Delaware incorporated articles of 
incorporation often determine that the board has the aforementioned authority.511 § 109 (a) 
DGCL ends by stating that this shall not divest the stockholders or members of this power, 
nor limit their power to adopt, amend or repeal bylaws. These broad powers for sharehold-
ers to alter the bylaws are limited by § 109 (b) DGCL: the bylaws may contain any provision, 
not inconsistent with law or with the certificate of incorporation, relating to the business 
of the corporation, the conduct of its affairs, and its rights or powers or the rights or pow-
ers of its stockholders, directors, officers or employees (cf. § 206 (b) MBCA). § 109 DGCL 
results in an internal tension in the Delaware corporate law statute between the clear prin-
ciple of board authority and the power of the shareholders to alter the bylaws; attempts 
by stockholders to adopt bylaws limiting or influencing director authority inevitably offend 
the notion of management by the board of directors.512 In CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pen-
stock corporation is governed by the principle that the form of constitutional documents is strictly 
prescribed, see also Karsten Schmidt, Gesellschaftsrecht, Heymans 2002, p. 771.
507 Gower and Davies, Principles of Modern Company Law, Sweet & Maxwell, London: 2008, p. 63. In 
substance related to the division of powers, it is said the US system results in similar system as in 
the UK. However a particular difference is that in the UK the board derives its powers delegated by 
the shareholders through the articles of incorporation; in the US and also in Germany this power is 
derived from the statute. In control situations in the UK shareholders seem withdraw their delegated 
powers.
508 § 109 (a) DGCL, and after a corporation has received any payment for any of its stock.
509 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporate law and Economics (2nd edition), Foundation Press 2009, p. 14.
510 Cf. Mathias M. Siems, Convergence in Shareholder Law, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008, 
p. 162.
511  1-9 Delaware Corporation Law and Practice § 9.02
512 See Delaware Chancery Court in General DataComm Industries, Inc. v. State of Winconsin Investment 
Board, 731 A 2d 818, 821 n. 2 (Del. Ch. 1999).
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sion Plan513 the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the supremacy of the board: only the 
board of directors is empowered to manage the corporation’s business and affairs, not the 
corporation’s shareholders. The bylaws may not “mandate how the board should decide 
specific substantive decisions”, but may “define the process and procedures by which those 
decisions are made”. However, the precise relationship (substance/procedure) between 
§§  109 and 141 DGCL remains subject to future case-by-case analysis.514 Stephen Bain-
bridge argues that bylaws should be treated the same way as articles of incorporation or, 
for that matter, virtually every other corporate action. He states: “The shareholder power 
to initiate bylaw amendments without prior board action is unique. It is also an historical 
anachronism states unthinkingly codified from old common law principles lacking either 
rhyme or reason. There simply is no good reason to treat bylaws differently than articles 
of incorporation”.515 Bebchuk argues to the contrary and states that shareholders should be 
allowed to initiate not only bylaw provisions but also charter provisions (rules-of-the-game 
decisions). However, under Delaware law, shareholders’ initiative to alter the corporation’s 
constitution is still inconceivable, even if their authority to alter the bylaws is taken into 
account.
EU: At EU level, no new proposals have been published with respect to changes of the inter-
nal organisation as provided for in the memorandum of incorporation or articles of incorpo-
ration since the draft 5th Directive was withdrawn (2004). Art. 39 (1) draft 5th Dir. required a 
majority of no less than two thirds of votes carried by shares represented at the meeting or 
of the capital subscribed which is represented at the meeting for passing resolutions alter-
ing the statutes.516 Concerning corporate governance, an EU CGC did not emerge. However, 
companies incorporated within the European Economic Area (EEA) and whose securities 
are traded on a regulated market have to make full disclosure about compliance (“com-
ply or explain” rule) with their national code as a result of art. 46A of the 4th EU Directive 
on accounts.517 When a company deviates from the principles and rules of the applicable 
national code, it has to explain its reasons for doing so. Apart from market pressure for 
513 453 A 2d 227 (Del. 2008). See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporate law and Economics (2nd edition), Foun-
dation Press 2009, p. 18.
514 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporate law and Economics (2nd edition), Foundation Press 2009, p. 18, 
as for the conflict between §§ 109 and 141, the court stated that: “Because the board’s managerial 
authority under § 141 (a) is a cardinal precept of the DGCL, we do not construe § 109 as an ‘excep-
tion…otherwise specified in the DGCL to § 141 (a). Rather, the shareholders’ statutory power to adopt, 
amend or repeal bylaws under § 109 cannot be ‘inconsistent with the law’, including § 141 (a).” Cf. also 
Cf. Mathias M. Siems, Convergence in Shareholder Law, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008, 
p. 162, it is disputed whether and to what extend the articles of incorporation can shape or restrict this 
dualism, and whether the board can reverse a decision of the general meeting. The question of the 
place of the by-laws is of topical interest particularly in takeovers. Shareholders seek to use by-laws 
to limit management’s room for manoeuvre. How far this is permissible has not yet been conclusively 
clarified. See however Delaware Chancery Court in General DataComm Industries, Inc. v. State of Win-
consin Investment Board, 731 A 2d 818, 821 n. 2 (Del. Ch. 1999).
515 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporate law and Economics (2nd edition), Foundation Press 2009, p. 18.
516 See also art. 39 (2) 5th Dir., where the laws of the MS provide that the GMS may validly transact busi-
ness only if at least one half of the capital subscribed is represented, resolutions for alteration of the 
statutes shall require a majority not less than that required under art. 36 (1), Resolutions of the GMS 
shall be passed by absolute majority of votes cast by all the shareholders present or represented, 
unless a greater majority or other requirements be prescribed.
517 Inserted in that Directive by art. 1(7) of Directive 2006/46/EC.
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compliance, EU law does not provide for any formal GMS involvement/vote to be required 
for a change in its corporate governance structure.
UK: In the UK, the articles can only be altered by the GMS by a special resolution requiring 
a majority of 3/4 of the votes (secs. 21 and 283 UK CA 2006)518. The memorandum or articles 
of association may not eliminate or limit the power to change these basic documents by 
special resolution.519 The UK Listing Rules (LR) require UK-registered companies with a pri-
mary listing in the UK to disclose in their annual report the extent to which they have com-
plied with the UK CC and to give reasons for areas of non-compliance.520 The sanctions for 
non-compliance with the LR are severe, but it would be perfectly in compliance with the LR 
for the company to report that it has not complied with the CC in any respect on the condition 
it also gives an explanation for this. Apart from market pressure for compliance, no formal 
GMS involvement/vote is required for a change in its corporate governancestructure.
Germany: In Germany, the GMS is allowed by a majority vote of 75% or higher, as set by the 
articles (§ 179 (2) AktG) to amend the articles of incorporation (§§ 119 (1) nr. 5 and 179 (1) 
AktG). In general, delegating this power to another organ of the company is not allowed. 
However, in case of a BoM decision to reduce the capital by repurchasing their own shares 
or to raise new capital (§ 202 AktG) the BoM can be authorised to alter the articles of incor-
poration as a consequence of the aforementioned decisions (§ 179 (1) AktG).521 § 161 AktG 
requires listed companies to state publicly whether and to what extent they comply with 
the code. Compare also sec. 3.10 GCGC, which states that the MB and SB shall report each 
year on the enterprise’s corporate governance in the annual report (corporate governance 
report). This includes the explanation of possible deviations from the recommendations of 
this Code. Apart from market pressure for compliance, no formal GMS involvement/vote is 
required for a change in its corporate governance structure.
Netherlands: According to art. 2: 121 (1) NCC, a GMS has the authority to alter the articles 
of incorporation.522 As far as the authority to alter the articles of incorporation has been 
excluded, alteration of these articles is still possible with a unanimous vote with a quorum 
of the outstanding capital. When an article stipulates that one or more articles only can be 
518 However the principle that constitution of the company can be altered by a three-quarters majority of 
the members can be in fact set aside by using entrenchment provisions; Sec. 22 UK CA 2006 enables 
the shareholders to make provisions capable of amendment or repeal only if certain conditions or 
procedures are met. Therefore, amendment or repeal could be made conditional the consent of a par-
ticular member or a higher percentage of the members than a special resolution requires. Entrenched 
status can be conferred upon provisions in the articles either upon the formation of the company. This 
mechanism of entrenchment almost functions the same as e.g. the use of priority rights.
519 See Malleson v. Nat’l Ins. & Guar. Corp., [1894] 1 Ch. 200 (1893).
520 LR 9.8.6 (5), cf. also LR 9.8.7., a company not incorporated in the UK but with a primary listing in the UK 
must explain whether it complies with the corporate governance code of its country of incorporation 
and how that code differs from the CC, but is not required to explain areas of non-compliance. Cf. 
Gower and Davies, 2008, p. 404.
521 Cf. A.G.H. Klaassen, Bevoegdheden van de algemene vergadering van aandeelhouders, Historische, con-
cernrechtelijke en rechtsvergelijkende beschouwingen, in het bijzonder over structuurwijzigingen, Devent-
er: Kluwer 2007, p. 81.
522 See amongst others J.J.M. Maeijer, Asser 2-III Vertegenwoordiging en Rechtspersoon, De Naamloze en 
de Besloten Vennootschap, Deventer: Tjeenk Willink 2000, nr. 540, E.J.J. van der Heijden and W.C.L. van 
der Grinten, Handboek voor de Naamloze en de Besloten vennootschap (11th edn.), W.E.J. Tjeenk Willink, 
1989, No. 342, P. Schilfgaarde en J. Winter, Van de BV en de NV, Kluwer: Deventer 2009, No. 124.
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altered under certain conditions, then this article itself can only be altered under the same 
conditions (art. 2:121 (2) NCC) or when an article stipulates that one or more articles cannot 
be changed, this article itself can only be altered with a unanimous vote with a quorum of 
the outstanding capital. Art. 2:391 sub 5 NCC provides a legal ground for the application, 
on a comply or explain basis, of the DCGC. Best Practise I.2 DCGC further requires every 
substantial change in the governance structure of the corporation and adherence to the 
DCGC to be submitted for discussion to the GMS under a separate agenda item. This provi-
sion in a certain way tends to give these corporate governance principles and best practices 
the gloss of having the same status as the company’s articles of incorporation (bylaws). As 
will be discussed in chapter 4 this has been made possible by extensive explanation of the 
DCGC by the Enterpise Chamber under the umbrella of art. 2:8 NCC (reasonableness and 
fairness).523
Thus in the UK, Germany and the Netherlands, the GMS has the authority to amend the 
articles of incorporation. Compared to the other systems, the UK system of default model 
articles offers shareholders the most discretion in altering the articles of incorporation to 
suit their own preferences. Notably, the UK CA 2006 allows for entrenched articles, which 
allows for founders of the company to be provided with a priority share, for example. Also 
the German and Dutch systems allow for (some) articles not to be changed, however the 
GMS, under higher thresholds, always reserves the authority to alter these articles. Espe-
cially in Germany shareholders have less room for altering the articles according to their 
own preferences because the AktG entails a mandatory system for the companies’ consti-
tution and the division of powers between the board and the GMS. The GCGC also mainly 
follows this statutory model.524 The NCC provides also a mandatory system (see art. 2:25 
NCC525) for the company’s constitution, but with more room for deviation in the articles, 
especially when a company does not have to adhere to the “structuurregime” for ‘large’ 
companies. However, an important difference with the other systems is the application of 
the DCGC. This corporate governance code in some respects goes further than statutory 
law. As with most other European corporate governance codes, it has to be applied on a 
comply or explain basis.526 However, as will be elaborated further in chapter 4, combined 
with the Dutch enforcement mechanism of the Amsterdam Enterprise Chamber (“enquete-
recht”), the principles and best practise of the DCGC have been held by the court to be to 
‘enforceable’ a certain extent. Compared to the US and UK systems, these DCGC principles 
and best practices therefore tend to be regarded as “mandatory” model articles for a public 
corporation/mandatory bylaws. If and how this Dutch system of application and enforce-
ment of the DCGC contributed to an erosion of the supremacy of the board of a Netherlands 
public corporation will be explained in chapeter 4. Another important difference with the 
US is, however, that the US board has a privileged position with respect to the initiative for 
altering the corporation’s constitution; only the co-authority with respect to altering the 
523 That provision in a certain way, i.e. in as far as adherence can be pressed for by the GMS, tends to-
wards a sort of bylaws since the power whether or not to adhere rests with the MB and SB. 
524 Cf. H.H. Voogsgeerd, Markt- of rechtsarrangement?, Deventer: Kluwer 2006, p. 11.
525 Art. 2:25 NCC, the articles of Book 2 (“legal entities”) provide mandatory law, unless the articles itself 
leave room for deviation.
526 Cf. Eddy Wymeersch, ‘Enforcement of Corporate Governance Codes’, ECGI-Law Working Paper No. 46, 
2005.
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bylaws gives the shareholders a limited power to influence the corporation’s constitution. 
However this shareholder power only confers to procedural rules how substantive board 
decisions are (should be) made.
3.3.8.2 Important changes of identity or character of the corporation and major transactions
In most countries for the transfer of the whole or substantial company assets the GMS must 
consent.527 There are, however, considerable differences between the examined jurisdic-
tions.
In the US, the BoD has essentially unconstrained authority to sell, lease, mortgage or other-
wise dispose of corporate assets, except for the disposal of all or substantially all corporate 
assets. These kind of transactions shall be approved by the shareholders,528 § 271 (a) DGCL: 
shareholders are entitled to vote on ‘sales, leases or exchanges of all or substantially all of 
the corporation’s property and assets’. The definition of ‘substantially all’ has been devel-
oped in case law, see for example Katz v. Bregman, 431 A2d 1274 (Del Ch. 1981);529 in general 
disposal of 75% of the total assets requires consent of the shareholders.530 Compare also 
§ 12.02 MBCA,531 which requires approval of the shareholders if the disposition would leave 
the corporation without significant ongoing business activity (< 25 % of total assets). This 
527 Cf. Allen, Kraakman and Subramanian, Commentaries and Cases on the Law of Business Organization(2nd 
Edition), New York: Aspen Publishers 2007, p. 461, they suggest that, rationally, principals will reserve 
power to veto those matters that are most economically significant and in which they have some ca-
pacity to exercise informed judgment. In the corporate context, these criteria suggest that dispersed 
shareholders will wish to decide at most only very large issues (those that affect their entire invest-
ment) and will wish to decide only issues that they can be expected to decide with some competence 
(“investment-like” decisions rather than “business” decisions). However, also in this case the ques-
tion is whether shareholders have that ability and information to make this kind of decisions.
528 § 271 (a) DGCL, shareholders are entitled to vote on ‘sales, leases or exchanges of all or substantially 
all of the corporation’s property and assets.
529 Cf. also Gimbel v. Signal Companies, 316 A. 2d 599 (Del.Ch. 1974).
530 This however is not a clear line in Katz v. Bregman the court also took into consideration the nature of 
the transaction plus the fairly high percentage of the assets being sold, this satisfied the “all or sub-
stantially all” standard and shareholder therefore was required. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporate 
law, 2nd edition, 2009, p. 346, a well-known rule of thumb suggests assuming that a sale of more than 
75% of balance sheet assets by market value is a sale of substantially all corporate assets and that a 
sale of less than 25% is not. Between those yard lines, one must make an educated guess based on 
qualitative considerations of the sort identified by Gimbel and Katz. 
531 Cf. also the § 12.01 MBCA no approval of the shareholders of a corporation is required, unless the ar-
ticles of incorporation otherwise provide: 1) to sell, lease, exchange, or otherwise dispose of any or all 
of the corporation’s assets in the usual and regular course of business. The Official Comment states 
that shareholder approval is not required for a disposition of the corporation’s assets in the usual and 
regular course of business, regardless of the size of the transaction. Examples of such dispositions 
would include the sale of a building that was the corporation’s only major asset where the corporation 
was formed for the purpose of constructing and selling that building.
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approval entails a majority vote of the shareholders entitled to vote. Other transactions, 
such as large share issues and asset purchases 532 do not require shareholder approval.533
In the UK, under the LR, significant transactions which meet the test of being “Class 1” 
transactions require shareholder approval; the LR nr. 10 ‘Class 1-tranctions’, “Class 1” cri-
teria are met if the transaction in question involves assets being acquired, the profits attrib-
utable to the business being acquired, the consideration being paid under the transaction 
or the capital of a company being acquired exceeding one quarter of the company’s existing 
assets, profits or capital, as the case may be.534 As will be explained in chapter 4, the nature 
of the LR’s enforcement seemingly has a different result on the supremacy of the board.
In Germany, in the event of the transfer of all the company’s assets, § 179 (a) AktG requires 
a decision of the GMS similar to that for alteration of the articles of incorporation (§ 179 (1) 
AktG): a majority vote of 75%535. Nevertheless, in Germany, case law for de facto changes to 
the company uses § 119 (1) AktG starting point.536 In the Gelatine-case,537 not rejecting but 
confirming the famous Holzmüller case, the German Supreme Court rejected a low thresh-
old of 20-25% requiring involvement of the GMS: in order not to needlessly disrupt the bal-
anced relationship of the company’s bodies, the involvement of the GMS on the ground of 
a major impairment of the unwritten participatory rights of shareholders would come into 
question only in exceptional cases.538 The ‘threshold of seriousness’ would accordingly as a 
532 Allen, Kraakman and Subramanian, Commentaries and Cases on the Law of Business Organization (2nd 
Edition), New York: Aspen Publishers 2007, p. 462, the different treatment of the sale of substantially 
all assets of a corporation and as well a shareholder vote on a merger, compared to a purchase of as-
sets that transforms the business of a corporation, is explained by possible concerns of shareholders 
relating to shareholder future control over managers, rather than size or shareholder competence. 
The former reason is a determent of when the law requires a shareholder vote. The other exam-
ined jurisdictions seemingly draw a different line for determining for which corporate transactions 
a shareholder vote is necessary. Cf. e.g. art. 2:107a NCC which also relates to the size of a corporate 
transaction to require a shareholder vote.
533 Allen, Kraakman and Subramanian, Commentaries and Cases on the Law of Business Organization (2nd 
Edition), New York: Aspen Publishers 2007, p. 461. However the NYSE Listing Rules do require com-
panies to obtain shareholder approval if they issue 20 percent or more of their outstanding stock in a 
single transaction, NYSE Listed Co. Rule 312.03 (c).
534 LR 10, The FSA has the power to dispense from the application of this rule. Cf. Gower & Davies, 2008, 
p. 377, the thought behind the provisions seems to be that a big transaction is as much like an invest-
ment decision as a management decision and so the shareholders are to be involved in the taking of 
the decision, along with the management. This ground for insisting on shareholder involvement in a 
decision has no counterpart in the Act.
535 German case law has established that when a corporation is left without a significant (< 25 % of total 
assets) continuing business activity a GMS vote under § 179 (a) AktG is required. Compare this to 
§ 12.02 MBCA.
536 Cf. Siems, Convergence in Shareholder Law, Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 165. Cf however 
A.G.H. Klaassen, Bevoegdheden van de algemene vergadering van aandeelhouders, Historische, con-
cernrechtelijke en rechtsvergelijkende beschouwingen, in het bijzonder over structuurwijzigingen, 
Deventer: Kluwer 2007, No. 60, p. 183, the BGH states that the approval right of the GMS in case of 
transactions resulting in a change of the identity or character of the company does not follow from 
§ 119 (2) AktG it purely is a result derived from case law.
537 BGH, BGHZ 159, 30 (Gelatine).
538 Cf. BGHZ 159, 30 (44/45), ‘(..) eine im Gesetz nicht ausdrücklich vorgesehene Mitwirkung der Haupt-
versammlung bei Geschäftsführungsmaßnahmen des Vorstands nur in engen Grenzen, nämlich dann 
in Betracht kommen, wenn sie an die Kernkompetenz der Hauptversammlung, über die verfassung 
der Gesellschaft zu bestimmen, rühren und in ihren auswerkung einem zustnad nahezu entsprechen, 
der allein durch eine Satzungsänderng herbeigeführt werden kann.’ 
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rule be reached only if a sale accounted for some 80% of company assets.539 This percentage 
is derived from the Holzmüller case.540
Under Dutch law, a decision that results in an important change of the identity or character 
of the corporation has to be submitted according to art. 2:107a NCC for approval to the GMS. 
Subsequently, the article gives some specific board actions requiring the approval of the 
GMS. Art. 2:107a (1) (a) NCC541 connects with the US and UK system in the case of a sale of 
all or almost all assets. In that case approval of the GMS is required. Art. 2:107 a (1) (b) NCC 
requires a GMS vote if the board decides to enter into or to dissolve a long-term cooperation 
of the firm with another legal entity, insofar this results in major consequences for the firm. 
Art. 2:107 a (1) (c) NCC relates to the size of a transaction and uses a threshold of one third 
to determine whether a GMS is needed; once the board takes a decision resulting in taking 
or disposing off an interest in the capital of a firm with a value of at least one third of the 
amount of the assets according to the balance sheet with explanation and according to the 
most recent annual account of the firm, by the company or a subsidiary. In the ABNAMRO-
case,542 art. 2:107a NCC was tested, the Netherlands Supreme Court held that the sale of 
ABNAMRO’s subsidiary La Salle to the Bank of America did not require approval by the GMS. 
The Court held that the board has discretion to set the company’s strategy and that the sale 
of LaSalle did not meet the thresholds of art. 2:107a NCC.
Moreover, Best Practise IV.1.3 DCGC requires the board to disclose a (non-public) offer for 
a subsidiary that exceeds the limit of art. 2:107a NCC. This rule was inspired by the HBG 
case (notably the decision by the Amsterdam Business Court was reversed by the Supreme 
Court). An equivalent rule does not exist in the US, UK or Germany, although it may be com-
pared to the famous decision of the Bundesgerichtshof in the Holzmüller case (BGHZ 83, 
122). However this case was confirmed by the Gelatine case and in short, only in exceptional 
cases is a shareholder vote necessary when a company decides to execute a significant 
transaction. Thus, compared to the other systems, especially the UK and the Netherlands, 
it provides a substantially lower threshold for the GMS to approve major transactions and 
transactions causing an important change of identity or character of the corporation. In the 
US and Germany, only in exceptional cases is GMS approval of a transaction needed. Appar-
ently, the Dutch system, with the possibility to request an inquiry, has a profound influence. 
In the UK, the ultimate and severe sanction is delisting. Under the investigation procedure, 
a decision by the Chamber of Business put the LaSalle transaction on hold and thereby also 
slowed down ABNAMRO’s decision to merge with Barclays. The Netherlands right of inquiry 
will be discussed in chapter 4.
539 BGH, BGHZ 159, 30 (Gelatine), Cf. Siems, Convergence in Shareholder Law, Cambridge University Press, 
2008, p. 166. Cf. also A.G.H. Klaassen, Bevoegdheden van de algemene vergadering van aandeelhoud-
ers, Historische, concernrechtelijke en rechtsvergelijkende beschouwingen, in het bijzonder over 
structuurwijzigingen, Deventer: Kluwer 2007, No. 60, p. 183.
540 BGHZ 83, 122 (Holzmüller).
541 Before the introduction of this statutory requirement the doctrine already required approval of the 
GMS in this kind of transaction. Cf. Asser/Maeijer 2000, nr. 258.
542 Dutch Supreme Court 13 July 2007, LJN BA7970 (ABNAMRO).
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3.3.9	 Public	tender	offers
In case of a public tender offer, a possible conflict of interest may arise between the board 
(appointment in resulting entity; golden parachutes) and the shareholders (maximum pre-
mium).
In US law, neither the bidder’s nor the target’s shareholders have to approve a public 
offer. This may be different in certain specific transactions such as (legal) mergers and 
divisions.543 In a public (hostile) tender offer, the bidder may bypass the target’s board by 
directly addressing the target’s shareholders without any action by the target’s board being 
required. However, since the 1970s hostile tender offers were often resisted by defensive 
tactics developed to impede such offers. A number of US states adopted anti-takeover 
acts.544 These developments reinforced the position of the target’s board.545 Constituency 
statutes, for example, allow the board to take into account the interests of other stakehold-
ers in taking defensive measures without the consent of shareholders. That discretionary 
board power, however, is limited if its decisions are contaminated by the self-interest of the 
members, as evidenced by Delaware case law on the limitations on the business judgement 
rule for deciding when defensive measures of the board are allowed.546 This will be further 
discussed in chapter 4.
The EU Transparency Directive547 establishes, albeit optionally, a duty of neutrality in its art. 
9 and restricts (art. 11) the use of transfer and voting restrictions in takeover bids (“break-
through rule”). However, art. 12 (1) allows MS to exclude these provisions and thus retain 
the existing defensive possibilities. Thus, arts. 9-12 are optional; GMS action is not required. 
Neither does it require a GMS to discuss a definitive public offer.
In the UK, the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers provides a comprehensive framework 
of self-regulation for, inter alia, tender offers. This code now, in view of the formal imple-
mentation of the Takeover Directive, has a statutory basis: sec. 943 UK CA 2006. The City 
Code and the guidance of the Panel on Takeovers and Mergers is considered to be investor-
friendly.548 The board may not take any action that could effectively result in any bona fide 
offer being frustrated or in the shareholders being denied an opportunity to decide on its 
merits.549
543 See the annexes.
544 Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen and Allen Ferrell, ‘Does the Evidence Favour State Competition in 
Corporate Law?’, 90 California Law Review Vol. 90, 2002.
545 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporate law and Economics (2nd edition), Foundation Press 2009, p. 376.
546 See ch. 4: In case of a creeping hostile takeover the target board (US) has a gate-keeping function. 
Although taking protective measures (poison pill, sale of assets, transaction with a ‘white knight’) the 
target board cannot simply qualify as ‘interested director transactions’ (§ 144 DGCL), the target’s board 
members in that situation also simply qualify as independent, now they in case of a successful bid can 
loose their function. That is the reason the Delaware courts have adjusted the BJR if investors claim 
that the target’s board members have breached their fiduciary duties in defending the corporation 
against a hostile takeover. It moves between two extremes: a) the assumption by the BJR that they 
are disinterested/independent, and b) that that assumption has been disproved and the target board 
members have to abstain of any action that could interfere with that takeover.
547 Directive 2004/25/EC.
548 John Armour and David A. Skeel, ‘Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and Why? The Peculiar 
Divergences of US and UK Takeover Regulation’, ECGI Law Working Paper No. 73, 2006.
549 General Principle 3 and Rule 21 UK City Code. Cf. Mathias M. Siems, Convergence in Shareholder Law, 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 183. 
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German takeover law provides that, after the filing of a takeover bid, management must 
take the interests of the target company into account, Wertpapiererwerbs- und Übernah-
megesetz (§ 3(3) WpÜG). This ‘interest of the firm’ entails a stakeholder concept embracing 
the interests of shareholders and of employees.550 This approaches the function of the US 
anti-takeover statutes, as will be discussed in chapter 4. The WpÜG does not oblige the 
board to take into account a strict rule of neutrality. The BoM is not bound by the bar on 
measures to obstruct a takeover (§ 33 (1) WpÜG (s.1)), if it is so authorised by the SB or the 
GMS, or the measures taken are part of everyday conduct of business or are part of the 
search for a competing bid (§ 33 (1) (s.2), (2)) WpÜG)551. Under § 33a WpÜG, it is also possible 
for German companies to opt for a strict duty of neutrality.
In the Netherlands, the neutrality and breakthrough rules have not been implemented in 
(art. 2:359b NCC) as mandatory provisions, but as an option for issuers. Particular, recent 
decisions of the Enterprise Chamber and the Supreme Court regarding the listed public 
corporations RNA, Stork, ABNAMRO and ASMI offer some guidance in answering the ques-
tion as to which norms apply in case of hostile takeovers.552 The norms following from the 
Supreme Court decision in RNA can still be used as starting point for the target board’s 
duties in case of a hostile takeover. In short: the corporation in principle may take protective 
measures to prevent a shareholder from acquiring control of paramount importance of the 
corporation. However, measure(s) taken in the given circumstances must be, on reason-
able reflection of the interests at play, within the margins of an adequate and proportional 
reaction. This not only applies for taking these measures, but also in maintaining these 
protective devices. What in a specific case is adequate and proportional cannot be derived 
from the RNA decision.553
Dutch law also requires a meeting of shareholders to be called to discuss an offer for the 
issuer’s share as well as the reaction from the board of the offeree (art. 18 Decree on Public 
Offerings). Neither German nor UK law require such a general meeting (§ 16 WpÜG). Com-
pare Rule 24-27 City Code).554
3.3.10	 GMS-powers	re	capital	and	shares
Unlike US law, EU and MS law reflects the principle of ‘capital protection’ and hence requires 
a series of corporate actions to be submitted for approval to the GMS (including pay outs). 
At EU level the 2nd, 3rd and 6th Directives provide for such rules. These are reflected in MS 
law.
550 Cf. Mathias M. Siems, Convergence in Shareholder Law, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008, 
p. 185.
551 Mathias M. Siems, Convergence in Shareholder Law, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008, 
p. 185.
552 M.J. van Ginneken, Vijandige overnames, De rol van de vennootschapsleiding in Nederland en de Ver-
enigde Staten, Kluwer: 2010, p. 40 for an extensive analysis of the Netherlands rules in hostile take-
overs.
553 Supreme Court 18 April 2003, NJ 2003, 286, with reference Maeijer, JOR 2003/110 with reference 
Blanco Fernandez (RNA/Westfield); See also G.N.H. Kemperink, ‘Enquêterecht en overname geschil-
len’, Ondernemingsrecht 2002-8, p. 236-243; RNA en de ontwikkeling van het Nederlandse fusie- en 
overnamerecht, Stichting & Vereniging 2002-6, p. 155-162; M.J.G.C. Raaijmakers, ‘Gedragsnormen 
voor overnamegevechten’, Tijdschrift voor Stichting, Vereniging & Vennootschap 2003-6, p. 215-223.
554 A Reverse Takeover has presentes as a ‘Class-1 Transaction’ to the GMS (Listing Rule 10-6).
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The US picture is different, the primary competence lies with the board; the board will 
decide whether to issue new shares or to repurchase own shares. Nonetheless, the GMS 
will be involved when the articles of incorporation have to be amended because of the share 
issue (see § 3.3.9.1) and the NYSE Listing Rules require companies to obtain shareholder 
approval if they issue 20% or more of their outstanding stock in a single transaction, NYSE 
Listed Co. Rule 312.03 (c).
In the Netherlands, the GMS has the power to issue shares, but may delegate that power to 
the BoM/SB (art. 2:96 a NCC),555 whereas in the UK and the US (secs. 549, 551 and 569 UK CA 
2006 ff, § 6.21 MBCA and § 152 DGCL, only the board has this authority) the board has the 
power to issue shares, and has the option to delegate this power to shareholders through 
the charter.
Similarly, the GMS shall decide on buy-back, but may delegate that power (art. 2:98 NCC);556 
in the US the board is empowered to do so (§ 6.31 MBCA and § 151 DGCL). Surpassing 
pre-emptive rights in the case of a share issue require GMS approval, again with power to 
delegate that power. Compare sec. 569ff UK CA 2006, and the US, § 6.30 MBCA, DGCL (no 
pre-emptive rights unless provided for in the issuers’ charter).
The Dutch GMS approves the reduction of capital (arts. 2:99/100 NCC) (compare the US 
insolvency test in § 6.30 MBCA), amendments of articles of incorporation (art. 2:121 NCC, 
§ 21 UK CA 2006, § 242 DGCL, only on initiative of the board, see also for alteration of bylaws 
§ 242, 102 and 109b), conversion (art. 2:18/71 NCC), legal merger (arts. 2:317/330/331 NCC, 
§ 251 DGCL and majority vote by shareholders of each constituent corporation, §§ 11.03 (a) 
and 11.04 (b), shareholder approval by each constituent corporation, legal split (art. 2: 334 
NCC and § 107 MBCA and §§ 213 DGCL and 275 DGCL. After resolution of the board, major-
ity vote shareholders, § 14.02 MBCA, after recommendation board, approval shareholders, 
order to apply for bankruptcy (art. 2:136 NCC) and delegation to fix record date (art. 2:119 
NCC, see § 107 RMBCA and § 213 DGCL Changes of class rights attached to shares, § 630 
UK CA 2006.
3.3.11	 Conclusions
The previous paragraphs showed that the basic differences between the US and the EU can 
prima facie be illustrated by comparing shareholders’ rights as attributed by the US MBCA 
and DGCL with the accumulated provisions of EU corporate law directives and national pro-
visions. The MBCA and DGCL limit the (collective and individual) powers of ‘shareholders’ 
(remarkably and in contrast to the EU and MS not using the GMS as notion of a body cor-
porate) to a few major issues: appointment and dismissal of board members, mergers and 
consolidations, sales, leases or exchanges of all or substantially all of the corporation’s 
property. EU and (examined) MS corporate law provides for a far more extensive list: e.g. 
appointment, dismissal and remuneration of directors, adoption of the annual accounts and 
distribution of dividends from profit, discharge, appointment and assignment of external 
auditors, changes in capital and share issues, buy-back of shares, passing pre-emptive 
555 § 6.21 MBCA power to issue shares lies with the board, but can be delegated in the charter to the 
shareholders; § 152 DGCL, issue of shares only the authority of the board.
556 § 6.31 MBCA, power of the board § 151 DGCL.
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rights, legal merger, de-merger, dissolution, and change of substance and character of the 
firm, use of certain anti-takeover devices (grant options on preferred protective shares). 
Similarly provisions on boards, indemnification and insurance of its members, corporate 
reorganisations, exit rules (squeeze out, sell out and appraisal rights) reveal remarkable 
differences. Also in their substance shareholders’ rights differ, for example UK and Dutch 
law provide for lower threshold for requiring GMS approval in the case of fundamental 
changes to the issuer’s charter or nature. In comparison with the other systems, the posi-
tion of the GMS in the organisational model of the Dutch listed public corporation has been 
amplified by extension of statutory shareholders’ rights, but also by the DCGC that merely 
functions as quasi-bylaws and sometimes goes beyond statutory law. The Dutch system 
provides some peculiar GMS rights, such as: adoption of the annual account and separate 
discharge of the board; separately discharge of the SB is required. Thus, adoption of the 
accounts and determination of payable profits (dividends) can also take place without dis-
charge. Consequently, the nature of the discharge seems to change to a ‘poll’ on present 
and future strategy and policies, thus extending the powers of shareholders in meeting and 
diminishing protection of board members. This departs from the other examined systems: 
in the US where the directors’ right to statutory indemnification and the protection of the 
BJR in a derivative suit shields them from liability, in the UK where the court has to allow a 
derivative suit and in Germany where a new BJR. has been introduced.As will be explained 
in chapter 4, the function of the right of inquiry in combination with the strengthened posi-
tion of the GMS in the organisational design of the Dutch public corporation has a profound 
influence on the supremacy and discretion of the board.
3.4 Group and individual rights of shareholders
Public corporations typically have a dispersed ownership base. Whether and to what extent 
individual or groups of investors can enforce their collective powers ‘in meeting’, i.e. as 
a body corporate, as discussed in the preceding paragraphs, will depend not only on the 
charter’s quorum and majority requirements, but also on individual and group rights and 
powers to enforce the corporate charter and protect their rights regarding their capac-
ity of investor-shareholder. To allow a full assessment, it is therefore necessary to review 
these statutory individual and group rights and powers. Individual rights evidently encom-
pass voting rights, the right to receive dividends and distributions from a pay out by the 
issuer and residual rights upon dissolution. (Holders of certificates of shares or depository 
receipts usually are entitled to the same rights.)557 These individual rights include those 
that are instrumental to enable collective exercise in meeting, such as the possibility to call 
an extraordinary meeting, to put items on the agenda of the meeting, and combine voting 
power through proxy solicitation. These influence the division of power between the board 
and the actual shareholders.558 Their influence is thus partly determined by such procedural 
557 They also can vote in the general meeting, except in case of a hostile takeover attempt (2:118a (2) NCC).
558 Extension shareholder rights. See EU Directive in shareholder rights concerning: record date, proxy 
voting, electronic voting, no solution for ultimate holder problems. Cf. also J. W. Winter, Grensover-
schrijdend stemmen, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam: Oration 2000.
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rules as convening a meeting and setting its agenda. The impact is clear: whether and to 
what extent the board/BoM may refuse to put an item on the GMS agenda is important in 
assessing the issuer’s exposure to shareholder activism. The same is true for ‘rules’ on 
the ‘dialogue’ that issuers should pursue with their (major) (institutional) investor base. 
Particularly in case of disagreement, the power to enforce these rights determines their 
effective power, for example when one investor or a group wish to use the GMS’s power to to 
challenge the incumbent management and thereby the supremacy of the board.559
The following paragraphs of this chapter aim at providing a comparative analysis of those 
group and individual rights of investors-shareholders that are functional or related to the 
internal division of powers that influence their position towards management and determine 
the balance of power between them. That means that other rights, such as a pre-emptive 
right of shareholders, will not be dealt with in detail. For these rights I refer to the inventory 
in the annexes. In par. 3.5 some general conclusions will be drawn.560
3.4.1	 Right	to	call	(special)	meetings	of	shareholders
The examined systems require at least one general meeting per annum to be held. The power 
to call an (annual) general or special meeting is attributed to the board/BoM.561 However, 
in the examined jurisdictions, shareholders can enforce that rule and force management 
to convene such a shareholder meeting, and, moreover, call a meeting themselves under 
some threshold, or apply for a court decree to call a meeting in case the board refuses to 
convene a meeting after a shareholder requisition notice.562
In the US, the Delaware statute requires that there be at least one shareholder meeting 
a year (§ 211(b) DGCL). However § 228 DGCL permits shareholders to act by written con-
sent entailing at least a majority vote, seemingly illustrating that the GMS is not merely 
seen as a disciplining device by exercising voice (cf. also § 7.04 MBCA). In Delaware, the 
annual meeting of shareholders is mainly related to the election of directors. DGCL states 
in § 211(b) that unless directors are elected by written consent in lieu of an annual meet-
ing, an annual meeting of stockholders shall be held for the election of directors on a date 
and at a time designated by or in the manner provided in the bylaws. A special meeting is 
held between annual meetings to consider extraordinary or urgent matters. 563 In Delaware 
(§ 211 (d) DGCL), a special meeting of stockholders may only be called by the board of direc-
tors or by such person or persons as may be authorised by the certificate of incorporation or 
the bylaws. This rule reflects the primacy of the board of the Delaware incorporated public 
559 Cf. Gower and Davies, 2008, pp. 425 and 437, the detailed legal rules governing the holding and con-
duct of meetings of shareholders can also be significant if it comes to a public fight. 
560 Before some general conclusion are drawn shareholders’ rights to put items on the agenda will first 
be analysed since the right to put items on the agenda of the general meeting basically arises out of 
the rules of convocation; only a combining analysis with the agenda right can draw some preliminary 
conclusions as to difference in possibilities for shareholders to exercise these rights with the purpose 
to influence the companies’ strategy and policy.
561 Mathias M. Siems, Convergence in Shareholder Law, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008, 
p. 92.
562 Dirk A. Zetzsche, ‘Shareholder Interaction Preceding Shareholder Meetings of Public Corpora-
tions. A six country comparison’, European Company and Financial Law Review, Vol. 2, No. 1, CBC-RPS, 
no. 0003, 2005, p. 9.
563 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporate law and Economics (2nd edition), Foundation Press 2009, p. 233. 
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corporation. § 7.02 (a) (1) MBCA also empowers the board of directors and any other person 
authorised by bylaws or articles to call special meeting, and § 7.02 (a) (2) MBCA empowers 
holders of at least 10% of the voting shares to call a special meeting on written demand to 
the corporation stating the purpose of the meeting.564 However, in the US public corpora-
tion on these annual and special meetings many shareholders will in practice be physically 
absent, but vote by proxy. Federal securities law governs the procedure and disclosures 
requirements to solicit proxies.565
EU: the former art. 22 (1) 5th Dir. requires that the general meeting shall be convened at 
least once each year. This meeting may be convened at any time by the management organ 
(22 (2)). Art. 23 (1) 5th Dir. states that shareholders who satisfy the requirements of art. 16 
(holding (a) shares of value not greater then 5%, (b) units not greater than 100,000), may 
request the company to convene a general meeting and settle the agenda therefore. If fol-
lowing this request no action has been taken by the company within one month, the compe-
tent court has power to convene the meeting or authorise it to be convened.
In the UK, every public company must hold its annual general meeting within the period of 
six months beginning on the day following its accounting reference date (sec. 336 (1) UK CA 
2006), which determines the beginning and end of its financial year (sec. 391 UK CA 2006).566 
The board may convene a meeting of the members of a public company at any time (Sec. 
302 UK CA 2006). Sec. 303 UK CA 2006 provides that the directors must convene a meeting 
on the request of holders of not less than one-tenth of the paid-up capital carrying voting 
rights. The request must state the general nature of the business to be dealt with at the 
meeting (sec 303 (4) UK CA 2006). It is advised to include the text of a resolution intended 
to be moved at the meeting.567 It is important to note that the resolution must be one which 
may be ‘properly moved’ at the meeting and, if it is not, the directors are under no obligation 
to circulate it.568 Sec. 303 (5) UK CA 2006: “a resolution may properly be moved at a meeting 
unless — (a) it would, if passed, be ineffective (whether by reason of inconsistency with any 
enactment or the company’s constitution or otherwise), (b) it is defamatory of any person, or 
(c) it is frivolous or vexatious.” If directors fail to call a meeting as provided for in sec. 303, 
sec. 305 UK CA 2006 allows the members who requested the meeting, or any of them repre-
senting more than one half of the total voting rights of all of them, to call a GMS themselves. 
Sec. 306 (1) UK CA 2006 also gives the court the power to convene a meeting.
Germany: § 121 (2) (1) AktG states that the GMS will be convened by the BoM. Furthermore, 
the SB is authorised to convene a general meeting if the interest (‘Wohl’) of the company 
demands such a meeting (§ 111 (3) AktG). Shareholders owning 5% of the capital of the 
AG are entitled to call a meeting of shareholders (§ 122 AktG). They have to indicate and 
argue ‘the purpose and the reasons for’ convening their proposal for the agenda and why 
564 §§ 7.05, 7.02 (d) MBCA subjects that may be considered at a special meeting should be described in the 
notice of meeting.
565 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporate law and Economics (2nd edition), Foundation Press 2009, p. 233.
566 Gower and Davies 2008, p. 441.
567 Gower and Davies 2008, p. 443.
568 Gower and Davies 2008, p. 443. A resolution may properly be moved at a meeting unless (a) it would, 
if passed, be ineffective (whether by reason of inconsistency with any enactment or the company’s 
constitution or otherwise), (b) it is defamatory of any person, or (c) it is frivolous or vexatious.
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the proposed items can not be suspended until the next ordinary general meeting.569 The 
shareholders are not allowed to call a meeting if this meeting is convened for the purpose 
of resolving matters concerning the management of the corporation, as such matters are 
only at their discretion if the management board so requires (§ 119 (2) AktG: “über fragen 
der geschäftsführung kann die hauptversammlung nur entscheiden, wenn der Vorstand 
es verlangt”).570 This reflects the supremacy of the German BoM/SB (public corporation) 
expressed in § 76 AktG, the mandatory statutory division of powers as provided by AktG 
(§ 119 AktG) and case law: Holzmüller and Gelatine case (discussed in par. 3.3.9.2571). Thus 
the limitation of the minority’s right to call a meeting also applies to transactions that in 
view of their fundamental importance for the company entail an unwritten competence of 
the shareholders’ meeting to resolve (Holzmüller and Gelatine Doctrine). The management 
board has to decide autonomously whether it wants to take such measure and if it requires 
the approval of the general meeting. As we have seen in Gelatine this only applies in excep-
tional cases. The general meeting cannot take the initiative in those cases.572 Nonetheless, 
it is permissible to call a meeting to determine confidence (‘Vertrauensentzug’) in the board 
members (§ 84 (3) AktG) and resolve on management actions in the context of this agenda 
item. However, the restrictive Holzmüller-doctrine means that this is exceptional. The 
minority right to convene a general meeting should not be abused (compare this to arts. 
2:8 NCC and 3:13 NCC). A minority of shareholders (5%) can be authorised by a court to call 
the general meeting § (122 (3) AktG).
In the Netherlands, art. 2:108 NCC requires that (1) a general meeting of shareholders will 
be held annually within 6 months of the end of the financial year or (2) a shorter period when 
provided for in the articles. A general meeting will also be held under certain conditions in 
case of a major decrease in capital (2:108a NCC). The BoM and the SB are authorised to call 
a general meeting (2: 109, 2:114 NCC). This power can be transferred in the articles of incor-
poration to “other persons”. Shareholders (art. 2:110 (1) NCC), representing at least 10% 
of the issued capital or such lesser amount as is provided for by the articles, may, on their 
569 P.P.M. Gozbach, ‘Shareholder democracy: an analysis of the regulatory framework in Germany’, TvOB 
2008, p. 160. Hüffer Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz § 122 note 4; Semler in: Münchener Handbuch des 
Gesellschaftsrechts, Part 4: Die Aktiengesellschaft,3. edition 2007, § 35 note 14. A detailed reasoning 
is not to be demanded. Also, the shareholders do not need to formulate the wording of the requested 
resolutions. However, if board elections, approvals to corporate agreements or amendments to the 
articles of association shall be resolved, then the wording of the proposed amendments have to be 
named, because such wording has to be made known with the agenda (§ 124 (2) (2) AktG).
570 P.P.M. Gozbach, ‘Shareholder democracy: an analysis of the regulatory framework in Germany’, TvOB 
2008, p. 160.Cf. also Ziemons, in K. Schmidt/Lutter (eds.), Aktiengesetz Kommentar, 2008, § 122.
571 In case of de facto changes to the company § 119 (1) AktG is used as starting point. In the Gelatine case 
(BGH, BGHZ 159, 30), not rejecting but confirming the famous Holzmüller case, the German Supreme 
Court rejected a low threshold of 20-25% requiring involvement of the GMS: in order not to needlessly 
disrupt the balanced relationship of the company’s bodies, the involvement of the GMS on the ground 
of a major impairment of the unwritten participatory rights of shareholders would come into ques-
tion only in exceptional cases\. The ‘threshold of seriousness’ would accordingly as a rule be reached 
only if a sale accounted for some 80 per cent of company assets. This percentage is derived from the 
Holzmüller case. 
572 P.P.M. Gozbach, ‘Shareholder democracy: an analysis of the regulatory framework in Germany’, TvOB 
2008, p. 160. Cf. also Werner in: Großkommentar zum Aktiengesetz, 4th edn. 1992 et seq., § 122 note 
27; Semler in: Münchener Handbuch des Gesellschaftsrechts, Part 4: Die Aktiengesellschaft, 3. edi-
tion 2007, § 35 note 16; see also OLG Frankfurt DB 2005, 1207.
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application, be authorised by the interim provisions judge of the court to convene a general 
meeting. On condition that a previous request to the BoM/SB, in writing, stating the exact 
matters to be considered has been filed with the BoM/SB and neither BoM nor SB has taken 
necessary steps, a meeting could be held within six weeks of the request.573
3.4.2	 Shareholder’s	right	to	put	items	on	the	agenda
Under the examined systems, the basic rule is that the board will set the agenda, although 
there are some differences related to the right of shareholders to put items on the agenda.574 
The level of influence of the shareholders in the company (board supremacy) is, besides 
the substantive rights of the shareholders, partly determined by procedural rules related 
to calling a meeting and setting the agenda for the annual and special meeting. Thus, for 
example, whether and under which criteria the board/BoM under its discretion has the right 
to refuse to put an item on the agenda as it proposed by the shareholders seemingly influ-
ences a company’s vulnerability to shareholder activism.
In the US, shareholders do not have the right to put items on the agenda (nor a legal right to 
ask questions in meeting),575 the board controls the agenda. However, US securities regu-
lation related to the system of proxy solicitation and voting give certain rights to share-
holders (seen from a shareholder’s perspective) to set the corporation’s agenda. Under the 
shareholder communication rule (SEC Rule 14a-7), any shareholder may collect proxies for 
matters to be resolved in the general meeting. To enable contact with other shareholders, 
management may at its discretion either send the shareholders a list of other sharehold-
ers or pass on his communication to the other shareholders. In either case the shareholder 
must bear the costs, which are considerable taking into account that these proxy rules 
573 Art. 2:110 (1) NCC, The interim provisions judge shall disallow the application if it does not appear 
to him that the applicants have previously requested the management and the supervisory board in 
writing, stating the exact matters to be considered, to convene a general meeting and neither the ma-
nagement nor the supervisory board, which in this case have equal powers, has taken the necessary 
steps so that the general meeting could be held within six weeks after the request
574 Dirk A. Zetzsche, ‘Shareholder Interaction Preceding Shareholder Meetings of Public Corpora-
tions. A six country comparison’, European Company and Financial Law Review, Vol. 2, No. 1, CBC-RPS, 
no.  0003, 2005, p. 7, preparation and voting comprise six steps. First: unless shareholders them-
selves invoke the meeting, the board of directors and officers – in two-tier jurisdictions, the board of 
management and the supervisory board [herein “management”] – prepare the schedule, the meeting 
agenda, and the management’s proxy circular. Second: management identifies the shareholders of 
the company. Third: management serves notice of the meeting, either by public announcement or 
through direct communication with the shareholders. Fourth: before or after the notice, shareholders 
are likely to communicate with management, or amongst themselves, and co-ordinate their actions 
with respect to the meeting. Fifth: shareholders register in order to attend the meeting, and finally: 
they vote.
575 The provision that gives shareholders the right to ask questions on agenda items which must be ans-
wered finds no similar specific requirement in US law. While it is common practice to have discussions 
of pending issues at shareholder meetings and allow shareholder questions at meetings of publicly 
traded corporations, if a company refused to do so it is unclear if that would violate the law in the 
US. But such behaviour would violate accepted norms of corporate behaviour and thus is unlikely. 
Nonetheless, shareholders can use their inspection rights under § 220 (b) DGCL, requiring a share-
holder asserting inspections rights to make a written demand setting forth a “proper purpose” for the 
request.
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mostly relate to public companies with dispersed shareholders.576 Another option is that 
shareholders can oblige the corporation to include a shareholder proposal in the proxy 
statement,577 SEC Rule 14a-8. That rule entitles shareholders to include certain proposals 
in the company’s proxy materials. The board, however, can exclude the proposals from the 
proxy materials on several grounds; SEC Rule 14a-8 provides a number of specific grounds 
to permit corporations to exclude shareholder-requested matter from the corporation’s 
proxy solicitation materials (management has to notify the SEC that the firm intends to 
exclude the proposal, SEC Rule 14a-8(j)).578 Rule 14a-8(i) lists 13 grounds that permit firms 
to exclude proposals from the company’s solicitation materials.579 SEC Rule 14a-8 (i)(1) 
excludes, inter alia: approval of a proposal that would be improper under state law and (SEC 
Rule 14a-8 (i) (x)), resolutions on specific amounts of cash or stock dividends. The reason 
for that exclusion, but also in general, is a crystallisation of the more general principle that 
shareholders should not vote on issues that are beyond their powers, since directors, rather 
than shareholders, decide upon the distribution of dividends in the US. Under state law, all 
corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the authority of the board (§ 141 (a) DGCL). 
The same reasoning applies to the exclusion of a proposal (SEC Rule 14a-8 (i) (7)), relating 
to a matter of ordinary business. Matters of ordinary business are regarded as the prov-
ince of the board under the design of the corporate form. Therefore these shareholder pro-
posals are often made in ‘precatory form’. As already mentioned, the board has discretion 
whether to disregard this kind of proposal;580 the board’s decision to do so is protected by the 
BJR.581 Formerly this also applied to proposals relating to an election for membership to the 
company’s board of directors (SEC Rule 14a-8 (i) (8)). However, the SEC proposed allowing 
shareholders to come with their own slate of directors (proposal SEC Rule 14a-11, 2003).582 
576 Cf. Mathias M. Siems, Convergence in Shareholder Law, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008, 
p. 94.
577 SEC Rule 14a-8; (SEA) 17 CFR 240.14a-8 (a): a shareholder proposal is your (shareholder) recommen-
dation or requirement that the company and/or its board of directors take action, which you intend to 
present at a meeting of the company’s shareholders. 
578 First, shareholders proposals must satisfy certain formal criteria: they must state the identity of the 
shareholder (SEC Rule 14a-8 (b) (1), the number of proposals (SEC Rules 14a-8c), the length of the 
supporting statement (SEC Rule 14 a-8 (d)), and the subject matter of the proposal (SEC Rule 14a-8i).
579 In the Netherlands the GMS can only decide on topics that place on the meeting’s agenda.
580 Bernard S. Black, Disclosure, Not Censorship: The Case for Proxy Reform, 17 J. Corp. L. 49 (1991-
1992), p. 541 and Sofie Cools, ‘The Real Difference in Corporate Law between the United States and 
Continental Europe: Distribution of Powers’, Delaware Journal of Corporate Law, Vol. 30, No. 3, 2005.
581 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporate law and Economics (2nd edition), Foundation Press 2009, p. 267, of 
course on the other hand, the risk of adverse publicity and poor shareholder relations may encourage 
a board to implement an approved precatory proposal even where the board opposes the proposal 
on the merits. (4) Conflicts with company’s proposal: the proposal directly conflicts with one of the 
company’s own proposals to be submitted to shareholders at the same meeting. The fourth reason 
relates to the fact that shareholders have the choice of voting “no” when voting upon the manage-
ment’s proposal. This exclusionary ground is, however, apt to impede the shareholders’ franchise, 
since management can effectively pre-empt a pending or imminent shareholder proposal. This obsta-
cle indicates the more general problem resulting from the discretion vested in U.S. boards to amend 
the bylaws of the corporation. American case law might restrict directors’ conduct, though it does 
not provide clear guidance, since relevant case law is principally related to proxy fights or defensive 
measures for takeovers, such as super-majority requirements. 
582 See very interesting debate on board elections enfolding during Symposium held by Harvard Univer-
sity, Lucian Bebchuk (editor), ‘Symposium on Corporate Elections’, Harvard, John M. Olin Center for 
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Recently, this rule has been enacted by the SEC, however it is not yet effective. Under this 
new Exchange Act Rule 14a-11, companies are required, under certain circumstances, to 
include a shareholder nominee or nominees for director in company proxy materials. Under 
the rule, companies will be required to include shareholder nominees for director in the 
company’s proxy materials, if the shareholder meets certain conditions, and if the share-
holders are not otherwise prohibited – either by applicable state or foreign law or a com-
pany’s governing documents – from nominating a candidate for election as a director.583 The 
most notable condition is that the shareholder seeking to invoke SEC Rule 14a-11 must not 
seek to change the control of the issuer or to gain more than a limited number of seats on 
the board.584 Thus, the rule does not permit a ‘change of the guard’, but simply provides a 
mechanism whereby shareholders can have a more meaningful tool to influence their cor-
poration’s governing structures.585
Other general formal requirements for including shareholder proposals in the proxy state-
ment are: 1) shareholders holding shares with a market value of USD 2,000 or 1% of the out-
standing share are authorised, 2) shareholders are only allowed to make one proposal per 
year, this proposal has to be filed five months before the next annual meeting and the share-
holder proposal has to be inserted into the proxy card and may not exceed 500 words.586 587 
These procedural restrains make it difficult for shareholders to use the requisition right 
Law, Economics, and Business, Discussion Paper no. 448, 11, 2003, the symposium brought together SEC 
officials, CEOs, directors, institutional investors, money managers, shareholder activists, lawyers, 
judges, academics, and others to discuss the subject from a wide range of perspectives. See also 
Grechten Morgenson, Who’s Afraid Of Shareholder Democracy? The New York Times, October 2, 2005.
583 17 CFR Parts 200, 232, 240 and 249, release Nos. 33-9 136; 34-62762; IC-29384; File No. S7-10-09, RIN 
3235-AK27 Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations.
584 See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 74 Fed. Reg. 29,024, at 29,056–58.
585 Reed Schuster, ‘Rule 14A-11 and the Administrative Procedure Act: it’s better to have had and waived, 
than never to have had at all’, Minnesota Law Review, forthcoming.
586 SEC Rule 14a-8, 17 C.F.R. 240. 14a-8 (1990).
587 But in the US, shareholders have been able to add other issues to the agenda through proxy fights that 
try to change and influence policy. These fights involve proposing a nonbinding resolution to influence 
the board, which is a right of expression. Because these resolutions do not mandate company action 
but try to influence the board through recommendations, they do not directly challenge the board’s 
legal authority as raised in mandatory bylaws. These fights can involve corporate social behaviour, 
corporate governance issues and corporate strategy. This right of expression has influenced com-
pany behaviour. The increased use of the internet as reflected in the directive also generally reflects 
US law. For example, Delaware allows the participation in shareholder meetings using remote com-
munications or the use of online meetings. In addition a shareholder can designate the proxy holder 
by electronic means. Similar to the directive, the federal proxy rules mandate e-proxy rules, which 
require companies and other soliciting persons to post their proxy materials on a publicly available 
internet website and provide shareholders with a notice regarding the availability of proxy materials 
on the Internet. Shareholders may now choose the means by which they access proxy materials either 
from the internet or paper copies and companies have some choice on how to deliver proxy material 
if the shareholder does not opt for paper delivery. Issuers and others that rely on the amendments 
may be able to lower the costs of their proxy solicitations although the amount of disclosure required 
under the proxy rules remain and possible liabilities for violating the proxy rules remain unchanged. 
Interestingly, in the US a number of companies have opted to continue to use paper materials because 
the use of e-voting actually reduced participation by individual shareholders which could give more 
power to larger institutional investors.
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as a response to topical issues.588 This gives the board time to prepare a defence to inform 
and convince the other shareholders. In the other systems, proxy solicitation and voting 
are mainly regulated through company law. Proxy voting/solicitation will be discussed in 
par. 3.5.
In the EU, the former draft art. 25 (1) 5th Dir. states that one or more shareholder, who 
((art. 16), hold (a) shares of value not greater then 5%, (b) units not greater then 100,000, may 
request that one or more items be included in the agenda of a GMS. Art. 6 (1) Shareholder 
Rights Directive states that shareholders acting individually or collectively have the right to: 
a) put items on the agenda, b) table draft resolutions for items included or to be included on 
the agenda, art. 6 (2) outlines the requirement for the minimum stake not art. 6 exceed 5% 
of share capital, to (3) states that MS shall set a single deadline, with reference to a speci-
fied number of days prior to the general meeting or the convocation, by which shareholders 
may exercise the right to put items on the agenda of the general meeting. See also art. 9(1): 
every shareholder shall have the right to ask questions related to the items on the agenda 
of the GMS.
In the UK, as part of the process to convene a meeting the board, can stipulate the items 
which it wishes to have discussed at the meeting.589 Under sec. 338 (1), (3) UK CA 2006, mem-
bers representing at least 5% of the total voting rights of all the members entitled to vote on 
the proposed resolution, or 100 members holding shares in which there has been paid up 
an average sum, per member, of at least GBP 100, may require the company to give notice of 
their resolutions which can then be considered at the next GMS.590 However, the company is 
not bound to give notice of the resolution (sec. 338 (2) when (2) (a) UK CA 2006) if (a) it would, 
be passed, be ineffective, (b) it is defamatory of any person, or (c) it is frivolous or vexatious. 
Under sec. 317 (1) UK CA 2006, the company is not required to circulate a member’s state-
ment if the court is satisfied, on application of the company or any other aggrieved person, 
that the rights under sec. 314 UK CA 2006 have been abused.591 Another condition is that 
the requisition, identifying the resolution of which notice is to be given, must be received by 
the company at least six weeks before the GMS or before the company gives notice to the 
members of the GMS (sec. 338 (4) UK CA 2006) and the length of the requisition is limited to 
a 1000 words (sec. 314 (1) UK CA). Finally, those requesting the circulation must pay for it 
(sec. 340 (2) UK CA 2006); the circulation shall only be free if the request is received before 
the end of the financial year preceding the meeting, which may be up to six months before 
588 Dirk A. Zetzsche, ‘Shareholder Interaction Preceding Shareholder Meetings of Public Corporations. A 
six country comparison’, European Company and Financial Law Review, Vol. 2, No. 1, CBC-RPS, no. 0003, 
2005, p. 17.
589 Gower and Davies, Principles of Modern Company Law, Sweet & Maxwell, London: 2008, p. 446.
590 See sec. 338 (2) UK CA unless (2) (a) it would, if passed, be ineffective, (b) it is defamatory of any per-
son, or (c) it is frivolous or vexatious. Gower and Davies, Principles of Modern Company Law, Sweet & 
Maxwell, London: 2008 p. 447, important to note is that the 100 “members” may include those who are 
not members of the company but whose interest in the shares arises form the fact that a member of 
the company holds the shares on their behalf in the course of a business and – a very important limita-
tion – the indirect investor has the right to instruct the member how to exercise the voting rights.
591 Gower and Davies, Principles of Modern Company Law, Sweet & Maxwell, London: 2008, p. 419.
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the meeting is held (secs. 340 (1), 437 and 442 UK CA 2006).592 A practical problem with the 
member’s resolution procedure is that the minimum period of notice for calling the GMS 
is 21 days (sec. 307 (2) UK CA 2006), for listed companies the recommend period is rather 
longer (sec. D.2.4 CC, 20 working days). Hence, members (UK members = shareholders, see 
ch.1) will have limited time to respond to the GMS documentation and to get their resolu-
tion to the company within the six-week limit.593 For meetings other than the GMS, there is 
no statutory procedure whereby members can add an item to the agenda of meeting called 
by the board. Of course 10% of the members can convene a meeting themselves and put a 
resolution on the agenda of that meeting.
According to German law, shareholders have a right to supplement items on the agenda of 
the meeting they hold 5% or EUR 500,000 of the issued capital (§ 122 (2) AktG). The purpose 
of this agenda right is shareholder minority protection.594 Shareholders can exercise this 
right when they hold their shares for more then 3 months (§ 142 (2) AktG).595.Shareholders 
in Germany according to § 124 (1) (2) AktG are also allowed ten days after the notice of the 
meeting to put items on the agenda.596 Shareholders can therefore use the proposal right for 
both an initiative, which will be included in the first notice of the meeting, and a response to 
the management’s notice of the meeting.597 It is important to note that in Germany, the power 
to exclude a proposal from the meeting’s agenda is formally vested in the management.598 
The same limitations apply as to the right to convene a meeting as analysed in par. 3.4.1. 
Thus the German BoM/SB has the power to exclude an item from the agenda if related ‘the 
ordinary business’. The management board has to decide autonomously whether it wants to 
take such measure and if it requires the approval of the general meeting. As we have seen 
in Gelatine this only applies in exceptional cases. The general meeting cannot take the initia-
tive in those cases.599 Shareholders also cannot utilise the proposal right to oppose a man-
agement proposal. The proposal right merely enables shareholders to add an item to the 
592 However, the costs of circulation should not be large if the members’ resolution can be circulated 
along with the general circulation for the AGM. The company is obliged to circulate the resolution with 
the notice if this is possible (sec. 339 (1) UK CA 2006.
593 Gower and Davies, Principles of Modern Company Law, Sweet & Maxwell, London: 2008, p. 447.
594 Ziemons in K. Schmidt/Lutter (eds.), Kommentar AktG, 2008, § 122.
595 Ziemons in K. Schmidt/Lutter (eds.), Kommentar AktG, 2008, § 122. Cf. Also Dirk A. Zetzsche, ‘Share-
holder Interaction Preceding Shareholder Meetings of Public Corporations. A six country compari-
son’, European Company and Financial Law Review, Vol. 2, No. 1, CBC-RPS, no. 0003, 2005, p. 7.
596 P.P.M. Gozbach, ‘Shareholder democracy: an analysis of the regulatory framework in Germany’, TvOB 
2008, p. 160, applications in respect of any of the items of the agenda may be raised regardless of the 
quorum required pursuant § 122 (2) AktG or the notification in the general meeting pursuant to § 124 4 
AktG. The claim to put down on the agenda further items may be raised during the whole financial year 
up to the next annual general meeting, even after the convening of the same (see § 124 (2) (2) AktG). 
However, the general meeting is only allowed to resolve upon such items of the agenda that properly 
have been made known (§ 124 (4) AktG). 
597 Consequently, shareholders of German companies can pursue both a long-and a short-term strategy, 
and they do not need to inform management about their strategy until very shortly before the meeting.
598 Dirk A. Zetzsche, ‘Shareholder Interaction Preceding Shareholder Meetings of Public Corporations. A 
six country comparison’, European Company and Financial Law Review, Vol. 2, No. 1, CBC-RPS, no. 0003, 
2005, p. 22.
599 P.P.M. Gozbach, ‘Shareholder democracy: an analysis of the regulatory framework in Germany’, TvOB 
2008, p. 160. Cf. also Werner in: Großkommentar zum Aktiengesetz, 4. edition 1992 et seq., § 122 note 
27; Semler in: Münchener Handbuch des Gesellschaftsrechts, Part 4: Die Aktiengesellschaft, 3. edi-
tion 2007, § 35 note 16; see also OLG Frankfurt DB 2005, 1207.
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agenda, in order to let all shareholders decide upon the proposal. Exercising the proposal 
right is invalid if the item is already on the agenda (since management will have put it on the 
agenda).600 According to §§ 126/127 AktG, shareholders can bring in counterproposals with 
regard to items on the agenda.601
The Netherlands: art. 2:114a (1) NCC allows shareholders owning 1% or more of the shares or 
representing a value of EUR 50 million to propose an item (for discussion) on the GMS agenda. 
This threshold of 1% was introduced in 2004 with the “Structuurregeling” amendment,602 but 
will be raised again to 3%.603 Art. 2:114a (3) NCC states that the articles can lower these 
thresholds, art. 2:114a (4) NCC states that certificates of shares (preferential shares) are 
treated equivalently. According to art. 2:114a (1) NCC, a shareholder’s request to add an item 
to the agenda has to be filed with the company 60 days before the meeting. If filed in time 
the item will be inserted in the notice of the meeting or announced in similar way, unless 
‘important interests of the corporation’ oppose such insertion of a shareholder’s proposal. 
This refusal right of the company (BoM) does not entail a substantive but merely a formal 
test related to the discipline of the meeting (cf the general test as to whether a shareholder 
has ‘abused’ his agenda right arts. 2:8 NCC and 3:13 NCC ‘abuse of law’).604 Art. 2:107 (2) 
NCC stated that the BoM and the SB will give all required information to the GMS, unless 
‘important interests of the corporation’ resist such a request containing a substantive test, 
for example if providing the GMS with certain information will damage the competitive posi-
tion of the firm. The Dutch broad shareholder’s agenda right played an important role in the 
break-up of ABN-AMRO in 2007. It was TCI’s proposal for a split translated into five items on 
the general meeting agenda of ABN-AMRO that effectively accelerated the actions of ABN-
AMRO’s board and the completion to acquire its control. Note that TCI’s items for the agenda 
were all within the corporate power of the board (art. 2:129 NCC). Therefore these items 
600 Dirk A. Zetzsche, ‘Shareholder Interaction Preceding Shareholder Meetings of Public Corporations. 
A six country comparison’, European Company and Financial Law Review, Vol. 2, No. 1, CBC-RPS, no. 
0003, 2005, p. 17.
601 Ziemons in K. Schmidt/Lutter (eds.), Kommentar Aktiengesetz 2008, §§ 136/127. Cf. also Dirk A. 
Zetzsche, ‘Shareholder Interaction Preceding Shareholder Meetings of Public Corporations. A six 
country comparison’, European Company and Financial Law Review, Vol. 2, No. 1, CBC-RPS, no. 0003, 
2005, p.24 Every shareholder of a German company can demand that the company publish a share-
holder’s opposing or dissenting statement on an (already announced) agenda item after the notice of 
the shareholder meeting. This statement may include a Draft Resolution and arguments as to why 
shareholders should vote in favour of the Draft Resolution. This right of Counter Motion can be exer-
cised up to two weeks before the meeting.
602 Law Gazette 2004, 370. Cf. Frans Overkleeft, ‘Het agenderingsrecht voor aandeelhouders in beurs-
vennootschappen: een aanzet tot (her) bezinning’, Ondernemingsrecht 2009, 167.
603 The Commission Frijns recommendates to raise het threshold from 1% to 3%, Parliamentary Papers 
31 083, nr. 1. see the use of the 1% requirement in the Stork and ABNAmro –case. See also proposal 
of bill (Parliamentary Papers 32 014), following the advice of the Monitoring Committee Corporate 
Governance Code of May 30, 2007, is in preparation and will include legislation that enable the listes 
public company to establish the identity of its shareholders
604 Cf. Frans Overkleeft, ‘Het agenderingsrecht voor aandeelhouders in beurs-vennootschappen: een 
aanzet tot (her) bezinning’, Ondernemingsrecht 2009, 167. He points out that in the explanatory memo-
randum the legislature noted the following on the “important interests of the corporation-test’’: “In 
refusing to add a subject to the agenda, the interests of the company shall be paramount. “Important 
interests” means that a refusal will not easily justified. Rejection of an application for adding a subject 
to the agenda is conceivable when a series of items appears to be proposed solely for the purpose to 
distort the proceeds of the meeting.”
Book Vanderschee.indb   162 18-3-2011   15:39:45
Investor protection in corporate law 163
should be qualified as mere motions,constituting, if adopted, non-binding expressions of the 
GMS opinion. Compared to the US precatory shareholder proposals (apart from interna-
tional market dynamics/pressure), such motions may really intrude into the supremacy and 
discretion of a Dutch issuer’s board (BoM/SB), since it lacks the clear discretion to refuse 
an item for the agenda related to the ordinary business, as prevails in the US and Ger-
man systems. A major difference results from the power to ‘enforce’ the strategy of activist 
investors through a request for an investigation-procedure with the Netherlands Enterprise 
Chamber as also applied in this case. It was not the ‘agenda right’ itself but the Dutch ero-
sion of board supremacy resulting from the application of the investigation procedure that 
seemingly caused insecurity for boards as to how to properly react to activist shareholders/
offerors and probably blurred the board’s judgement that, within the prevailing parameters, 
they simply could have responded: “no”! (See further: chapter 4).
Recently, the Bill to implement the Shareholder Rights Directive,605 propose two amend-
ments to art. 2:114: 1 NCC) a request for putting an item on the agenda should clearly 
explain its grounds, hand 2) abolishment of the corporation’s right (art. 2:114a (1) NCC) to 
refuse such a proposal because of ‘important interests of the corporation’. This seems to 
strengthen the right of shareholders to put an item on the agenda, since the board’s discre-
tion to reject such a proposal is decreasing. This, however, does not affect the basic rule 
that only resolutions on subjects within the power of a GMS are legally binding. Nor does 
it affect ‘motions’ to be voted on (which may be the basis for a petition for an investigation 
procedure (see below: par. 3.5 and chapter 4)). Thus such motions will appear to become 
‘instructions’ by the GMS to the board. However, recent case law of the Supreme Court 
(ASMI-case) seems to re-establish board supremacy and discretion, including refusal of 
agenda items and neglect of ‘instructive motions’.
3.4.3	 ‘Rights’	of	investors-shareholders	and	‘duties’	of	issuer’s	board	to	have	a	
‘dialogue’	with	the	issuers’	investors.
In recent years, ‘activist’ shareholders have pressed issuers and their boards to be respon-
sive to their own views on alternative strategy and policies, starting with presentations to 
and discussions with the board, but often followed by public disclosure of their views, com-
munication with other shareholders and the investment community, setting the stage for 
voting advisers (ISS), analysts and the financial press. It was the sequence of events for 
some major cases in the Netherlands as well, such as ABNAMRO and Stork. Building their 
case dialogues with the issuer’s board would strengthen their position in the market. On 
the other hand, issuers themselves have an interest in good relations with their investors, 
particularly institutional and other major investors. Their investor relations policy usually 
includes regular contact with such institutional and major investors.
605 Lower House 2008-2009, 31 746, nr 2, Wetsvoorstel Wijziging Boek 2 en Wft ter uitvoering Richtlijn 
inzake aandeelhoudersrechten, Proposal of Bill is pending with First Chamber of the Parliament. 
Simultaneously with this proposal of bill another proposal of bill (Parliamentary Papers 32 014), fol-
lowing the advice of the Monitoring Committee Corporate Governance Code of May 30, 2007, is in 
preparation and will include legislation that enable the listes public company to establish the identity 
of its shareholders; R.G.J. Nowak, ‘Het wetsvoorstel ter uitvoering van de Shareholders Directive’, 
Ondernemingsrecht 2008, 183, p. 620.
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US practice seemingly, as in the UK, shows an approach by (institutional) shareholders as 
part of their investor relations policy. However, rules (principles, best practices) do not exist 
and, again, the market-oriented disclosure system indicates strict securities law rules on 
inside information and disclosure of price-sensitive information will prevail (as in the EU 
according to the Market Abuse Directive). If activist shareholders want to increase pressure 
they can solicit proxies and start a proxy contest and/or try to table proposals to sharehold-
ers, but a refusal to continue the ‘dialogue’ with the issuer’s board cannot be construed as 
infringement of any ‘rights’ of investors. The issuer under the Delaware statute may estab-
lish that parties respectfully agree to disagree.606
The EU and its Member States seem to be moving in the direction of strengthening share-
holder’s power, at least in the Shareholder Rights Directive on that subject, which aims to 
take away technical constraints to communication with shareholders. Whereas US proxy 
rules are part of securities regulation focussing on disclosure instead of aiming at share-
holder democracy, the EU Shareholders Rights Directive takes the latter perspective. This 
conceptual difference seems already to influence board supremacy when activist share-
holders target an (undervalued) corporation and its board. This topic will be further ana-
lysed in par. 3.6.
Fitting into the UK market and City tradition,607 the UK CC (note: part of the LSE listing 
rules608) was the first to provide (sec. D1 on dialogue with institutional shareholders): ‘there 
should be a dialogue, based on mutual understanding of the objectives. The board as a 
whole has responsibility for ensuring that a satisfactory dialogue with shareholders takes 
place’. The supporting principle reads: ‘whilst recognising that most shareholder contact 
is with the chief executive and finance director, the chairman (and the senior independent 
director and other directors as appropriate) should maintain sufficient contact with major 
shareholders to understand their issues and concerns.’ The board should keep in touch 
with shareholder opinion in whatever ways are most practical and efficient. The chairman 
should ensure that the views of shareholders are communicated to the board as a whole. 
The chairman should discuss governance and strategy with major shareholders. Sec. D.1.2 
UK CC: ‘The board should state in the annual report the steps they have taken to ensure 
that the members of the board, and in particular the non-executive directors, develop an 
understanding of the views of major shareholders about their company, e.g. through direct 
face-to-face contact, analysts’ or brokers’ briefings and surveys of shareholder opinion.’ 
See also sec. E.1 UK CC institutional shareholders should enter into a dialogue with compa-
nies based on the mutual understanding of objectives. Thus the focus is on good investor 
relations with institutional shareholders.
In Germany the topic of a dialogue with (institutional) shareholders as such is not regulated 
in statutory law nor in the GCGC.
606 US ALI Principles. 
607 John Armour and David A. Skeel, ‘Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and Why? The Peculiar 
Divergences of US and UK Takeover Regulation’, ECGI Law Working Paper No. 73, 2006, p. 1727. See 
also the work of Mark J. Roe, Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political Roots of American Corporate 
Finance, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press 1994.
608 If the company is not adhering to the UK CC a possible but presumably theoretical possibility is that the 
LSE would sanction a refusal to adhere to the UK CC by delisting the issuer.
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The Netherlands609 shows a somewhat different picture since DCGC rules appear to have 
been to a certain extent accepted to be as ‘enforceable’ as ‘customary’ rules (generally 
accepted principles) under the umbrella of its general corporate law principle that the 
internal affairs of a corporation shall be governed by reasonableness and fairness (art. 2:8 
NCC, see chapter 4 for further analysis). The DCCG confirms the ‘constituency’ character 
of statutory corporate law. Management shall balance the various interests in pursuing its 
tasks. Stakeholders, including investors, may follow and prioritise their own interests, but 
with due regard to the principles of reasonableness and fairness (Preamble DCGC, no. 9). 
Following the example of the UK CC but deviating from its limitation to institutional inves-
tors and focussing on the Dutch market, the DCGC proclaims that good relations between 
stakeholders (also shareholders) are of great importance, particularly through a continu-
ous and constructive dialogue (Preamble DCGC, no. 10). Best Practise IV.4 DCGC reads: 
‘shareholders shall act in relation to the company, the bodies corporate of the company 
and their fellow shareholders in keeping with the principle of reasonableness and fair-
ness. This includes the willingness to engage in a dialogue with the company and their fellow 
shareholders’. Is the board obliged to enter into a dialogue610 with all shareholders and other 
stakeholders on its strategy and policies?611 The Amsterdam Enterprise Chamber decided 
affirmatively in investigation procedures initiated by hedge funds to attack the prevailing 
strategy and policies;612 its decisions with respect to the binding and enforceable nature 
of DCGC ‘norms’ were upheld by the Supreme Court, but at the same time the principle of 
board supremacy was strongly confirmed (chapter 4 will elaborate the investigation proce-
dure with the Amsterdam Business Court).
This illustrates that shareholder activism is more successful in some jurisdictions than 
in others and that a proper distinction between securities regulation and corporate law to 
protect investors is a key element. (Broad private) enforcement seems to be the explanatory 
factor. Obviously this will influence board supremacy (see chapter 4).
609 See the AFM’s concept policy measure ‘investor recommendations’, in which the supervisor determi-
nes under which conditions information is considered to be ‘public’. This policy measure will replace 
the policy measure of 12-12-2006 (06-03).
610 The meaning of the word ‘dialogue’ presupposes an equality of arms between two ‘parties’ having a 
conversation about a certain topic. From this concept seems to follow and seemingly presupposes that 
(groups) of shareholders having a dialogue with the board on the corporation’s strategy and policy also 
have or should have a role in determining corporation’s strategy.
611 Preamble (no.5) of the DCGC states that ‘both shareholders and the management and supervisory 
boards should be prepared to enter into a dialogue on the reasons for any departures of the Code.’ 
This could already be considered as a departure from Dutch law in which the board is supreme and 
it seems a further-going obligation that is imposed on the board then just to ‘comply or explain’ the 
principles of the Code. Compare this to the Preamble (no. 5) of UK CC where the company only has to 
give a clear explanation to its shareholders when the company chooses not to comply with a certain 
provision of the code, and see Preamble (no. 7) which states that institutional investors themselves 
should be prepared to have a dialogue with the company if they do not agree on the compliance of UK 
CC by the company.
612 Supreme Court 13 July 2007, JOR 2007, 178, 434 (ABNAMRO), AA (2007), p. 734-743 with annotation 
Raaijmakers. The comment of Eumedion proposing that when the legislator will stay with its pro-
posal the corporation have to provide the shareholders with a detailed overview of the strategy is also 
against the division of powers. More than price sensitive information.
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Meanwhile a Bill is pending, following the advice of the Netherlands Monitoring Commis-
sion Corporate Governance,613 obliging shareholders with more than 3% of the issued capi-
tal or voting rights to disclose whether or not they oppose the issuer’s strategy/policy. The 
Bill aims at improving ‘constructive dialogue’, but does not clearly explain how that result 
can be achieved.614 Submission of the issuer’s strategy for GMS approval would already con-
tradict the mandatory division of powers between board, supervisory board and sharehold-
ers.615 The proper connection seems to be the system of § 13A SEA’34 as implemented by 
the  Williams Act 1968 and related to a takeover context and aims for informing the other 
investors of a ‘creeping’ takeover. See also 13D (‘intent’) and RNA-rules, as discussed in 
par. 3.3.10.
3.4.4	 Annulment	of	GMS	resolutions
The preceding paragraphs discussed the collective, group and individual rights and powers 
of investors, as well as specific supporting court actions, in and with respect to the issuer’s 
internal organisation, the GMS and the division of powers. These may not prevent resolu-
tions being taken by majority vote that may infringe shareholders’ substantive, procedural 
rights and their claims under securities law.616
In the traditional view of the corporation as an ‘association’ with ‘members’617, one of the 
major enforcement mechanisms is a corporate law cause of action in court to annul res-
olutions taken by the GMS (or another body corporate).618 This rescission right evidently 
is particularly important to protect minorities in ‘block-holder’ systems against a major 
shareholder. It is, of course, less important in a system, as in the US, where the issuer’s 
shares are widely dispersed, which does not prevent board resolutions being ‘attacked’. US 
courts, however, apply the BJR and, hence, will refuse to review and ‘second guess’ (opera-
tional) board decisions. In the examined systems, the nullification (or judicial confirmation 
of a decision being void) of board decisions appear to be of no major practical importance. 
However, the Dutch investigation procedure effectively allows for board and GMS decisions 
to be annulled by way of injunctive relief (art. 2:349 NCC) and, hence, provides a means 
613 Lower House, Parliamantary Papers, II, 2008/2009, 32 014, no.1-5.
614 See the Comments on this proposal by Eumedion, 29 September 2009.
615 Cf. Charles Honnee, investors relations en de kunst van het laveren, in: De nieuwe macht van de ka-
pitaalverschaffer, Uitgave vanwege het instituut voor Ondernemingsrecht, nr. 57, p. 13-29), p. 26, he 
makes disclosure of SH’s intentions a condition for having a dialogue with the issuer, in that sense the 
disclosuer of these intentions functions a requirement to be admissable to that dialogue. PvdS: in the 
US, however this kind of requirements are part of § 13 (d) SEA, in case of a possible takeover investors 
must disclose their intentions when aiming for control of the issuer.
616 Cf. Gower and Davies, Principles of Modern Company Law, Sweet & Maxwell, London: 2008 p. 649, in 
any company law system a number of techniques are in principle available to control the exercise by 
the majority of the shareholders of voting power over the company in an unfair way. E.g., the legisla-
ture could specify in advance certain decisions which should not be open tot the majority to take.
617 This suits the more continental view of the legal form of the public corporation. Cf. Raaijmakers, 
Ondernemingsrecht, Pitlo/Raaijmakers, Deventer: Kluwer 2006, p. 573.
618 Mathias Siems, Convergence in Shareholder Law, Cambridge University Press 2008, p. 218, protec-
tion against abuse by the shareholders majority becomes acute particularly where resolutions of the 
general meeting threaten to injure the interests of the minority. The examined jurisdictions accord-
ingly provide that individual shareholders can defend themselves against unlawful resolutions of the 
general meeting but also decisions of other corporate bodies.
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to attack board decisions. This had and seemingly still has its profound influence on the 
supremacy of the Dutch board. This analysis will explained further in chapter 4. A short 
overview follows.
In the US and UK, there are no detailed statutory provisions; case law primarily regulates 
the annulment of decisions.619 Actions against general meeting decisions are admissible in 
principle, but tend to be of minor importance.620 However, typical US appraisal rights may 
offer an alternative in protecting minority shareholders. See also sec. 994 UK CA 2006 as an 
alternative for minority protection that provides that any member may petition the court for 
relief under certain conditions.621
The German § 243 AktG allows for challenging the meeting’s decision on the ground that 
the decision violates either a statutory provision or a provision of the articles of associa-
tion.622 This not only pertains to the substance of the decision, but also to the procedure 
through which the decision was established.623 The decision cannot be challenged after a 
one-month time limit for appeal has expired (§ 246 (1) AktG). No limitation is set for violation 
of fundamental rules and principles and resolutions taken at inadequately called meetings 
(§ 241 AktG). In severe cases, a decision is void by law (§ 241 AktG). An action for nullity is 
regulated in §§ 249 (1) AktG and 248 (1) AktG. A particular rule is that a decision is deemed 
to be valid if no action for nullity has been started within three years of the resolution’s 
entry in the commercial register (§ 242 (2) AktG).624 A personal interest in the respective 
resolution is not a precondition for filing the suit.625 The costs are in principle paid by the 
losing party (§  91 GerZPO). Recently this became an incentive for (activist) shareholder/
investors to reach a settlement with the company. These shareholders could pressure 
management because they could block entry of the resolution into the commercial register 
until a final decision had been made on its alleged voidness (§ 127 GerFGG). These actions, 
often qualified as abusive, usually started with a rescission suit claiming that their statutory 
rights as provided by the AktG were violated, such as a claimed breach by the company of 
619 See e.g. the US case CSX v. The Children’s Investment Fund (TCI), U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of New York, 11-06-2008, Case 1: 08-cv-02764 LAK.
620 Mathias Siems, Convergence in Shareholder Law, Cambridge University Press 2008, p. 220. Cf. also 
James D. Cox and Thomas L. Hazen, Corporations, 2nd edition, New York: Aspen 2003, §§ 22.23, 23.02. 
UK: Edwards v. Halliwell [1950] 2 All ER 1064, 1067 (Court of Appeal). Notably in the US and the UK no 
pure voidability of decisions is provided for. In the tradition of the ultra vires theory, now largely aban-
doned in relation to management actions, unlawful decisions are null even if not proceeded against.
621 Sec. 994 UK CA 2006 that provides that any member may petition the court for relief under certain 
conditions: a) the company’s affairs are being or have been conducted in a manner which is unfairly 
prejudicial to the interest of its members generally or some part of the members (including at least 
himself) or b) that any actual or proposed act or omission of the company (including any act or omis-
sion on its bealf) is or would be so prejudicial.
622 § 243 (1) AktG, Ein beschluss der Hauptversammlung kann wegen Verletzung des Gesetzes oder der 
Satzung durch Klage angefochten worden.
623 This is part of the traditional German concept which perceives the individual shareholder to be the 
watchdog of management, the supervisory board, and majority shareholders.
624 See Ulrich Noack and Dirk Zetzsche, ‘Germany’s Corporate and Financial Law 2007: (Getting) Ready 
for Competition’, Heinrich-Heine-University Dusseldorf-CBC-RPS 0028, June 2007.
625 Erik P.M. Vermeulen & Dirk A. Zetzsche , ‘The Use and Abuse of Investor Suits’, TILEC Discussion Paper, 
DP 2010-001, January 2010, p 32, It is the theory behind the design of the rescission suit that by filing 
the rescission suit, shareholders, while pursuing their own interests, simultaneously pursue the in-
terest of the corporate or overall shareholder constituency.
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their (broad) right to information (§ 131 AktG).626 The enactment of UMAG627 (2005) tried to 
tackle these abusive suits and aimed at tightening the right to contest GMS decisions. One 
of these reforms introduced a provision (§ 243 (4) AktG)628 which clarifies that the failure to 
provide information which a reasonable shareholder would not consider relevant for his 
voting decision, does not justify contesting of a shareholder meeting’s decision.629 Also a 
special shareholders’ compensation procedure (Spruchverfahren) has been developed with 
the aim of preventing obstructive actions.630 If the appropriateness of the compensation is 
tested separately, the threat to have the GMS decision suspended or rescinded on those 
grounds alone may be dropped.631 The Spruchverfahren is permissible in situations where 
the company’s value is concerned (mergers, acquisitions, amalgamations etc.). The last 
exclusionary reason is particularly relevant in the context of freeze-outs and fundamental 
changes, the validity of which were frequently threatened by strike suitors until the adoption 
of the UMAG.632 The UMAG also introduced a general release procedure; courts can order 
that, despite a pending claim against a decision by the general meeting, it can be entered 
in the commercial register (§ 246a AktG).633 If the court of first instance (in the preliminary 
proceeding634) holds that the measure may take place and the court of last resort eventu-
ally finds the measure to be illegal, the claimants may be reimbursed for their damages. 
The measure itself, however, will nevertheless be deemed to be legal by the force of the 
626 See Ulrich Noack and Dirk Zetzsche, ‘Germany’s Corporate and Financial Law 2007: (Getting) Ready 
for Competition’, Heinrich-Heine-University Dusseldorf-CBC-RPS 0028, June 2007, p. 18, from the tra-
ditional point of view – the AktG generously assigned rights to challenge the meeting’s decision to 
shareholders as part of the traditional watchdog-function of the shareholders. Related to the informa-
tion right of shareholders (§ 131 AktG), previously, an individual shareholder could ask any question 
related to the topics that the meeting was called to vote on and management was required to answer 
these questions. Failure to fully answer such questions could lead to the contesting of the shareholder 
meeting’s decision.
627 Gesetz zur Unternehmensintegrität und Modernisierung des Anfechtungsrechts (UMAG) of 22-09-
2005, BGBI.I 2802.
628 Cf. Schwab in: K. Schmidt/Lutter (eds.), Kommentar Aktiengesetz, 2008, § 243 (4).
629 Ulrich Noack & Dirk Zetzsche, ‘Die Informationsanfechtung nach der Neufassung des § 243 Abs. 4 
AktG’ , 170 ZHR, 218, 226, 2006
630 Mathias M. Siems, Convergence in Shareholder Law, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008, 
p. 219.
631 Mathias M. Siems, Convergence in Shareholder Law, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008, 
p. 219.
632 Ulrich Noack and Dirk Zetzsche, ‘Germany’s Corporate and Financial Law 2007: (Getting) Ready for 
Competition’, Heinrich-Heine-University Dusseldorf-CBC-RPS 0028, June 2007, p. 19, the validity of 
freeze-outs and fundamental changes were frequently threatened by strike suitors until the adoption 
of the UMAG. Cf. also Erik P.M. Vermeulen & Dirk A. Zetzsche, ‘The Use and Abuse of Investor Suits’, 
TILEC Discussion Paper, DP 2010-001, January 2010.
633 Mathias M. Siems, Convergence in Shareholder Law, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008, 
p. 219. See § 246(a) (4) AktG, If the court of first instance (in the preliminary proceeding) holds that the 
measure may take place and the main court eventually finds the measure to be illegal, the claimants 
may be reimbursed for their damages. The measure itself, however, will nevertheless be deemed to 
be legal by the force of the preliminary judgment. 
634 In 2009 the preliminary procedure was amended; since 1 November 2009, this procedure is a one 
instance only procedure in front of the Oberlandesgericht (Higher Regional Court, Appeal Court) which 
must issue a decision within three months or account for delays in writing. In urgent cases, the Ober-
landesgericht may forego an oral hearing and decide on the basis of written facts. See § 246a (1) and (3) 
of the Aktiengesetz and § 16 (3) of the Umwandlungsgesetz, as amended.
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preliminary judgment.635 Compare this to the Dutch Versatel-case636 in which the integra-
tion of Versatel in Tele2 was put on hold primarily for validation reasons of buy-out by a 
minority as consequence of a legal merger of Versatel in a subsidiary of Tele2. The Ger-
man ‘Spruchverfahren’ and rescission suit are two different procedures, any claim that a 
compensation for shares is inadequate belongs to the domain of the ‘Spruchverfahren’. The 
Netherlands Investigation procedure does not provide similar procedural clarity. The func-
tion of this ‘Spruchverfahren’ is quite similar to the US appraisal procedure (§ 262 (c) DGCL), 
it prevents shareholders from blocking a transaction; it suits a market-oriented system in 
which investors are protected by giving them the right to have the fair value of their shares 
determined and paid to them in cash, not a sale of the shares to a third party637. Cf. also the 
squeeze-out and sell-out-rights under the 13th Directive.
In the Netherlands, a decision of the GMS, or another organ, is void if the decision violates a 
statutory provision or a provision of the articles of association. This article safeguards the 
mandatory division of powers between the board and the GMS as prescribed by statute and 
fixed in the articles of incorporation. This article thus allows enforcement of rules regulat-
ing the internal division of powers in the organisation of the company.638 Furthermore, in the 
Netherlands any regular court could void resolutions on the grounds that a) the decision 
violates either a statutory provision or a provision of the articles of association regulating 
the realisation of decision (art. 2:15 (1) (a)), b NCC) in case of violation of notions of rea-
sonableness and fairness as required by art. 2:8 NCC: shareholders, but also the board and 
the company itself, are prevented from exercising a right if its exercise disproportionally 
harms other shareholders, the management board, the supervisory board or the corpora-
tion itself,639 and c) in case of violation of regulations.640 In principle, art. 2:16 NCC will pro-
tect third parties if a decision of the company is rescinded.
The Dutch investigation procedure with the Enterprise Chamber of the Amsterdam Court of 
Appeals (hereafter: “investigation procedure”) also provides the possibility to void decisions 
of the GMS, but also of other organs of the company. This procedure is unique and does not 
exist in the US, the UK or in Germany. This procedure allows – also for issuers – immediate 
and final injunctive relief (arts. 2:349a NCC and 355) if, according to the court, the state of 
affairs so requires. In recent years this procedure and the possibility for (immediate) injunc-
tive relief has developed into a very accessible, quick and extremely effective weapon for 
activist shareholders, especially in formal or material takeover conflicts and to put pres-
sure on boards to change strategy and policy (break up scenario, buy-backs, exit appraisal). 
635 See Ulrich Ulrich Noack and Dirk Zetzsche, ‘Germany’s Corporate and Financial Law 2007: (Getting) 
Ready for Competition’, Heinrich-Heine-University Dusseldorf-CBC-RPS 0028, June 2007, p. 20. Erik P.M. 
Vermeulen & Dirk A. Zetzsche, ‘The Use and Abuse of Investor Suits’, TILEC Discussion Paper, DP 2010-
001, January 2010, p. 37, Any claim arguing that the level of compensation is inadequate, or that wrong-
ful information has been given with respect to the compensation, does not belong to the domain of the 
rescission suit, if the evaluation proceeding is available.
636 Amsterdam Enterprise Chamber 14-12-2005, AA 2006, 198 (Versatel) with annotation Raaijmakers.
637 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporate law and Economics (2nd edition), Foundation Press 2009, p. 179.
638 Raaijmakers, Ondernemingsrecht, Pitlo/Raaijmakers, Deventer: Kluwer 2006, p. 572.
639 Work council as well.
640 Erik P.M. Vermeulen & Dirk A. Zetzsche, ‘The Use and Abuse of Investor Suits’, TILEC Discussion Paper, 
DP 2010-001, January 2010. Empirical data shows that this type of ‘rescission suit’ is mainly used by 
directors to challenge dismissal resolutions and notices.
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Shareholders who alone or together own 10% of the shares or shares representing the 
nominal value of EUR 225.00 (as well as related trade unions). (arts. 2:346/347 NCC).
This investigation procedure deviates from usual litigation and rescission suits (art. 2:15, 
also art. 2:15 (3) reasonable interest), since it may be initiated by a petition rather than an 
indictment and, hence, the court has great freedom to direct the course of this procedure. 
These procedural differences have a significant influence on the position of the ‘plaintiffs’ 
(formally: petitioners) and, hence, on the ‘target’ corporation and its board as ‘defendants’. 
The boundary between the rescission suit (arts. 2:15 and 2:14) and the investigation proce-
dure has been somewhat blurred. The Entrerprise Chamber may also annul a decision of 
the GMS as well as of the board or supervisory board. The court may regulate the conse-
quences of the given rescission. In the case of a listed public corporation, these procedural 
differences had a major influence on the court’s assessment of board supremacy. Its find-
ings on this subject have been overruled by the Supreme Court. This and other possibilities 
for shareholder’s litigation will be further discussed in Chapter 4.
3.4.5	 Correction	(restatement)	of	the	annual	accounts
With reference to chapter 2 the US SEC has the power to force upon an issuer a restatement 
of disclosure documents. In the UK, the Secretary of State has this power, other persons 
require his permission to ask for correction of the annual accounts, secs. 455-458 UK CA 
2006. The German Gesetz zur Kontrolle von Unternehmnesabschlüsse provides the Bun-
desanstalt with this authority, which can rely on a ‘Prüfstelle’ for this purpose, § 342b HGB 
and Wertpapierhandelsgesetz §§ 37n-37u. In the Netherlands, arts. 2:447-453 NCC, along 
with the AFM, provides that each person with a due interest and shareholders can request 
for correction of the annual accounts.
3.5 Preliminary conclusions
Shareholders’ procedural pre-meeting rights and also possibilities for (broad) enforce-
ment, such as the right to rescind decisions of the GMS (but also of other organs of the 
company), determine the division of power between the board and the shareholders and 
also influence the supremacy of the board to execute its strategy and policy.
In the US, the pre-meeting rights of shareholder as well as the rescission right reflect the 
US market-oriented system which aims at protection of investors. The US board effectively 
controls the charter. US shareholders can vote on issues that are beyond their powers, 
since the board decides on matters related to the ordinary business. Shareholders have the 
power to start a proxy contest or make (precatory) proposals.
The EU’s (examined) MS all reflect their aim for minority protection. They all provide (under 
different thresholds) ‘calling’-rights. In all systems, shareholders also have the right to 
put items on the agenda. The Netherlands until now provides a strikingly low threshold of 
1% for placing items on the agenda. All systems (especially the US and Germany), except 
the Netherlands, have similar discretion as the US board not to convene a meeting and to 
refuse to put an item on the agenda when it is related to for example ordinary business. The 
UK board, under certain conditions, has the power not to convene a meeting and to refuse 
a resolution that cannot be ‘properly’ moved at the meeting. Notably, the board (BoM/SB) 
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of a Dutch public corporation has less discretion not only in refusing to convene a meeting, 
but also in refusing to put a right on the agenda. In the Netherlands, shareholders’ motions, 
unlike the US precatory rights, in practice function as some kind of instruction right. Part of 
this mechanism is that DCGC-rules appear to be to a certain extent enforceable as ‘custom-
ary’ rules (generally accepted principles) under the umbrella of its general corporate law 
principle that the internal affairs of a corporation shall be governed by reasonableness and 
fairness (art. 2:8 NCC, see chapter 4 for further analysis). The same applies to the require-
ment to have a dialogue with shareholders and therefore seems to be enforceable.
In Germany and the Netherlands, shareholders have a right to rescind a decision of the 
GMS but also other organs, if the decision violates a statutory provision or a provision of the 
articles of association. However, because of abusive suits in Germany, the UMAG further 
developed the ‘Spruchverfahren’-procedure. The German ‘Spruchverfahren’ and rescission 
suit are two different procedures, any claim that a compensation for shares is inadequate 
belongs to the domain of the ‘Spruchverfahren’. The function of this ‘Spruchverfahren’ is 
quite similar to the US appraisal procedure (§ 262 (c) DGCL), in preventing shareholders 
from blocking a transaction; it suits a market-oriented system in which investors are pro-
tected by giving them the right to have the fair value of their shares determined and paid to 
them in cash. The Dutch investigation procedure with the Enterprise Chamber also provides 
the possibility to void decisions of the GMS, but also of other organs of the company. The 
investigation procedure, somewhat absorbing the normal rescission suit, does not offer 
the procedural clarity of that procedure and does not offer the procedural safeguards of a 
regular contra dictionary procedure. In the case of a listed public corporation, these pro-
cedural differences had a profound influence on the supremacy of the Dutch board (listed 
public corporation). In chapter 4 these influences and other possibilities for shareholder’s 
litigation will be further analysed.
3.6 Combining shareholder’s voting power: proxy solicitation and 
voting641 (corporate & securities law)
The above comparative analysis of the dissemination of powers between shareholders 
(investors) and the board of an issuer (‘public corporation’) remains ‘abstract’ in the sense 
that it does not take into account the influence on practice of de facto dispersion of shares, 
block holdings, free float and market conditions.642
Now we turn to the bundling of shareholders’ power, apart from pre-meeting rights, 
through concerted actions or the mechanism of proxy voting and targeted solicitation of 
proxies in the open market. All examined jurisdictions allow proxy voting: a shareholder 
is allowed to authorise someone else to vote on his behalf, albeit that ‘purchasing’ of votes 
641 In this paragraph proxy solicitation and voting will be analysed. Postal voting by which a vote is cast 
directly by the shareholder who holds the vote without attending a meeting, will not be addressed. 
642 For a more extensive analysis of shareholders’ absenteeism, apathy and the more technical details of 
depositing evidential titles and ‘record dates’ reference is made to a variety of studies including the 
HLG Report (2002) and the EU directive to enhance shareholders’ rights (2007).
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may be restricted. The significance is evident. It allows the concentration and ‘line up’ of 
voting power to activate the voting power of passive or ‘silent’ investors and thus to acquire 
a decisive, blocking, prominent or at least influential vote. Institutional investors, pension 
funds and others have been under pressure to use their voting power to enhance the bal-
ance of powers within issuers. Specialised firms (such as RiskMetrics) advising on the use 
of voting rights emerged. Issuers, also in the EU, enhanced their investor relations and 
developed a growing interest in knowing their shareholders’ constituency, also for commu-
nication (on top of prevailing disclosure). The concept of ‘dialogue’ should be understood in 
this context. Proxy voting/solicitation is a mechanism used by issuers that facilitates voting 
by mostly ‘anonymous’/dispersed shareholders who cannot physically attend a meeting of 
share holders.643
Proxies may be needed to ensure that a required quorum of shareholders will be present or 
represented at the meeting and valid decisions can be taken.644 Regulation of voting by proxy 
is the subject of corporate law, the solicitation of proxies and the required disclosure to 
protect investors will be a subject of securities regulation. Conceptually this makes a differ-
ence. The former may be part of a tradition of corporate/governance aiming at shareholder 
democracy and the shareholder voice in the corporation and to underscore the monitoring 
function of investors; the latter also aims to improve shareholder voice as part of ‘good’ 
corporate governance. Thus if, how and on at what level (corporate or securities law) legal 
regimes have developed and are facilitating mechanisms and rules on proxy voting and 
solicitation may influence the division of power within the corporation.
This paragraph will discuss proxy solicitation and voting.645 Rules on acting in concert, 
although important for shareholders trying to activate other investors, are not part of this 
analysis, nor are ‘empty voting’ and securities lending.
643 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporate law and Economics (2nd edition), Foundation Press 2009, p. 247. Allen, 
Kraakman and Subramanian, Commentaries and Cases on the Law of Business Organization (2nd Edi-
tion), New York: Aspen Publishers 2007, p. 185, Shareholder Meetings require a quorum to act. Given 
the widely dispersed share ownership of most publicly financed corporation, public shareholders are 
unlikely to actually attend shareholder meetings. As a result, in order to gather a quorum, the board 
and its officers are permitted to collect voting authority from shareholders in the form of proxies. Cf. 
also William A. Klein and John C. Coffee Jr., Business Organizations and Finance, Legal and Economic 
Principles, New York: Foundation Press 2004, p. 127.
644 Generally, proxies will be sought by companies for the annual shareholder meeting or other special 
meetings. Because so many publicly traded corporations are Berle-Means corporations and there 
is no controlling shareholders presence, proxies are often needed to be sure there is a quorum or a 
minimum number of shareholders present at the meeting in order to conduct business and to take 
whatever actions are needed. The frequent use of proxy voting historically in the US was a major rea-
son that the SEA’34 gave the SEC broad powers to regulate proxies. The federal proxy rules are very 
detailed with its primary focus on disclosure with publicly traded corporations required to comply 
when proxies are solicited. But there is also state company law which actually provides the basis for 
this.
645 Mathias Siems, Convergence in Shareholder Law, Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 96 explaining 
the different modes of communication between registered or bearer shares; with registered shares 
the identity of the shareholders should in principle be known, these shareholders are to be informed 
personally. For bearer shares by contrast the emphasis is on the public notice. Furthermore, financial 
intermediaries who have custody of shares can be obliged to forward information to bearer share-
holders.
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3.6.1	 US	proxy	rules:	disclosure	function
US federal securities law is concerned mainly with disclosure obligations in the process of 
soliciting proxies, as well as procedural and antifraud rules designed to make the required 
disclosure more effective. In contrast, regulating the substance of corporate governance 
standards is a matter for state corporate law. This also applies to the rules concerning proxy 
voting and solicitation, a system regulated by the § 14 (a) SEA’34 and subsequent SEC rules.646 
The federal proxy rules are very detailed. Their primary focus is on disclosure by issuers 
required to comply when proxies are solicited by themselves.647 Federal proxy regulation has 
two principal goals. First and foremost, it regulates the disclosures to be provided to inves-
tors whose votes are solicited.648 § 14 (a) (c) SEA’34 and its proxy rules focus on disclosure. 
According to SEC Rule 14a-3 (b) proxy solicitation by the issuer itself for the election of direc-
tors at an annual meeting must be accompanied or preceded by an annual report to security 
holders that includes amonst others: 1) balance sheets for two years and income statements 
for three, all audited and prepared on a consolidated basis in accordance with Regulation 
S-X; 2) selected financial data; 3) management’s discussion and  analysis of financial condi-
tion and results of operation, etc.649 Thus these requirements fit into the issuer’s obligations 
to disclose its annual and periodical report as discussed in Chapter 2.
Secondly, it regulates the procedures, by which proxy solicitations are conducted. SEA’34 
§14(a) however, does, not regulate substantive elements of shareholder voting.650 The extent 
to which the SEC proxy rules go beyond disclosure relate mainly to the procedures by which 
the proxies are to be prepared, solicited and used. For example, SEC Rule 14a-4 restricts 
management’s use of discretionary power to cast votes obtained by a proxy solicitation. 
Rule 14a-7 requires management cooperation in transmitting an insurgent’s proxy materi-
646 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, ‘The Scope of the SEC’s Authority over Shareholder Voting Rights’, UCLA 
School of Law Research Paper No. 07-16, May 2007., p. 1. Regulation of the proxy process is a core func-
tion of the Commission and one of the original responsibilities assigned to the Commission upon its 
creation in the SEA’34. When Congress charged the Commission with regulating the proxy process, 
it created a federal role in vindicating shareholders’ state law rights. The federal interests include 
the importance of fair corporate suffrage and the prevention of abuses that would frustrate the free 
exercise of shareholders’ voting rights. At the same time, however, Congress also recognized the tra-
ditional role of state corporation law, particularly with respect to the board’s powers to manage the 
company’s affairs. Briefing Paper: Roundtable on the Federal Proxy Rules and State Corporation Law 
(May 7, 2007), available at <http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/proxyprocess/proxybriefing050707.htm>.
647 See generally 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3. Even if the company is not soliciting proxies it still must provide 
shareholders with information prior to a meeting. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14c-2.
648 Once a proxy is solicited every ‘solicitee’ has to be provided with a written proxy statement which has 
to the disclosure rules. This statement has be approved by the SEC before it may be send to the share-
holders. One exception is when the solicitation is done to less then 10 shareholders and the solicitation 
is not the initiative of the corporation itself, Rule 14a-2 (b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14 a-2 (b) (1) (1990). 
649 1) Quantitative and qualitative disclosures about mark risk required since 1997 by Regulation S-K Item 
305; 2) A brief description of the business done by the registrant and its subsidiaries during the most 
recent fiscal year as well as industry segment data; 3) Information concerning each of the registrant’s 
directors and executive officers; 4) The market price of and dividends on the registrants’ common equi-
ty, together with related security holder matters. Unless the report itself satisfies Form 10-K, either 
the report or the proxy statement must contain an undertaking to supply a copy of the 10-K report. 
650 See 2nd District Court in Business Rountable.
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als to shareholders. SEC Rule 14a-8 requires management to include qualified shareholder 
proposals in the corporation’s proxy statement at the firm’s expense (see § 3.4).651
These observed goals are reflected in the legislative history of the Exchange Act and its 
§ 14 (a) (proxy rules). Historically, proxy voting was used frequently in the US. However, in 
practice investors were often not fully informed or actually deceived when their votes were 
solicited. The intent of § 14(a) SEA’34 and SEC’s Rules thereunder is to ‘protect investors 
from promiscuous solicitation of their proxies’.652 These rules are enforced in the SEA’34 
itself, private enforcement playing a particular role in enforcing these rules; any misleading 
statements under the federal proxy rules § 14 (a) are covered under the general securities 
fraud action (§ 10-b and SEC Rule 10-b-5). (see par. 2.6 and 2.7 for public (SEC!) and private 
enforcement.)
Summarising, the focus of US proxy voting is on enabling shareholders to make effective 
use (by disclosure) of whatever voting rights they possess by virtue of state law. In its con-
cept, the federal securities rules take no stand in the debate on improving shareholder 
democracy, however, as observed improving shareholder democracy has been on the regu-
latory agenda of the SEC for years. Also listing rules (such as NYSE, NASDAQ) regulate cor-
porate governance items, but their enforcement differs substantially as will be discussed 
in the next paragraph.
3.6.2	Proxy	voting	and	corporate	governance
Proxy voting is closely connected with ‘corporate democracy’ and corporate governance. 
The EU Shareholders Rights Directive also aims at shareholder control as part of sound 
corporate governance facilitated by a system of proxy voting. Also in the Netherlands, the 
introduction of a record date facilitating a system of proxy voting and Principle IV DCGC 
seems to be part of or have been part of the tide to ‘improve’ shareholders democracy.
In the US, the system of proxy voting was enacted as part of the overall objective of the Secu-
rities Exchange Act ’34. The Securities Exchange Act, as discussed above, does not address 
corporate governance as such. Instead, its focus is on trading of securities and securities 
pricing in the securities markets. Virtually all of its provisions address such matters as the 
651 Stephen M. Bainbridge, ‘The Scope of the SEC’s Authority over Shareholder Voting Rights’, UCLA 
School of Law Research Paper No. 07-16, May 2007.
652 Id. at 77. The Senate Committee’s report on stock exchange practices likewise focused on disclosure 
concerns. It noted that management frequently asked shareholders to grant proxies without explana-
tion of the matters to be acted upon. S. Rep. No. 1455, supra note 30, at 74. See also S. Rep. No. 792, 
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1934) (“Too often proxies are solicited without explanation to the shareholder of 
the real nature of the questions for which authority to cast his vote is sought.”). The report emphasised 
the need for adequate shareholder knowledge about both the company’s financial position and matters 
of policy. S. Rep. No. 1455, supra note 30, at 74. Finally, in describing the intent of § 14(a), the report 
contemplated that the SEC’s rules thereunder would “protect investors from promiscuous solicitation 
of their proxies.” Congress was made aware of these concerns in some detail. Thomas Corcoran, for 
example, told the House Committee that “[p]roxies, as solicitations are made now, are a joke.” He testi-
fied at length about the lack of disclosure provided to shareholders and abuses of the proxy solicitation 
process. In answer to a question as to how these abuses could be prevented, he referred solely to the 
need for better disclosures. Similarly, in a brief supporting the Exchange Act’s constitutionality, Cor-
coran and Benjamin Cohen stated that the proxy provisions were “designed to make available to the 
investor reasonable information regarding the possibility of control of the corporation ....”
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production and distribution of information653 about issuers and their securities, the flow of 
funds in the market, and the basic structure of the market.654 The legislative history of the 
SEA’34655 clarifies that its purpose is not to regulate topics of corporate governance, which 
remains the realm of state corporate law. This also applies to the broad regulatory power 
giving to the SEC under the SEA’34 and also § 14 (a);656 the SEC has no authority over the 
substance of corporate governance.657 An attempt by the SEC to regulate the substance of 
voting rights (SEC Rule 19a-4, prohibiting the use of non-voting stock) arguing that the Com-
mission has the power to do so under § 14 (a) SEA’34 (proxy voting), was immediately and 
successfully contested in the case of the Business Roundtable v. the SEC.
In striking down SEC Rule 19c-4, the DC Circuit closely tied the question of the scope of 
the SEC’s authority over voting rights to the broader question of the SEC’s authority over 
the substance of corporate governance generally. As the court observed: “nothing in the 
legislative history comes near to saying: ‘The purposes of this act, although they generally will 
653 See e.g. Federal Licensing of Corporations: Hearings Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 75th Cong., 
1st & 3d Sess. (1937 & 1938), at one of the hearings, the SEC’s Assistant Director of Registration was 
asked whether the federal securities laws prohibited the use of nonvoting stock. He replied that “they 
only require that an adequate disclosure of the material facts concerning that structure be made.”
654 Stephen M. Bainbridge, ‘The Scope of the SEC’s Authority over Shareholder Voting Rights’, UCLA 
School of Law Research Paper No. 07-16, May 2007, p. 10 and further for an extensive overview of the 
legislative history of the SEA’34 and of § 14 (a) SEA’34 which indicates that congress did not have any 
intention to regulate corporate governance also not under rules on proxy voting and broad regulatory 
power given to the SEC. Important is the remark on page 10, Congress’ inaction, accordingly, should 
be read as leaving voting rights in the hands of the states and the exchanges, especially when consid-
ered in light of the repeated congressional rejections of proposals to federalize corporate law. See 
also: Disclosure was the chief vehicle by which the Act’s drafters intended to regulate the markets. 
Brandeis’ famous dictum – “Sunlight is . . . the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient 
policeman” – was well accepted by the 1930s; indeed, it was the basic concept around which the fed-
eral securities laws were ultimately drafted. Because state securities laws could not effectively as-
sure full disclosure, federal intervention was widely accepted as essential to maintaining the national 
capital markets.
655 See SEA’34, Pub. L. No. 73-291, § 2, 48 Stat. 881, 881-82 (1934); S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 
3 (1934) (need to control excessive stock market speculation that had “brought in its train social and 
economic evils which have affected the security and prosperity of the entire country.”); Cong. Rec. 
7921-22 (1934) (Rep. Mapes) (the Act had two objectives: to prevent excessive speculation and to pro-
vide a fair and honest market for securities transactions).
656 Brief for Respondent at 13, Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990) [hereinafter SEC 
Brief]. The legislative history of § 14(a) is relatively sparse, in large part because the controversy over 
federal proxy regulation was resolved early in the legislative process. As originally introduced, the 
proxy provision mandated substantial disclosures and gave the SEC authority to adopt additional dis-
closure requirements. H.R.7852, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. § 13(a) (1934). The proposal met with substantial 
criticism. In redrafting § 14(a) in response to these criticisms, Congress did what it often does when it 
has a tough problem to solve: it told somebody else to solve it. In effect, the Act simply made it unlaw-
ful to solicit proxies “in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe 
as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.” SEA’34, Pub. L. 
No. 73-291, § 14(a), 48 Stat.881, 895 (1934).
657 Stephen M. Bainbridge, ‘The Scope of the SEC’s Authority over Shareholder Voting Rights’, UCLA School 
of Law Research Paper No. 07-16, May 2007, concludes after extensive reading of the legislative history of 
the SEA’34: “But surely the Congress that repeatedly denied any intent to regiment corporate manage-
ment, and later repeatedly rejected proposals to federalize corporate law, did not intend to sneak those 
powers back into the bill through the back door by authorizing the SEC to adopt corporate governance 
rules. More important for present purposes, however, there is no reason to believe that Congress in-
tended to carve out the substance of voting rights as a single exception to this general rule.” 
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not involve the Commission in corporate governance, do include preservation of the one share/
one vote principle.’ And even [if any did] we doubt that such a statement in the legislative his-
tory could support a special and anomalous exception to the Act’s otherwise intelligible concep-
tual line excluding the Commission from corporate governance. Accordingly, it is appropriate to 
devote some attention to the evidence supporting that ‘conceptual line’.”658 Compare also Santa 
Fe Industries v. Green659 and CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp660, in which the US Supreme Court 
confirms the view that the state is the principal regulator of corporate governance. Federal 
law is seen as placing a gloss on the underlying background of state corporate law, but not 
as replacing it.661
§ 14 (a) SEA’34 states that SEA confines itself to disclosure and procedural rules as seen 
above. Of course, some of these rules affect shareholder voting, but only with a narrow 
affect on corporate governance. However, SRO, like NYSE and NASDAQ, disseminate, under 
pressure of the SEC, listing rules that the SEC is not allowed to promulgate under the rule of 
Business Roundtable. However these listing rules are enforced totally differently to ‘enforce-
ment’ of corporate governance codes in the EU. This will be analysed in chapter 4. In the EU 
and several Member States, no comparable system of proxy voting as in the US has evolved 
so far. The EU Shareholder Rights Directive does not result in a EU federal system of proxy 
voting, once implemented it should only eliminate national barriers to voting as it facilitates 
cross-border voting in the EU and strengthening of shareholder rights/position.662 In the 
658 Other judicial interpretations of § 14 are also consistent with the notion that § 14 (a) SEA ‘34 was 
 directed at assuring full disclosure and a fair opportunity to exercise corporate voting rights (of 
course, these decisions were rendered in cases in which it was those aspects of the rules that were at 
issue). E.g., Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 381 (1970); Greater Iowa Corp. v. McLendon, 378 
F.2d 783, 795 (8th Cir. 1967); Dann v. Studebaker-Packard Corp., 288 F.2d 201, 208 (6th Cir. 1961); SEC v. 
Transamerica Corp., 163 F.2d 511, 518 (3d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 847 (1948); NUI Corp. v. Kim-
melman, 593 F. Supp. 1457, 1469 (D.N.J. 1984), rev’d, 765 F.2d 399 (3d Cir. 1985); Freedman v. Barrow, 
427 F. Supp. 1129, 1145 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Leighton v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 397 F. Supp. 133, 
138 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Studebaker Corp. v. Allied Products Corp., 256 F. Supp. 173, 188-89 (W.D. Mich. 1966).
659 In Santa Fe Industries v. Green, the Supreme Court applied the brakes to efforts to give SEC Rule 10b-5 
an increasingly expansive reading that in time might have led to a federal common law of corporations. 
The Court did so by holding that the fundamental purpose of the Securities Exchange Act is to assure 
full disclosure. Once complete disclosure is made, the transaction’s fairness and terms do not be-
come issues under federal law, instead they are a matter for state corporate law. The Court’s analysis 
was driven by a concern that a broader view of the Act’s purposes would result in federalizing much of 
state corporate law, overriding well-established state policies of corporate regulation.
660 In CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp., the Supreme Court again drew a sharp line between the state and fed-
eral role, this time with specific application to the problem at hand. The Court recognized that states 
have a legitimate interest in defining the attributes of their corporations and protecting shareholders 
of their corporations. Specifically, the Court strongly indicated that the substance of corporate voting 
rights is solely a matter of state concern: “No principle of corporation law and practice is more firmly 
established than a State’s authority to regulate domestic corporations, including the authority to de-
fine the voting rights of shareholders.”
661 Stephen M. Bainbridge, ‘The Scope of the SEC’s Authority over Shareholder Voting Rights’, UCLA 
School of Law Research Paper No. 07-16, May 2007, p. 17, absent a clear expression of congressional 
intent, the Court has been reluctant to federalize questions traditionally within the state sphere. Given 
the absence of any indication of congressional intent to pre-empt state laws governing shareholder 
voting rights, it is therefore unlikely that the Supreme Court would support an expansive view of the 
SEC’s authority to regulate the substance of shareholder voting rights. To the contrary, it seems far 
more likely that the Court would embrace the line drawn by Business Roundtable.
662 Luca Enriques and Matteo Gatti, ‘The Uneasy Case for Topdown Corporate Law Harmonization in the 
European Union’, 27 U. Pa. Int’l Econ. L. 939, 2006, have argued that there were insufficient reasons 
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examined MS, the proxy rules are partly regulated in listing rules (see the UK) and/or cor-
porate law (UK/NL/GER) and soft law (corporate governance codes, NL).
3.6.3	 EU	Shareholder	Rights	Directive	and	the	concept	of	proxy	voting
In the EU, no system of federal proxy voting has developed so far. The EU Shareholders 
Rights Directive aims to facilitate shareholder voting focusing in particular on problems 
with cross-border voting (Member States should implement as of 3 August 2009, the Neth-
erlands has not implemented yet).
The Shareholder Rights Directive is a mix of principles, mandatory rules and rules that pro-
vide companies with options. The Directive harmonises certain shareholder rights.663 The 
key provisions include: 1) equal treatment of shareholders as to participation and voting in 
the general meeting, a requirement also enacted in the Transparency Directive; 2) required 
notice of general meeting of at least 30 days and certain required information;664 3) the right 
to put items on the agenda of the general meeting and table draft resolutions;665 4) removal 
of requirements of any blocking mechanism such as share deposits that restrict share-
holder participation in the general meeting and a record date, mandatory for an issuer with 
bearer shares;666 5) the right of shareholders to ask questions on agenda items and the duty 
to respond thereto;667 6) allowing and facilitating proxy voting; the Transparency Directive 
also entitles shareholders to exercise voting rights by proxy. In particular, the Transparency 
to justify the Voting Rights Directive. They see the Voting Rights Directive as having two goals – the 
removal of national barriers to voting and strengthening shareholder right and that the former is 
the only legitimate goal for the EU. But they think that Voting Rights Directive goes beyond what was 
needed to accomplish that goal, see p. 983-91.
663 Lower House, 2008–2009, 31 746, no. 3 Explanatory Note (explanation proposal of Bill ‘Shareholder 
Rights Directive), p.1.
664 The information according to art. 5 of the Voting Rights Directive includes “(a) a precise indication of 
the place, time and draft agenda of the meeting; (b) a clear and precise description of the procedures 
that shareholders must comply with in order to be able to participate and to cast their vote in the gen-
eral meeting, including the applicable record date; (c) a clear and precise description of the available 
means by which shareholders can participate in the general meeting and cast their vote. Alternatively, 
it may indicate where such information may be obtained; (d) an indication where and how the full, una-
bridged text of the resolutions and the documents intended to be submitted to the general meeting for 
approval may be obtained.” In addition companies must post on their Internet sites (a) the meeting no-
tice (b) the total number of shares and voting rights; (c) the texts of the resolutions and the documents 
for the meeting; (d) the forms to be used to vote by correspondence and by proxy (or where and how 
the forms can be obtained). Id., art. 15, at 13 (publishing post meeting information on the company’s 
internet site within 15 days the voting results). See also Dirk Zetzsche, ‘Virtual Shareholder Meetings 
and the European Shareholder Rights Directive – Challenges and Opportunities’, CBC-RPS No. 0029, 
June 2007 see also Arthur R. Pinto, The European Union’s Shareholder Voting Rights Directive from 
an American Perspective: Some Comparisons and Observations, Fordham International Law Journal, 
Vol. 32, 2008, p. 20. E.g. SEC Rule 14a-16 provides for a proxy statement at least 40 days before a 
meeting while Del. Gen. Corp. Law § 222(b) indicates notice of not less than 10 or more than 60 days. 
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-16; Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 222(b).
665 Art. 6 Shareholder Rights Dir. indicates that Member States can require a minimum stake in the share 
capital of the issuer but such minimum shall not exceed 5% or a nominal value of EUR 10 million, 
whichever is the lower.
666 See art. 7 Shareholder Rights Directive.
667 In 2005 amendments to the German Stock Corporation Act allows German companies to provide in 
their articles or by laws to authorize the chairman of the meeting to restrict a shareholder’s right to 
speak and ask questions. Michael Arnold and Andreas Wolfle, ‘Defining the rights of shareholders’, 
International Financial Law Review, May 2006, See Arthur R. Pinto, ‘The European Union’s Shareholder 
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Directive requires that “issuers make available electronic or paper proxy forms to each 
person entitled to vote” (art. 17 Transparency Directive668). MS can restrict the exercise of 
shareholder rights through proxy holders only for the purpose addressing potential conflict 
of interest, for example if the proxy holder is a controlling shareholder of the company (art. 
10 (3) (i) Shareholder Rights Directive or a member of the administrative, management or 
supervisory body of the company (art. 10 (3) (ii) Shareholder Rights Directive). MS in doing 
so shall not impose any requirements other than listed in art. 10(3) (a)-(c), (a) states that MS 
may prescribe that the proxy holder disclose certain specified facts which may be relevant 
for the shareholders in assessing any risk that the proxy holder might pursue any inter-
est other than the interest of the shareholder. As analysed in the previous paragraph, the 
purpose of addressing potential conflicts of interest when shareholders are asked for their 
(proxy) vote is one of the aims of US federal proxy rules evidenced by its legislative history, 
and one of the reasons for extensive disclosure duties for proxy solicitation individually and 
through securities accounts.669
The Directive further attempts to deal with the potential of the internet and thus one of its 
goals was to “remove all legal obstacles to electronic participation in general meetings”.670 
In concept, this Directive follows the Commission’s plan of May 2003 (‘Modernising Company 
Law and enhancing Corporate Governance in the European Union, A Plan to Move Forward’ 
(‘CLAP’)), namely corporate governance671 672. As already observed in Chapter 1, this plan fol-
lows the HLG Final Report of 4 November 2002, which identified shareholder protection as 
a key issue for ensuring good corporate governance, with particular emphasis on the elimi-
Voting Rights Directive from an American Perspective: Some Comparisons and observations’, Ford-
ham International Law Journal, Vol. 32, 2008, p.21.
668 Art. 17 TD, with respect to shareholder information, the TD also requires, in particular, information 
about the place, time and agenda of shareholder meetings, and the rights of holders to participate in 
meetings. MS must allow the use of electronic means for the purposes of conveying information to 
shareholders if the shareholders so decide.
669 Member States can restrict proxy holders who may be connected to the company.
670 Dirk Zetzsche, ‘Virtual Shareholder Meetings and the European Shareholder Rights Directive – Chal-
lenges and Opportunities’, CBC-RPS No. 0029, June 2007 and Arthur R. Pinto, ‘The European Union’s 
Shareholder Voting Rights Directive from an American Perspective: Some Comparisons and observa-
tions’, Fordham International Law Journal, Vol. 32, 2008, p.21.
671 A number of rationales were given for CLAP including increased cross-border operations activities 
requires common EU company law mechanisms to facilitate freedom of establishment and cross-
border restructuring; integration of capital markets and the need to have equivalent corporate gov-
ernance frameworks; maximisation of the benefits of modern technologies on information and com-
munication technology; the forthcoming enlargement of the EU with 10 new Member States; recent 
financial scandals and the needs and demands of investors for protection from “shoddy, greedy and 
occasionally fraudulent corporate behaviour.” CLAP § 1.2. CLAP also discussed other shareholder 
rights that should be harmonised such as a right to appoint a special auditor and a duty of institutional 
investors to disclose their investment and voting policies, which may be dealt with at a later time. See 
Baums, ‘European Company Law Beyond the 2003 Action Plan’, ECGI-Law Working Paper No. 81, 2007.
672 The EU has implemented some other provisions from CLAP involving corporate governance-related 
issues with three recommendations (which are not binding) and four directives, which have been en-
acted. The three recommendations deal with auditors’ independence, remuneration of directors, and 
the role of non-executive directors. The four directives enacted include the Directive on Statutory 
Audit, a revision of the Directive on Legal Capital, the Directive on Shareholders’ Rights and the Di-
rective on Cross-Border Mergers. However also the 4/7th Directives were amended, i.e. corporate 
governance statement and collective responsibility for the board.
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nation of obstacles to cross-border activities.673 The EU Shareholder Rights Directive fits in 
the above mentioned regulatory agenda by aiming at amongst other things the promotion 
of good corporate governance through shareholder participation in voting.674 Its Preamble 
(no.3) states that ‘holders of shares carrying voting rights should be able to exercise those 
right given that they are reflected in the price that has to be paid at the acquisition of the 
shares.675 Furthermore, the Preamble states that ‘effective shareholder control is a prereq-
uisite to sound corporate governance and should, therefore, be facilitated and encouraged’. 
This Directive therefore, as do other initiatives of the Commission, fits into the tradition of 
protecting the shareholder through corporate law as we have seen in part II by amending EU 
corporate Directives (4/7th and 8th) and Recommendations (e.g. on NED). Conceptually this 
Directive takes a different route than the US proxy system regulated mainly in the SEA’34. 
The EU Shareholder Directive aims at better monitoring by shareholders and does not seem 
to absorb the evolved system of EU securities regulation and the protection of the investor 
in the market; as to disclosure requirements it focuses on providing shareholders with, for 
example, notice of the meeting (art. 5) and procedure of voting (art. 7).676 It appears to follow 
the path of harmonising corporate law rather than extending the body of EU securities law.
673 Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on a Modern Regulatory Framework for Com-
pany Law in Europe (Nov. 4, 2002) (Brussels): <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/
modern/report>, The report indicates a number of specific obstacles concerning the entitlement to 
vote, admission to general meetings, information and documentation, and shareholders’ rights at the 
general meeting. The Winter Group also recommended that the Commission, as a matter of priority, 
set up a specific project to build a regulatory framework for shareholder information, communication 
and decision making that would facilitate the participation of shareholders across the EU and, where 
possible, outside the EU, in the governance of European listed companies
674 Arthur R. Pinto, ‘The European Union’s Shareholder Voting Rights Directive from an American Per-
spective: Some Comparisons and observations’, Fordham International Law Journal, Vol. 32, 2008; 
There are a number of different reasons behind this directive. In much of Europe there is no long tra-
dition of easy proxy voting directly by shareholders with a variety of constraints, and the voting rights 
directive may enhance that voting. There was the promotion of good corporate governance through 
shareholder participation in voting, the protection of EU shareholders who do not reside in the home 
country where their company resides, the protection of small individual shareholders, the concern 
that increased ownership by foreign investors could create firms with passive investors, the recogni-
tion of increased cross border investing and the importance of integrated markets. see Annex to the 
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Exercise of Voting Rights 
by Shareholders of Companies Having Their Registered Office in a Member State and Whose Shares 
are Admitted to Trading on a Regulated Market and Amending Directive 2004/109/EC, Eur. Parl.Doc. 
(COM 2005) 685, available at <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/shareholders/
comm_native_sec_2006_0181_en.pdf>(hereinafter “Annex”).
675 However the share price of restricted or non-voting shares in most instances will have incorporated 
the fact exercising a voice through voting is restricted. If one extends this line of reasoning also pro-
tective devices in case of a hostile takeover by which shareholder voice is neutralised for a period in 
time are not allowed.
676 According to the Preamble of the Shareholder Rights Directive, “The existing Community legislation 
is not sufficient to achieve this objective. Directive 2001/34/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 28 May 2001 on the admission of securities to official stock exchange listing and on infor-
mation to be published on those securities focuses on the information issuers have to disclose to the 
market and accordingly does not deal with the shareholder voting process itself. Moreover, Directive 
2004/109/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 2004 on the harmoni-
sation of transparency requirements in relation to information about issuers whose securities are 
admitted to trading on a regulated market imposes on issuers an obligation to make available certain 
information and documents relevant to general meetings, but such information and documents are to 
be made available in the issuer’s home Member State. Therefore, certain minimum standards should 
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3.6.4	 Proxy	voting	in	the	MS:	UK,	Ger	and	NL
Proxy voting in the UK is regulated by statutory provisions in the secs. 324-331 UK CA 2006; 
these can be characterised as procedural rules. Formerly, UK proxy voting was (since 
1948) mainly regulated in the articles of association which, in practice, allowed the board to 
entrench their position. It had become common practice for boards to send proxy forms in 
their own favour with the notice of the meeting and for these to be stamped and addressed 
at the company’s expense.677 For this lack of shareholder democracy the LSE, however, 
required that listed companies should send out ‘two-way’ proxies, i.e. forms which enabled 
members to direct the proxy whether to vote for or against any resolution. The FSA’s listing 
rules currently require ‘three-way’ proxies (for, against or abstain) (LR 9.3.6.).678
Sec. 324 (1) UK CA 2006 states that any member is entitled to appoint another person 
(whether a member of the company or not) as his proxy to attend, speak and vote instead of 
himself at a meeting of the company. Sec. 324 (2) UK CA 2006 provides that the member may 
appoint more than one proxy, provided each proxy is appointed to exercise rights attached 
to different shares. Sec. 325 UK CA 2006 states that members must be informed of their 
statutory rights to attend, speak and vote by proxy in the notice convening the meeting; sec. 
236 (1) if proxies are solicited at the company’s expense, the invitation must be sent to all 
members entitled to attend and vote; sec. 327 the articles may not require that proxy forms 
must be lodged more than 48 hours before a meeting or adjourned meeting.679
The UK CC does not address proxy voting. The aforementioned provisions does not really 
influence the tactical advantages of the directors. They still strike the first blow and their 
solicitation of proxy votes is likely to meet with a substantial response before the opposi-
tion is able to react.680 However, once opposition is aroused, members may be persuaded to 
cancel their proxies (sec. 330 UK CA 2006).
Proxy voting in Germany: § 134 (3) AktG681 makes proxy voting (including by electronic means 
(§ 126 BGB)) possible. See also sec. 2.3.3 GGCC which requires the company to assist the 
be introduced with a view to protecting investors and promoting the smooth and effective exercise of 
shareholder rights attaching to voting shares.” 
677 Gower and Davies, Principles of Modern Company Law, Sweet & Maxwell, London: 2008 p. 456.
678 The Jenkins Committee advised to makes this requirement statutory law. Proxy voting is also regu-
lated in the FSA Listing rules (9.3.6 ‘proxy forms’ and 9.3.7 ‘proxy forms for re-election of retiring di-
rectors). These rules are an addition to the proxy rules in UK CA 2006, they do not relate to disclosure 
(procedural rule attaching voting rights).
679 Gower and Davies, Principles of Modern Company Law, Sweet & Maxwell, London: 2008, p. 487
680 Gower and Davies, Principles of Modern Company Law, Sweet & Maxwell, London: 2008, p. 457, actu-
ally describing what happens when management is allowed and in practice is soliciting proxies of their 
shareholders: ‘Even if their proxies are in “two-way” form, many members will complete and lodge 
them (encouraged by the fact that postage is prepaid). Most two-way proxies provide that if neither 
“for” nor “against” is deleted the proxy will be used as the proxy thinks fit, e.g. as the board wish. LR 
9.3.6 requires this to be expressly stated: “After hearing but one side of the case, and only the most 
intelligent or obstinate are likely to withstand the impact of the, as yet, un contradicted assertions of 
the directors.” The Shareholder Rights Directive allows restriction of aforementioned practice by al-
lowing the MS (amongst others) to restrict or exclude the exercise of shareholder rights through proxy 
holders without specific voting instructions for each resolution in respect of which the proxy holder is 
to vote on behalf of the shareholder.
681 § 134 (1) AktG regulate one share one vote.
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shareholders in the use of proxies.682 The UMAG introduced a record date; shareholders who 
hold shares in their bank account under their own name at the relevant record date 21 days 
prior to the meeting are entitled to exercise their shareholder rights at the meeting (123 (2) 
AktG).683 The traditional important position of German banks684 in the system of corporate 
governance has to be taken into account.685 Because of the traditional use of bearer shares 
in Germany and their deposition with banks, as well as the generally strong position of the 
banking sector, special attention is paid to the exercise of the vote by banks on behalf of 
the shareholders.686 § 135 (1), (5) AktG and § 128 (2) AktG for example address potential 
conflict of banks in voting.687 Because of a number of developments one of them being the 
introduction of the management proxy in Germany banks are losing their influence. Since 
2001, it is explicitly admissible for a proxy to be given to the management, § 134 (3) AktG.688 
US-style (securities law) proxy rules requiring information under the supervision of a fed-
eral authority have not been introduced so far. However, a management proxy can only be 
used if accompanied by binding instructions (§ 135 (1) AktG), as is allowed under art. 10 (3) 
682 Sec. 2.3.3 GCGC The company shall facilitate the personal exercising of shareholders’ voting rights. 
The company shall also assist the shareholders in the use of postal votes and proxies. The Manage-
ment Board shall arrange for the appointment of a representative to exercise shareholders’ voting 
rights in accordance with instructions; this representative should also be reachable during the Gene-
ral Meeting.
683 Ulrich Noack and Dirk Zetzsche, ‘Germany’s Corporate and Financial Law 2007: (Getting) Ready for 
Competition’, Heinrich-Heine-University Dusseldorf-CBC-RPS 0028, June 2007, p. 17, the UMAG facili-
tates also electronic proxy voting and other forms of electronic voting in absentia, since the procedure 
for identifying and authorizing shareholders may rely entirely on electronic. In terms of shareholder 
representation at the meeting this reform is a success; the implementation of the record date system 
raised average turn-outs at shareholder meetings in the 30 largest corporations by app. 4 percent.
684 Spindler, in K.Schmidt/Lutter (eds.), Kommentar Aktiengesetz, 2008, § 134 (3): “Das Depotstimm-
recht hat lange zeit zu einer besonderen Form der Corporate Governance geführt, die einhergehend 
mit Überkreuzverflechtungen und Fremdfinanzierungen zur einer Art finanz- und bankzentriertter 
Unternehehmenskontrolle geführt hat, die ert in Rahmen der zunehmenden Globalisierung und Be-
teutung der Kapitalmärkte aufgebrochen wurde.“
685 Udo C. Braendle, ‘Shareholder Protection in the USA and Germany – “Law and Finance” Revisisted’, 
German Law Journal, Vol. 07 No. 03, 2006. Traditionally the German system was characterised by the 
mechanism of depositary proxy votes practices of banks. Proxy voting by banks is available after the 
assignment of legitimation to a bank. This is a legal disposition of the voting rights without transfer-
ring the ownership. The bank receives the right to exercise the vote either on behalf of the owner if he 
gives clear instructions or on its own behalf if these instructions are missing. In the latter case, banks 
are not obliged to disclose the owner of the shares. Cf. also Seibert, ‘Die Stimmrechtsrechtsausübung 
in deutschen Aktiengeselschaften – ein Bericht an den Deutschen Bundestag’, AG 2004, 529.
686 Mathias M. Siems, Convergence in Shareholder Law, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008, 
p. 105.
687 Theodor Baums and Philip von Randow, ‘Der Markt für Stimmrechtsvertreter’, AG 1995, 145.
688 134 (3) AktG, as amended by Gesetz zur Namensaktie und zur Erleichterung der Stimmrechtsausübung 
(NaStraG) of 18.01.2001, BGBI. I 123.Spindler, , in K.Schmidt/Lutter (eds.), AktG, 2008, § 134 (3), Rz. 
55. Cf. also Lenz, Die gesellschaftsbenannte Stimmrechtsvertretung (Proxy-Vertretung) in der haup-
tversammlung der deutschen publikums-AG, 2005, S. 209, 216. Whether the German BoM can vote by 
proxy for its shareholders as in the US system is not certain. Spindler, K.Schmidt/Lutter (eds.), AktG, 
2008, § 134 (3), Rz. 55 doubts whether a US-style proxy voting system, in which management is in 
control has been enabled by § 134 (3). Cf. also Mathias M. Siems, Convergence in Shareholder Law, New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 105.
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Shareholder Rights Directive (see the US system).689 Notably, the shareholder’s forum,690 as 
introduced by the UMAG (§ 127a AktG), facilitates communication between shareholders, 
which should reduce shareholders’ collective action problems.691
Proxy voting in the Netherlands is allowed under art. 2:117 NCC.692 A record date, underpinning 
a system of proxy voting, was introduced by art. 2:119 NCC.693 This rule aims at better com-
munication between the firm and its shareholders and has its origins in the Dutch corporate 
governance debate around 2002/2003 on the question of how to strengthen the check and 
balances in the public corporation.694 The alleged weak position of shareholders in Dutch 
listed public corporations was perceived as one of the causes of the 2000/2001 corporate 
scandals, see par. 2. Also the DCGC of 2009 still, at least in part, focuses on strengthening 
the position of shareholders. Principle IV DCGC apparently combines the procedural/tech-
nical possibility by mandating the possibility to vote by proxy (“Good corporate governance 
requires the fully-fledged participation of shareholders in the decision-making in the gen-
eral meeting. It is in the interest of the company that as many shareholders as possible take 
part in the decision making in the general meeting. The company shall, in so far as possible, 
give shareholders the opportunity to vote by proxy and to communicate with all other share-
holders”.) The substance of shareholders’ rights, namely ‘to exert such influence on the 
policy of the management board and the supervisory board of the company that it may play a 
689 Ulrich Noack, ‘Stimmrechtsvertretung in der Hauptversammlung nach NaStraG’, ZIP 57, 2001.Cf. also 
Mathias M. Siems, Convergence in Shareholder Law, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008, 
p. 106.
690 Ulrich Noack and Dirk Zetzsche, ‘Germany’s Corporate and Financial Law 2007: (Getting) Ready for 
Competition’, Heinrich-Heine-University Dusseldorf-CBC-RPS 0028, June 2007. On this website share-
holders may give notice of their intent to induce the above pre-procedure for a particular shareholder 
suit; initiate a special investigation of certain managerial conduct; propose a vote on a specific issue in 
shareholder meetings, or call a shareholder meeting on behalf of the corporation. As far as we know, 
this institution is unique.
691 Ulrich Noack and Dirk Zetzsche, ‘Germany’s Corporate and Financial Law 2007: (Getting) Ready for 
Competition’, Heinrich-Heine-University Dusseldorf-CBC-RPS 0028, June 2007. Apparently only a few 
shareholders have used this electronic forum. One of the reasons is that securities law claims, where 
collective action problems are probably at their most severe, are not yet in the catalogue of rights 
which may be exercised over the shareholders’ forum.
692 C.A. Schwarz, Stemrechtloze aandelen, Maastricht University: Oratie: 1990, J.J.M. Maeijer, Asser 2-III 
Vertegenwoordiging en Rechtspersoon, De Naamloze en de Besloten Vennootschap, Deventer: Tjeenk 
Willink 2000, nr. 282. Cf. Also Raaijmakers, Ondernemingsrecht, Pitlo/Raaijmakers, Deventer: Kluwer 
2006, p. 385. Cf. also J. W. Winter, Grensoverschrijdend stemmen, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam: 
Oratie 2000 and J.W. Winter en M. van Ginneken, ‘Stemmen op afstand van dichtbij bekeken’, in: M. 
Raaijmakers, R.van Rooy en A. tervoort (Eds.), Ongebonden recht bedrijven, Deventer: Kluwer 2001, 
p. 325-342, on inter alia ultimate holding issue.
693 The right for shareholders to ask questions during a meeting and to make draft resolutions were al-
ready law in the Netherlands. 
694 Explanatory Memorandum, Parliamentary Papers II, 2003/2004, 26 668, No. 3, p.1, entering a record 
date was considered necessary because the listed company has listed bearer shares. Therefore the 
company has no opportunity at the time of the general meeting to determine who its shareholders 
are. This makes it difficult to check the validity of the proxies granted by the shareholders. A proxy at 
a general meeting is only valid if the shareholders at that time are still shareholder. To ensure this the 
shares had to be blocked during the time the proxy has been given, Schwarz, article 119, note 3. The 
record date prevents the aformentioned “blocking” of shares because at the time of the record date 
the then registered shareholders at the GMS counts as those entitled to vote even though between the 
day of registration and the date of the GMS the share(s) are transferred, Explanatory Memorandum, 
Parliamentary Papers II, 1998/1999, 26 668, No 3, p. 1-6).
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fully-fledged role in the system of checks and balances in the company’ (Principle IV DCGC) 
entails a totally different route than under the US investor market-oriented proxy system.
The Dutch Bill to implement the Shareholder Rights Directive695can be regarded as continu-
ing the corporate governance debate that re-started in 2002/2003. The explanatory notes 
to the Bill state that the Directive aims to strengthen the exercise of rights of shareholder 
in listed public companies and to resolve problems connected to cross-border voting.696 The 
NCC will be amended (see also the proposed amendment considering shareholders’ right to 
put items on the agenda as analysed under par. 3.4.2697) and some new articles introduced, 
such as art. 2:113 (6) NCC requiring listed public corporations to issue the convocation of 
the general meeting through electronic means which will be directly assessable upon the 
meeting that will take place (art. 5 (2) Shareholder Rights Directive) or art. 117 (3) NCC, 
implementing art. 7 (1) (a): participation/voting by shareholders in the general meeting shall 
not be subject to any requirement that his shares be deposited with another natural or legal 
person before the general meeting. These procedural rules, such as the introduction of a 
single record date, facilitate shareholder voting.698
Art. 10 (3) Shareholder Rights Directive provides MS the option to restrict the exercise of 
shareholders’ rights through a proxy holder only for the purpose of addressing potential 
conflict of interest. Such a conflict of interest is potentially present when the proxy holder 
is, for example, a member of the administrative, management or supervisory body of the 
company (art. 10 (3) (ii) Shareholder Rights Directive). This default rule will not be executed 
by the Bill; according to the proposal there is no reason to make a special regulation on this 
topic, because Dutch law offers enough possibilities to tackle possible abuse by the proxy 
holder. For example under Dutch law a proxy can be rescinded under art. 3:40 NCC because 
of breach of the public order or mandatory law. Solicitation of proxies by the board (BoM/
SB) is seemingly not prohibited. Nonetheless, extensive disclosure rules to prevent abusive 
695 Lower House, 2008-2009, 31 746, nr 2, “Wetsvoorstel Wijziging Boek 2 en Wft ter uitvoering Richtlijn 
inzake aandeelhoudersrechten”, a Proposal of Bill is pending with First Chamber of the Parliament. 
Simultaneously with this proposal of bill, a proposal of bill (Lower House 2008-2009, 32 014) following 
the advice of the Monitoring Committee Corporate Governance Code of May 30, 2007 is in preperation, 
that entails a regulation that enables a listed company to discover the identity of its shareholders.
696 The measures in the Directive to which the bill (31 746) is implemented, facilitate the participation of 
shareholders in decisions of the GMS.
697 Recently, cause of implementation of the Shareholders Rights, a proposal of Bill proposes two amend-
ments to art. 2:114: 1 NCC) a request for putting an item on the agenda should state the grounds for 
putting it on the agenda, 2) abolishment of the corporation’s right (art. 2:114a (1) NCC) to refuse to put 
an item on the agenda because of ‘important interests of the corporation’. Consequently, the right 
of shareholders to put an item on the agenda seemingly will be strengthened; the discretion of the 
board to refuse an item proposed by the shareholder is affected. However, only subjects on which 
the GMS has a right to vote can be legally binding; putting other items as recommendations on the 
agenda combined with enforcement (elaborated hereafter) in practice can have binding force (ch. 4 
will elaborate this item); de facto in practice the right to put also motions (see Stork and ABNAMRO) 
not belonging to the competence of the GMS to decide functions as an “instruction-right”of the GMS. 
However it also could be argued that the proposed amendment strengthens the position of the board. 
Under arts. 2:129/2:8 and ASMI the board has the discretion to refuse agenda items that do not belong 
to the competence of the GMS.
698 See p. 4 of the Explanatory Memorandum (31 746), on a record date and convocation of a GMS in case 
of protective measures according to art. 2:359 (b) NCC. According to art. 5 (1) of the Dir., the notice 
period for convocating a meeting in case of a take over will be set on 30 days for approving, if the art. 
of incorporation so determine, protective devices by the GMS.
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solicitation, as in the US, are lacking under the Dutch system. Some of the prescribed rules 
of the Shareholders Rights Directive will be implemented in the Act on Financial Super-
vision (AFS).699 For example rules related to the requirement to place information on the 
company’s website (AFS chapter 5.1a).
3.5.5	Conclusions
If, how and on at what level (corporate or securities law) legal regimes have developed and 
are facilitating mechanisms and rules on proxy voting may influence the division of power 
within the corporation. US practice illustrates that a) incumbent management may use the 
proxy machinery to collect a decisive power to vote on proposals presented by the board to 
shareholders, b) the main focus is on appointment of members of the board (and incidental 
corporate reorganisations), c) that board proposals may be contested by means of a proxy 
fight and d) that solicitation of proxies is regarded and regulated as a ‘market transaction’ 
(through securities law disclosure not intruding the internal affairs of the corporation). The 
system is moulded into US securities regulation (securities acts/rules and listing rules) aim-
ing at investor protection by disclosure.
As discussed, these proxy rules may also fit into a tradition of corporate/governance aiming 
at ‘shareholder democracy’ and voice within issuers. Conceptually this makes a difference. 
The former mainly underscores the monitoring function of investors; the latter also aims at 
improving the shareholder voice as part of ‘good’ corporate governance. In the EU/MS proxy 
voting is part of traditional corporate law protecting shareholders in the corporation; the 
EU’s Shareholder Rights Directive facilitating shareholder cross-border voting in the EU 
fits the CLAP (Commission 2003) corporate governance concept of strengthening the posi-
tion of shareholders in the corporation, also partly influenced by the LLSV study (par. 2.2). 
It is again remarkable that the EU, thus far, did not follow the US approach (of §14 SEA’34) 
to regulate proxy solicitation primarily as a securities law ‘market transaction’ and provide 
for adequate disclosure by the solicitor of such proxies. Again, the EU approaches the sub-
ject, at least in part, from the corporate law perspective of extending shareholders’ rights, 
thus further intruding on the issuers’ internal affairs. Also the examined MS approach this 
subject from a corporate law perspective: proxy voting, facilitated by the introduction of a 
record date, is allowed; securities law disclosure rules regulating proxy solicitation and 
voting to protect investors were not thus far introduced. Also the US-style mechanism/
practice of management soliciting proxies, without extensive disclosure (only the default 
rule of art. 10(3) Shareholder Right Directive) is allowed in the UK, Germany (and at least is 
not excluded in the Netherlands). In the UK, the long-standing practice of the board to send 
out proxies is still prevailing. Provisions aiming to increase ‘shareholder democracy’ seem 
not to have eroded the tactical advantages of the directors in having two-way proxies going 
to them neither “for” nor “against” is filled in (LR 9.3.6 requires this to be expressly stated). 
Art. 10 (3) Shareholder Rights Directive, allowing restriction of the aforementioned practice 
by allowing the MS (amongst others) to restrict or exclude the exercise of shareholder rights 
through proxy holders without specific voting instructions for each resolution in respect of 
699 E.g. rules related to the requirement to place information on the companies’ website (AFS ch. 5.1a), 
See art. 5:25k (a) AFS.
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which the proxy holder is to vote on behalf of the shareholder, is not implemented in the UK. 
In Germany, a management proxy can only be used with binding instructions.
3.7 Overall conclusions
Thus far, the results of the comparative analysis of shareholders’ rights in the statutory 
charter of issuers seem to confirm my hypothesis that a) investor protection in the US is 
modelled primarily through high standards of initial and continuous disclosure, b) the pro-
tection does not come from extensive powers in the corporation’s charter, c) that the divi-
sion of powers indeed follows state rather than any federal corporate law (which is virtually 
nonexistent), d) that the corporation’s charter is effectively controlled by the board, e) that 
the new EU securities law effectively results in a US-style investor protection by introduc-
ing a disclosure system under public oversight, f) that, however, investor protection also 
continues to build on shareholder protection in the statutory charter and, at least to some 
extent, also by corporate governance codes; in the Netherlands in particular this led to a 
strengthened position of the GMS and (groups of) shareholders opposed to the board (BoM/
SB) of a Dutch listed public corporation g) that this seem to explain the emergence of codes 
on corporate governance, h) that this does not seem to be the case only for Member States 
but also for the EU level that continues to build on the acquis communautaire without clearly 
singling out the charter for issuers and to follow and support the mechanism of soft law on 
governance.
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4
Board supremacy and discretion in the 
context of investor’s actions: the Dutch 
right of inquiry as unique action for 
activist shareholders700
700 This chapter builds on joint research as reflected: M.J.G.C. Raaijmakers and P.A. van der Schee, 
 Bescherming van beleggers in beurs-NV’s: het enquêterecht als actie- en de business judgement 
rule als afweermiddel, in: H.J. Bruisten, M.J.G.C. Raaijmakers, A.F. Verdam, NGB-bundel 2010. 
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The HLG in 2002, in its report for modernising company law in the EU, advised providing 
shareholders in a general meeting or holding a maximum of at least 5 or 10% of the share 
capital with the right to apply to a court or appropriate administrative body to order a special 
investigation. A European framework rule should be adopted to this end (Recommendation 
III.8). The HLG places its proposal for an investigation procedure in the context of strength-
ening (minority) shareholders’ rights and their monitoring role as ‘principal’ by stating: “In 
companies with one or more controlling shareholders, minority shareholders usually have 
no real influence, even if they vote. In group of companies and particularly in multinational 
groups, the minority shareholders of the subsidiary, and even those of the parent, may just 
not know where the real problems are. In such cases, what is needed for shareholders is 
to first find out the facts (e.g. about related party transactions) and then to consider the 
appropriate course of action, which could be a shareholder’s resolution or even an action to 
hold directors liable.” The HLG seemingly did not take into account the already evolving EU 
securities disclosure system under which issuers are required to provide investors on an 
annual and interim basis with information and which does not make a distinction between 
listed public and closed companies by stating: “the Group believes that the shareholders’ 
right to vote and their standard right to information should be supplemented by a European 
framework rule on the right of shareholders to require a special investigation and the pro-
cedure for it. The Group recommends the extension of the special investigation right to all 
companies, whether listed, open or closed.” The HLG’s proposal also seems to be inspired 
by The Dutch right of inquiry (NCC Book 2 Title 8, arts. 2:344 - 359 NCC) and states: “The 
order should only be given when there is a serious suspicion of improper behavior, in order 
to avoid the procedure being used as a ‘fishing expedition’ or as an instrument of harass-
ment. The investigation should be conducted by the court or administrative body ordering 
the special investigation, or by professionals under its supervision.”
In this chapter it will be demonstrated that is not advisable to follow the HLG’s proposal of 
2002 to introduce an investigation procedure at EU level. This investigation by its nature is at 
odds with the securities disclosure system and as well with corporate law for (listed) public 
corporations. The analysis of chapter 4 also leads to the conclusion that the Dutch right of 
inquiry should be re-examined. This does not mean that the idea of a BJR, without a right of 
inquiry, is not of interest for preserving board supremacy and discretion. Also, the US and 
German systems offer a certain solution. Delaware goes even further and displays a totally 
different fundamental position by safeguarding the supremacy and discretion of the board 
also by statutory D&O/indemnification.
As analysed in chapter 2, investor protection in the US as well as in the EU is primarily based 
on securities law disclosure, public oversight and enforcement both in the primary market 
(IPO) by prospectus liability and in the secondary market by securities fraud. The second 
layer of investor protection is found in the US, UK and German derivative suits, albeit under 
the protection of the BJR and hence focussing on its limits, i.e. breach of fiduciary duties.701 
US (Delaware) and German law firmly establish the principles of board supremacy and dis-
701 a)  Protection of shareholders, as especially provided for by EU continental systems, is also found in 
the possibility to annul decisions of the bodies corporate within the issuer’s organisation. It can be 
considered as the bolt on GMS decision-making and in that sense as protection against abuse by the 
majority. Also decision of other organs as the board can be rescinded, e.g. art. 2:15 NCC. However 
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cretion. These are upheld in court when business decisions of the board are challenged 
in claims for damages and rescinding business decisions. The BJR protects the board by 
procedural requirements but also, more importantly, by the basic assumption of supremacy 
and discretion of the board. This may be set aside if the claimant – in a derivative suit – can 
prove a breach of fiduciary duties of the board vis-à-vis the corporation.
A comparative analysis of this issue reveals a remarkable difference in Dutch law, both 
regarding the basic rule on directors’ liability, but more fundamentally with respect to the 
impact on the board’s discretion of the case law under its investigation procedure. Board 
members may be held liable through an art. 2:9 NCC procedure, but not derivatively. As 
stated above, no BJR-rule will protect the board (members), although the standard used in 
that particular (but for issuers extremely unusual) procedure would presumably not differ 
substantially from that of the US, Germany and the UK since the judicial standard is rather 
high. The judicial assessment, however, does not start – as the BJR does – with a ‘free zone’ 
starting from its basic assumption of discretionary business judgement. Thus it lacks the 
certainty of the BJR-approach.
The more remarkable difference, however, is created by the Dutch investigation procedure, 
which is unique and does not exist in the US, at EU level or in the UK or Germany. The 
procedure is enacted in NCC Book 2, chapter 8 (arts. 2:344-2:359). The competent court 
is the Enterprise Chamber of the Amsterdam Court of Appeal.702 It provide shareholders703 
with two successive rights in respect of a corporation (including issuers as well as private 
limited companies). First, shareholders (owning 10% of the shares or shares representing 
an nominal value of EUR 225,000) are entitled to petition for an investigation to be ordered 
if there are well-founded reasons to doubt proper (‘juist’) administration (‘beleid’) of the 
corporation, and – if the court so finds – appoint one or more investigators to investigate the 
administration and course of affairs of the corporation (during a certain period). Secondly, 
based upon the report of the investigator(s) they may request the court to establish that 
this constitutes mismanagement (‘wanbeleid’), and order specific injunctions, including dis-
missal and appointment of new directors.704 Apart therefrom the court may grant injunctive 
in the Netherlands it is very rarely used as such in the case of issuers since the same or similar 
results can be reached by an investigation procedure.
702 Cornelis de Groot, Corporate Governance as a Limited Legal Concept, Netherlands: Kluwer Law Inter-
national 2009, p. 34, technically, the Chamber of Business is a division of the Court of Appeals in 
Amsterdam (one of the five Court of Appeal in the Netherlands). Although part of the Court of Appeal 
in Amsterdam, the Chamber of Business acts as the court of first instance under the provisions on the 
right of inquiry. The aforementioned book gives an extensive overview of this investigation procedure 
in the Netherlands. For some other English articles on this investigation procedure see: M. Josephus 
Jitta et.al., The Companies and Business Court from a Comparative Law Perspective, Deventer: Kluwer 
2004; J.B. Jacobs, ‘The Role pf Specialed Courts Resolving Corporate Governance Disputes in the 
United states and in the EU: An American Judge’s Perspective’, Ondernemingsrecht 2007, p. 80-85; M.J. 
Kroeze, ‘The Companies and Business Court as a Specialized Court’, Ondernemingsrecht 2007, p. 86-
91; L. Timmerman, ‘Company Law and the Dutch Supreme Court’, Ondernemingsrecht 2007, p. 91-95. 
See also the article of Erik P.M. Vermeulen & Dirk A. Zetzsche, ‘The Use and Abuse of Investor Suits’, 
TILEC Discussion Paper, DP 2010-001, January 2010, for interesting comparative research into the Ger-
man rescission suit and the Dutch investigation procedure.
703 And holders of depository rights.
704 Cornelis de Groot, Corporate Governance as a Limited Legal Concept, Netherlands: Kluwer Law Interna-
tional 2009, p. 34, see this book for an extensive overview of this procedure.
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relief (art. 2:349a NCC) during the whole procedure if the court finds that the state of affairs 
so require. Over the last decade, as will be set out below, this procedure and the possibil-
ity for (immediate) injunctive relief has turned the investigation procedure into a strong 
weapon for investors and activist shareholders to challenge the board’s supremacy and 
discretion and thus ‘provoke’ a judicial review of its strategy, policies and actions. As will 
be set out below, this procedure effectively evolved towards a quasi derivative suit, at least 
to the extent that preliminary judgement may be acquired as to ‘misconduct’ of the board 
which can be used in a subsequent liability suit. In any event, this evidently provides claim-
ants ‘leverage’ in subsequent settlement negotiations. In a comparative perspective, the 
most remarkable element of the investigation procedure is that it allows almost unlimited 
judicial review board action, in sharp contrast to the BJR-approach.
Meanwhile this procedure almost completely absolved the ‘classical’ action to annul 
(former) decisions/resolutions of the GMS and Dutch (Supervisory) board.
My next hypothesis is that board supremacy and discretion of the board of Dutch issuers 
has eroded remarkably over the last decade (being re-established only very recently by 
the Supreme Court), due to the fact that this investigation procedure has not been the sub-
ject of a fundamental review in the total change of the regulatory landscape for issuers 
and remained a corporate law procedure not taking into account the fundamental change 
in securities law.705 This investigation procedure and its declared, but seemingly outdated, 
purposes will be tested and contrasted to the separate ‘layers’ of investor’s protection 
offered by the completely revised EU and Dutch securities regulation, again in comparison 
with the US, EU, UK and Germany. Again I suggest the reader compare the tables as pro-
vided in the Annexes.
4.1 The rise of shareholder activism and the Dutch Investigation 
procedure as battle device
Professional investors (in shares) operate in worldwide markets and base their investment 
decisions not only on economic and other market factors, but also on rights protecting their 
interests as investors.706 Against that stands a company’s freedom of choice to choose the 
home base for its seat and the market(s) in which it wants to trade its shares and thereby 
choose the applicable securities law. As has already been explained in chapter 1, both view-
points necessarily lead to an inquiry into the total regime for listed public corporations.
As has already been explained in previous chapters, pressure from investors on listed com-
panies to raise profit (dividends), to raise the company’s value on the stock exchange inter 
705 Of course the Supreme Court in ABNAMRO and AMSI reconfirmed the supremacy and discretion of the 
Dutch board (BoM/SB), nonetheless the procedural structure of the investigation procedure almost 
automatically leads to substantial board review. 
706 See Law and Finance research of Shleifer & Vhisny, researching (minority) shareholders’ rights and 
made the conclusion that common in comparison to civil law countries offered better protection for 
shareholders and consequently explained the more liquid capital markets in the Anglo-American 
countries. However, they were heavily criticised for their research techniques (Cf. Zetzsche for over-
view critic).
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alia through buying their own shares, splitting of core activities, distribution of the revenues 
(superdividends), giving up oligarchic regulations and protective devices increased. Listed 
public corporations often comply voluntarily. However, when activist investors, including 
hedge funds with explicit or silent support of other investors also without approval of the 
target, extort accelerated maximisation and realisation of shareholder’s value by in essence 
debating the board’s strategy, policy and other scenarios of the company, the supremacy 
and discretionary powers (business judgement) of the board (BoM and SB) comes under 
attack. The interest of the public corporation in having a clear governance structure has 
somehow got lost, at least in the Netherlands.
The unique Dutch investigation procedure has become a quick, successful and efficient 
extra coercive measure for internal and foreign investors, an action in their own interest for 
coercing the board (BoM/SB) of a Dutch public corporation to change its strategy and policy. 
Corporate litigation in the Netherlands has increased strongly. The Enterprise Chamber 
has shown itself to be responsive in allowing immediate injunctive relief even before having 
decided on the petitioners to order an investigation (i.e. whether there were well-founded 
reasons to do so on the proper administration of the corporation (art. 2:350 (1) NCC), exer-
cising continuous supervision during the procedure, intervening in the business organisa-
tion of the firm and establishing new rules by interpreting prevailing Dutch corporate law 
not the least by a remarkably extensive interpretation of the general rule of 2:8 NCC (rea-
sonableness and fairness, see par. 3.4.4). It thus allowed investors to ‘enforce’ their actions 
for change of corporate strategy and actions, but at the same time caused its rulings to 
become hard to predict. It ruled inter alia for an obligation to have (continue) a dialogue and 
for the SB to mediate with (specific) investors (Stork and ASMI), application of the DCGC on 
a subsidiary acquired in a successful bid (Versatel), to present a refusal of a third party bid 
on a subsidiary for submission/approval to the GMS (HBG, ABN-AMRO, see art. 2:107a NCC, 
as analysed under par. 3.3.9), to block voting on protective preference shares (Gucci, RNA, 
Stork, ASMI) to block a post-bid consolidation and integration of a subsidiary by means of 
a legal merger to freeze out minority shareholders (Versatel, Shell), to block a vote of the 
GMS to amend the articles for introducing a loyalty dividend (DSM), ex-post judgement of 
companies’ policy and nullification of discharge already granted by a well-informed GMS 
(ASMI, PCM, see par. 3.4.4 on Dutch rescission suit art. 2:15), to allow investigation by the 
receiver in bankruptcy or on request of labour organisations (PCM; 25/5/2010) and to effec-
tively allow fishing for facts in advance of a liability suit (Van der Moolen; OK 5.7.2010) or to 
settle disputes of a ‘general contractual’ nature (Unilever). Rulings of the Enterprise Cham-
ber did not reveal any consideration or reflection of the new securities regulation, including 
disclosure and rules regarding takeover bids, as implemented in the Netherlands under 
supervision of the AFM as the competent government agency. Neither did its rulings reveal 
judicial reluctance as evidenced by the BJR. A lot of debate ensued.
Some of its rulings were overruled by the Netherlands Supreme Court. The Supreme Court 
reconfirmed the supremacy of the board (BoM/SB) and its discretionary powers (HBG, 
ABNAMRO and ASMI), limited immediate injunctive relief before a decision to order an inves-
tigation (art. 2: 350 (1) NCC), and, by requiring a strengthened judicial assessment of all 
interests involved (DSM), precluded any final judgement without an investigation report hav-
ing been ordered and being available and limited reflex (overspill) towards a proper liability 
suit (art. 2:9 NCC) in Skipper and Laurus. The last-mentioned does not completely exclude 
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‘ fishing expeditions’ (even in bankruptcy: KPNQwest), nor a judgement against a director or 
the rescission of a resolution for discharge.707
The effect of these Supreme Court decisions on the judicial policies of the Enterprise Cham-
ber were seemingly limited. A more fundamental analysis and review therefore still seems 
to be vital. Guidance can be derived from the landmark decision of the Supreme Court of 
9-07-2010 (ASMI).
4.1.1	 Regulatory	reform	through	securities	regulation
The necessity for study already appeared from the reaction of the legislator and other regu-
latory organisations. Many of the aforementioned cases, not least HBG, Stork and ABNAMRO 
received a lot of attention in the media, professional literature and politics. They led to cor-
rections of and supplements to the rules concerning Dutch (listed, not always singled out) 
public corporations. The Frijns Commission changed the DCGC, including by introducing a 
response time in case of threat of the supremacy of the board (DCGC, no. IV.4.4, response 
time)708. On its advice some proposals of Bill to raise the threshold concerning sharehold-
er’s right to put an item on the agenda from 1% to 3%, to clarify the identity of shareholders 
and reporting agreement on strategy, director’s remuneration and ‘claw-back’-rules were 
filed. The government, inspired by the ABNAMRO-case, initiated a debate on a market mas-
ter for takeovers as e.g. the UK Takeover Panel. However this did not lead to the introduction 
of such a device nor did it change the division of roles between the AFM and the Chamber 
of Business. The Decree on Public Offerings (Besluit Openbare Biedingen) will, according 
to a recently published preliminary draft for consultation, be changed importantly and sup-
plemented by ‘a put up or shut up’ rule-rule as inspired by the UK. This rule suits the bid-
ding processes as regulated by securities law.709 These aforementioned proposed reforms 
concern merely securities regulation; in the Netherlands the Minister of Finance is the first 
responsible. Other Bills, such as the introduction of the option to have a one tier board, in 
which also liability rules and rules concerning a conflict of interests will be changed, are the 
responsibility of the Minister of Justice. In these proposals issuers are not singled out. The 
investigation procedure also is the competence of the Minister of Justice, as part of Book 2 
(Netherlands Civil Code) on Legal Persons.
707 See Enterprise Chamber 5-07-2010 (KPN/Qwest); Chamber of Business 5-06-2010 (Van der Moolen); 
Chamber of Business 27-05-2010 (PCM), JOR 2010/189 and ASMI, Chamber of Business 5-08-2009, AA 
2009, 734, with reference M.J.G.C. Raaijmakers.
708 A shareholder shall exercise the right to put an item on the agenda only after he consulted the ma-
nagement board about this. If one or more shareholders intend to request that an item be put on the 
agenda that may result in a change in the company’s strategy, for example through the dismissal of 
one or more management or supervisory board members, the management board shall be given the 
opportunity to stipulate a reasonable period in which to respond (the response time).
709 M.J.G.C\. Raaijmakers & Van der Schee, ‘Regulering en handhaving van overnamebiedingen in per-
spectief’, in: Marco Nieuwe Weme, Gerard van Solinge, R.P. ten Have (eds.), Handboek Openbaar Bod, 
Kluwer Juridisch, 2008.
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4.1.2	 Preliminary	draft	Right	of	Inquiry:	not	focused	on	listed	public	corporations
The Social Economic Council (SER), on request of the government, published its advice ‘Bal-
anced Entrepreneurship’, which focused on Dutch issuers.710 Some roundtable conferences 
and empirical research by Maarten Kroeze and others were the basis for a draft Bill, pub-
lished for consultation, to amend the investigation procedure. This draft Bill received wide 
attention in the literature.711
Quite remarkably, the explanatory memorandum to the draft Bill observes: ‘the contem-
porary system does not enfold fundamental problems, however the right of inquiry can be 
partly be ameliorated’. That observation is, as far issuers are concerned, not underpinned 
by a fundamental analysis of the applicable renewed securities regulation (FSA-regime), 
nor the affect of the right of inquiry as developped as a means for ‘tactical litigation’.712 Also 
the reactions in the literature do not pay a lot attention to the its very different function for 
issuers compared to (small) private limited corporations and other legal entities.713 Mean-
while the draft addresses some worries of issuers by a) raising the financial thresholds for 
making a request (art. 2: 346b NCC), b) the possibility for the issuer to request an inquiry, 
c) the codification in art. 2:349a NCC of the rules set by the Supreme Court (‘DSM-rule’): 
weighing of interests in case of immediate measures and the court’s obligation to decide 
on the petition ‘in reasonable time’, still allowing immediate injunctive relief before that 
judgement.
The use of an investigation procedure as a ‘quasi-liability suit’ will not be limited, nor will 
a BJR be introduced. Nonetheless, the Enterprise Chamber can limit the liability of inves-
tigators and directors (BoM/SB) appointed by the Enterprise Chamber itself (arts. 2:350 
(3) NCC and 2: 357 (4)). This may simplify actions against issuers. Art. 2:351 (4) NCC would 
rule for hearing board members (BoM/SB) who may feel threatened by subsequent liability 
suits: ‘those are named in the inquiry report’ should have the opportunity to make remarks 
in case of fundamental results relating to themselves’. Otherwise the draft Bill does not 
change the procedure. Hence, existing doubts and questions will not be resolved.
710 SER-Advies Evenwichtig Ondernemingsbestuur, nr. 08/01 (SER); consult the rapport on which it is 
based nr. 08/01a, Evenwichtig Ondernemingsbestuur: Externe consultatie en (onderzoeks)rapportag-
es, M.J.G.C. Raaijmakers, Cristophe van der Elst, Abe de Jong, Frans Overkleeft and P.A. van der 
Schee contributed to these reports.
711 Amongst others: S.M. Bartman and M. Holtzer, ‘Enqueterecht voorzichtig onder het mes’, Ondernem-
ingsrecht 2010, p. 76; J. Flemming, ‘Het voorontwerp aanpassing enquêterecht, in: Holtzer et al., Ge-
schriftten vanwege de Vereniging Corporate Litigation 2009-2010, Deventer: Kluwer 2010, p. 111-134; M.J. 
Kroeze and B. Assink, ‘Rechterlijke toetsing van ondernemingsbeleid, Hoe marginaal zou ‘marginaal’ 
moeten zijn’, in: K.M. van Hassel and M.P. Nieuwe Weme (eds.), Willem’s wegen, Deventer: Kluwer 2010, 
p. 11-32; see also their joint column, ‘Ja, wij willen’, Ondernemingsrecht 2010, in which they plead for 
introducing a BJR in the Netherlands; compare also B.F. Assink, Rechterlijke toetsing van bestuurlijk 
gedrag, Deventer: Kluwer 2007, M.J. Kroeze, Bange bestuurders, Deventer: Kluwer 2005, B.F. Assink 
and D.A.M.H.W. Strik, Ondernemingsbestuur en risicobeheersing op de drempel van een nieuw decen-
nium: een ondernemingsrechtelijke analyse, Preadviezen Vereniging Handelsrecht 2009, Kluwer 2009; 
B.F. Assink, De januskop van het ondernemingsrecht, Deventer: Kluwer 2010 cf. for what I consider a 
‘securities fraud’-action: B.J. de Jong, Schade door misleiding op de effectenmarkt, Deventer: Kluwer 
2010.
712 Cf. M.J.G.C. Raaijmakers, Naar een Wetboek Ondernemingsrecht?, Den Haag: Boom Juridische Uit-
gevers 2009, p. 53.
713 E.g. dispute resolution for closed companies can be revised in the law related to these closed corpora-
tion, as have been done in other jurisdictions: e.g. see regulation concerning the GmbH, LLC and SAS.
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The draft Bill rejects the suggestion of the Social Economic Council to apply the BJR on the 
‘entrance’ to the procedure (ordering of an investigation). The draft Bill does not provide a 
proper analysis of the relation between the ‘institutional’ purposes, stemming from another 
period in time, and the procedural form and position in Book 2 of the right of inquiry and 
the renewed public- and private law protection of investors in the new securities law: ‘full 
disclosure’, public supervision by the AFM and its power to request restatements of disclo-
sure documents, new liability actions (‘securities fraud’) in case of misleading information 
in accordance with art. 6:193a NCC (and art. 3:305a NCC and art. 7:907 ff. NCC) and a ‘post-
investigation’ liability suit under art. 2:9 NCC.
The draft Bill does not assess the ratio legis for issuers in comparison to the new securities 
regulation or other jurisdictions, nor assess the impact on regulatory competition for issu-
ers. The analysis pursued in this study aims at contributing to such assessment and clari-
fies the strong need for a proper distinction between aims, means and enforcement of the 
different areas of securities and corporate law. A further analysis of the aims and means of 
the Dutch investigation procedure may further reveal the importance of this.
4.1.3	 The	right	of	inquiry	as	‘action’	in	protecting	a	listed	public	corporation’s	investors	
and	the	meaning	of	its	open	purposes
The implementation of the European Prospectus-, Transparency-, Takeover- and Market 
Abuse Directive argues for contemplation on private law devices as a whole in enforcing 
the ‘new’ securities regulation; the right of inquiry in its unique set-up as being only avail-
able for a Dutch listed public corporation in protecting the interest of investors has not 
been involved in that contemplation.714 For the Netherlands, the investigation procedure still 
offers additional means for enforcement to investors. It allows the Enterprise Chamber 
much freedom for judicial lawmaking, certainly if compared to other jurisdictions (as will 
be set out below). Its general character does not direct its embedment in the total regime of 
corporate and securities law for Dutch issuers.
In making up for the lack of analysis we should reconsider the original, by now 40-year-
old general set up and purposes of the investigation procedure: 1) bringing matters in the 
open, 2) restructuring and restoration of sound relations by means of measures that serve 
to reorganise the enterprise of the legal person concerned, 3) establishing ‘responsibility’ 
(note: not liability) for mismanagement that may exist, and 4) prevention.715 The question 
714 The plea (November 2002) of the HLG (with Jaap Winter as its chair) for developing a European action 
so far has been without results; Corporate Governance Action Plan (21-05-2003); Klaus Hopt, ‘Mod-
ern Company and Capital Market Problems: Improving European Corporate Governance after Enron’, 
in: John Armour and Joseph McCahery (eds.), After Enron, Improving Corporate Law and Modernising 
Securities Regulation in Europe and the US, Oxford: Hart Publications 2006, p. 466. In my view Hopt’s po-
sition that the ‘investigation’-procedures in France, Germany and Denmark as discussed are similar 
to the Dutch right of inquiry is inaccurate. Where he discusses the protection of the German BJR, he 
overbooks the fact that the BJR in the Netherlands is not provided for; in his argumentation related to 
information asymmetry he ignores the strengthened disclosure obligations under European securi-
ties regulation. 
715 Supreme Court (Dutch Supreme Court, further: SC) 10-1-1990, NJ 1990, 465/466 (OGEM); AA 1990, 858 
with reference Raaijmakers; SC 26-06-2009, 107 (KPN/Qwest I); Asser/Maijer/Van Solinge & Nieuwe 
Weme 2-II, Rechtspersonenrecht:De Naamloze en Besloten Vennootschap, Deventer: Kluwer 2009, no.729 
distinguish between curative, inquisitorial and inquiries with antagonist characters.
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arises: do these purposes still fit in the now fundamentally changed corporate and securi-
ties law regime for listed public corporations?
Notably, the Supreme Court (KPNQwest)716 also apparently addressed that question. Con-
flicts on property rights and their factual background are not covered by the scope of the 
investigation procedure, which raises the question of whether the type of conflicts between 
investors and issuers are of that nature.717 More importantly, the Supreme Court held that 
the power of the Enterprise Chamber to order an inquiry remains in itself a discretionary 
matter, but should be used by properly weighing all the interests involved and that the rul-
ing should be underpinned by facts and circumstances in a specific case: ‘In weighing these 
interests (the Enterprise Chamber, PvdS), as much as it will take place in a concrete case, 
besides the purpose of the right of inquiry also the drawbacks against a broad application 
of the right of inquiry have to be taken into account, and also the nature of the conflict as 
exists between the applicant and the legal person has to be taken into account. (…). A cer-
tain motivation may (…) be required in case of facts and circumstances who (clearly) plea 
for or against granting the request for an investigation, and the Chamber of Business nev-
ertheless comes to a other judgement.’ This evidently seems to be an incentive for a more 




The aims of the investigation procedure as they were formulated upon its introduction in 
1970/1971 and repeatedly confirmed in case law, were not re-assessed over time nor upon 
the introduction of the new securities regulation, the emergence of shareholder activism or 
the introduction (and revision) of the DCGC. That is quite remarkable since closer analysis 
shows that these aims can be explained historically by an analysis of the ‘institutional’ view 
on ‘large’ corporations and issuers (see next paragraph) and the broad regulatory aims of 
enterprises, but seem hardly adapted to function in the present regulatory environment. To 
illustrate this point I will now first briefly discuss the (‘historical’) aims of the investigation 
procedure.
a. ‘Bringing matters in the open’ seems outdated in view of the vast extension of strict annual 
and intermediate disclosure and transparency rules in the AFS (Wft), public oversight by the 
AFM, the AFM’s power to request restatement of annual reports, the supervision of the AFM 
on interim reports and price-sensitive information, and on the enforcement of rules of con-
duct in case of a public bidding. Simultaneously, discovery rules have also been amended. 
See: art. 6:193a ff NCC, art. 162, 284 (1) and 843a Procedural Rules, enabling a plaintiff to 
require information (‘discovery procedure’). Hence, it is hard to see what room is left for the 
court to establish that there are ‘well-founded reasons to doubt good administration of the 
corporation’ or to legitimise immediate injunctive relief?
b. ‘restructuring and restoration of sound relations by means of measures that serves to reor-
ganise the enterprise of the legal person concerned.’ In small private firms this explains the 
716 Supreme Court 17 december 2010, LJN BO 3356 (KPNQwest).
717 Cf. also the Unilever –case.
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court’s power to resolve a deadlock. Historically, it also refer to disputes with employees, 
such as on the consequences of a major impact for employees. However, applied to issuers 
with dispersed shareholders a ‘blocking’ deadlock in practice is hard to imagine. Given that 
an issuer is free to determine its own internal affairs, application of this aim remains prob-
lematic. Still, the Enterprise Chamber used its discretionary power to rule on ‘desirable’ 
governance setting aside the issuer’s charter (such as in the ASMI-case). Again, it leaves 
open the question of when this aim constitutes the required reasonable doubt to grant the 
petition for an investigation and, moreover, for immediate injunctive relief. c. ‘Establishing 
responsibility for mismanagement that may exist’. An investigation procedure by its nature 
is not a liability suit, but, apart from often affecting the stock process, board members of 
issuers may suffer reputational loss, be forced to divert much management time and atten-
tion to ‘damage control’ during the procedure and, if the court finds mismanagement of 
the issuer, also result in factual and legal ‘disqualification’.718 719 Again, looking to the initial 
admission to the procedure, statements of fact in terms of mismanagement of the board will 
blur the borders with private enforcement through the GMS powers as well as with the lia-
bility-procedure of art. 2:9 NCC. Thus, it evolves towards a quasi-liability procedure, how-
ever without the procedural safeguards of that procedure and different standard of ‘serious 
reproachability’ (‘ernstig verwijtbaarheid’). Thus it allows ‘fishing expeditions’ (‘pre-trial 
discovery’),720 also for a receiver in bankruptcy721
d. ‘Prevention’. Effectively this aim comes close to ‘naming and shaming’ of board members. 
It has not been re-assessed upon the disclosure and transparency regime for issuers, nor 
to the confidentiality rules under the new securities regulation that have to be observed in 
public oversight by the AFM to protect (the reputation) of issuers and avoid influence on the 
stock price. Again, what does this aim mean for the initial judgement allowing entry to the 
investigation procedure?
Since these questions and observations seem to be clear illustrations of the central theme 
of this study, i.e. the distinct regulatory means, ends and effectiveness of securities and cor-
porate law for issuers, I will elaborate in the next paragraphs in somewhat more detail the 
original objectives and present application of the Dutch investigation procedure to  issuers.
4.1.5	 Meaning	of	the	‘institutional	doctrine’:	interest	of	the	firm
One of the basic elements in Dutch corporate law is its conceptual starting point to regard 
a corporation as an ‘institution’ separated from its shareholders with its own interest. It 
reflects the basic structure of corporate law that was merged (1976) into the Civil Code 
under the common denominator of ‘legal persons’ (comprising both large issuers and small 
718 Such as ‘improper or irresponsible corporate governance’, ‘worn-out governance’, ‘violation of 
elementary principles of responsible entrepreneurship’. If a given discharge is rescinded on these 
grounds, then the BJR again comes into play.
719 Cf. M.J. Kroeze, Bange bestuurders, Deventer: Kluwer 2005.
720 Cf. D. Slotema, ‘‘Vissen’ naar het feitensubstraat voor de civielrechtelijke aansprakelijkheid van bes-
tuurders en commissarissen’, V&O 2010, p. 105-108. 
721 According the Enterprise Chamber 05-07-2010 (KPNQwest) LJN BN0254 the Netherlands association 
of securities owners (VEB) reached a settlement with the corporation; however the withdrawal has 
been refused with an appeal on the public interest. 
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private corporations with one or a few shareholders).722 For longtime it supported board 
supremacy and discretion (also in private companies). The objectives of the investigation 
procedure as briefly described above fitted into that picture.
However, case law based on the investigation procedure took its own route amidst the 
emerging corporate governance debate and the creation of the new securities regulation 
by allowing activist shareholders to pursue their own interests in a way that appears to 
be unfamiliar to the other systems and contrary to the concept of the issuer as an ‘institu-
tion’ but still using the original ‘institutional’ objectives of the investigation procedure. More 
remarkable is that the draft Bill to amend the procedure does not address these changes. 
Its explanatory memorandum even seems to suggest that the Enterprise Chamber could 
take the driver’s seat of the corporation and its board (BoM/SB): ‘In case of a business deci-
sion, the board has a certain discretionary freedom (sic!), restricted by the law, articles of 
incorporation and decisions amongst others of the GMS. Also the court has to take this 
discretionary freedom into account. In case of a business consideration of policy Netherlands 
corporate law takes as starting point that the board (BoM/SB) has to act in the interest of 
the legal entity and its connected enterprise [as explained under this also applies to the 
other systems]. The board (BoM/SB) is not allowed to focus entirely on the interests of the 
shareholders in the legal entity.’ And further: ‘So it is important whether the board is entitled 
to discretionary freedom. (…) That discretionary freedom is lacking when the board has to 
adhere to statutory requirements and requirements derived from the articles of incorpo-
ration, such as convening a GMS and bookkeeping- and annual accounts requirements.723 
This discretionary freedom always will exist, however according to the circumstances and 
requirements following from regulation can be tested [Italic PvdS].’ The explanatory memo-
randum does not, also for issuers, put first and foremost that discretionary freedom.
Apart from the vagueness of the ‘institutional’ concept and of the distinction between deci-
sions related to the legal entity and ‘business decisions’, also by Assink and Kroeze, which 
seem to me to be inextricably related to each other,724 the basic relation between ‘interest’ 
and ‘action’ seems to be blurred in the abstract debate on a broad or a narrow interpreta-
tion of the interest of the ‘legal entity’. Particularly for issuers with continuously chang-
ing shareholders and many ‘involved interests’, the law should be clear in which directly 
interested parties should be recognised as having a course of action to sue the issuer for 
violating that interest. The confusion is illustrated by the fact that some have defended that 
722 ‘In the Netherlands the board shall have to act in the interest of the firm, which entails more, then 
the interest of the shareholders.’ In case of small (personal) private limited companies this will not 
always apply. Cf. M.J.G.C. Raaijmakers, Joint Ventures, 1976, p.85 and further; M.J.G.C. Raaijmakers, 
Rechtspersoon tussen contract en instituut, Oratie: UvT, Deventer: Kluwer 1987; M.J.G.C. Raaijmakers, 
Enkele rechtsvergelijkende beschouwingen over joint ventures, preadvies NVvR 1992; M. J. G. C. Raaijmak-
ers, ‘Besloten vennootschappen: ‘quasi-nv’ of quasi-vof’? Enkele rechtsvergelijkende notities’, Ars 
Aequi 1994, p. 340-348; M.J.G.C. Raaijmakers, Naar een Wetboek Ondernemingsrecht?, Den Haag: Boom 
Juridische Uitgevers 2009.
723 ‘The court can examine whether eventual breach of such requirements is sufficiently severe for the 
conclusion that there are well-founded reasons to doubt good policy on the part of the corporation or 
mismanagement.’
724 If the core from that is that the board (BoM/SB), as long as it is in function and not fired, independently 
determine the policy and strategy of the corporation as ‘agents’, then the law has to acknowledge that 
and the board could only be sued for ‘improper’ governance through art. 2:9 NCC procedure.
Book Vanderschee.indb   197 18-3-2011   15:39:46
 Chapter 4198
pressure groups and the Attorney General acting ‘in the public interest’ should be admit-
ted standing in the investigation procedure in case of violation of basic principles of ‘social 
responsible entrepreneurship.’725 Even if one were to take a neutral stand it seems incon-
ceivable that the legislator itself should explicitly propose and debate such extension of the 
traditional scope of corporate actions. Has the Enterprise Chamber the power to refuse a 
request for withdrawal of a petition for an investigation on the ground that pursuance of the 
procedure is no longer directed by the petitioner but should be assessed against such public 
and social interests?726 Such an implication of that ‘institutional doctrine’ seems to require 
clear proposals and proper debate. Again, what does it mean for the admission of petition-
ers to the investigation procedure? What would, looking from the issuer’s perspective, the 
impact of such ‘contingent risks’ in an offering circular or annual disclosure documents 
be? Disclosure should be clear and understandable and investors cannot be required to 
minutely study the peculiarities and unpredictable risks of any application of the investiga-
tion procedure that remains unique in the international capital market. Evidently all this 
may impact upon regulatory arbitrage.
As mentioned earlier I will now turn to a more detailed analysis of the original objectives of 
the investigation procedure.
4.2 ‘Bringing matters into the open’ and investor protection through 
securities – and/or corporate law: EU and US
If we take again the purpose of ‘bringing matters into the open’ as one of the grounds for 
judicial assessment of a petition for an investigation, then the meaning for issuers should 
relate to the context of the (re)newed European Securities Law as implemented in the Neth-
erlands ASF. As extensively discussed already in chapter 2, the capital market (shares) 
and investors in these markets are primarily protected by strict and extended securities 
law under public oversight, mainly: mandatory disclosure and transparency rules to enable 
investors to monitor their investment and to decide to buy, sell or keep their shares. All this 
follows the issuer’s going public and by submit, regardless of which corporate law and the 
corporate charter is appicable, the issuer e.g. to Dutch securities law.
In the US, the mechanism of an IPO will follow and adhere to the applicable US federal 
securities laws (SA’33 and SEA’34). US corporate law, as analysed in chapter 3, only plays 
a minor role in protecting investors in a listed public corporation. However, the corporate 
derivative suit provides a device for investor protection. It is that action, in which the US 
Business Judgement Rule plays its role to protect board supremacy and discretion.
725 Cf the joint introduction of De Jongh, Eijsbouts, Kristen and Timmerman accompanying the NJV-
preadviezen; A.J.A.J. Eijsbouts, F.G.H. Kristen, J.M. de Jongh, A.J.P. Schild en L. Timmerman, Maat-
schappelijk verantwoord ondernemen, Preadviezen NJV 2010, Den Haag: Kluwer 2010 and A.J.A.J. Eijs-
bouts, ‘Elementary principles of social responsible entrepreneurship, cf. also Raaijmakers, NJB 2010, 
p. 1410-1413.
726 Cf. Enterprise Chamber, 5-07-2010 (LJN BN0254): request VEB for withdrawal inquiry has been de-
clined with an appeal on social interests. 
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As already discussed in chapter 2, the ‘federal’ European securities law only came into 
existence in the last decade: Prospectus Directive and Regulation, Transparency Directive, 
Market Abuse Directive, Admission Directive, IAS Regulation and Takeover Directive. Also 
here disclosure is the central focus of securities regulation: initial and continuous disclo-
sure duties for issuers. This also underpins the ‘market for corporate control’ and the mon-
itoring and governance functions of the market.
Because in the EU the dichotomy between securities and corporate law was hardly per-
ceived, let alone regulated, the protection of investors in shares was previously primarily 
regulated by corporate law. Additional ‘self-regulatory’ market rules were set by (mutual) 
stock exchanges. Evidently market structures and systems differed, such as dispersed ver-
sus block holding systems, different social and historical developments.727 Statutory law 
and articles of incorporation provide shareholders ‘as member’ individual and collective 
rights: meeting, agenda, information and approval rights. These rights, as in the Nether-
lands (elaborated in chapter 3), are much more extensive than in the US.
On top of all that, the Dutch investigation procedure still uses the standard and objective of 
‘bringing matters into the open’. No guidance has been given by the legislator as to how this 
should be interpreted in view of the new set of rules in securities law disclosure and public 
oversight. For an extensive comparison of securities and corporate regulation protecting 
investors/shareholders I refer to the chapters 2 and 3 and the annexes. However in short, 
the by now ‘federal’ EU disclosure system provides a similar US ‘full disclosure’-system. 
In my view ‘bringing matters into the open’ as a ground for the investigation right of inquiry 
for Dutch issuers has become obsolete. Note that this standard was formulated at the time 
when the rules on annual reporting were dealt with by just one article (!): Code of Commerce 




Thus, if and insofar the original objectives might be interpreted as a means to enforce the 
high level of securities law obligations on disclosure of annual and intermediate informa-
tion, that objective has by now been superseded and effectively replaced by the new mecha-
nisms. To that extent the investigation procedure has become obsolete (cf. also German 
background shareholders’ broad information rights which led to abusive suits, see chapter 
3, par. 3). As discussed above, Dutch investors and the AFM can start a restatement action 
in case of incorrect or misleading annual reports (art. 2:447 NCC and further), although – 
with respect to Dutch issuers – in principle only after adoption of the annual accounts by 
the GMS.728 Dutch law is silent on any possible procedural overlap of such actions with the 
investigation procedure. So far, however, these actions do not exclude each other. Conse-
quently and remarkably, issuers may thus be exposed to them simultaneously; in practice, 
therefore, also as a device to press issuers to settle such court actions.
727 See e.g. Mark J. Roe, Political Determinants of Corporate Governance, New York: Oxford University 
Press 2003.
728 Mark J. Roe, Political Determinants of Corporate Governance, New York: Oxford University Press 2003.
Book Vanderschee.indb   199 18-3-2011   15:39:46
 Chapter 4200
The basic action for private law enforcement against a breach of disclosure duties is offered 
by the ‘securities-fraud’-action (cf the comparative analysis of chapter 2). This action can be 
brought by investors against an issuer on the ground of misleading information (in issuing 
prospectus, annual accounts/report or other interim information): in the Netherlands art. 
6:193a NCC. Unlike the US, the EU-Directives and Regulations do not provide for a federal 
‘securities fraud’-action (and strict liability rules, as provided by §§ 11 and 12 SA’33). SOx, 
as already mentioned, strengthened demands of quality and trustworthiness and made the 
sanctions for breaches thereof more severe. In the EU, the MS shall provide, according to 
the various securities law directives and regulations, adequate means for private enforce-
ment.729 The result is not uniform. But clearly the investigation procedure was not intended 
or considered to operate as a course of action to fulfil these European requirements, neither 
did it replace the actions for misleading information as enacted in art. 6:193 a NCC (mislead-
ing commercial practises) and art. 6:162 NCC (general tort action), also not for ‘bringing 
matters into the open’. The Netherlands does not provide for a class action, although the 
possibilities have been extended by art. 3:305a NCC (collective action) and – if a settlement 
has been reached – also by the possibility to have such settlement declared binding by court 
decree for a ‘class’: art. 7:907 ff. NCC, allowing such universal binding settlements for a 
whole class of claimants at the petition of parties to the settlement agreement.730 Remark-
ably, the recent decision in KNP/Qwest (5.7.2010) forestalls the reaching of a settlement 
just by declining the agreed withdrawal of the brought inquiry by the Dutch Association of 
Security Owners (VEB).731
With the Dutch ‘securities-fraud’-action (art. 6:193a NCC), the Netherlands meets the Pro-
spectus and Transparency Directives. That action for compensating damages is aimed at 
the issuer itself on the ground that the issuer has misled investors and thereby caused the 
damage. Not the board’s conduct/actions, but misleading by the corporation is the founda-
tion of this action. Hence, the BJR does not play an independent role in this action.
In the German Verkaufprospektgezets (1990) and the Wertpapierprospektgezets (2005), 
Germany introduced new rules. § 37b WpHG provides a general action for securities fraud 
and the KapitalanlegerMusterverfahrensgesetz provides a collective action. For the UK, 
the Financial Services Markets Act (§ 90 FSMA) and the previous regulation in the UK CA 
1985 is referred to.
All these regulations provide investors with an action to claim their damages in the issuer 
itself in that they (whether or not as a class) suffered on grounds of misleading information 
by breach of securities disclosure requirements, whether by (initial or subsequent) issue 
of securities (shares) by a misleading prospectus, or continuous and interim information 
729 See e.g. art. 6 Prospectus Directive: “to ensure that their laws, regulations and administrative provisi-
ons on liability apply to issuers, the bodies referred to in this article or the persons responsible within 
the issuers”.
730 See the Court of Appeal 29-07-2009 (Shell-settlement), JOR 2009/197 (with reference A.F.J.A. Leijten, 
about which B.J. de Jonge, p. 336 and further); cf. I.N. Tzankova, ‘Kwaliteitsbewaking van belangen-
behartiging bij collective acties en massaschade’, in: Holtzer et al., Geschriften vanwege de Vereniging 
Corporate Litigation 2009-2010, Deventer: Kluwer 2010, p. 135-161.
731 Dutch Supreme Court, 17 December 2010, LJ BO3356 (KPN/QWest), rescinding the order of the Enter-
prise Chamber to continue the research.
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requirements (annual reports, quarterly and interim announcements). It is difficult to argue 
for any role of the investigation procedure in this whole context.
4.3 Establishing responsibility for mismanagement on the part of the 
corporation and (derivative) actions of the corporation towards its 
board members
At the next level of private law protection of investors we see the action of the corporation 
(issuer) itself, as represented by its board, against its (previous) directors (BoM/SB) in col-
lecting compensation for damages (and thereby – indirectly – against its investors). Kroeze 
has proposed introducing a derivative suit in the Netherlands with adequate thresholds 
(demand or Vorferfahren).732 However, Bill 31 763 (one-tier board model) does not take that 
route. This will be explained below.
The Dutch ground for this general action in NCC Book 2 on ‘legal persons’ is ‘improper man-
agement/supervision’ (art. 2:9 NCC). It is not directed at directors of entrepreneurial legal 
entities, let alone issuers. Dutch law does not recognise a BJR as adopted in the US and 
Germany, and thoroughly analysed by Assink, in which the business judgement of the board 
(BoM/SB) in a liability suit will be honoured by the court as principle starting point. The 
BJR will only be disregarded in case of (serious) breach of duties of loyalty and – lesso – of 
duties of care. The Supreme Court in the Staleman-case733 held that a claim will be granted 
only if the alleged misconduct of directors meets the standard of ‘serious reproachability’ 
(‘ernstige verwijtbaarheid’)’. This does not involve a BJR since its crucial ‘hands-off’ start-
ing point is lacking. Again, these parameters and their impact on issuers have not been 
re-assessed in relation to the investigation procedure.
As stated before, the key issue remains whether the board of an issuer is allowed to dis-
charge its function and operate independently and on its own discretion can determine, 
settle and execute the issuer’s strategy and policy in its own interest , while being assured 
that if it is sued (for damages) its own ‘business judgement’ will be upheld in court and not 
be replaced by any ‘wisdom of hindsight’. Hence, the focus will shift to assessing any alleged 
breach of loyalty, fraud and possible self-enrichment. However, the starting point remains 
that the board (BoM/SB) performs the issuer’s function and character as ‘entrepreneur’. 
Thus it should aim for its success, even though Dutch law, other than UK CA 2006, does 
not explicitly assign such. Success will be achieved in the market in which products and 
services will be developed and sold in competition with others. Businesslike production, 
freedom of entrepreneurship and open competition shape the accepted foundations of our 
(European) market economy. This implies at micro level that success for entrepreneurs 
will never be assured and the associated risk of failing will always be present. Innovation of 
products, services and markets is key to success. It takes innovative guts, courage and per-
severance to overcome scepticism and to find and persuade financiers. That brings us to the 
732 M.J. Kroeze, Afgeleide schade en afgeleide actie, Den Haag: Kluwer 2004, p. 342.
733 Supreme Court 10-01-1997, NJ 1997, 360.
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key questions of societal and legal objectives of the legal regime for issuers. American and 
German law clearly place their BJR just from that general perspective of board supremacy 
and discretion upfront to give room for in its nature risky undertaking. How does the more 
limited, but nonetheless broadly formulated purposes of the right of inquiry fit in with that, 
here: establishing responsibility for alleged mismanagement on the part of the corporation.
4.3.1	 The	investigation	procedure	as	quasi-liability	action?
Although establishing who is responsible for ‘mismanagement’, still serves as the objec-
tive for an investigation, also for issuers, the procedure is not equipped for that purpose. 
Nonetheless, a request for an investigation – also in bankruptcy – is often used and even 
clearly focuses on (the preparation of) a liability suit734 (or a settlement). It should be noted, 
however, that even the final judgement of ‘mismanagement of the corporation’ (art. 2:355 
NCC) following an investigation and report, still – In itself – does not constitute a judge-
ment on ‘improper governance/management or supervision’ of individual board members 
or commissioners as required in a liability procedure.735 A fortiori this applies to the judge-
ment as to whether there are well-founded reasons to doubt good policy. However, practice 
is different.
4.3.1.1 ‘Well-founded reasons to doubt good policy’ with entrance to the Investigation 
procedure; not the same function as the ‘demand’ (US) or Vorferfahren (Germany) 
procedure
If an investigation does indeed aim at preparing a liability suit, the petitioner, remarkably, 
can suffice, without demand or Vorferfahren (see below), with a statement that there are 
well-founded reasons to doubt good policy. This in practice is a far lower threshold than 
required in a liability suit where the claimant has to state the facts for such an allegation 
and has the burden of proof for ‘improper governance/management’ in the sense of art. 
2:9 NCC.736 Thus, the petitioner passes (any assessment by) the board (BoM/SB) and the 
GMS and the inquiry’s (‘fact-finding’) costs will be borne by the issuers. That investigation, 
moreover, has a broad, but time-limited, character. By its nature, it focuses on policy and 
strategy of the incumbent board (BoM/SB) being in function. That alone has a malign affect 
on the reputation of the issuer and its board (BoM/SB) and may substantially influence the 
stock price (and consequently a possible duty of the issuer to disclose such price-sensitive 
information). A court in a subsequent art. 2:9 NCC-liability procedure will not be strictly 
bound to a final judgement in an investigation procedure, but that does not take away from 
734 As recently declared, the purpose of the inquiry against Van der Moolen; see FD; cf also Laurus and 
Skipper Club Jaarsma and KPN/Qwest.
735 Art. 2:354 NCC: though the costs can be claimed from the board, in case of ‘improper policy’.
736 B. Assink 2007, p. 477: the authority of the Chamber of Business to grant an inquiry is discretionary. 
Thereby besides the purposes of the investigation procedure the Chamber of Business has to also take 
into account the drawbacks of the corporation and the nature of the conflict between the applicant and 
the corporation. See also DSM. It is not clear for entrance to the procedure whether a presumption of 
mismanagement has to be present and/or the applicant has to state that one of the purposes of the 
investigation procedure can be realised. See Assink, p. 400 on the threshold for granting an inquiry: 
1) absence ‘good policy’ not exchangeable with presence of ‘mismanagement’. Absence ‘good policy’ 
entails possibility ‘unjust policy’. 2) Presumption of ‘unjust policy’ or ‘mismanagement’. Policy at least 
qualified as ‘unjust’; presumption mismanagement is possible, but not required.
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its ‘ biasing impact’. This is certainly the case for established facts when directors (board 
members and commissioners) have appeared in the procedure.737 Some more notes on this 
will follow.
4.3.1.2 Prejudicial working of an investigation procedure
In cases against issuers, the investigation will often not result in a final judgement on ‘mis-
management on the part of the corporation’. Nonetheless, decisions on the initial request, 
interim decisions and decisions on granting injunctive relief (arts. 2:350 and 2:349a NCC) 
often imply (disqualifying) judgements by the Enterprise Chamber on policy, strategy and 
operation of the board (BoM/SB), that may be prejudicial in a subsequent liability procedure 
and/or negotiations for a settlement.738
That prejudicial effect tends to erode the independence of the board and its discretion 
entailing only breach of duties of loyalty739 or clear breach of ‘duties of care’ should be pos-
tulated, proved and judged. That point of departure prevents ‘risk aversion’ (because of 
developments of recent years leading to the ‘credit crunch’, it would be more suitable to 
use the term: ‘excessive passivity’). But this should be the realm of a direct art. 2:9 NCC-
liability action. If for that procedure – without a BJR – the marginal test of the norm ‘seri-
ous reproachability’ (‘ernstig verwijt’) prevents the court from taking the driver’s seat from 
the entrepreneur, it is hard to reconcile the fact that the Enterprise Chamber in granting 
entrance to the investigation procedure, totally bypasses that starting point, adjourns the 
request for an inquiry, already takes immediate measures and their allows investors to cir-
cumvent, their duty to postulate facts and burden of proof in the ordinary court (2:9 NCC).740
4.4 Derivative suit in the US (Delaware), Germany and the UK: point of 
departure independence of the board (BoM/SB) and its discretion
Unlike the US, Germany and the UK, Dutch law does not explicitly provide for a derivative 
suit allowing shareholders to bypass the board’s representative power to sue on behalf of 
the company. However, its investigation procedure as analysed above developed towards a 
quasi-derivative suit in preparation of further action(s) by the issuer or – in bankruptcy – the 
receiver (without major constraints on starting such a procedure). A comparative analysis 
reveals that jurisdictions providing for a derivative suit also provide for preparatory proce-
dures (US demand procedure, German ‘Vorferfahren’) to be observed by the plaintiff before 
737 The dilemma (cf. Enterprise Chamber JOR 2005/119) for board members and commissioners is still 
whether or not to appear in the investigation procedure; if they appear, then a possible judgement of 
the Enterprise Chamber will be binding in a later art. 2:9 NCC procedure, if they do not appear, influ-
ence on possible judgement of ‘mismanagement on the part of the corporation’ by the Enterprise 
Chamber is not possible. Cf. also Flemming.
738 Cf. M.J. Kroeze, Bange bestuurder, Deventer: Kluwer 2005; B.F. Assink, De Januskop van het ondernem-
ingsrecht, Deventer: Kluwer 2010.
739 Cf. G.J.H. van der Sangen, ‘Tegenstrijdigbelangperikelen, the saga continues’, TVoB 2010, p. 44-50.
740 Cf. P.J. van der Korst and I. Wassenaar, ‘Maak van de enqueteprocedure een dagvaardingsprorcedure’, 
in: K.M. van Hassel and M.P. Nieuwe Weme (eds.), Willem’s wegen, Deventer: Kluwer 2010.
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being allowed such a suit. These procedures effectively serve to protect the corporation and 
its board from ‘frivolous actions’.
In the US, a liability suit can be brought as a derivative action. Shareholders/investors can 
start such a suit on behalf of the corporation against its (previous) board members.741 In 
starting a derivative suit, shareholders have to make a demand to the board, on which the 
board or a ‘special litigation committee’ formed for that purpose decides. The board itself 
thus has influence on bringing a derivative suit (§ 327 DGCL and §§ 7.40 – 7.47 MBCA; § 7.01 
ALI Principles). The purpose is to foreclose ‘frivolous actions’. Also, the board decision is 
protected by the BJR. If the action proceeds then the sued directors will also be protected 
by the BJR as well as by indemnifications742 (art. 23 FRCP and Chancery Rule concerning the 
demand procedure).
In the UK, the derivative suit is regulated in secs. 260-264 UK CA 2006: ‘A derivative claim 
only if there is a cause of action arising from an actual or proposed act or omission involv-
ing negligence, default, breach of duty or breach of trust by a director of the Company’. The 
court has to give its permission to start a derivative suit: sec. 261 (1) UK CA 2006, ‘A member 
of a company who brings a derivative claim must apply to the court for permission to con-
tinue it’.743
Upon implementing the new EU securities regulation Germany introduced a derivative 
action (§§ 147-149 AktG) for the AG, also in comparison to the US and also the UK, with strict 
entrance requirements and safeguards, including through a German BJR (§ 93 (1) AktG) as 
introduced in 2005. The conditions as inserted in §§ 147-149 AktG aim at foreclosure of so-
called ‘strike suits’.744 Germany codified the BJR in § 93 (1) AktG as previous accepted by the 
Bundegerichtshof745 “weiten unternehmerischen Handlungsspielraum”, without undertaking 
(stimulate entrepreneurial spirit) is not possible.746 In the art. 2:9 NCC-procedure as in the 
investigation procedure (art. 2:345 NCC and further), these thresholds are lacking.
4.4.1	Recognition	of	Board	supremacy	and	discretion:	the	BJR
Evidently, large-scale firms, organised as public corporations, like any large organisation 
irrespective its nature, form and activities, can only operate under a board (BoM/SB) with 
proper strategic and operational powers to govern the corporation and to represent it in 
its external relations in the market. This is no different in the organisation of issuers.747 
741 This action and function are the research topic of the dissertations by M.J.Kroeze and B.F. Assink.
742 § 102 (b) (7) DGCL gives the corporation the power to amend their certificates of incorporation to elimi-
nate or limit the personal liability of directors for monetary damages, with certain limited exceptions.
743 Gower and Davies, 2008, p, 605 ff. Cf. also John Armour, Benard S. Black, Brian R. Cheffins and Rich-
ard Nolan, ‘Private Enforcement of Corporate Law: An Empirical Comparison of the UK and the US’, 
Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, Vol. 6, 2009, pp. 687-722.
744 Cf. Ulrich Noack and Dirk Zetzsche, ‘Germany’s Corporate and Financial law 2007; (Getting) Ready for 
Competition’, CBC-RPS No. 0028, June 2007.
745 BGH 21-04-1997 – II ZR 175/95 – “ARAG/Garmenbeck”, BGHZ 135, 244, cf. Klaus Hopt in Großkomm. 
AktG, § 93Rz. 81; Hefermehl/Spindler in MunchKomm. § 93 Rz. 24 ff AktG; Kindler, ZHR 162 (1998), 101, 
103 ff; Henze, NJW 1998, 3309, 2211; Assink, 2007 and SER-advies Evenwichtig Ondernemingsbestuur.
746 K. Schmidt, Gesellschaftsrecht, Heymans 2002, p. 815: „Nach § 76 (1) AktG hat der Vorstand die Ges-
ellschaft unter eigenen verantwordung zu leiten, wobei ihm nach der sog. ‘business judgement rule’ 
ein unternehmerischer Ermessensspielraum zusteht”.
747 Sven Dumoulin, ‘De positie van niet-uitvoerend bestuurder in het monistisch bestuursmodel’, 
Ondernemingsrecht 2005-8, p. 268.
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The Berle & Means analysis supports that observation from the perspective of (dispersed) 
investors, though the more recent L&E ‘agency theory’ of investors as ‘owners’, together 
with the increased shareholder activism and regulatory extension of shareholders’ rights 
seem to question that principle.
Nevertheless, the principle of supremacy and discretion being attributed to the board in 
office seems firmly vested in the jurisdictions discussed here. The board’s core assignment 
in the examined jurisdictions is to decide on policy and strategy and monitoring the execu-
tion thereof.748
In comparising the statutory assignment and rules the following has been found: the posi-
tion of and (core) assignment of the board of a (listed) public corporation are not fundamen-
tally different in the US, UK, Germany or the Netherlands. It is appointed in that function 
and independently, thus without instructions of others, according to its own abilities and 
insight will give form and content to the entrepreneurial function of the corporation (legal 
entity), will determine strategy and policy and execute these with guiding and monitoring of 
its execution by the organization.749 The BJR in the US and Germany confirms and protects 
this supremacy and discretion of the board.
In the US, the MBCA-principles750 read as follows: § 8.01 (a), each corporation must have 
a board of Directors, § 8.01. (b), All corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the 
authority of, and the business and affairs of the corporation managed by or under the direc-
tion of, its board of directors, subject to any limitation set forth in the articles of incorpo-
ration or in an agreement authorised under § 1 7.32. The Delaware751 DCGL expresses the 
supremacy and discretion of the board: § 141 (a) DGCL § 141 (a) DGCC: ‘the business and 
affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under 
the direction of a board of directors.’752 As stated before US issuers, most often based in 
748 Reinier R. Kraakman, Paul Davies, Henry Hansmann, Gerard Hertig, Klaus J. Hopt, Hideki Kanda & 
Edward B. Rock, The Anatomy of Corporate Law, A Comparative and Functional Approach, New York: Ox-
ford University Press 2004, p. 12, the board is formally distinct from the firm’s shareholders. This 
separation economised on the costs of decision-making by avoiding the need to inform the firm’s ulti-
mate owners and obtain their consent for all but the most fundamental decisions regarding the firm.
749 Cf. Reinier R. Kraakman, Paul Davies, Henry Hansmann, Gerard Hertig, Klaus J. Hopt, Hideki Kanda 
& Edward B. Rock, The Anatomy of Corporate Law, A Comparative and Functional Approach, New York: 
Oxford University Press 2004, p. 12; Raaijmakers, Ondernemingsrecht, Pitlo/Raaijmakers, Deventer: 
Kluwer 2006, p. 390 and further; B.F. Assink, De Januskop van het ondernemingsrecht, Deventer: Klu-
wer 2010.
750 Cf § 4.01 ALI Principles of Corporate Governance (1994): According to the American Law Institute’s 
(ALI’s) Principles of Corporate Governance, a corporate director or officer is required to perform his 
or her functions 1) in a good faith, (2) in a manner that he or she reasonably believes to be in the best 
interests of the corporation, and (3) with the care that a ordinarily prudent person would reasonably 
be expected to exercise in a like position and under similar circumstances. The core of this standard 
is the level of care that we expect would be exercised by an ordinarily person
751 Bainbridge 2005, p. 7: “The corporation is properly understood as a legal fiction representing the 
nexus of a set of contracts among the multiple factors of production provided by the organization’s 
various constituencies. Because shareholders are simply one of the inputs bound together by this web 
of voluntary agreements, ownership is not a meaningful concept as applied to the corporation.”
752 It is conceptually important to establish that in the US/ Delaware remaining powers belong to the 
board § 141 (a); § 8.01 MBCA, whereas in the Netherlands system takes the reverse position as star-
ting point; these powers belong to the GMS art. art. 2:107 NCC,
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Delaware, use staggered boards which re-affirm board supremacy, also in case of hostile 
takeover attempts.753
In the UK, the UK CA 2006754 leaves the determination of the role of the board and the level of 
independency and discretion largely to the company’s constitution.755 The UK model articles 
assume756 the independency and discretion of the board and give substantial authority to the 
board, as illustrated by the default provisions757 of Companies (Model Articles) Regulations 
2008,758 (UKCA (2006) § 20 (1)), arts. 3 and 4 MAPC759 (see also Table A, art. 70760).
Germany. The principle of board supremacy and discretion was firmly vested in German 
corporate law for ‘public’ corporations (Aktiengesellschaft) in the Aktiengesetz as early 
as 1937 (Führer-prinzip). § 76 (1) AktG: the management board shall manage the company 
under its own responsibility (Der Vorstand hat unter eigener Verantwortung die Gesells-
chaft zu leiten).761
In the Netherlands, a statutory rule, besides art. 2:129 NCC that only states the corporation 
will be managed by the board, that expresses the supremacy and discretion of the board as 
753 § 8.01(a) MBCA, each corporation must have a board of Directors, § 8.01. (b) MBCA, All corporate 
powers shall be exercised by or under the authority of, and the business and affairs of the corporation 
managed by or under the direction of, its board of directors, subject to any limitation set forth in the 
articles of incorporation or in an agreement authorized under § 7.32 MBCA.
754 See however § 154 UK CA 2006 requires all public companies to have two directors.
755 In the UK the division of powers as between board and the shareholders is seen as a matter for private 
ordering by the members of the company rather than something to be specified mandatorily in the 
companies legislation.
756 Subject to the provisions of the Act, the memorandum and the articles and to any directions given by 
special resolution, the business of the company shall be managed by the directors who may exercise 
all the powers of the company.
757 The function of a default rule is that the obligees can easily remove the obligation; the rule may ne-
vertheless have the important function of relieving parties of the task of working out the best rule for 
themselves. Only if the particular parties want something different from that normally adopted will 
they have to go through the process of altering the rule.
758 Gower & Davies, 2008, p. 368, as far as the shareholders are concerned, for many years it was dispu-
ted whether the effect of the delegation of authority in the articles to the directors was simply to confer 
authority on the directors or also, at the same time, to restrict the authority of the shareholders in 
general meeting to take decisions in the delegated area.
759 See also Combined Code 2006, supporting principle A1, The board’s role is to provide entrepreneurial 
leadership of the company within a framework of prudent and effective controls which enables risk 
to be assessed and managed. The board should set the company’s strategic aims, ensure that the ne-
cessary financial and human resources are in place for the company to meet its objectives and review 
management performance. The board should set the company’s values and standards and ensure that 
its obligations to its shareholders and others are understood and met.
760 Companies (Tables A – F) Regulations 1985 as amended by SI 2007/2541and SI 2007/2826, these are 
the temporary articles of incorporation. Table A, Regulations for management of a (public) company 
limited by shares. Subject to the provisions of the Act, the memorandum and the articles and to any 
directions given by special resolution, the business of the company shall be managed by the directors 
who may exercise all the powers of the company. No alteration of the memorandum or articles and no 
such direction shall invalidate any prior act of the directors which would have been valid if that altera-
tion had not been made or that direction had not been given. The powers given by this regulation shall 
not be limited by any special power given to the directors by the articles and a meeting of directors at 
which a quorum is present may exercise all powers exercisable by the directors. 
761 § 111 AktG, der Aufsichtsrat hat die Geschäftsführung zu überwachen and forward of the Deutscher 
Corporate Governance Code, The Management Board is responsible for managing the enterprise. Its 
members are jointly accountable for the management of the enterprise. The Chairman of the Manage-
ment Board coordinates the work of the Management Board.
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such is lacking. However, jurisprudence explicitly confirms that rule for the first time in the 
decision of the Supreme Court in the Forumbank case762 and recently by the decisions of the 
Supreme Court in ABNAMRO and ASMI.763 Therefore, a statutory rooted normative principle 
and point of departure recognising the discretionary powers of the board is lacking. Such 
a statutory starting point constitutes the foundation for the BJR in Delaware and Germany.
In relation to judicial review of board’s decision and the application of the BJR, it is not 
very clear in all of the examined systems whether board supremacy and board discretion 
is adhered to. However, US courts in breach of duty of care and loyalty cases will, in the 
first instance, put the board supremacy and discretion foremost. Therefore these important 
corporate principles of the board’s authority are protected against fishing expeditions by 
plaintiffs and ‘second guessing’ by courts, who de facto review the complaint ex post and 
with hindsight. This will be the subject of par. 4.4.1.4 below. First, the position of the board 
as trustee and entrepreneur as filled in by their fiduciary duties of loyalty and care will be 
explained.
4.4.1.1 Board’s position as trustee and entrepreneur: duties of loyalty and care
The second layer as introduced in par. 4.3 concerns responsibility and liability of (members 
of) the board vis-à-vis the issuer for damages incurred by the issuer itself and therefore, 
indirectly, by its investors. Enforcement may be used merely to compensate such loss (often 
from former board members), often in insolvency, but also as a means to put pressure 
on the board to change its strategy or position in a contested takeover. Such a suit can be 
brought derivatively, i.e. – if certain conditions are met764 – also without the consent of the 
board in the US, UK and Germany. The Netherlands does not allow this, but the investigation 
procedure as previous explained may also be used as an alternative. Conceptually, such a 
derivative suit is based on the failure by (members of) the board (and, as the case may be, 
officers) to properly discharge their duties under the issuer’s statute to direct and manage 
the issuer and its entrepreneurial activities (firm). Their position has a dual nature. They 
are both ‘entrepreneur’ and ‘trustee’. Acting as an entrepreneur in a competitive environ-
ment is by its very nature risky (a ‘venture’) and requires ‘entrepreneurial skills and spirit’. 
Acting as ‘trustee’ (with supremacy and discretionary power), requires proper prudence in 
the administration of the issuer’s assets and activities, resistance of ‘moral hazards’ and 
abstaining from any (form of) self to enrichment. These two – in a certain way opposite, but 
also strongly interlinked – aspects over time directed the development and shape of statu-
tory and case law on the liabilities of the board, its members and officers and the means for 
their enforcement.
762 Supreme Court 21-01-1955, NJ 1959, 43 (Forumbank); See also Raaijmakers, ‘Forumbank Revisited’, 
AA 2006, 522.
763 Supreme Court 13-07-2007, LJN BA7970 (takeover battle for ABNAMRO); JOR 2006/179; AA 2006 (with 
reference Raaijmakers); Enterprise Chamber 5-08-2009, LJN BJ 4688 (battle for strategic course 
ASMI), AA 2009, p. 734 – 743 (with annotation Raaijmakers).
764 American and German law here offer a double protection of the Board: a) Procedural by requirements 
for admission of the action and b) material by the business judgment rule. Cf. M.J. Kroeze, Bange bes-
tuurders, Deventer: Kluwer 2005.
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4.4.1.2 Fiduciary duties of care and loyalty
In private enforcement, a derivative suit will prevent the judiciary from ‘second guessing’ 
the board’s business judgement, but they will review its non-observance of fiduciary duties. 
These duties are distinguished between duties of care (primarily focussing on the proc-
ess of decision-making and seldom leading to liability) and duties of loyalty (focussing on 
decent ‘non-selfish’ behaviour as a ‘trustee’ and – if proved by the plaintiff – usually upheld 
in court). The content of these duties as supplemented by judicial review give direction to 
the board’s assignment. These duties and the content thereof do not give a clear cut rule, 
however, they are standards that are filled in ex post. Director conduct will be reviewed in 
court and depending on how business decisions are assessed, judges will give more or less 
deterrence to board authority.765
In common law countries, such as in the US and UK, fiduciary duties as developed in case 
law play an important role,766 although by now at least in the UK they have some basis in 
statutory law. In the UK, principal fiduciary duties have made their way into the UK CA 2006, 
Chapter 2 of Part 10, ‘General Duties of Directors’.767 As formulated by UK common law, 
fiduciary duties are owed to the company, see also § 170 (1) UK CA 2006. UK directors in 
general do not owe fiduciary duties to shareholders individually.768 In the US and the UK, 
fiduciary duties (duties of loyalty, care and good faith) serve as a basis for board conduct 
and judicial review.769 Fiduciary duty analysis traditionally focusses on the duties of care 
and loyalty and recently in the US also on the duty of good faith.770 The duty of care sets the 
765 Again the central theme is that authority and accountability of the board, depending on how the con-
tent of these duties are filled in, and how the business decisions are reviewed in court, judges will 
give more or less deterrence to board authority. (According to Sean J. Griffith, ‘Good Faith Business 
Judgment: A Theory of Rhetoric in Corporate Law Jurisprudence’, Duke Law Journal, Vol. 55, no.1, 
2005, the context of applying and review of fiduciary duties, e.g. financial crises, (in Delaware federal 
pre-emption or corporate migration) influence the way the judiciary and legislation intervene in the 
balance of authority/accountability of the board.
766 Gower and Davies, Principles of Modern Company Law, Sweet & Maxwell, London: 2008, p. 477, the 
substantial corpus of learning on the nature and scope of these general fiduciary duties and duties of 
skill and care has remained until now largely within the common law. However with the enactment of 
the Companies Act 2006 these common law principles got a statutory basis.
767 Sec. 170 (3) and (4) UK CA 2006 say that the general duties replace the common law duties on which 
they are based. Consequently, in future any allegation of breach of duty by the director to the company 
needs to be identified as a breach of one or more of the general duties set out in the statute, except in 
so far as the statutory statement preserves, as it does in reaction to creditors ’interest, the common 
law duties. NB, there is no desire on the part of the legislature to cut the law of director’s duties off 
from its historical roots in the duties applying to other persons acting in a fiduciary character.
768 Gower and Davies, Principles of Modern Company Law, Sweet & Maxwell, London: 2008, p. 480, this is 
different for fiduciary duties owed to shareholders which are dependent upon establishing ‘a special 
factual relationship between the directors and the shareholders in the particular case’. 
769 B.F. Assink, Rechterlijke toetsing van bestuurlijk gedrag, Deventer: Kluwer 2007, p. 264. Allen and 
Kraakman, 2003, p. 239, the first and most basic duty, sometimes called the duty of obedience, is that 
a fiduciary must act consistently with the legal documents that create her authority. Thus, a corpora-
tion’s charter charges its director with certain tasks, such as holding an annual meeting on a fixed 
date, these directors may face liability for failing to do as they are asked, even if they act in good faith. 
However the discretionary power of the board as such is not eroded.
770 See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor. 634 A 2d 345, 367 (Del. 1993), ‘Duty of care and duty of loyalty are the 
traditional hallmarks of a fiduciary who endeavours to act in the service of a corporation and its stock-
holders. Each of these duties is of equal and independent significance.’ The court refers to Court of 
Chancery van Delaware Lutz v. Boas (Del Ch. 1961): ‘Duty of care and duty of loyalty are the traditional 
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minimum quality threshold for managerial decisions at some benchmark standard such as 
for negligence or gross negligence.771 The US duty of care requires the corporate fiduciar-
ies, especially directors and officers, to act with ‘the care of an ordinarily prudent person in 
the same or similar circumstances’,772 773 see ALI Principles of Corporate Governance. There 
are only a few cases that impose liability in case of breach of duty of care.774 775 Regarding 
the preparation of a business decision, directors have a duty to inform themselves,776 prior 
to making a business decision, of all material information reasonable available to them. 
Having become so informed they must then act with requisite care in the discharge of their 
duties777 (well-considered and well-informed). The duty of loyalty is a proscription against 
director conflict of interest and self-dealing. The duty requires a corporate director, officer 
or controlling shareholder to exercise his institutional power over corporate processes or 
hallmarks of a fiduciary who endeavours to act in the service of a corporation and its stockholders. 
Each of these duties is of equal and independent significance.’
771 As Reinier R. Kraakman, Paul Davies, Henry Hansmann, Gerard Hertig, Klaus J. Hopt, Hideki Kanda 
& Edward B. Rock, The Anatomy of Corporate Law, A Comparative and Functional Approach, New York: 
Oxford University Press 2004, p. 52 describes, the only standard that qualifies as a general instrument 
of corporate governance is the duty of care, which sets the minimum quality threshold for managerial 
decisions at some benchmark standards such as negligence or gross negligence. Defining and enforc-
ing such a standard is notoriously difficult and, to our knowledge, is not done extensively anywhere 
for good reason: evaluating business decisions ex post is difficult, and legal error in imposing liability 
is likely to make directors overly risk adverse ex ante. The rare case in which the law appears to hold 
directors liable for negligent decisions without evidence of bad faith or self-dealing generally involves 
extraordinary and easily distinguishable circumstances that we consider in later chapters, such as a 
sale or merger of the entire company.
772 Despite its sweeping scope, however, the duty of care is litigated much less than the duty of loyalty, 
primarily because the law insulated officers and directors from liability based on negligence (as op-
posed to knowing misconduct) in order to avoid inducing risk-averse management of the firm.
773 Allen, Kraakman and Subramanian, Commentaries and Cases on the Law of Business Organization (2nd 
Edition), New York: Aspen Publishers 2007, p. 242, from the beginnings of Anglo-American corporate 
law, courts have maintained that a corporate director must do more than pursue the corporations’ 
interest in good faith, she also has the duty to act as a reasonable person would in overseeing the 
company’s operations. Note 5, p. 242 Allen & Kraakman, The Charitable Company v. Sutton, 2 Atk. 400, 
406 (Ch. 1742), 26 Eng. Reps. 642 (1742) and see, e.g. Godbold v. Branch Bank, 11 Ala. 191 (1847). Hodges 
v. New England Screw Co., 1 R.I 312 (1850), Bates v. Dresser, 252 US 524 (1929) (Holmes, J.). It is notable 
that Sutton is not a case in which a loss resulted from a board decision, rather, it was a neglect of at-
tention case. The cases of inattention, rather than poor judgment, are the case in which one would 
traditionally find directors liable for breach of care.
774 B. Assink 2007, p. 176. 
775 Within the BJR the court can only review the preparation of a business decisin to the duty of care, not 
the content of that decision: process of duty of case
776 Brehm v. Eisner (Del. 2000), the standard for judging the informational component of the director’s de-
cision making does not mean that the board must be informed of every fact. The board is responsible 
for considering only material facts that are reasonable available, not those that are immaterial or out 
of the board’s reasonable reach.
777 B. F. Assink, p. 186/196, Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984), Smith v. Van Gorkum (Del. 1985), The 
Walt Disney Company Derivative Litigation (Del. Ch. 2005), Hollinger, Inc. v. Hollinger International, Inc. (del 
Ch.2004), Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993), also important to represent the court: 
in those decisions we have defined a board’s duty of care in variety of settings. For example, we have 
stated that a director’s duty of care requires a director to take an active and direct role in the context 
of a sale of a company from beginning to end. (Directors cannot be passive instrumentalities during 
merger proceedings.) In a merger or sale, we have stated that the director’s duty of care requires a 
director before voting on a proposed plan of merger or sale, to inform himself and his fellow directors 
of all material information that is reasonable available to them.
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property (including information) in a good-faith effort to advance the interests of the com-
pany.778 In the US, the duty of loyalty is owed by the board to the corporation and its share-
holders.779 In the UK, the duty of loyalty is regulated in sec. 175 UK CA 2006 (see the annexes 
for an overview statutory law).
Apart from the UK (having a well-established and elaborate trust law), the distinction 
between duties of care and those of loyalty are not clearly distinguished in the EU and 
examined MS. For example, Germany § 93 (1) AktG: ‘Die Vorstandmistlfieder haebn bei ihrer 
Geschäftsführung die Sorgfalt eines ordenrtlichten und gewissenhaften Geschäftsleiters 
anzuwenden’. Further German law provides a legal competition prohibition (§ 88 AktG); 
sec. 5.5 GCGK supplies some general rules in case of conflicts of interest. See also § 311 
ff Konzernrecht addresses, among other things, the conflicts of interest that may arise in 
transactions between a corporation and its controlling shareholder.
In the Netherlands, the board’s assignment is (cf. also art. 2:140 (2)) substantiated in case 
law by interpreting art. 2:8 NCC (reasonable and fairness) and art. 2:9 (internal liability).780 
The substantiation of open norms as art. 2:8 NCC (reasonableness and fairness) by the 
Enterprise Chamber at least in part was achieved by accepting ‘self-regulating’ governance 
rules of the NCGC. As discussed above, director conduct in an investigation procedure is not 
directly reviewed in the face of the general rules of arts. 2:8 and 2:9 NCCC781. However, in 
the application of the open norm of equity (art. 2:8 NCC), the Enterprise Chamber used its 
interpretational freedom to adopt norms of ‘good governance’.782
In summary: duties of care are linked to the concept that entrepreneurial decisions of the 
board should be well-informed and well-considered. Translate this into ‘not recklessly’ and 
the connection with the entrepreneurial basis and therefore also with the business judge-
ment (rule) is revealed. These duties in fact build on the internal statute of issuers, more 
particularly on the procedures for decision-making.783 Some of these duties are regarded 
778 Allen, Kraakman and Subramanian, Commentaries and Cases on the Law of Business Organization(2nd 
Edition), New York: Aspen Publishers 2007, p. 285 and Hamilton 2000, 467 and Klein, Ramseyer and 
Bainbridge, Business Associations, cases and materials on agency, partnerships and corporations, 
2006, p. 374. Stated negatively, the duty of loyalty requires such a person who transacts with the cor-
poration to fully disclose all material facts to the corporation’s disinterested representatives and to 
deal with the company on terms that are intrinsically fair in all respects.
779 B.F. Assink, Rechterlijke toetsing van bestuurlijk gedrag, Deventer: Kluwer 2007, p. 150.
780 See Raaijmakers, Ondernemingsrecht, Pitlo/Raaijmakers, Deventer: Kluwer 2006, p. 397. See also 
Stork- and ABNAMRO-cases.
781 Raaijmakers 2006, It should be noted that very significant effects of corporate reasonableness and 
fairness have been developed in the context of case law by the Enterprise Chamber. Moreover also, 
except specific rules for eacht of the forms of reorgaqnization, in Dutch law how in these particular 
circumstances art. 2:8 NCC has to be interpreted plays an important role: the general standard of 
reasonableness and fairness that applies to all private law legal entities. Two functions are distin-
guished: the supplementary working and the restrictive working of reasonableness and fairness. The 
first is particularly important in real ‘closed’, i.e. personal relationships. However in case of a formally 
legitimized decision of X to consolidate a public offer as a capital transaction the emphasis necessarily 
relates to a possible restrictive working. Case law does not make the aformentioned difference very 
clear. Art. 2:8 NCC provides, generally speaking, no basis to force a positive action of Y. However, that 
provision offers – ‘passive though’ – a basis to rescind ex art. 2:15 NCC a decision already taken; in 
general, therefore, a restrictive working.
782 Raaijmakers, 2006, p. 398.
783 See e.g. the famous US case Smith v. Van Gorkum.
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as so important that they are enacted, such as the certification procedure in §§ 302 and 
906 SOx. This also illustrates the focus of the worldwide corporate governance debate of 
the last decade on strengthened monitoring by the board (NED/SB), the independence of 
NED and SB-members especially of their audit, nomination and remuneration committees 
and of the requirement for the isuuer of ‘being in control’. In the US, as already mentioned, 
the aforementioned requirements merely underpin accurate non-misleading disclosure of 
information by the issuer to the market. They connect in general with the requirements of 
US securities regulation that requires every reporting company to make and keep books, 
records and accounts that accurately and fairly reflect the issuer’s transactions.784 When 
these disclosures by the issuer are misleading they will be prosecuted amongst other things 
by a securities fraud action (Rule 10b-5 SEA’34). Connected but distinct is the US duty of the 
board to exercise oversight (Delaware Chancery Court In re Caremark International, Inc. 
Derivative Litigation)785. In that contect also duty of oversight has to be noted.786 787 This duty 
is part of the duty of care and as such requires that information and reporting systems exist 
that allow the board (BoM/SB) to reach informed judgments concerning both the corpora-
tion’s compliance with law and its business performance.788
In the EU (examined MS) many principles and best practices in governance codes can be 
regarded as ‘codifying’ such duties of care (such as Best Practise II.1 DCGC, ‘The manage-
ment board is responsible for complying with all relevant primary and secondary legisla-
tion, for managing the risks associated with the company activities and for financing the 
company. The management board shall report related developments to and shall discuss 
784 Allen, Kraakman and Subramanian, Commentaries and Cases on the Law of Business Organization(2nd 
Edition), New York: Aspen Publishers 2007, p. 281 in the matter of Michael Marchese, p. 280, Subra 
Section 13 (b) (2)(A) of the SEA’34 requires every reporting company to make and keep books, records 
and accounts that accurately and fairly reflect the issuer’s transactions. Section 13 (b) (2) (B) requires 
a company to devise and maintain a system of internal controls sufficient to provide reasonable assur-
ances that transactions are recorded as necessary to permit the preparation of financial statements 
in conformity with GAAP.
785 In re. Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation (Del. Ch. 1996), the Caremark decision is rightly 
seen as a prod towards the greater exercise of care by directors in monitoring their corporation’s 
compliance with legal standards.’
786 Allen/Kraakman, p. 269, boards of public companies have a particular obligation to monitor their 
firm’s financial performance, the integrity of its financial reporting, its compliance with the law, its 
managemnet compensation, and its succession planning.
787 Allen, Kraakman and Subramanian, Commentaries and Cases on the Law of Business Organization (2nd 
Edition), New York: Aspen Publishers 2007, p. 263, the BJR rule protects boards that have made deci-
sions. In fact, however, the relatively few cases that actually impose liability on directors for breach of 
the duty of care are not cases in which a decision proved disastrously wrong but cases, like the Enron 
collapse of 2001, in which directors simply failed to do anything under circumstances in which it is 
later determined that a reasonably alert person would have taken action.
788 B.F. Assink, Rechterlijke toetsing van bestuurlijk gedrag, Deventer: Kluwer 2007, p. 184, recently the 
reasoning by Chancellor Allen in In re. Caremark International, Inc. Derivative Litigation has been con-
firmed by the Supreme Court of Delaware, Justice Holland considers: ‘It is important, in this context, 
to clarify a doctrinal issue that is critical to understanding fiduciary liability under Caremark as we 
construe that case. The phraseology used in Caremark and that we employ here, describing the lack 
of good faith as a ‘necessary condition to liability’ is deliberate. The purpose of that formulation is to 
communicate that a failure to act in good faith may result in liability because the requirement to act in 
good faith ‘is a subsidiary element (,) i.e. a condition, ‘of the fundamental duty of loyalty’. It follows that 
because a showing of bad faith conduct, in the sense described in Disney and Caremark, is essential 
to establish director oversight liability; the fiduciary duty violated by that conduct is the duty of loyalty. 
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the internal risk management and control systems with the supervisory board and the audit 
committee’789). Strictly speaking they are not enforceable, but neither are they irrelevant.
Duties of loyalty, on the other hand, refer directly to the core of the ‘truste-like’ position of 
board members. Statutory rules cover, inter alia, duties to disclose conflicts of interest and 
related party transactions, incompatibilities, limits to representation of the corporation, 
non-competition clauses for board members and officers. Many principles and best prac-
tices in codes also are directed at loyalty, e.g. Best Practise II.3 DCGC Conflicts of interest, 
Principle: ‘Any conflict of interest or apparent conflict of interest between the company and 
management board members shall be avoided. Decisions to enter into transactions under 
which management board members would have conflicts of interest that are of material 
significance to the company and/or to the relevant management board member require the 
approval of the supervisory board’.
4.4.1.3 Purpose and nature of the BJR in further detail
The BJR obviously does not provide ‘carte blanche’ to make the board invulnerable. The 
fiduciary position (see par. 6.4.1) of the board according to its appointment and assignment 
alse means that the board has to execute it adequately (according to its fiduciary duties as 
prescribed in the US and UK) and account for it in the prescribed manner to the corporation, 
that is to say towards its supervisors (SB/NED) and the GMS, and not to abuse its position, 
not to intertwine its interests and absolutely not to enrich itself.790 As explained in the previ-
ous paragraph this concerns the fiduciary duties of care, loyalty (and good faith).
If the strategy and policy of the corporation (board) does not deliver the success as expected 
by investors and the market, the greatest danger lies in the fact that the board (members) 
in a liability suit will be condemned because the court with wisdom of hindsight (‘hindsight 
bias’) and insufficient expertise places its own judgement on what the board (members) 
as entrepreneurs should have done better. Board members want to be indemnified from 
that risk and to that effect serve not only (statutory) indemnification and D&O-insurance, but 
especially the BJR.791 This prevent ‘risk aversion’ to the detriment of the corporation, its 
789 Best Practise III.8.1 DCGC, requirement for the SB to discuss strategy of the corporation; Best Prac-
tise III.1.9 DCGC requirement for SB to require all relevant information from the management; Best 
Practise II.1.3 DCGC The company shall have an internal risk management and control system that is 
suitable for the company. It shall, in any event, employ as instruments of the internal risk manage-
ment and control system: a) risk analyses of the operational and financial objectives of the company; 
b) a code of conduct which should be published on the company’s website; c) guides for the layout of 
the financial reports and the procedures to be followed in drawing up the reports; and d) a system of 
monitoring and reporting.
790 Cf. § 21 UMAG: ‘Die Regelung geht von der Differenzierung zwischen fehlgeschlagenen unter nehrnei-
schen Entscheidungen einerseits und der Verleizung sonstiges-Plichten andererseits (Treuep flich-
ten; Infomiationspflichten; sonstige algemeine Gestetzes- und Salzungsverstdlle) aus. Em VerstoB 
gegen diese Jetztere Pflichtengruppe ist von der Bestimmung nicht erfasst. Die untemehmerische 
Entscheidung steht im Gegensatz zur rechtlich gebundenen Entscheidung. Fur illegales Verhalten 
gibt es keinen “sicheren Hafen” im Sinne einer haftungstatbestandlichen Freistellung, es kann hier 
nu Einzelfall aber aan Verschulden fehien.’
791 Cf. also M.J. Kroeze, Bange bestuurders, Deventer: Kluwer 2005; B.F. Assink, Rechterlijke toetsing van 
bestuurlijk gedrag, Deventer: Kluwer 2007; ALl Principles of Corporate Governance, ad § 4.01: ‘The 
drafters justify the business judgment rule as being necessary to protect “directors and officers from 
the risks inherent in hindsight reviews of their business decisions” and avoid “the risk of stifling in-
novation and venturesome business activity.”’ Cf. William A. Klein & John Coffee Jr., Business Organi-
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investors, other interested parties and the society as a whole. That danger is turned by the 
BJR: in its judgement, the court will honour the business judgement of the board, will refrain 
from judging with wisdom of hindsight and will not place its own judgement instead of the 
board (will not sit on the ‘chair’ of the board). In that way the board’s supremacy and discre-
tion will be protected.
The Delaware Supreme Court considered: ‘Under Delaware law, the business judgment 
rule is the offspring of the fundamental principle, codified in § 141(a) DGCL, that the busi-
ness and affairs of a Delaware corporation are managed by or under its board of directors... 
The Business judgement rule exists to protect and promote the full and free exercise of the 
managerial power granted to Delaware directors.’ Bainbridge summarises this rule: ‘to 
protect and promote the full and free exercise of the managerial power granted to Delaware 
directors’.792 Compare also ABA Corporate Director’s Guidebook: ‘Where it is said that a 
decision constitutes a valid business judgment (and gives rise to no liability for ensuing loss) 
when it 1) is made by financially disinterested directors or officers 2) who have become duly 
informed before exercising judgment and 3) who exercise judgement in a good-faith effort 
to advance corporate interests.’793
zation and Finance, New York: Foundation Press 2002, p. 258-60: “Another explanation for the BIR is 
that judges are no business experts”, see Dodge v. Motor Co, 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919). Allen, Kraak-
man and Subramanian, Commentaries and Cases on the Law of Business Organization (2nd Edition), New 
York: Aspen Publishers 2007, p. 256: “Without a certain rule directors who risk liability for making 
unreasonable decisions, would likely behave in a risk-averse manner that also harms shareholders.” 
Cf. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A2d 805, 812 (Del 1984), “the rule creates a presumption that the directors of 
officers of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith, and in the honest belief the action 
was in the best interest of the company. The BJR is also in the shareholders’ economic interest to of-
fer sufficient protection to directors from liability for negligence” (…), “to allow directors to conclude 
that, as a practical matter, there is no risk that, if they act in good faith and meet minimal procedural 
standards of attention, they can face liability as a result of a business loss”. In similar sense legisla-
tive history of the German UMAG; cf. B.F. Assink, Rechterlijke toetsing van bestuurlijk gedrag, Deventer: 
Kluwer 2007, p 429; see also § 8.31 (a)(2) MBCA: “directors are not liable to the corporation or its 
shareholders for any decision, unless, challenged conduct consisted or was the result of i) action not 
in good faith; or (ii) a decision (A) which the director not reasonable believe to be in the best interest of 
the corporation, or (B), as to which director was not informed to an extent the director reasonably be-
lieved appropriate in the circumstances; or (iii) a lack of objectivity due to the director’s self-interest. 
(iv), a sustained failure of the director to devote attention to ongoing oversight of the business and 
affairs of the corporation (v), receipt of financial benefit to which the director was not entitled or any 
other breach of director’s duty of loyalty”.
792 Smith v. Van Gorkum, 488 A 2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985). Cf. Bainbridge 2002, p. 267.
793 Cf. Allen, Kraakman and Subramanian, Commentaries and Cases on the Law of Business Organization(2nd 
Edition), New York: Aspen Publishers 2007, p. 255, in some formulations (like ALL, Corporate Govern-
ance Project § 4.01 (c) (1994)), it is also said that the business judgment rule does not protect ‘irra-
tional’ or ‘egregious behaviour’. However, we interpret this additional stricture as a restatement of the 
requirement that directors must act in good faith to enjoy the protections of the business judgment 
rule. Since the law cannot order directors to make correct decisions by flat, It follows, in our view, that 
disinterested directors who act deliberately and in good faith should never be liable for a resulting 
loss, no matter how stupid their decisions may seem ex post. Cf. Bainbridge 2002: The good faith and 
disinterested independence of the directors also are often identified as constitutions on which the rule 
is predicated, see, e.g. Auerbach v. Bennet, 393 N.E.2d 994, 999 (NY 1979), so long as directors were 
disinterested and acted in good faith, the business judgment rule required the court to defer to board 
committee’s recommendation to dismiss a shareholder derivative suit.
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The plaintiff has to state and prove that the presumption that the board acted in a well-
considered, well-informedway and in good faith is false.794 Therefore he has to proof that the 
board acted fraudulently/illegally, or was influenced by a conflict of interest or the decision 
did not serve any rational purpose or is a breach of the ‘process of due care’ (a rational and 
good faith decision-making process). That obligation to state facts and the burden to prove 
them combined with limited possibilities for discovery make it difficult to attack the BJR.
Similarly § 93 (1) AktG: ‘Die Vorstandsmitglieder haben bei ihrer Geschäftsführung die Sorg-
falt eines ordentlichen und gewissenhaften Geschäftsleiters anzuwenden’, however sub 2 
adds: “Eine Pflichtverletzung liegt nicht vor wenn das Vorstandsmitglied bei einer unterneh-
merischen Entscheidung vernünftigerweise annehmen dürfte, auf der Grundlage angemessener 
Information zum Wohle der Gesellschaft zu handelen.” The German legislator operates the 
same notion: avoidance of risk-averse behaviour.795
4.4.1.4 BJR: material and procedural safeguards
The sued director (BoM/SB) will not be liable in the ‘liability-free zone’, which stops where 
the plaintiff proves that the board members had a conflict of interests, were not sufficiently 
informed, or could not reasonably be said to have acted in the interests of the corporation.796 
This does not entail a marginal test in which the court judges the board’s policy; however 
only restrictively.
The BJR is also the point of departure in the first (demand) phase of a derivative suit.797 
To file such a suit the board first authorised.798 The plaintiff has to file a demand with the 
board, before he can go ahead with this action in court.799 The board’s decision on demand 
will be protected by the BJR. In most cases this demand will be met and the plaintiff will 
address the court directly, stating that a ‘demand’ is unnecessary: ‘futile’ or ‘excused’. This 
will succeed if a majority of the board in taking that decision had a conflict of interests, was 
not independent or reasonable doubt exists that the BJR does not apply for the challenged 
actions because of breach of the duty of loyalty or reasonable doubt exists that the BJR-
794 Or as De Wulf, 2002, p. 476 describes: ‘No matter what decision of the board (BoM) it has to be exa-
mined whether the board acted subjectively in good faith, informed, and rational. That three-way test 
is, as seen in general, a test of the duty of care. However when a director has nevertheless an econo-
mical interest in that decision, then a further test has to be executes, namely a loyalty test: has the 
decision making been independent.’
795 The explanation with the UMAG states: “Eine untemehmerische Entscheidnng beruht häufig auch 
auf Instinkt, Erfahrung, Phantasie und Gespür for künftige Entwicklungen und einem Gefühl für die 
Märkte und die Reaktion der Abnehmer und Konkurrenten. Dies lässt sich nicht vol1ständig durch 
objective Informatjon ersetzen.” Cf. B.F. Assink, ‘Enige beschouwingen over Duitse ontwerpwetgev-
ing, de Amerikaanse “business judgment rule” en ontwikkelingen in het Nederlandse vennootschap-
srecht’, Ondernemingsrecht 2005-10 and B.F. Assink, ‘De Mannesmann-zaak, Een verhaal over irra-
tioneel gedrag, hoogmoed en de bijbehorende val’, Ondernemingsrecht 2006, p. 50 ff.
796 De Wulf 2002, p. 479. 
797 Bainbridge, 2002, p. 269; cf. R. Franklin Balotti & James J. Hanks, jr., ‘Rejudging the Business Judg-
ment Rule’, 48 Bus. Law. 1337, 1345, 1993. “Given the significant virtues of discretion, however, one 
must not lightly interfere with management or the board’s decision making authority in the name of 
accountability. Preservation of managerial discretion should always be the null hypothesis. The sepa-
ration of ownership and control mandated by US corporate law has precisely that effect. Likewise, the 
business judgment rule exists because judicial review threatens the board’s authority.”
798 § 141 (a) DGCL; § 76 AktG.
799 Art. 23 Chancery Rule and art. 23.1 Federal Rules on Civil procedure.
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boundary has been crossed.800 The fact has to be stated with ‘particularity’ without a right 
for discovery.801 The plaintiff will base his claim mainly on disclosure documents (annual, 
semi-annual and quarterly accounts as filed with the SEC) and other external sources. 
These high thresholds try to prevent ‘fishing expeditions’ and ‘frivolous actions’. Once they 
are met, then the derivate suit will start. In that procedure again the BJR will be taken as 
the starting point. Although the plaintiff does not have to attack that rule immediately, he 
has little chance if he has a real case.802 The procedural and material meanings of the BJR 
are thus interwoven.803 This also respects in principle the independence of the board (board 
supremacy) as well as the discretion of the assignment given to the board (board discretion) 
and prevents ‘second guessing’ by the court that – by definition in retrospect – judges the 
claim. ‘Fishing expeditions’, aimed at ‘discovery’, and also intervening through immediate 
measures (injunctions; orders by the court) will be stopped. The Delaware legislator and 
court also place the BJR clearly in the context of pervasion and stimulation of business 
climate.804
4.4.1.5 BJR and hostile takeovers
Because board supremacy and discretion in the case of (an attempted) hostile takeover 
specifically play an important role, and in relation to the Netherlands, have led to a series 
of Chamber of Business decisions (RNA, Stork, ABNAMRO, ASMI), Delaware corporate law 
will briefly be analysed. In this paragraph, I have limited myself, not only because of a lack 
of space, but also cause of the fact that Delaware corporate law is the most clear example 
of a system in which the board can defend the corporation as a ‘bastion’ against possible 
attacks.805
800 See the famous case of Aronson v. Lewis, which B.F. Assink, Rechterlijke toetsing van bestuurlijk gedrag, 
Deventer: Kluwer 2007, analyses in chapter 2.
801 Art. 23.1 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and art. 11 Chancery Rule; cf. B.F. Assink, Rechterlijke toets-
ing van bestuurlijk gedrag, Deventer: Kluwer 2007, p. 122; see however § 220 DGCL: limited inspection 
of books and records.
802 Cf. B.F. Assink, Rechterlijke toetsing van bestuurlijk gedrag, Deventer: Kluwer 2007, p. 132; M.J. Kroeze, 
Afgeleide schade en afgeleide actie, Den Haag: Kluwer 2004, p. 202: “to put it strongly: if the court finds 
the claim weak by its substance, then the procedural obstacles are unassailable, if the court finds the 
claim strong, then these rules are no problem.”
803 See Aronson v. Lewis (Del. 1984): “the function of the business judgment rule is of paramount signifi-
cance in the context of a derivative action. It comes into play in several ways, in addressing demand, 
in the determination of demand futility, in efforts by independent disinterested directors to dismiss 
the action as inimical to the corporation’s best interests, and generally, as a defence to the merits of 
the suit. However, in each of these circumstances there are certain common principles governing the 
application and operation of the rule”. Cf. also B.F. Assink, Rechterlijke toetsing van bestuurlijk gedrag, 
Deventer: Kluwer 2007, p. 111.
804 It is illustrative that the threat of the well-known case in Smith v. Van Gorkum quickly was countered 
by § 140 DGCL; cf. also B.F. Assink, Rechterlijke toetsing van bestuurlijk gedrag, Deventer: Kluwer 2007, 
p. 456.
805 See for an extensive overview of the role of the board in case of a hostile take over: M.J. van Ginneken, 
Vijandige overnames, De rol van de vennootschapsleiding in Nederland en de Verenigde Staten, Deventer: 
Kluwer 2010, p. 483, stating that a rough distinction can be made between two basic models relating 
to the role of the board of the target company. The first model places the decisions regarding the out-
come of a hostile takeover entirely in the hands of the shareholders of the target company and side-
lines the board. The board should remain passive. In the second model the board has an active role. It 
acts as a gatekeeper an may take defensive measures to fulfil its role. As a result, shareholders are 
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In the case of a creeping hostile takeover, the target board (US) has a gate-keeping func-
tion.806
Although taking protective measures (poison pill, sale of assets, transaction with a ‘white 
knight’) the target-board cannot simply qualify as ‘interested director transactions’ (§ 144 
DGCL), the target’s board members in that situation also simply qualify as independent, 
as in case of a successful bid they can lose their function.807 That is the reason the Dela-
ware courts have adjusted the BJR if investors claim that the target board’s members have 
breached their fiduciary duties in defending the corporation against a hostile takeover.808 It 
hovers between two extremes: a) the assumption by the BJR that they are disinterested/
independent,809 and b) that that assumption has been disproved and the target-board mem-
bers have to abstain from any action that could interfere with the takeover (cf. the UK neu-
trality rule of the UK City Code). I will just briefly sketch the result. If a target board takes 
protective measures against a hostile tender offer, then it has to show that they in ‘good faith 
and after reasonable investigation’ could view the threat as danger to corporate policy and 
effectiveness.
The test of Unocal was (i) whether the board may reasonably judge that the hostile tender 
offer forms a threat to the entity of the enterprise and (ii) whether the protective measures 
taken were reasonable in relation to the threat. In Revlon this test was refined if the board 
concludes that the sale is inevitable or the board itself puts the corporation up for sale or 
takes action for a merger with a white knight, a leveraged buy-out or a total sale of assets. 
In these cases they have to strive for the highest price for the shareholders. In the meantime 
– over and above ‘Revlon-situations’ – the main rule of Paramount v. Time and Paramount v. 
QVC of the board to ‘just say no’, still stands.810 Of course, as has been describe in chapter 3, 
control can also be gained by replacement of board members through a proxy contest. Then 
the securities proxy rules play a profound role. Thus a new board could rescind a poison pill. 
In Unitrin v. American General Corp.811 the court decided that as long as the board could be 
replaced by a proxy contest, the target-board may take protective measures. However, the 
shareholder’s rights to convene a special meeting is often lacking, so that the bidder could 
has to wait for coming elections to execute a proxy contest. Also, over 60% of listed public 
unable to determine the outcome of the bid is not supported by the board. In practise, this means the 
bid must be accepted by both the board and the shareholder. In practise, this means the bid must be 
accepted by both the board and the shareholders. The manner in which the board fulfils its role may 
be reviewed by the courts. In the US, board passivity has explicitly been rejected by the Delaware Su-
preme Court. The board is expressly permitted to take defensive measures against a hostile takeover. 
Clearly, the US has opted for the second model.
806 Stephen M. Bainbridge, ‘Unocal at 20: Director Primacy in corporate takeovers’, University of Califor-
nia, Los Angeles School of Law, Law & Economics Research Paper Series NO. 05-19, September 2005, p. 3. 
807 Christian Kirchner and Richard W. Painter, ‘Towards a European Modified Business Judgment Rule for 
Takeover Law’, European Business Organizations Law Review 2000, p. 13.
808 Christian Kirchner and Richard W. Painter, ‘Towards a European Modified Business Judgment Rule for 
Takeover Law’, European Business Organizations Law Review 2000, and Stephen M. Bainbridge, ‘Unocal 
at 20: Director Primacy in corporate takeovers’, University of California, Los Angeles School of Law, Law 
& Economics Research Paper Series NO. 05-19, September 2005 and B. Assink 2007.
809 See B. Assink, 2007, for further filling in of these norms.
810 M.J. van Ginneken, Vijandige overnames, De rol van de vennootschapsleiding in Nederland en de Ver-
enigde Staten, Deventer: Kluwer 2010.
811 651 A 2d 1361 (Del.1995).
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corporation make use of ‘staggered boards’, in which only a part will put themselves up for 
elections (§ 141 DGCL). Acquiring effective control in that way can take several years. A poi-
son pill in combination with staggered boards offers effective protection against a hostile 
takeover.812
4.5 Again: comparison with the Dutch investigation procedure
Whatever may be the final outcome of the draft Bill to amend the investigation procedure, its 
impact on the Dutch business climate for issuers cannot be ignored and requires analysis 
and assessment, particularly its use as quasi-liability suit or a means to press for a settle-
ment, even without completion of the procedure or subsequent liability procedure. 813 Such 
assessment should properly observe the differences that were already discussed above 
and may be briefly summarised as follows.
The investigation procedure lacks the usual procedural safeguards of a liability suit in which 
the claimant has to state facts and has the burden of proof, parties will be heard and have 
to follow the sequence of exchanging written statements (of claim and of defence). Some-
what comparable to ‘demand’ and ‘Vorferfahren’ is the requirement of art. 2:349 NCC to 
get access to the procedure: require petitioners shall inform the board of their complaints 
in order to allow the issuer a grace period for proper reaction. However, this requirement 
became practically obsolete and therefore does not function as demand or Vorferfahren. 
Similar protection is missing in case of granting immediate injunctive relief even without 
a judgement on admission to the procedure. Nevertheless, such initial judgements often 
contain, although an investigation report is not yet available, already ‘qualifies’ the behav-
iour of the board without the reluctance of a BJR. Both in interim and final decisions, the 
Enterprise Chamber uses (dis)qualification as ‘improper governance’, that is difficult to dis-
tinguish from the grounds of a art. 2:9 NCC-liability procedure (‘improper governance’) or of 
the receiver in bankruptcy on art. 2:138 NCC (‘obvious improper governance’).
As stated above, the explanatory notes to the draft Bill to amend the investigation procedure 
observe ‘that there are no fundamental problems with the temporary system, however the 
right of investigation can be ameliorated in some details’ and rejects the proposed BJR to 
lift the threshold for entry to the procedure and for the final judgement to be ‘mismanage-
ment of the corporation’. This statement seems to disregard the previous analysis in its 
application for issuers now having to adhere to the new securities law as well as its possible 
impact on jurisdictional arbitrage.
Shortly before finishing this study (1-9-2010), the Netherlands Supreme Court rescinded 
the Enterprise Chamber’s decision in the ASMI-case. This decision is of utmost importance 
for further development. It therefore requires proper attention. Before summarising that 
812 Zie Bebchuk/Ferrell 2001: Bebchuk represents a goup of US academics who plea for a more inluential 
role of shareholders in the listed public corporation.
813 With the short comment that if the Enterprise Chamber’s decision of 5-07-2010 (KPN/Qwest) is not 
appealed to the Supreme Court, the applicant (‘plaintiff’) cannot offer the withdrawal of the request 
for an inquiry without permission of the Enterprise Chamber, which can, as it turned out, decide dif-
ferently ‘in the public interest’.
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 decision in par. 4.7.3. I shall continue my summary of the distinct elements of the investiga-
tion procedure.
4.6 Restructuring and restoration of sound relation in a listed public 
corporation (N.V.)
The comparative analysis also seems to support the hypothesis that the investigation pro-
cedure’s objective of restructuring and restoring ‘sound relations’ in an issuer does not 
fit. The point of departure for an issuer going public, as discussed in chapter 3, remains 
its freedom to structure its internal affairs as it think fit for its organisation, observing of 
course the limits set by mandatory law.814 This includes the division of tasks and powers 
between the board (BoM/SB) and the GMS, oligarchic regulations, anti-takeover devices 
and the rights connected to its securities (shares): voting, dividends and liquidation rights. 
The prospectus to be disclosed shall explain all this in proper detail; including adherence 
to the DCGC (comply or explain). Thus, investors are adequately informed and by accept-
ing the offer also accept the issuer’s internal governance. Board members are collectively 
assigned to manage the corporation and its undertaking under oversight of the SB/NED and 
to guide it and independently determine its strategy and policy. A division of tasks is usual 
(CEO, CFO and other officers). They shall act in the interest of the issuer and its business 
which also underscores their independence (supremacy).815 They shall account to the GMS, 
which decides on their appointment and dismissal. To the market and its investors they 
are required to adhere to the rule of ‘full disclosure’ as prescribed by EU/Dutch securities 
regulations. Enforcement of investor’s collective and individual rights as attributes by stat-
ute, articles of incorporation and bylaws as shareholders will follow the law and articles of 
incorporation:816 voting and information rights in the GMS, reception of dividends, but also by 
buying and selling (‘Wall Street Walk’) on the exchange or offering their shares to a offeror 
in a public bid. Decisions can be rescinded ex post through art. 2:15 NCC rescission action 
(see par. 3.4 for similar actions in the other jurisdictions), however they cannot be enforced 
ex ante. Investors may collect/solicit other proxies or together call a GMS and – unimpeded 
(art. 2:114a NCC) – propose items for its agenda on matters within the competence of the 
GMS. Major decisions (such as sale of all assets) require the approval of the GMS, but a deci-
sion on adhering to the NCGC does not have the character of an amendment of the articles 
of incorporation that needs the approval of the GMS.
In their capacity as investors they are protected by mandatory securities law (AFS): initially 
by the strict disclosure and transparency rules for the offering circular and prospectus 
and subsequently by ongoing and continuous AFS disclosure requirements: annual reports, 
814 See also Dutch Supreme Court, LJN BM0976 (ASMI), 4..4.2 under (iv).
815 Cf. M. Blair and Lynn. A. Stout, ‘A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law’, Virginia Law Review, Vol. 
85, No. 2, 1999, p. 248-328.
816 Important to these shareholder’s rights are when and on which grounds can one convene an annual 
GMS or special GMS, place items on the agenda and which quorum criteria apply for topics on which 
shareholders are authorised to decide, see chapter 3, par. 
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semi-annual, quarterly, and interim information.817 Public supervision on enforcement of 
the securities regulation assigned to the AFM means: preceding approval for issuing and 
bidding (public takeover) prospectuses (art. 5:6 ASF), supervision on continuous disclo-
sure, including the annual reports (art. 5:25a ASF), restatement (art. 2:445 ff. NCC)818 and 
oversight on rules to be observed in public (takeover) bids (art. 5:70 ASF). The borderlines 
between the competence of the AFM and the Enterprise Chamber are not clear. The issuer 
as a corporation (NV) will go public “as is” in an IPO. The assessment by the market, ana-
lysts and investors of the IPO will cover the value of the securities in the offer, the market 
position, its products, services, innovative power, ‘past performance’, future expectations 
and success, as well as confidence in its board (especially the CEO and CFO) and its supervi-
sors (SB-members or NEDs).
Investors evidently have great interest in the issuer’s performance, but investing is not the 
same as managing. Trust in the board’s entrepreneurship and strategy remains essential 
and the securities law disclosure and transparency rule will allow ongoing monitoring by 
the market and investors. Loss of trust will cause pressure to replace the CEO and/or board 
members and adapt the strategy and policies. The SB or NEDs are best suited for that. The 
GMS as such is utterly unsuitable for taking such actions. Investors remain free to trade 
their shares and disinvest, but also to stay on and to voice their criticism of board perform-
ance. Analysts, the financial press, rating agencies and voting advisors play a very impor-
tant role in continuous assessment of that performance and its reflection in the stock price 
and the issuer’s reputation and disciplining the board (cf chapter 2, par. 2 on that monitoring 
function of the market).
This short analysis may already illustrate the difficulties in addressing ‘insane internal 
relations’ in court by means of allowing entry to the investigation procedure and by sub-
sequent immediate and/or final specific injunctions and to balance these with the issuer’s 
interest in undisturbed pursuance of its ongoing business and activities and prevention of 
exposure to reputational damage.
4.6.1	 Unsound	relations	in	issuers?
The most simple ground would be that the issuer violated organisational rules (internal 
affairs) provided by statute and/or the articles of incorporation (US = bylaws, UK = articles), 
although that leaves open the question of whether and to what extent that already consti-
tutes ‘insane’ and ‘restorable relations’. However, the key test remains the board’s suprem-
acy and discretion with respect to the issuer’s strategy and policies. Not surprisingly, the 
Enterprise Chamber repeatedly paid lip service to that principle. Subsequently, however, it 
817 I refer to ch. 2. By that the ASF implemented the European system in protecting investors in the mar-
ket (Prospectus, Admission, Transparency, and Market Abuse Directives, the IAS Regulation (IFRS), 
the 8th Directive that does not fit well, and, rules of conduct in case of public biddings (TD). Everything 
under preventative and repressive public supervision by the AFM. Cf. also Raaijmakers/Van der Schee 
(2008) (reference 5).
818 The enforcement (private law) of art. 2:101 (3) NCC, the authority for listed public corporations of 
the GMS to adopt the annual accounts, suggests an intra-corporate enforcement of the disclosure 
obligation of annual reports as required by the FSA. In our view, this as well as the dependency of the 
restatement action of the AFM (art. 2:447 NCC) on that adoption of the annual accounts, in the new 
structure of the securities law this is an anomaly. 
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effectively created new organisational rules in the issuers’ internal affairs, most often by 
extensive interpretation of the general standards of art. 2:8 NCC (reasonable and fairness, 
discussed in chapter 3), allowing a breach of these rules so ‘created’ to be determined. 
As stated above these include: a) extensive application of art. 2:107a NCC in the LaSalle-
transaction (ABNAMRO819; cf. chapter 3.3.9.1); b) the ‘duty’ of (continued) dialogue with inves-
tors (Enterprise Chamber 17-01-2007, JOR 2007, 47 (Stork)); c) the duty of the SB to ‘negotiate’ 
and mediate (Stork, ASMI); d) the limitation of time to respond to a hostile takeover attempt 
(Stork); e) ‘enforcing’ soft law NCGC-best practices on board-composition and to extend 
these to a subsidiary (Versatel)820; f) qualification of a white knight foundation as ‘shadow 
director’ (ASMI); g) extension of duties to consult the GMS (HBG, ABNAMRO); h) qualification 
of non-agreement with investors as a ‘dead-lock’ to be resolved by injunctions (ASMI).821 
Remarkably, the very ratio legis of the very broad standard (for all ‘legal persons’) and its 
specific meaning for issuers was not tested and argued by the court. Thus, non-observance 
of these rules created by extensive interpretation of art. 2:8 NCC could be constituted by the 
court as violating the issuer’s internal affairs regime. In the ASMI-case it even set aside an 
explicit, well-informed and extensively debated GMS-resolution to discharge the BoM and 
SB.822 Equally remarkable is that the court disregarded the question of its own competence 
vis-à-vis the agencies for public oversight (AFM and the National Bank).823
‘Restructuring and restoration of sound relations’ does not therefore constitute a proper 
objective for judicial intervention in an issuer’s internal affairs. It is clearly preposterous to 
require investors to assess their position by minutely studying the investigation procedure 
and the case law promulgated thereunder. Conversely, it seems at odds to require issuers 
in their prospectus and continuous disclosures to explain the (possible) impact of the Enter-
prise Chamber’s (evolving) case law.
4.7 Judicial review of the Enterprise Chamber’s case law on 
investigation rights of investors by the Netherlands Supreme Court
Although (still) confirming the original aims of the investigation procedure as discussed in 
this chapter, the Netherlands Supreme Court overruled a series of decrees of the Enterprise 
Chamber in investigation procedures initiated by (activist) investors against Dutch issuers. 
Its decisions in DSM824, KPN/Qwest825, ABNAMRO826 and the landmark decision in ASMI827 taken 
819 Enterprise Chamber, 03-05-2007, LJN: BA4395, 451/2007.
820 Enterprise Chamber 24-03-2006, JOR 2006, 98 (Versatel).
821 Enterprise Chamber, 05-08-2009, JOR, 2009, 254; see also Enterprise Chamber, 1305-2009, JOR 2009, 
163 and Enterprise CHamber 27-06-2008, JOR 2008, 230 and Enterprise Chamber, 20-05-2008, JOR 
2008, 158.
822 See the ASMI-case.
823 See the ASMI-case.
824 Supreme Court 14-12-2007, LJN: BB3523.
825 Supreme Court 17-12-2010, LJN: BO3356.
826 Supreme Court 13-09-2007, LJN: BA 7970, BA 7971, BA 7972.
827 Supreme Court, 09-09-2010, LJN: BM 0976, BJ 4688.
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together has now established quite clear guidance on such major issues as the entry to the 
procedure and intermediate ‘stop orders’, and, most importantly, reconfirmed the issuer’s 
board supremacy and discretion. See especially HBG828, ABNAMRO and Stork829, ASMI.
In the absence of a stare decisis-rule, however, this is not binding the Enterprise Chamber. 
Thus, a re-assessment of the basic statutory rules, taking stock of both the introduction of 
the protection of investors by the new securities regulation, the DCGC and the rulings of the 
Supreme Court seems to be due. This, however, is not yet reflected in the draft Bill to amend 
the investigation procedure.
Below I will summarise the most important rulings of the Supreme Court.
4.7	1	 General	explanation	of	the	right	of	inquiry
In KNP/Qwest, the Supreme Court upheld the Enterprise Chamber’s discretionary power to 
order an inquiry. However, it firmly ruled that, in using that power, the Enterprise Chamber 
should carefully weigh all interests, facts and circumstances of the case at hand. It also 
should take into consideration the disadvantages of a low entry for an investigation and the 
nature of the specific conflict. The Enterprise Chamber, hence, should argue its decision 
carefully. Summarising, this means that: a) the Enterprise Chamber and consequently the 
petitioners in drafting their request to argue (i) specific analysis and explanation of the pre-
viously discussed purposes, (ii) similarly the drawbacks against a broad application in the 
case at hand, (iii) the nature of the conflict and (b) for an explicit analyses of the interests 
of the corporation itself (enforcement of its internal organisational rules, reputation, but 
also its submission to securities disclosure – and other rules). Careful and conscientious 
application of these rules of the Supreme Court, already raise the thresholds for an inquiry 
as ‘action’.
4.7.2	 Higher	standards	for	allowing	immediate	injunctive	relief	(DSM)
Immediate injunctive relief (‘stop orders’) can have profound and sometimes irrevers-
ible consequences for issuers. In the DSM –case, voting by the GMS on an amendment of 
the articles of incorporation, scheduled properly for the GMS-agenda, was blocked by an 
injunction. The Supreme Court overruled the order. It argued that the first step remains a 
judgement as to whether there are well-founded reasons to doubt good policy, but also con-
firmed that immediate injunctive relief may be granted before such decision has been taken. 
However, at this stage that power should be used only restrictively and taking into account 
and weighing properly all the interests involved. Hence, the injunctive relief should be pro-
portional.830 Once this is properly established, injunctive relief may be granted in any form 
(not limited to the list of art. 2:356 NCC831).
828 Supreme Court 21-02-2003, LJN: AF 1486.
829 Supreme Court 17-02-2007, LJN: AZ 6440.
830 Supreme Court 14-12-2007 (appeal in the interest of the law against Enterprise Chamber’s decision of 
28-03-2007, JOR 2007/118, with reference Brink), NJ 2008, 105 (with reference Maeijer); JOR 2008/11 
(with reference A. Doorman).
831 See the conclusion of Advocate General Timmerman in the DSM-case, especially the sections 3.76-
3.79 and 3.83-3.84.
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The discussion in this and the preceding chapters seems to indicate that application of these 
procedural rules in cases against issuers should involve a judicial assessment of inter alia 
the ratio and effectiveness of alternative securities law protection of investors, the spe-
cific own interest of the issuer as a publicly traded firm, the competence of the AFM, the 
expected pros and cons of granting any injunctive relief and possible alternatives. This may 
substantially increase the standards to be applied.
The draft Bill to amend the investigation procedure does not elaborate on that further step 
and is limited to codifying the bare rules as described above.
4.7.3	 Supreme	Court	reconfirms	board	supremacy	and	discretion	(ASMI:	a	‘landmark	
decision’)
These rules therefore still leave the Enterprise Chamber wide discretion, also with respect 
to the board’s supremacy and discretion which had been severely eroded by a series of deci-
sions, not least in the ASMI-case.832 This decision was overruled by the Supreme Court – in 
my opinion a ‘landmark decision’.
First, it reconfirmed the supremacy and discretion of an issuer’s board. ‘The board of a 
corporation should in executing its tasks as assigned by the statute and articles of incorpo-
ration place the interest of the corporation and the connected undertaking upfront and take 
the interests of all involved parties, under which those of the shareholders, into account in 
making its decisions. The strategy as followed by ASMI is therefore in principle a matter of 
the board and the board, under oversight of the SB, will judge whether, and to what extent, it is 
desirable to have a consultation with its external shareholders. The board of a corporation has 
indeed to account for its policy to the GMS, but it is, in the absence of statutory rules or rules 
of the articles of incorporation, not obliged to involve the GMS upfront in its decision-making 
when actions within the authority of the board are concerned.’ It conforms its ruling in the 
ABNAMRO-case: there is no obligation for consultation or approval of the GMS for the sale 
of LaSalle, also not on the grounds of this extensively interpreted ‘governance’-rules. In 
this AMSI-case a similar extension was overruled: the refusal to continue discussions with 
investors does not per se constitute a ‘defensive and closed position’. The SB does not have a 
mediating role; such obligation would contravene its discretionary freedom. Furthermore, the 
Supreme Court overruled the qualification of a anti-takeover foundation as ‘shadow director’ 
whose conduct should count in the assessment of whether an entry to the procedure should be 
allowed.
Secondly, the Supreme Court accepted the complaint that the Enterprise Chamber insuf-
ficiently argued why the board’s strategy and ASMI’s internal organisation would meet the 
‘reasonable doubt’ standard. Thus, the issuer’s internal affairs and its charter have to be 
respected. Moreover, the Supreme Court overruled the findings of the Enterprise Chamber 
832 See extensively M.J.G.C. Raaijmakers in his annotation under the Chamber of Business’s decision, AA, 
2009, p. 734-743 and G.N.H. Kemperink, ‘De beschermingsstichting en de strategie van de vennoot-
schap’, in: Holtzer a.o., Geschriftten vanwege de Vereniging Corporate Litigation 2009-2010, Deventer: 
Kluwer 2010, p. 95-110.
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as far as it is based unilaterally on the petitioners statements and, hence, without explicitly 
taking into account the defence as presented by ASMI.833
Thus, in my opinion the Supreme Court itself ‘restored relations’ in the internal affairs of 
issuers and restricted the admission to the investigation procedure, the effect of which is 
somewhat akin to that of the BJR. One could observe that thus a ‘level playing field’ with 
the other examined jurisdictions had been restored and the investigation procedure is 
 better embedded in the total regime for issuers of securities and corporate regulation and 
enforcement mechanisms (transparency, disclosure, auditor’s control, internal monitoring, 
appointment/resignation, rescission of decisions).
Thirdly, as discussed above, the Enterprise Chamber often intruded into the internal affairs 
of issuers and effectively seemed not to hesitate to second guess entrepreneurial board 
decisions, as clearly illustrated in the HBG-case and the more recent PCM-case.834 In the 
latter case with a final qualification of mismanagement and rescission of the GMS-decisions 
for discharge. It clearly illustrates its use as quasi-liability suit and its subsequent transit 
to a proper liability suit.
Note that the Code thereby (through ‘duties of care & loyalty’) ‘also gives content’ to those 
requirements. However, it does make the principal starting point different, especially when 
actions of the board will also be judged also according to those requirements, were that 
to take place under the procedural safeguards of a (contra-dictionary) liability suit of an 
art. 2:9 NCC-procedure and also then honouring of the discretionary authority of the board, 
as is expressed by the BJR, is needed. That clarity is not (yet835) provided by the Supreme 
Court.
Nonetheless, I find that the reconfirmation of board supremacy, strengthening of the obliga-
tion to motivate and ‘hearing’ the corporation itself, not only strongly increases the thresh-
old, but also substantive ‘second guessing’ by the Enterprise Chamber maybe does not 
exclude but in any case severely hinders it. The security of a statutory BJR is, however, 
lacking.
Fourthly, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to express its views on the meaning of 
‘protection’.836 Before summarising its findings I recall two important elements in regula-
tory developments on this subject:837 a) the new response time of 180 days now inserted 
in the DCGC (Best Practice IV.4.4) and b) proposed amendments of the ‘Decree on Public 
Offers’ (Besluit Openbare biedingen), including the introduction of a ‘put up or shut up’-rule 
allowing the AFM to intervene when announcements or rumours on (possible) public bids 
833 Cf. P.J. van der Korst and I. Wassenaar, ‘Maak van de enqueteprocedure een dagvaardingsprorcedure’, 
in: K.M. van Hassel and M.P. Nieuwe Weme (eds.), Willem’s wegen, Deventer: Kluwer 2010.
834 Enterprise Chamber May 2010, JOR 2010/189 (with reference T.M. Stevens).
835 Is it wishful thinking if we remark that the ASMI-decision of the Supreme Court is only a small step 
removed from the landmark decision form the German BGH in the case ARAG/Garmenbeck and that has 
been codified by the German legislator in § 93 AktG?
836 See for an extensive overview of handled devices: Asser/Maijer/Van Solinge & Nieuwe Weme 2-II, 
Rechtspersonenrecht: De Naamloze en Besloten Vennootschap, Deventer: Kluwer 2009, CH. 10 (bescher-
mingscontructies; certificering = protective devices and certificates)
837 M.J.G.C. Raaijmakers & Van der Schee, ‘Regulering en handhaving van overnamebiedingen in per-
spectief’, in: Marco Nieuwe Weme, Gerard van Solinge, R.P. ten Have (eds.), Handboek Openbaar Bod, 
Kluwer Juridisch, 2008.
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confuse the market. Both changes have a direct impact on our subject, since they seem to 
clearly restrict the judicial power of the Enterprise Chamber in takeover and control fights.
The standard as set in the RNA-case838 (see chapter 3) is that protection in a (threatened) 
hostile takeover bid is allowed and conditioned only by the test of proportionality and tem-
porality. In Stork839, the Enterprise Chamber decided that the ‘protective preference shares’ 
as issued to the Foundation Continuation Stork (Stork) had to be withdrawn because, in 
short, the period of ‘temporarily’ had already ended by the time Stork negotiated with the 
requesting hedge funds. In the ASMI-case the Supreme Court overruled the qualification of 
the ‘white knight foundation’ as a shadow director whose conduct, hence, can be taken into 
account in assessing the issuer’s conduct. Also the DCGC-response time was not taken into 
account by the Enterprise Chamber’s decision but this was not discussed by the Supreme 
Court. The Supreme Court’s decision thus completely overruled that of the Enterprise 
Chamber. It clarifies a number of questions. It confirms that the issuer’s freedom of organi-
sation includes the power to protect itself ex ante against a takeover of control or factual 
control. From a securities law point of view the issuer shall evidently fully disclose such 
devices.840 Remarkably, the fact that ASMI had done so was virtually ignored by the Enter-
prise Chamber.
Apart from the new response time allowed to the target’s board (Best Practise IV.4.4 DCGC), 
the Supreme Court seems to confirm that exercising the option right on protective prefer-
ence shares does not in itself constitute any ground for starting an investigation procedure 
and therefore any blockade of the foundation’s voting right, at least on the ground of the 
right of investigation, was eluded.841 An ‘attacker’ and his legal advisers do know that and 
are forced to reach their purpose in negotiations. The picture in Delaware is not essentially 
different.842 Except in ‘Revlon-situations’, in which the corporation brings itself ‘in play’, the 
main rule of Paramount v. Time and Paramount v. QVC still stands: the board can ‘just say 
no’.843
838 Supreme Court 18-04-2003, NJ 2003, 286 annotation Maeijer.
839 Supreme Court 17-02-2007, LJN: AZ 6440.
840 See also chapter 2 on the working of the capital market and the ECMH. The Enterprise Chamber igno-
red the defence of ASMI that such disclosure had taken place in the issuing and admission prospectus 
when extended its listing on NASDAQ (NY) to the exchange of Amsterdam.
841 Cf. G.N.H. Kemperink, ‘De beschermingsstichting en de strategie van de vennootschap’, in: Holtzer 
a.o., Geschriftten vanwege de Vereniging Corporate Litigation 2009-2010, Deventer: Kluwer 2010, p. 95-
110.
842 M.J.G.C.. Raaijmakers & Van der Schee, ‘Regulering en handhaving van overnamebiedingen in 
perspectief’, in: Marco Nieuwe Weme, Gerard van Solinge, R.P. ten Have (eds.), Handboek Openbaar 
Bod, Kluwer Juridisch, 2008; cf. M.J. van Ginneken, ‘The US Poison Pill from a Dutch Perspective’, 
in: Dumoulin, Raaijmakers & Tervoort, Tussen Themis en Mercurrius, Deventer: Kluwer 2005, p. 121-
142; B.F. Assink, Rechterlijke toetsing van bestuurlijk gedrag, Deventer: Kluwer 2007. Cf. Stephen 
M. Bainbridge, ‘Unocal at 20: Director Primacy in corporate takeovers’, University of California, Los 
Angeles School of Law, Law & Economics Research Paper Series NO. 05-19, September 2005, p.3; Christian 
Kirchner and Richard W. Painter, ‘Towards a European Modified Business Judgment Rule for Takeover 
Law’, European Business Organizations Law Review 2000, p.13.
843 Cf. also Nieuwe Weme in his annotation under Enterprise Chamber 13-04-2007 (ABNAMRO), 
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4.8 Back to the draft Bill to amend the Dutch investigation procedure
Thus, the Supreme Court in ASMI effectively strongly conditioned the application of the 
investigation procedure against issuers. This coincides with the corrective amendments 
in the NCGC, primarily the response time for target boards in case of a hostile takeover 
attempt, and the new takeover rules, especially the ‘put up or shut up’-rule. One could ques-
tion whether issuers should not be completely exempted from the investigation procedure 
in view of the investor protection in the new securities regulation, governance code and 
extension of shareholder’s rights. This question, valid as it may be, is not (yet) on the agenda.
The Supreme Court’s decision, however, seems to be better aligned to the borderline 
between corporate and securities law and thus also to reflect the comments of the Social 
and Economic Council and of academia to introduce some form of the BJR into the investiga-
tion procedure.
Assink and Kroeze proposed inserting the BJR into the structure of the investigation pro-
cedure, based upon their important and interesting research into the relation of the BJR, 
derivative suits and the investigation procedure. I strongly support their pleas, although 
this study clearly reveals the highly exceptional position of Dutch issuers being exposed 
to the investigation procedure alongside the (‘European’) investor protection as provided 
by the new securities regulation. Assink and Kroeze focus on judicial review as the initial 
test for entry into the investigation procedure and the final judgement of ‘mismanagement’ 
thus increasing the thresholds for (marginal) judicial review. They do not suggest inserting 
the BJR, as in the US and Germany, into the central provision on tasks and assignments 
of directors (of legal persons) and their powers and the liability as provided for in art. 2:9 
NCC. Also the Social Economic Council did not propose such a direct connection, but rather 
defended settling board independence and discretion (‘freises Ermessen’) by applying the 
fundamental idea of the BJR to the admission of the right of inquiry (‘well-founded reasons 
to doubt good policy’), the final judgement as to whether there are grounds for ‘mismanage-
ment’844, but obviously also in the judicial decisions on granting immediate injunctive relief. 
The last element remains underexposed in the debate.
The explanatory notes to the draft Bill published by the Ministry of Justice reject the idea of 
transferring the (notion of) BJR to the method of and standards for judicial review in and/or 
the admission to the right of inquiry: ‘In practice it is of importance that the court sufficiently 
argues why it finds that there are well-founded reasons to doubt good policy or misman-
agement has taken place. The far-reaching consequences of an inquiry procedure and/or 
the ordering of immediate injunctive relief for the legal person and interested parties, jus-
tify that these decisions shall be well argued and motivated. There is no reason to replace 
“well-founded reasons to doubt good policy on the part of the company” and “mismanage-
ment” with another description. Granting injunctive relief by the Enterprise Chamber is only 
justified if there are serious indications that the policy of and operations of the legal person 
are not have (been) just and/or that serious mistakes have been verified (Italic: PvS).’ That last 
element again implicates, if I am correct, a judicial review and not the indemnification that 
844 Advies Evenwichtig Ondernemingsbestuur 08/01, p. 53.
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the BJR offers as presumption of good governance. Neither does this limit the power of the 
Enterprise Chamber to develop new rules.
That reasoning disconnects the BJR from art. 2:9 NCC, where it actually belongs. Remark-
ably the explanatory notes to the draft Bill make a ‘cross-over’ from the derivative suit (Del-
aware) to the Dutch right of investigation and conclude that the BJR does not fit in that 
procedure and leave it that way. “The Social Economic Council did not argue to copy one-
on-one the criteria for reviewing board decisions that have been developed in Delaware into 
Dutch law. That is also not feasible, because fundamentally a system of precedent law is 
prevailing and not a codified system (apart from the fact that the manner in which justice 
is administered and of judicial construction resembles more the system of precedent of 
a common law system).” Apart from overlooking the fact that case law of the Enterprise 
Chamber also creates precedents albeit without the certainty of the stare decisis rule, the 
reasoning of the explanatory notes seems to fail, since the BJR can very easily, as in Ger-
many, be introduced in art. 2:9 NCC. That would be the proper way since Delaware indeed 
has no investigation procedure or a comparable action for ‘injunctive relief’. On this subject 
the explanatory notes seem to make the wrong connection by saying that a BJR is not fea-
sible for that action since they focus on order measures (‘ordemaatregelen’) as required by 
the ‘condition of the legal person and in the interest of the research’. However, application 
of the BJR is enframed in the question of whether and if so how a business decision could 
or should be reviewed by the court which is not related to an ‘order’ but to a judicial assess-
ment of (the merits of) a regular business judgement and business policies. The scope of 
judicial review therefore differs. The explanatory notes seem to miss the ‘hands off’-rule of 
the BJR respecting the board’s entrepreneurial and discretionary freedom.
In my view, the explanatory notes miss here the crucial element of judicial grants of injunc-
tive relief that are so problematic in case of issuers. With the experiences of the last decade’s 
case law applied in cases against issuers, the question arises as to whether preference 
should be given to regular summary proceedings on liability where plaintiffs have to state 
accurately the facts and the norm that were allegedly breached and which allow for a proper 
defence. This would prevent the Enterprise Chamber, without even judging whether there 
are ‘well-founded reasons to doubt good policy on the part of the corporation’, from placing 
itself in the position of an umpire for the duration of the whole procedure. The explanatory 
notes do not address this.
4.9 The investigation procedure for issuers and HLG-recommendation 
(2002) to be reconsidered
The investigation procedure is unique. Its application to issuers is problematic since it is not 
carefully linked with the new securities regulation nor properly assessed; at least harmoni-
sation with the applicable regime for listed corporations as applied elsewhere is important 
considering the strongly increased foreign investments in Dutch listed corporations, the 
mobility of investors, but just as much for the attractiveness of the Dutch business climate 
for listed public corporations. The right of inquiry seems, when compared to the other sys-
tems, at odds with regulation of a listed public corporation.
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If we only look to the Netherlands, then the previous analysis illustrates, in my view, that 
purposes of the right of inquiry cannot bear application to listed public corporations. The 
described practical experiences do not lead to any other insight. The ASMI-decision of the 
Netherlands Supreme Court takes away a lot of uncertainty, however it does not provide 
certainty in answering the many questions that will rise when applying the right of inquiry as 
still governed by its open purposes, especially in taking immediate measures and in using 
the right of inquiry as a quasi-liability procedure. Therefore, it does not seem illogical to 
exclude the right of inquiry for listed public corporations.
The international familiar regime for private law devices for listed public corporations 
is mainly underpinned by securities fraud – and liability actions. Again it does not seem 
illogical to adjust the Dutch system for listed public corporations. If one should choose to 
eliminate the right of inquiry for listed public corporations, then it seems to be logical to 
introduce it as a derivative action, as previously argued by Kroeze in his dissertation845, and 
also in that respect to connect with the international regular regime for listed public corpo-
rations. German law provides a continental example of this.
Considering the analysis of chapter 4 the conclusion seems to be that introducing, according 
to the HLG’s proposal of 2002, an investigation procedure at EU level does seem justified. 
This investigation by its nature is at odds with the securities disclosure system and with 
corporate law for (listed) public corporations. The analysis of chapter 4 also leads to the 
conclusion that the Dutch right of inquiry should be re-examined. This does not mean that 
the idea of a BJR, without a right of inquiry, is not of interest for preserving board suprem-
acy and discretion. Also the US and German systems offer a certain solution. Delaware 
goes even further and displays totally different fundamental position by safeguarding the 
supremacy and discretion of the board also by statutory D&O/indemnification.
845 M.J. Kroeze, Afgeleide schade en afgeleide acte (diss. Utrecht), Deventer: Kluwer 2004.
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The preceding chapters may have illustrated the influence of the generalising L&E debate 
on the paradigm change from ‘apathic’ to ‘activist’ investors in globalising financial markets 
and investors and on the governance of issuers in which they are investing. That debate 
included an in-depth analysis of differences in markets, shareholders base (full disper-
sion versus different types of block holdings), changes in the demography of investors (rise 
of institutional investors, pension funds, state wealth funds, hedge funds, private equity) 
and the impact on the dynamics of market regulation and investor protection in the rel-
evant jurisdictions. The ‘agency theory’, its analysis of ‘moral hazards’ and, hence, the need 
for disciplinary mechanisms (disclosure, bonding, alignment, market for corporate con-
trol) implicitly claims a sort of theoretical ‘universal truth’ that would cause or result in a 
substantial convergence of the regulatory environment for issuers. Indeed these theories 
(backed up with and further elaborated by immense subsequent worldwide research) and 
the push of (global) investors for their practical implementation had a remarkable influence 
both on corporate practice (aligning incentive programme, investor relations, governance, 
successful pressure on abolition of protective devices) as on regulators (such as the fall out 
from the 2002 HLG Report). However, markets remain different and does the equity base of 
issuers (ranging from wide dispersion to block holders and limited free float) and what is 
equally important: the regulatory framework and societal environment. The preceding com-
parative analysis of resulting regulation seems to confirm the differing ‘path dependent’ 
jurisdictional realities in which issuers have to operate. These reveal quite different mix-
tures of regulatory options and choices responding to these developments and the growing 
influence of investors: a) the extension of substantive shareholders’ corporate law powers, 
b) the facilitation (and sometimes – such as in the case of empty voting and securities lend-
ing – further regulation) of the use of these powers (proxy solicitation, identification, techni-
cal rules such as the introduction of record dates), c) the introduction or strengthening of 
public oversight and sanctions, d) intensifying oversight in the issuer’s internal organisation 
(strengthening the powers of – independent – non-executive directors, e) strengthening of 
‘oversight’ (review) and accountability of independent public auditors, and last but certainly 
not least f) extension and enhancing of the issuer’s disclosure requirements.
Comparing the US and EU, the regulatory choices that were made appear to differ substan-
tially. The former is still characterised by the combination of on the one hand a well-estab-
lished, standalone and federal market-oriented securities regulation focussing on investor 
protection and supported by strong federal public oversight and on the other hand a com-
petitive state corporate law that, as in Delaware, firmly establishes the business-oriented 
organisational principles of corporate law, primarily board supremacy and discretion.
The EU, on the other hand, introduced a US-style ‘federal’ securities regulation with 
national (not yet federal) public oversight, but continues to build – also in its securities law 
disclosure – on its corporate law protection of shareholders in public corporations both at 
the level of Member States and of the EU itself. The clear demarcation of both branches of 
regulation that is characteristic for the US is, as evidenced in the comparative inventory in 
the Annexes, not present in the EU.
The corporate governance – and much of the L&E debate – focuses on the division of powers 
between corporate actors: board (NED/SB) and shareholder meeting/groups of sharehold-
ers. The use of seemingly similar concepts and parameters seems to conceal the remaining 
strict demarcation between federal securities and state (Delaware) corporate law in the US 
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and the more diffuse situation in the EU (and Member States). It explains the different regu-
latory responses over the last decade in the US and the EU. The response of US Congress 
to “Enronitis” in the SOx and subsequent SEC-regulations and NYSE and NASDAQ listing 
rules, was almost completely restricted to enhancing the prevailing securities regulation 
of the 1933 and 1934 Acts, focussing on investor protection by means of strict disclosure 
requirements for issuers and by public oversight (SEC) and private enforcement (especially 
securities fraud action). Their function remains investor protection and market transpar-
ency, not – as in the EU – (also) to protect the interests of creditors and other stakeholders 
of issuers. It did not, apart from audit committees, substantially change the internal affairs 
and governance of corporate issuers, board supremacy and discretion. Unlike corporate 
law of EU jurisdictions on ‘public’ corporations, ‘US’ corporate law does not aim specifi-
cally at investor protection, although investors may apply corporate law procedures (such 
as derivative suit, proxy voting) to discipline and challenge an issuer’s board on the basis of 
breach of fiduciary duties, for example.846 US shareholders’ rights are restricted to annual 
board elections and approval of major transactions. The board will be protected by indemni-
fication rules in issuers’ articles of incorporation, by directors and officers (D&O) insurance, 
the business judgment rule (including the ‘just say no-rule in contested takeovers). This 
US model of corporate state law survived the recent ‘fire alarms’. Although in the US the 
recently enacted rule concerning shareholder’s nominees for the board gives shareholders 
some influence on the composition of the board, this new rule does not allow shareholders 
to gain control over the board; they may only nominate a restricted number of directors and 
only if not in order to gain control.
This paragraph will summarise some major differences between the EU and US regime for 
issuers.
Thus markets will continue to develop as will strategies and policies of (major) investors 
and regulators at all levels. There seems no end to corporate history (Hansmann &Kraak-
man) as illustrated by divergent political, societal forces and regulatory responses to the 
two recent major fire alarms: Enronitis (2003) and the financial crisis (2007). Law continues 
to matter (SLLV) in its full ‘path dependent’ and broad societal meaning, i.e. including regu-
latory political and societal framework, its civil and commercial legal traditions, the frame-
work for oversight and enforcement, the role of the judiciary and the means and framework 
for broad and narrow private enforcement by investors themselves. In the EU, the May 2003 
Report of the EC still seems to guide its agenda, albeit that the 2010 Report on the Transpar-
ency Directive tends to concentrate more on developing the EU disclosure system alongside 
the more corporate law-oriented May 2003 Report.
All these observations guided this study and led to my central hypothesis that a clear dichot-
omy between aims, nature and scope of securities and corporate law is needed to enable 
proper analysis and guidance both at EU and Member State, as well as at international level, 
implementing, absorbing and enforcing of (new) rules for investor protection and thereby 
contributing to a consistent regulatory system needed in its further development and reac-
tion to new circumstances: globalisation of markets, entrance of new players such as state 
846 Cf William W. Bratton and Michael L. Wachter, ‘The Case against Shareholder Empowerment’, Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania Law Review, vol. 158: 653, 2010.
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wealth funds and hedge funds, extension of international financial reporting standards, new 
financial instruments and techniques such as stock lending and empty voting, mergers of 
stock exchanges, creation of new market platforms (MIFID), other techniques to acquire 
control of issuers alongside a takeover or proxy fight, development in suits that support 
shareholder and again, last but not least, the organisation and governance model of issu-
ers.
The broadness and complexity of the subject induced a limitation of its scope. I refrained 
from a repetitional review of the L&E debate. Although its subject is really ‘global’, I also 
refrained from a global analysis and limited myself to a ‘transatlantic’ comparative sum-
mary inventory of prevailing securities and relevant corporate law and aimed to eluci-
date the basic architecture as well as its major changes (and direction) of and regulatory 
responses to Enronitis and the financial crisis. Evidently, a multitude of subjects will require 
further study.
5.1 Disclosure and accounting; Descriptive analysis and comparison 
of the US and EU regulation (of) issuers and markets, disclosure 
versus accounting
The Introduction explored the dual regulatory perspective and dichotomy between securi-
ties and corporate law to protect the investors in financial instruments, particularly shares, 
by proper disclosure rules and shareholders’ rights and powers respectively. Chapter 2 
explored and compared in more detail the first layer of investor protection as provided for 
by US and EU securities law and its relation to corporate law, focussing on the standalone 
(or mixed) character of initial and continuous disclosure and any impact on the governance 
of issuers upon going and while being public. That chapter therefore explored from the 
perspective of the US and EU financial market regulation and securities law (mainly related 
to disclosure and accounting regulation of the issuer) the requirements for issuers and the 
question of whether and to what extent (the regulatory aims of) such regulation affect the 
internal affairs and governance of issuers upon going and being public. My hypothesis is 
that the comparison between the US and (Member States of) the EU will reveal the stan-
dalone character of federal US securities regulation and a somewhat mixed character of EU 
regulation that remains linked to some extent to corporate law and thereby in the EU and 
examined MS, especially in the Netherlands, caused overlap and frictions of the securities 
disclosure systems as implemented in the MS with the existing national system of corporate 
law.
5.2 EU-US: convergent securities law
In the EU, the execution of the FSAP (1999) resulted in a ‘federal’ and US-style separate 
layer of European securities regulation focussing on market regulation and investor pro-
tection through initial and continuous disclosure requirements and statutory enforcement 
through public oversight and private enforcement by means of a series of EU directives 
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and regulations on prospectuses (IPO), admission to listing/trading, continuous disclosure 
and transparency, market abuse and the application of IFRS in the issuer’s (consolidated) 
annual financial report. As in the US, disclosure serves its disciplining monitoring function.
Member States implemented these new rules to replace the existing self-regulation by stock 
exchanges and the securities industry, but often additionally overlapping with existing cor-
porate law protection of investors, including rules on ‘internal accounting’ to shareholders 
(AGM). The resulting differences in substantive law and enforcement, do not take away from 
the fact that its design resulted in integrated ‘federal’ EU securities law, although without 
federal public oversight but with coordination by CESR (by now ESMA). Aiming at a com-
mon financial market, the EU regulations provide for mutual recognition of prospectuses 
and other disclosure documents. The core of the new EU continuous disclosure rules is the 
issuer’s annual financial report consisting of its annual accounts, management report and a 
certification by its responsible persons that these provide a true and fair view. To allow com-
parability and standardisation of disclosure documents the issuer’s consolidated accounts 
shall be drafted in accordance with IFRS. Like the US Report to Shareholders (10K-20F), 
this annual financial report effectively serves as a standalone market and investor-oriented 
disclosure document. Thus going public results, for both US and EU issuers, in materially 
similar securities regulation (including listing rules) becoming and remaining applicable.
5.3 EU disclosure (Annual Financial Report) connected with (1st,4th,7th 
and 11th) company law directives
However, EU securities law rules and the annual financial report also build on and remain 
connected with the parallel corporate law accounting and disclosure rules of the 1st, 4th and 
7th company law Directives that apply to all (close and publicly held) companies. These provide 
mandatory stakeholder-oriented rules for single and consolidated accounts with their own 
accounting, audit and ‘classical disclosure’ rules, i.e. through filing with the commercial 
register (or similar agency).
I observe that not all Member States have (yet) embodied the sharp distinction between 
the securities law objectives as reflected in the concept of the ‘annual financial report’ for 
issuers of the Transparency Directive and the remaining corporate law procedures and con-
cepts of the 4th and 7th Directive as reflected in their national (corporate) law. The conceptual 
overlap and linkage between securities law disclosure and corporate law ‘accounting’ is 
illustrated both in the structure of the accounts as well as in the corporate action for finalis-
ing, adoption (and subsequent disclosure to the market).
5.3.1 The Transparency Directive requires disclosure of the annual financial report, i.e. the 
financial statements, the management report and the declaration of responsibility, i.e the 
certification by the persons responsible for its content. The issuer (as corporate entity) itself 
shall make annual accounts in accordance with the 4th Directive, which applies to all com-
mercial corporations irrespective of they are being ‘public’ or privately held. If, as required 
for issuers, it has to draw up consolidated accounts, the IAS Regulation requires that IFRS 
shall be applied. The management report remains clearly separated – also in the audit 
Book Vanderschee.indb   233 18-3-2011   15:39:48
 Chapter 5234
and approval – from the financial statements and follows art. 46 of the 4th Directive; since 
IFRS itself does not (yet) contain standards for the management report. This system differs 
from the US annual report to shareholders (on Form 10-K for domestic and Form 20-F for 
foreign issuers) in various ways. It only applies to issuers. It follows separate and focussed 
securities regulation, particularly the SEC’s Regulation S-K and is therefore not in any way 
linked to or constrained by any broader application to non-issuers. The management report 
is integrated in the disclosure document (Item 303 Regulation S-K) and therefore not sepa-
rated as in the EU. The report upon its finalisation (after the audit committee’s approval) will 
be signed (and certified) by the CEO and CFO (§§ 303 and 906 SOx) and filed promptly with 
the SEC and be thus disclosed.
The preparatory process of drawing up and internal discussion with the audit committee 
and external auditor is similar, but disclosure on the procedures followed takes a different 
form (certification versus ‘declaration on responsibility’ and narrative discussion in MR of 
risk factors and management; in the EU the last mentioned often is dealt with in national 
corporate governance codes). Final corporate action on adoption and disclosure differs as 
well. Whereas the UK rules are akin to those in the US, Dutch law still requires (in German 
law as an option) submission of the report (with audit opinion) to the AGM for adoption of 
the (audited) accounts (only) and subsequent filing with the AFM (that only then can act to 
‘correct’ the financials if these, in its opinion, are misleading) and – like all other non-issu-
ers – with the commercial register, although securities law disclosure to the market should 
take place promptly upon finalisation and signing by all members of the board of manage-
ment and the supervisory board. Filing the annual accounts with the commercial register 
also required an updated audit report which seemingly leads to extra costs (however fur-
ther empirical research is needed). Thus the corporate procedures and actions to submit 
annual accounts for adoption to the AGM (as in the Netherlands, but not in the UK) is at 
odds with the standalone securities law disclosure character of the annual financial report 
(art. 4 Transparency Directive). The connection with corporate law procedure of adoption 
and finalisation of the financial annual report/accounts and enforcement and means for 
restatements shows the tension enforcing market-oriented substantive rules. The request 
for a restatement has to be filed in the Netherlands within two months after the adoption of 
the annual accounts. By then the issuer has to assess whether this requires disclosure by 
the Transparency, Market Abuse and Stock Admission Directives. Although adoption of the 
annual accounts/report includes implicit or explicit discharge of the directors, the question 
remains as to whether and if so how ex post liability of the issuer and its directors and offic-
ers for misleading annual and intermediate reports are addressed.
Historically, discharge of the board was closely connected to adoption of the annual accounts 
by the AGM as finalising the ‘accounting’ of management to shareholders. This element is 
unknown in the US and covered by indemnification provisions, D&O insurance and in court 
(derivative suit) by the business judgement rule.
5.3.2 Thus the new US-style EU securities disclosure system in various Member States 
remains connected to internal corporate law accounting concepts, i.e. the board ‘account-
ing’ to its GMS as a body corporate within the issuer’s internal organisation. The 4th and 
7th Directives (note: applicable to all ‘companies’) were amended (2006) to insert new 
items to be discussed in the MR, related party transactions, but also on collective board 
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 responsibility for the financial report and – for issuers only – the requirement to report on 
compliance with the issuer’s national corporate governance code as well as disclosure of 
a separate corporate governance statement (cf art.10 Transparancy Directive).847 These in 
turn contain a series of disclosure items (board composition, directors, meetings, etc). Such 
disclosure was thus used as regulatory tool allowing investors and the market to monitor 
the compliance with corporate governance codes. Thus the management report allows for 
‘sideway influx’ of corporate governance rules and, as analysed in chapter 4, to a sort of 
enforceability (such as in the Dutch inquiry procedures) albeit without BJR-protection. The 
UK CGC is connected to the LSE listing rules, allowing the LSE to take sanctions upon non-
compliance, without intruding into the internal organisation. Note that these codes aim both 
at enhancing disclosure to investors and at strengthening the position of shareholders in 
meeting. They thus do not reveal a similar dichotomy.
5.4 Public enforcement in securities law (securities fraud action)
Public enforcement is exercised by national public agencies (including restatement pro-
cedures). Private enforcement of the issuer’s initial, continuous or intermediate disclo-
sure duties by dissemination of ‘misleading’ information to the investors and the markets 
is vested in the securities fraud action against the issuer as such to restore to them (as a 
‘class’) their damages. Unlike the US (§ 10b SEA’34 and Rule 10-b) the EU did not provide 
for a federal securities fraud action, but assigned the Member States to provide for proper 
civil actions. In comparison to the US, class actions are less developed, but for example the 
Netherlands now allows a ‘collective’ actions (art. 3:305a NCC)848 and a settlement to be 
declared binding for a whole ‘class’ (arts. 7:907 and further).849
5.4.1 Being left to the Member States, public and private enforcement of these combined 
and entangled new rules reveal remarkable differences. The way that the role and respon-
sibility of authorities to require ‘correction’ of defective annual financial reports have been 
implemented shows remarkable differences, as does further comparison with the SEC’s 
powers. Evidently, disputes on the correctness of disclosure documents may also affect the 
assessment of the statutory audit that was exercised. An important difference with the US 
remains that the EU, although aiming at integration of the European financial markets, has 
not yet created a European SEC, although CESR has been assigned with a coordinating role 
that as from 24 November 2010 has been attributed to ESMA. Since public oversight extends 
to compliance by issuers with IFRS, the dispersion of oversight between national authorities 
847 Directive 2006/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 amending Council 
Directives 78/660/EEC on the annual accounts of certain types of companies, 83/349/EEC on consoli-
dated accounts, 86/635/EEC on the annual accounts and consolidated accounts of banks and other 
financial institutions and 91/674/EEC on the annual accounts and consolidated accounts of insurance 
undertakings, OJ L 224, 16/08/2006, art. 46a Dir 4 and arts. 50b/50c Dir4 and arts. 36a/36b Dir7.
848 See HR 27 November 2009, LJN BH2162 (WorldOnline) and Hof Amsterdam 25 January 2007, LJN 
AZ7033 (Dexia)
849 See Court of Appeals Amsterdam 29 mei 2009, LJN BI5744 (Shell), see also B.J. de Jong, p. 315 e.v.
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does not guarantee uniform interpretation and application thereof even though the ECJ has 
final jurisdiction in these matters.
Private enforcement of the new EU securities regulation, also of disclosure of the annual 
financial report as the key disclosure document, is left to the Member States to fit into 
their national legal systems and traditions. My analysis reveals that the classic accounting 
approach already seeks to attribute shareholders (AGM and individually or groups) with 
powers in the corporate decision-making process with respect to laying down, discus-
sion and even adoption or approval. The flipside thereof results in the principle that those 
that did account duly and properly will be discharged from the execution of their tasks and 
assignment during the reporting period. This approach, as observed, still characterises 
(corporate) law in some EU jurisdictions. Specific actions for damages caused by mislead-
ing information are embedded in principles of tort law. Specific prospectus liability for pro-
moters was addressed at an early stage, but enforcement of continuous disclosure rules is 
evolving.
It is expected that the focus will shift towards assessment of the correctness of the annual 
financial report within the decreasing limits of managerial discretion in the application of 
IFRS.
5.5 Investor protection in corporate law: shareholders rights and board 
supremacy in the ‘internal affairs’ of issuers
In the Introduction, I briefly referred to the famous article by Hansman and Kraakman 
on the end of corporate history. They claimed the dominance of the corporate ideology 
of shareholder primacy leading to major jurisdictions adopting similar rules of corporate 
law and practice. Their claim in a certain way illustrates a school of thought in corporate 
governance observing and forecasting convergence of corporate governance systems all 
adopting shareholder primacy as the best model to generate most value for the corporation 
and its shareholders, keeping directors’ interests aligned to shareholders. Their approach 
essentially follows the analysis of the ‘agency theory’ as developed in the Law & Economics 
literature: shareholders are ‘principals’, ‘residual/ultimate claimants’ and ‘owners’ of the 
corporation, the corporation’s board (members) and officers being aligned to the share-
holders’ interests. Shareholder orientation and the hegemony of the shareholder model 
would eventually replace ‘employee’ and ‘state orientation’. Then the dotcom bubble burst 
and corporate scandals erupted. Remarkably the regulatory responses on both sides of 
the ocean differed substantially putting the former claim in a different perspective.850 US 
securities law was amended to enhance financial disclosure by the SOx, but the prevailing 
principle of board supremacy and division of powers in the internal affairs of US issuers 
850 John C. Coffee Sr., ‘A Theory of Corporate Scandals: Why the US and Europe Differ’, in: John Armour 
and Joseph McCahery (eds.), After Enron, Improving Corporate Law and Modernising Securities Regula-
tion in Europe and the US, Oxford: Hart Publications 2006.
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remained, at least conceptually, unchanged. In contrast, the EU did not limit itself – as did 
SOx in the US – to building on the basics of the then emerging EU securities law as discussed 
in chapter 2, although it accelerated the regulatory FSAP-process. Both at the level of the 
EU and of its Member States, discussions and, hence, regulation focussed on enhancing 
corporate governance by means of corporate governance codes, amendments of corporate 
law and new case law resulting in a shift of powers in the internal affairs of issuers by rules 
on oversight by non-executive directors, powers of the AGM and of individual shareholders, 
the role of independent auditors, the relationship and ‘dialogue’ between issuers and their 
investors, executive compensation and the mechanics of the market for corporate control.
The introduction of the EU securities law neither stopped nor channelled the debate. The 
increasing shareholder activism illustrated again that law matters. The developments also 
showed that relevant law did not converge, but rather took different routes on both sides 
of the Atlantic. If we look from the perspective of issuers, the question can be raised as to 
whether and to what extent their internal affairs do indeed converge, especially if we focus 
on the supremacy and discretion of the board. My hypothesis is that convergence of securi-
ties regulation seems to go along with a certain degree of divergence of the corporate law 
regime for issuers in the examined systems as related to the division of powers between 
the board (BoM/SB) and the GMS and (groups of) individual shareholders. GMS rights are 
of course important, such as GMS required approval for an important change of identity or 
character of the corporation entailing a low threshold such as in the Netherlands of one 
third subsequently influences the supremacy of the board (BoM/SB). However, alongside the 
collective powers of shareholders ‘in meeting’, the GMS as a body corporate of the issuer, 
shareholders also have statutory individual and groups rights and powers. Individual rights 
evidently encompass voting rights, the right to receive dividends and distributions from a 
pay out by the issuer and the residual rights upon dissolution. As part of these individual 
rights of shareholders, the possibilities to make them concrete by using the mechanism of 
voting, such as the possibility to call an extraordinary meeting, to put items on the agenda 
of the meeting, possibilities of proxy solicitation and voting influences the division of power 
between the board and the shareholders. The level of influence of the shareholders in the 
company (board supremacy) is, apart from the substantive rights of the shareholders, 
partly determined by these procedural rules related to convocation of a meeting and setting 
the agenda for the meeting. For example, whether and under which criteria the board/BoM 
under its discretion has the right to refuse to put an item on the agenda as it proposed by 
the shareholders seemingly influences a company’s vulnerability to shareholder activism.
In particular, if focussing on the supremacy of the board, the Dutch system in comparison 
to the other examined systems’ GMS substantial rights and procedural shareholder’s rights 
to effectuate these rights seemingly led to a stronger position in the organisational design 
of the issuer than in the other examined systems (in combination with the unique Dutch 
right of inquiry, as has been elaborated in chapter 4 this seemingly resulted in an erosion 
of the Dutch board supremacy). This seems, however, to be concealed by the international 
hype of corporate governance and resulting principles and ‘best practices’ to discipline 
management and protect investors. They also conceal the lack of clear US-style distinc-
tion between the regulatory ends and means of securities regulation and corporate law. It 
seems to bypass the traditional regulatory role of corporate law in (Member States of) the 
EU to protect investors (shareholders) by means of corporate law (often based on ‘institu-
Book Vanderschee.indb   237 18-3-2011   15:39:48
 Chapter 5238
tional’ and the so-called ‘stakeholder’ model). Thus Chapter 3 explored in more detail the 
(statutory) division of (collective and individual) powers of investors (GMS) and the board/SB 
and, hence, both the nature of protection thus provided to investors (as shareholders) and 
the statutory level and extent of board supremacy, taking into account recent developments 
that affected the prevailing systems. Although there is more than one good reason to extend 
the research to other areas as well, this was limited to these two markets.
5.5.1	 EU:	investor	protection	through	corporate	law:	(extension)	of	shareholders’	rights
So a clear demarcation between securities and corporate law protection does not prevail in 
the EU as was again illustrated by recent regulatory responses to the challenges of ‘Enro-
nitis’ and the financial crisis. This is not new. From the early days, EU law tended to elab-
orate corporate law and governance to protect the interests of investors (shareholders). 
The 1972-draft 5th Directive, until its withdrawal in 2004, aimed at harmonising the basics 
of corporate governance by mandatory ‘internal’ governance rules: the division of powers 
between management, supervisors (NEDs) and the GMS. Its model was the German AktG 
(1965) designed as ‘Publikumsgesellschaft’ and therefore providing investor protection by 
means of corporate law. Compare the famous US debate on the ‘race to the bottom’ initiated 
by Professor Winter in 1964.
The 2004-withdrawal of the draft 5th Directive followed in the hectic days of Enronitis, the 
2002 HLG report, the strategy developed in the May 2003-reaction of the EC, the fierce 
debate on the Takeover directive (market for corporate control), coincided with the finali-
sation of the EU securities law in the execution of the FSAP (1999) and US SOx, but also 
with the emergence of a growing series of national corporate governance codes (starting 
with the UK Cadbury Code of 1992 that responded to the BCCI- and Maxwell-scandals but 
gradually changed towards (investor driven) codes, see chapter 3.2 for an overview of the 
historical development of these codes). Neither the emerging EU securities law, nor the 
withdrawal of the draft 5th Directive changed the regulatory perspective looking towards a 
strict demarcation of both branches of regulation. The links remained also with corporate 
law. The subsidiary principle (art. 5 EC Treaty) did not completely discourage the initial aim 
to harmonise all major company law issues for on ‘public’ companies (as a corporate form 
for businesses rather than issuers). May 2003: acquis communautaire!
Thus also after 2000/2001 corporate scandals, in comparison to the US SOx, the changes 
in the EU were different. Their responses were fragmented over corporate and securities 
law rules by different regulatory instruments, amending prevailing EU corporate law direc-
tives and issuing new recommendations and – at the national level of Member States – by 
amending corporate law (see the Netherlands’ strengthening of shareholder rights), but 
also introducing ‘self-regulatory’ codes of best practice, part of which focussed on the role 
and organisation of boards, the role of executive and non-executive directors, the role of the 
GMS and, hence, the division of corporate power between these bodies corporate.
5.5.2	 Takeover	Directive:	securities	and	corporate	law
Whereas, in the US, Williams (1968) was restricted to adding ‘traffic rules’ for takeover 
bids in the SEA’34 without intruding on corporate law and the use of anti-takeover devices 
(including the ‘just say no’-rule), the very fierce EU debate on the 13th Directive concentrated 
effectively on mandatory board neutrality in the case of a hostile takeover bid to create 
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a level playing field in the EU market for corporate control (by mandatory neutrality and 
break-through rules). It introduced the mandatory bid upon acquisition of effective control 
and public oversight of the bidding process but, remarkably, refrained from focussing on 
common EU ‘traffic rules’ to be applied by the offeror and target-issuer in the framework 
of the then forthcoming EU securities law. It resulted in ‘traffic rules’ on proper market 
disclosure to allow a proper assessment and judgement being made by the market and the 
investors, but at the other hand in optional corporate law rules on the ‘internal’ relationship 
between the board and the investors and the meeting of shareholders.
5.5.3	 EU:	corporate	governance	codes	(soft	law	in	between	securities	and	corporate	
law)
That lack of distinction may also have contributed to the emergence of corporate govern-
ance codes in the EU as ‘self-regulatory’ responses to both the growing pressure of inves-
tors and the financial markets for extension of investor protection (including ‘market for 
corporate control’) as well as – later – to Enronitis. The first tendency explains ‘shareholder 
friendly’ amendments to corporate law before and during the execution of the FSAP (1999), 
the second could continue to build on this regulatory ‘innovation’.
As discussed above, the EU reacted by recommendations on NEDs and executive pay, 
amendment of corporate law Directives (4th, 7th and 8th) and adopting the Takeover Direc-
tive and Shareholders’ Rights Directive. Member States amended their corporate law and 
‘supported’ ‘self-regulatory’ corporate governance codes and obliged issuers to report 
(‘comply or explain’). The new US-style EU securities disclosure system and the disciplining 
monitoring function thereof was apparently not absorbed. Regulators apparently did not 
distinguish between investor protection through securities regulation, based on that new 
pillar, and corporate law and corporate governance codes. It caused remarkable overlaps 
as was illustrated above with the annual accounts as disclosure document and as ‘account-
ing’ to the GMS and the function and format of the management report (extended with 
mandatory reporting on compliance with governance codes) and combined with different 
enforcement mechanisms (public oversight, discharge in absence of the BJR, restatements 
and annulment, but also immediate measures in Dutch inquiry procedures) seemingly to 
enforceability of these codes (as has been elaborated in chapter 4).
These codes are a mix of securities (disclosure) and corporate law (intrusion in different 
ways and degrees into the internal affairs of issuers). The rules deviate as well as – apart 
from the comply or explain-rule – the enforcement (and oversight) mechanisms.851 In the 
Netherlands, observance of the Corporate Governance Code is primarily a matter for dis-
cussion in the GMS, but non-observance may be subject of judicial review in an inquiry pro-
cedure before the Enterprise Chamber Amsterdam Court of Appeal (at least if and as far 
as the issuer ‘committed’ itself to observance).852 Being linked to LSE Listing Rules, non-
851 Cf. Wymeersch.
852 See e.g. Enterprise Chamber 5 August 2009, LJN: BJ4688 (ASMI).
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observance of the UK Code may, at least theoretically, cause delisting.853 These differences 
also influence exposure to shareholder activism, as has been elaborated in chapter 4.854
5.5.4	 Intrusion	into	internal	affairs	of	issuers
Therefore, in hindsight Hansmann and Kraakman seem to have been right in their 
2003-analysis that at that time EU public corporations (issuers) were also moving towards 
(increasing) shareholder orientation, but they apparently did not foresee that the simulta-
neous introduction in the EU of a US-style securities law and extension of the powers of 
shareholders and their enforcement could result in a considerable intrusion into the inter-
nal affairs of issuers to the extent of eroding the principle of board supremacy in managing 
the issuer’s affairs. In the following years, such erosion seemed to emerge particularly in 
the Netherlands where (activist) investors successfully challenged in some major law suits 
large issuers’ board supremacy and discretion in the pursuit of the issuers’ strategy and 
policies. This can be explained by some coinciding factors: growing pressure of financial 
markets and investors especially in the direction of enhancing the market for corporate 
control, early reactions of the legislator to renew the rules for takeover bids and extension 
of shareholders rights, the introduction of a bill – in advance of a definitive 13th EU Direc-
tive – to limit anti-takeover defences, the introduction of a (first) set of recommendations 
on corporate governance and followed (after the outbreak of ‘Enronitis’) by a full Nether-
lands Code on Corporate Governance, together with the then emerging renewal of securi-
ties law and introduction of public oversight. In these circumstances, the very broad powers 
of the Netherlands Enterprise Chamber in an inquiry procedure (including assessment of 
‘(mis)management’) were applied to the principle of board supremacy and discretion. And 
although the Netherlands Supreme Court in several cases (most recently ASMI) overruled 
such judgements, the practical impact on issuers confronted with requests for changes of 
strategy and policies (including but not limited to break up scenarios) remained (the rights 
of inquiry as regulated in Title 8 of Book 2 Netherlands Civil Code was analysed in chapter 4).
5.5.5	 Issuer’s	internal	governance	model	focused	on	board’s	supremacy	and	discretion:	
some	results
The previous paragraphs showed that the basic differences between the US and the EU can 
prima facie be illustrated by comparing shareholders’ rights as attributed by the US MBCA 
and DGCL with the accumulated provisions of EU corporate law directives and national pro-
visions. The MBCA and DGCL limit the (collective and individual) powers of ‘shareholders’ 
(remarkably and in contrast to the EU and MS, not using GMS as the notion of a body cor-
porate) to a few major issues: appointment and dismissal of board members, mergers and 
consolidations, sales, leases or exchanges of all or substantially all of the corporation’s 
property. EU and (examined) MS corporate law provides for a far more extensive list: such 
as appointment, dismissal and remuneration of directors, adoption of annual accounts and 
853 Alain Pietrancosta, ‘Enforcement of Corporate Governance Code’, as Anton Philips Professor 2008-
2009, Tilburg University: Oration: 2008-2009.
854 In the ABNAMRO-case the Amsterdam Business court de facto put the sale of La Salle on hold in the 
takeover fight for ABN. Interesting is the comparison with the UK, where, under the supervision of the 
Takeover Panel, tactical litigation is not allowed. 
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distribution of dividends from profit, discharge, appointment and assignment of external 
auditors, changes in capital and share issues, buy-back of shares, passing pre-emptive 
rights, legal merger, de-merger, dissolution, and change of substance and character of the 
firm, use of certain anti takeover devices (grant options on preferred protective shares). 
Similarly, provisions on boards, indemnification and insurance of its members, corporate 
reorganisations, exit rules (squeeze out, sell out and appraisal rights) reveal remarkable 
differences. Also in its substance shareholders’ rights also differ in substance, such as 
UK and Dutch law provide for lower threshold for requiring GMS approval in case of fun-
damental changes to an issuer’s charter or nature. In comparison with the other systems, 
the position of the GMS in the organisational model of the Dutch listed public corporation 
has been extended by extension of statutory shareholder’s right, but also by the DCGC that 
seem merely to function as quasi-bylaws and sometimes surpass statutory law. The Dutch 
system provides some peculiar GMS rights, such as: adoption of the annual account and 
separate discharge of the board; separately discharge of the SB is required as well (Best 
Practise IV.1.6 DCGC; cf art. 2:102-3 NCC). Thus adoption of these accounts and determi-
nation of payable profits (dividends) can also take place without any GMS-resolution on 
discharge of BoM/SB. Consequently, the nature of the discharge seems to change direc-
tion according to a ‘poll’ of present and future strategy and policies, thus and to that extent 
extending the powers of shareholders in meeting and diminishing protection of board mem-
bers. This differs from the other examined systems: in the US system where the director’s 
right to statutory indemnification and protection of the BJR in a derivative suit shields the 
director from liability, the UK where the court has to allow a derivative suit and Germany 
where a new BJR has been introduced. As explained in chapter 4, the function of the right 
of inquiry in combination with the strengthened position of the GMS in the organisational 
design of the Dutch public corporation has a profound influence on the supremacy and dis-
cretion of the board.
5.5.5.1 Shareholder’s procedural rights
Shareholders’ procedural rights pre-meeting and also possibilities for (broad) enforce-
ment, such as the right to rescind decisions of the GMS (but also of other organs of the 
company) determine the division of power between the board and the shareholders and also 
influence the supremacy of the board to execute its strategy and policy.
In the US, the rights of shareholder pre-meeting as well as the rescission right reflect the 
US market-oriented system aiming at protection of investors. The US board effectively con-
trols the charter. US shareholders cannot vote on issues that are beyond their powers, since 
the board decides on matters related to the ordinary business. Shareholders do have the 
power to start a proxy contest or make (precatory) proposals.
The EU’s (examined) MS all reflect their aim for minority protection. They all provide (under 
different thresholds) ‘calling’-rights. In all systems, shareholders also have the right to 
put items on the agenda. The Netherlands so far provides a striking low threshold of 1% 
[or: the shares represent a value of 50 million EUR] for placing items on the agenda. All 
systems (especially the US and Germany), except the Netherlands, have similar discretion 
as the US board not to convene a meeting and to refuse to put an item on the agenda when 
it is related to ordinary business for example. Also the UK board, under certain conditions, 
has the power not to convene a meeting and to refuse a resolution that cannot be ‘properly’ 
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moved at the meeting. Notably, the board (BoM/SB) of a Dutch public corporation has less 
discretion not only in refusing to convene a meeting, but also in refusing to put a right on 
the agenda. In the Netherlands, shareholders’ motions, unlike the US precatory rights, in 
practice function as a kind of instruction right, although case law has been overruled by the 
Supreme Court. Part of this mechanism is that DCGC-rules appear to be a certain extent 
enforceable as ‘customary’ rules (generally accepted principles) under the umbrella of its 
general corporate law principle that the internal affairs of a corporation shall be governed 
by reasonableness and fairness (art. 2:8 NCC, see chapter 4 for further analysis). The same 
applies to the requirement to have a dialogue with shareholders and therefore seems to be 
enforceable.
In Germany and the Netherlands, shareholders have a right to rescind a decision of the 
GMS but also other organs, if the decision has violated a statutory provision or a provision 
of the articles of association. However, because of abusive suits in Germany, the UMAG 
further developed the ‘Spruchverfahren’-procedure. The German Spruchverfahren and 
rescission suit are two different procedures, and any claim that a compensation for shares 
is inadequate belongs to the domain of the ‘Spruchverfahren’. The function of this ‘Spruch-
verfahren’ is quite similar to the US appraisal procedure (§ 262 (c) DGCL), as it prevents 
shareholders from blocking a transaction; it suits a market-oriented system in which inves-
tors are protected by giving them the right to have the fair value of their shares determined 
and paid to them in cash. The Dutch investigation procedure with the Enterprise Chamber 
also provides the possibility to void decisions of the GMS, but also of other organs of the 
company. The investigation procedure seems to largely absorb the normal rescission suit, 
although it does not offer the procedural clarity and safeguards of a regular contradiction-
ary procedure. In case of issuers, these procedural differences had a profound influence on 
the supremacy of the Dutch board (listed public corporation). In chapter 4 these influences 
and other possibilities for shareholder’s litigation were further discussed.
5.5.5.2 Combining shareholder’s voting power: proxy solicitation and voting 
(corporate & securities law)
Proxy regulation can be part of securities regulation aiming at investor protection through 
disclosure. However these rules can also be part of a tradition of corporate/governance 
aiming at shareholder democracy and shareholders having a voice in the corporation. The 
former mainly emphasises the monitoring function of investors; the latter also aims at 
improving the shareholder voice as part of ‘good’ corporate governance.
US practice illustrates that a) incumbent management uses the proxy machinery to achieve 
a decisive power to vote on proposals presented by the board to shareholders, b) that the 
main focus is on appointment of members of the board (and incidental corporate reorgani-
sations), c) that board’s proposals may be contested by means of a proxy fight and d) that 
solicitation of proxies is regarded and regulated as a ‘market transaction’ (through secu-
rities law disclosure not intruding on the internal affairs of the corporation). The system 
is moulded into US securities regulation (securities acts/rules and listing rules) aiming at 
investor protection by disclosure.
In the EU/MS, proxy voting is part of traditional corporate law protecting shareholders in 
the corporation; the EU’s Shareholder Rights Directive facilitating shareholder cross-bor-
der voting in the EU fits the Commission Action Plan 2003 corporate governance concept 
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of strengthening the position of shareholders in the corporation, also partly influenced by 
the LLSV study (par. 2.2). It is again remarkable that the EU, thus far, did not follow the 
US approach (of § 14 SEA’34) to regulate proxy solicitation primarily as a securities law 
‘market transaction’ and provide for adequate disclosure by the solicitor of such proxies. 
Also, the examined MS approach this subject from a corporate law subject: proxy voting, 
as by now facilitated by a record date, is allowed in these jurisdictions; securities disclo-
sure rules regulating proxy solicitation and voting aiming at investor protection under a 
(national) supervisor were not thus far introduced. Also the US-style mechanism/practice 
of management soliciting proxies is facilitated by UK and German law. However, in Germany 
only proxies with binding instructions are allowed (see default rule art. 10(3) Shareholder 
Rights Directive). Proxy solicitation by the management is not facilitated under Dutch law, 
however it is also not excluded. In the UK, the long-standing practice of the board to send 
out proxies still prevails.
5.5.6	 Preliminary	conclusions
Thus far, the results of the comparative analysis of shareholders’ rights in the statutory 
charter of issuers seems to confirm the hypothesis that a) investor protection in the US is 
modelled primarily through high standards of initial and continuous disclosure, b) the pro-
tection does not come from extensive powers in the corporation’s charter, c) that the divi-
sion of powers indeed follows state rather than any federal corporate law (which is virtually 
nonexistent), d) that the corporation’s charter is effectively controlled by the board, e) that 
the new EU securities law effectively results in US-style investor protection by introducing 
a US like disclosure system under public oversight, f) that, however, investor protection 
also continues to build on shareholders protection in the statutory charter and, at least to 
some extent, also by corporate governance codes, in the Netherlands in particular this led 
to a strengthened position of the GMS and (groups of) shareholders opposes to the board 
(BoM/SB) of the Dutch listed public corporation g) that this seem to explain the emergence 
of codes on corporate governance, h) that this does not seem to be the case only for Member 
States but also for the EU level that continues to build on the acquis communautaire without 
clearly singling out the charter for issuers and to follow and support the mechanism of soft 
law on governance.
5.6 Board supremacy and discretion in the context of investor’s actions: 
the Dutch Right of Inquiry as unique action for activist shareholders
The HLG in 2002, in its report for modernising company law in the EU, advised providing 
shareholders with the right to apply to a court or appropriate administrative body to order 
a special investigation. A European framework rule should be adopted to this end (Recom-
mendation III.8). The HLG places its proposal for an investigation procedure in the context 
of strengthening (minority) shareholders rights and their monitoring role as ‘principal’. The 
HLG seemingly did not take into account the already evolving EU securities disclosure sys-
tem under which issuers are required to provide investors on annual and interim basis with 
information and does not make a distinction between listed public and closed companies 
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and states. The EC in its Action Plan 2003 for the medium term proposed enhancing the 
responsibilities of board members by special investigation rights, wrongful trading rules, 
and director’s disqualification. However, the EC did not clarify its proposal. In chapter 4 it 
was demonstrated that the HLG’s proposal of 2002 to introduce an investigation procedure, 
which in the Netherlands has gained experience over 40 years, at EU level should not be 
continued. This investigation entails in essence a broad review of corporate policy and is at 
odds with the securities disclosure system and as well with corporate law for (listed) public 
corporations. The analysis of chapter 4 also led to the conclusion that the Dutch right of 
inquiry should be re-examined.
As demonstrated in chapter 2, investor protection in the US as well as in the EU is primarily 
based on securities law disclosure, public oversight and enforcement both in the primary 
market (IPO) by prospectus liability and in the secondary market by securities fraud. The 
second layer of investor protection is found in the US, UK and German derivative suits, 
albeit under the protection of the BJR and hence focussing on its limits, i.e. breach of fidu-
ciary duties. US (Delaware), German and also UK law, firmly establishes the principles of 
board supremacy and discretion. These are placed foremost where the board’s business 
decisions are under attack (through claiming of damages; rescinding business decision 
however not in practice). The BJR protects the board by procedural requirements but also 
material by assuming the supremacy and discretion of the board. The burden of proof for 
breach of fiduciary duties is with the claimant. In the Netherlands, board members may be 
held liable through an art. 2:9 NCC procedure, but not derivatively. No BJR-rule will protect 
the board (members), although the standard (‘ernstig verwijt’) used in that procedure will, 
in its final outcome, not differ too much from the US, Germany and the UK, but does not pro-
vide the upfront protection of the BJR. The assessment does not – as the BJR does – start 
from a ‘free zone’ by assuming its basic discretionary business judgement. Thus it lacks the 
(upfront) certainty of the BJR-approach.
This approach of an upfront ‘free discretionary zone’ is also lacking in the Dutch investiga-
tion procedure. This procedure is unique and does not exist in the US, the UK or in Germany 
or – to my knowledge – in any other jurisdiction. The procedure is regulated in NCC Book 2 
in Title 8: Dispute resolution by compulsory transfer of shares or compulsory acquisition of 
shares, and the right of investigation. The provisions on the right to request an investigation 
are laid down in arts. 2:344-359 NCC. The competent court is the Enterprise Chamber of 
the Amsterdam Court of Appeal (Enterprise Chamber). The procedure is divided into two 
steps. First, shareholders may petition for an investigation into the corporation’s affairs in 
a certain period if the court is satisfied that there are well-founded reasons to doubt good 
policy (proper administration) of the corporation. Secondly, shareholders may request for 
a judgement of the court if the report produced after the investigation shows that there has 
been ‘mismanagement of the legal person’ and – if the court so concludes – to order specific 
injunctions (including replacement of the board). This procedure allows – also for issuers – 
immediate and final injunctive relief (arts. 2:349a and 355 NCC) if, according to the court, 
the state of affairs so require. In recent years, as discussed in chapter 4, this procedure and 
the possibility for (immediate) injunctive relief has developed into a very accessible, quick 
and extremely effective weapon for activist shareholders, especially in formal or material 
takeover conflicts and to put pressure on boards to change strategy and policy (break up 
scenario, buy-backs, exit appraisal) and thus to challenge board supremacy and discre-
Book Vanderschee.indb   244 18-3-2011   15:39:48
Closing and synthesizing observations 245
tion as well as to ‘provoke’ a judicial review of its strategy, policies and actions. One could 
say that this procedure evolved towards a quasi-derivative suit, at least to the extent that 
a preliminary judgement may be acquired as to ‘misconduct’ of the board to be used in a 
subsequent action (art. 2:9 NCC), which evidently may also provide ‘leverage’ in settlement 
negotiations. The most remarkable element of the investigation procedure is its effectively 
unlimited possibility to review board action. It is not surprising that in practice classical 
suits for rescission ex post of corporate decisions became extremely rare. In the US, busi-
ness decisions as such are also protected by the BJR.
My next hypothesis is that board supremacy and discretion of the board of Dutch issuers 
eroded remarkably over the last decade (being re-established only very recently by the 
Supreme Court), due to the fact that this investigation procedure has not been the subject 
of a fundamental review in the total change of the regulatory landscape for issuers and 
remained a corporate law procedure not taking into account the fundamental change in 
securities law.855 This investigation procedure and its declared, but seemingly outdated pur-
poses will be tested and contrasted to the separate ‘layers’ of investor’s protection offered 
by the completely revised EU and Dutch securities regulation, again in comparison with the 




The implementation of the Prospectus, Transparency, Takeover and Market Abuse Direc-
tives argue for contemplation on private law devices as a whole in enforcing the ‘new’ secu-
rities regulation; the right of inquiry in its unique set-up as being only available for a Dutch 
listed public corporation in protecting the interest of investors has not been involved in that 
contemplation.856 The right of inquiry still comes in addition to other available actions. It 
offers the Enterprise Chamber room for its own forming of the law, but taking into account 
its general character it does not give any direction to the embedment in the total regime of 
corporate and securities law for listed public corporations in the Netherlands. In compari-
son, the other examined systems (as we will see) have a different ‘hands-off’ judgement.
The 40-year-old general purposes: 1) bringing matters in the open, 2) restructuring and 
restoration of sounds relations by means of measures that serve to reorganize the enter-
prise of the legal person concerned, 3) establishing responsibility for mismanagement that 
855 Of course the Supreme Court in ABNAMRO and AMSI reconfirmed the supremacy and discretion of the 
Netherlands Board (BoM/SB), nonetheless the procedural structure of the inquiry procedure almost 
automatically leads to substantial board review. 
856 The plea (November 2002) by the HLG (with Jaap Winter as its chair) for developing a European action 
has so far been without results; Corporate Governance Action Plan (21-05-2003); Klaus Hopt, ‘Modern 
Company and Capital Market Problems: Improving European Corporate Governance after Enron’, in 
Armour/McCahery (red.), After Enron, Improving Corporate Law and Modernising Securities Regulation 
in Europe and the US, p. 466. In my view Hopt’s position that the ‘investigation’-procedures in France, 
Germany and Denmark as discussed are similar to the Dutch right of inquiry is inaccurate. Where he 
discusses the protection of the German BJR, he overlooks the fact that the BJR in Netherlands is not 
provided for; in his argumentation related to information asymmetry he ignores the strengthened 
disclosure obligations under European securities regulation. 
Book Vanderschee.indb   245 18-3-2011   15:39:49
 Chapter 5246
may exist, and 4) prevention of the right of inquiry in my view no longer fit in the fundamen-
tally changed corporate and securities law regime for listed public corporations.
5.6.2	 ‘Bringing	matters	into	the	open’	and	investor	protection	through	
securities	–	and/or	corporate	law:	EU	and	US
If we take again the purpose of ‘bringing matters into the open’ as ground for an inquiry 
request, then the question concerning the meaning of that for listed public corporations 
(NV) should be answered by searching for the context of the (re)newed European Securities 
Law as implemented in the Netherlands AFS. As already extensively analysed in chapter 
2 the capital market (shares) and investors in these markets are primarily protected by 
severe and heavily extended securities law as placed under public supervision. This makes 
in my view ‘bringing matters into the open’ as a ground for the right of inquiry related to 
Dutch public listed public corporations obsolete.
Thus for retaining previous possible difficult information, which the issuer now has to make 
public on grounds of securities regulation, (minority) shareholders do not necessarily need 
the right of inquiry anymore. That this is not very illogical illustrates the German amend-
ments to the rescission suit, because, having broad information rights under the AktG, 
shareholders abused these actions to get a higher exit price such as in case of a freeze out; 
the Spruchverfahren-procedure was further evolved.
Furthermore, in all systems investors are provided with an action to claim their damages on 
the issuer itself that they (whether or not as class) suffer on the ground of misleading infor-
mation by breach of securities disclosure requirements, whether by (initial or subsequent) 
issue of securities (shares) by a misleading prospectus, or continuous and interim informa-
tion requirements (annual reports, quarterly and interim announcements): such as in the 
Netherlands art. 6:193a NCC, US SEA’34 Rule 10-b5 vervangen door Rule 10b-5 SEA’34, 
§ 37b WpHG and § 90 FSMA (see chapter 2 for further elaboration). A role for the right of 
inquiry in the above described context seemingly lacks any purpose.
5.6.3	 Establishing	responsibility	for	mismanagement	on	the	part	of	the	corporation	and	
(derivative)	actions	of	the	corporation	towards	its	board	members
At the next level of private law protection for investors is the action of the corporation 
(issuer) itself, as represented by its board, against its (previous) directors (BoM/SB) in col-
lecting compensation for damages (and thereby – indirectly – its investors).
The Dutch ground for this general contradictionary claim (part of Book 2 on legal persons) 
is ‘improper management/supervision’ (art. 2:9 NCC). It is not directed towards directors 
of entrepreneurial legal entities, and not least on public listed companies. A BJR, as known 
in the US and Germany, in which the business judgement of the board (BoM/SB) in a liabil-
ity suit will be honoured by the court as principle starting point (this will only change for a 
breach of duties of loyalty and – more gradually – of duties of care) is not (yet) provided for 
in Dutch law. In accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court in the Staleman –case, 
a claim under the in that case operated catalogues will only be granted in case of ‘serious 
reproach’. This does not involve a BJR since its crucial ‘hands-off’ starting point is lacking. 
Also these topics and their relation to the right of inquiry upon introduction of the new secu-
rities regulation are not recalibrated.
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Although establishing who is responsible for ‘mismanagement’ is still, also for listed public 
corporations, a recognised purpose of the right of inquiry, the procedure is not equipped for 
that. Nonetheless, a request for an inquiry is sometimes clearly directed towards (the prep-
aration of) a liability suit. The purpose of the right of inquiry handled here applies to the final 
judgement of’mismanagement of the corporation’ (art. 2:355 NCC) after the total procedure 
has ended. Even that judgement is not a judgement on ‘improper governance/management 
or supervision’ of individual board members or commissioners. A fortiori this applies to the 
judgement, as to whether there are well-founded reasons to doubt good policy. However, 
practice is different.
5.6.4	 The	investigation	procedure	as	quasi-liability	action?
The admittance to the inquiry procedure, however, does not provide for the same threshold 
as in the Delaware, UK and German derivative suit (demand or Vorferfahren). These pre-
procedures effectively serve to protect the corporation and its board from ‘frivolous actions 
(§ 327 DGCL and §§ 7.40 – 7.47 MBCA; § 7.01 ALI Principles; secs. 260-264 UK CA 2006; 
sec. 261 (1) UK CA 2006; §§ 147-149 AktG). In these derivative suits, the board’s supremacy 
and discretion are put foremost as protected by a BJR. These aforementioned principles 
underpin the position of and (core) assignment of the board of a (listed) public corporation; 
these are not fundamentally different in the US, UK, Germany or the Netherlands. In these 
systems, statutory law expressing the supremacy and discretion of the board underpins 
BJR’s protection: § 141a DGCL, § 76 (1) AktG, also UK Model Articles provide these princi-
ples. In the Netherlands, a statutory rule (see art. 2:129 NCC: management of the corpora-
tion) rooted normative principle and point of departure recognising the discretionary powers 
of the board is lacking. However jurisprudence explicitly confirms that rule (Supreme Court 
in Forum-Bank ABNAMRO and ASMI.)
However, the BJR, also in the examined systems, does not provide ‘carte blanche’. The judi-
ciary will abstain from ‘second guessing’ the board’s business judgement, but will review 
non-observance of fiduciary duties of care (primarily focussing on the process of decision-
making and seldom leading to liability) and duties of loyalty (focussing on decent ‘non-self-
ish’ behaviour as ‘trustee’ and – if proved by plaintiff – usually upheld in court). The BJR 
provides that, in the judgement of the complaint, the court will honour the business judge-
ment of the board, will refrain from judging with wisdom of hindsight and will not place its 
own judgement instead of the board. (will not sit on the ‘chair’ of the board). The BJR is also 
the point of departure in the first (demand) phase of a derivative suit. ‘Fishing expeditions’, 
aimed at ‘discovery’, and also intervening through immediate measures (injunctions; orders 
by the court) will be stopped.
In the inquiry procedure a similar ‘hands-off’ approach protecting principles of board 
supremacy and discretion is missing. The procedural safeguards provided by a contradic-
tionary procedure to the corporation and its board (BoM/SB), are lacking and with that the 
typical obligation to state facts, the burden to prove, hearing both sides, a written debate 
between parties with a usual exchange of statements (of claim and of defence). The safe-
guards of a pre-procedure (demand and Vorferfahren) are also missing. A court in the last 
names art. 2:9 NCC-procedure will not be strictly bound to a final judgement of an inquiry 
procedure, however it will have pre-judicial working. The Enterprise Chamber, in giving 
a decision on the initial request or in taking immediate measures (arts. 2:350 and 3:349a 
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NCC), has often already made (disqualifying) judgements on policy and operation. This does 
not provide a similar ‘hands-off’ approach as is the case in the derivate suit entailing that 




As demonstrated in chapter 4, the last purpose of an inquiry procedure is restructuring and 
restoration of sound relations in a listed public corporation (N.V.), which does not seem to 
fit for a listed public corporation. The corporation is allowed to structure its own organisa-
tion, limited by mandatory law, according to its own view. The corporation will go public 
(IPO) as such under its prevailing governance system: division of tasks and powers between 
the board (BoM/SB) and the GMS, adherence to corporate governance codes, oligarchic 
regulations, anti-takeover devices and the rights (control, right on dividends and liquida-
tion – and transfer worth) connected to the securities (shares) that are being offered. As 
demonstrated in chapter 3, investors as shareholders are also protected by collective and 
individual statutory rights (following the law and articles of incorporation).
Under this pattern for listed public corporation, in which, for example, the rescission of 
decisions also offers important ex ante protection, restructuring and restoration of sound 
relations offers the listed public corporation no good manageable focus point. The clearest 
attack that investors can make on the corporation (NV) is that statutory organisational rules 
or organisational rules as part of the articles of incorporation (US = bylaws, UK = articles) 
have been breached (NCGC) resulting in rescinding decisions (art. 2:15) or possible liability 
on grounds of art. 2:9 NCC. However, the Chamber of Business, often paying lip service 
to the supremacy of the board often on grounds of art. 2:8 NCC, has filled in or extended 
organisational rules and subsequently determined a breach of these rules. Chapter 4 pro-
vided some examples: a) the broad explanation of art. 2:107a NCC in the LaSalle-transaction 
(ABNAMRO and explained under chapter 3; b) the ‘duty’ for (continued) dialogue with inves-
tors (Stork, ASMI); c) the duty of the SB to negotiate (Stork, ASMI).
Thus the last purpose of the right of inquiry does not give clear focus and guidance. For 
listed public corporations in particular, their open character makes internal governance 
and the implications thereof easily distinguishable for all investors without studying the 




Although (still) confirming the original aims and ends of the investigation procedure as 
discussed in chapter 4, the Netherlands Supreme Court overruled a series of decrees of 
the Enterprise Chamber in investigation procedures initiated by (activist) investors against 
Dutch issuers. Its decisions in DSM, KPN/Qwest, ABNAMRO and the landmark decision in ASMI 
taken together has now established quite clear guidance on major issues such as the entry 
to the procedure and on intermediate ‘stop orders’, and, most importantly, reconfirmed the 
issuer’s board supremacy and discretion.
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In the absence of a stare decisis-rule however, this, is not binding the Enterprise Chamber. 
Thus, a re-assessment of the basic statutory rules, taking stock of both the introduction of 
the protection of investors by the new securities regulation, the DCGC and the rulings of the 
Supreme Court is necessary.
The ASMI – case most clearly has reconfirmed the supremacy and discretion of an issuer’s 
board by establishing that a corporation’s strategy falls within the discretion of the board 
also in judging whether it is desirable to have a consultation with external shareholders: 
thus no obligation for consultation, also not on the ground of extensively interpreted ‘gov-
ernance’-rule. In my opinion the Supreme Court in ASMI itself ‘restored relations’ in the 
internal affairs of issuers and restricted the admission to the investigation procedure, the 
effect of which is somewhat akin to that of the BJR. One could observe that thus a ‘level 
playing field’ with the other examined jurisdictions had been restored and the investiga-
tion procedure is better embedded in the total regime for issuers of securities and corpo-
rate regulation and enforcement mechanisms (transparency, disclosure, auditor’s control, 
internal monitoring, appointment/resignation, rescission of decisions). Nonetheless, I find 
that the reconfirmation of board supremacy, strengthening of the obligation to motivate and 
‘hearing’ the corporation itself, not only strongly increases the threshold, but also substan-
tive ‘second guessing’ by the Enterprise Chamber maybe does not exclude but in any case 
severely hinders it. The security of a statutory BJR is, however, lacking. ASMI also confirms 
the issuer’s freedom of organisation to include the power to protect itself ex ante against a 
takeover of control or factual control. From a securities law point of view the issuer shall 
evidently fully disclose such devices.857 Remarkably, the fact that ASMI had done so was 
virtually ignored by the Enterprise Chamber. Thus, the Supreme Court in ASMI effectively 
strongly conditioned the application of the investigation procedure against issuers.
The ASMI-decision of the Dutch Supreme Court takes away a lot of uncertainty, however 
it does not provide certainty in answering the many questions that will rise when apply-
ing to right of inquiry as still governed by its open purposes, especially in taking immedi-
ate measures and in using the right of inquiry as a quasi-liability procedure. Therefore, it 
does not seem illogical to exclude the right of inquiry for listed public corporations. The 
international familiar regime for private law devices for listed public corporations is mainly 
underpinned by securities fraud – and liability actions. If one should choose to eliminate the 
right of inquiry for listed public corporations, then it seems to be logical to introduce it as a 
derivative action and also in that respect to connect with the international regular regime 
for listed public corporations. German law provides a continental example of this.
5.7 Final observations
Going back to where I started I recall the observations by Hansmann & Kraakman on global 
convergence of public corporations towards a shareholder primacy model. This transat-
857 See also chapter 2 on the working of the capital market and the ECMH. The Enterprise Chamber over-
looked the defence of ASMI that such disclosure had taken place in the issuing and admission pros-
pectus when extended its listing on NASDAQ (NY) to the exchange of Amsterdam.
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lantic comparative analysis, excluding BRIC and other emerging markets, showed that his-
tory reveals another route. Closer analysis reveals some major conceptual elements: a) the 
long-standing and clear dichotomy in the US between securities and corporate law and b) 
the primary focus of securities regulation on investor protection and market transparency, 
c) the crucial meaning of the well-defined term ‘issuer’ as the basic addressee of securities 
law, d) the very modest role of corporate law to protect investors. From a US perspective 
these conceptualise the basic ideas of ‘firms’ and issuers. It explains the US limited regula-
tory response to ‘Enronitis’ in the framework of the issuer and market-addressed securities 
regulation.
Hansman and Kraakman in part reflected upon the HLG Report of 2002 that on the one hand 
underscored the emerging EU securities regulation as a separate body of EU law and, in 
doing so, seemed to contribute to a convergence towards a US-style (global) securities reg-
ulation and, hence, a standard model for issuers. On the other hand, in hindsight, the HLG 
seem to have overlooked the basic meaning of the dichotomy between corporate and secu-
rities law and consciously to have broadened their analysis to (harmonisation) of classical 
corporate law subjects, such as on investigation rights. The response of the EC, not surpris-
ingly, focused on preserving the acquis communautaire in corporate law. This research may 
have illustrated that in comparison with the US system the EU does not operate the same 
dichotomy between federal securities and state corporate law. Starting from that point, 
developments show on the one hand the emergence of a standalone US-style EU securi-
ties law, but on the other hand the existing overlap with corporate law (disclosure, GMS 
and shareholders, board supremacy and discretion, corporate governance codes, takeover 
bids, private and public enforcement).
The lack of a clear demarcation between securities and corporate law protection may be 
expected to continue to divert regulatory choices and responses to new developments. 
Similarly, it will continue to influence the position of (boards of) issuers and protection and 
enforcement powers of investors and shareholders in a way that will continue to reveal 
important differences within the EU and in comparison to the US. There seems no indi-
cation, so far, that the EU will choose to focus completely on securities law addressed at 
issuers and protection for investors and leave – in the US – corporate law to jurisdictional 
competition.
Moreover, major differences were revealed by comparing jurisdictions within the EU with 
for example, the Dutch investigation procedure as a shining example of extending investor 
enforcement power in issuers. The UK and Germany seem to go further in aligning with the 
dichotomy.
Nevertheless, converging securities law regime at EU level remains crucial to market inte-
gration and regulatory competition and arbitrage. Market regulation and investor protec-
tion being focussed on issuers rather than corporations may be helpful in the furthering of 
these objectives.
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Annex I:
Securities Regulation Basics1
1 Annex I is accompanying chapter 2 and entails a basic comparison of securities regulation. 
Annex II is accompanying chapter 3 and entails a comparison of Powers of General Meeting of Share-
holders; Group and Individual Rights of shareholders.
Book Vanderschee.indb   251 18-3-2011   15:39:49

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Book Vanderschee.indb   252 18-3-2011   15:39:49
 Securities Regulation Basics252 Securities Regulation Basics 253
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Book Vanderschee.indb   253 18-3-2011   15:39:49

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Book Vanderschee.indb   254 18-3-2011   15:39:49






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Book Vanderschee.indb   255 18-3-2011   15:39:49



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Book Vanderschee.indb   256 18-3-2011   15:39:49
Annexe II: 
Powers of General Meeting 
of Shareholders; 
Group and Individual Rights of 
shareholders
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